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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the composition and behaviour of the Palestinian leadership during the 
peace process, from the Madrid conference in 1991 to the breakdown of Oslo in 1997. 
Through an historical survey, an assessment of the structure and documents of the peace 
process, and an analysis of the strategies ofthe Palestinian leadership, it demonstrates that the 
invitation to the peace process arrived when the Palestinian leadership in exile outside was at 
its weakest, simultaneously seeking to further weaken it by restricting participation in the 
peace talks to Palestinians from the OPT except East Jerusalem. The outside leadership 
decided to fall back on the strong political support and loyalty of the leadership by appointing 
a delegation from inside in order to avoid the political danger of exclusion and 
marginalization. The Palestinian delegation from inside was selected from individuals with 
credibility and the credentials of struggle, which meant that they were loyal to the inside's 
main source of power, the Palestinian public in the OPT. Thus the relationship between the 
inside and outside leaderships was complementary: the inside needed the legitimacy and 
political access of the outside, and the outside needed the unity and representation of the 
inside. This mutual opportunism exposed, however, each leadership's differences in structure 
and priorities, which stemmed from their different realities. Because its priorities and approach 
prevailed, the outside manipulated the inside delegation to encourage secret but direct talks 
between the PLO and Israel in Oslo, in parallel with the talks in Washington. The Oslo talks' 
lack of structure and terms of reference, the absence of a third party, as well as the missing 
expertise ofthe negotiators from the OPT, who had personal knowledge of both the Israelis 
and the terrain, led to weak Palestinian performance and a weak agreement. This, combined 
with an unfavourable environment created by Israel's expansion of illegal settlements, the 
asymmetry of power, and the biased position ofthe US mediator, led to a flawed 
implementation of the agreement. Among the unfortunate outcomes was the creation of a 
Palestinian Authority that was structurally dependent on and compromised by Israel, which 
thereafter affected the Palestinian leadership's implementation of subsequent agreements. 
Thus, the thesis concludes that a vicious cycle was created where problematic structure, 
delegation composition, and the leadership and delegation's behaviour led to poor process, 
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which in turn brought about flawed agreements, which influenced the Palestinian 
performance, in tum. 
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IX 
INTRODUCTION & METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is an attempt to answer the following research question: "To what extent did the 
composition and behaviour of the Palestinian leadership have an impact on the process and 
outcomes of negotiations with Israel from Madrid to Oslo II? 
The peace process first attracted the attention of researchers because of its success, first 
when during the first direct peace conference and direct bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations in Madrid (1991 ), and later when the two sides reached agreement for the first 
time in history in Oslo (1993). 
However, after the collapse of the peace process at the Camp David negotiations in 2000, 
the main question for researchers became why the talks failed, and what went wrong. 
Needless to say, there are a number of reasons for the failure of the negotiations-some 
related to the Israeli partner, some to the Palestinian, and some to third parties, including 
the sponsors of the process, donors and regional powers. Certainly, the failure of the peace 
process has far-reaching implications for both the Middle Eastern and international studies, 
on the political reality in Palestine, Israel and the region. Studying the experience of the 
peace process and evaluating the various factors that contributed to its outcome is an 
important contribution to solving current problems, and ensuring better chances for future 
initiatives to bring peace to the conflict and the region. 
While all the factors that contributed to the outcome of the process should be studied (and 
many have been studied), Palestinian internal factors contributing to the failure, including 
the composition and behaviour of the leadership, have been the least examined and 
understood. Even when they were researched, the results included basic shortcomings and 
gaps. In addition- in what is perhaps a contributing factor to these shortcomings- most of 
the work was done by non-Palestinians who, at the very least, lacked original data and 
first-hand access to the main events and players. 
Therefore, by researching the structure and the behaviour of the Palestinian leadership and 
their impact on the outcome of the process, with sufficient access to original data, primary 
resources and main players, this thesis will fill some of the existing gaps in our knowledge, 
and contribute to a better understanding of the failure of the peace process. 
Methodology 
In order to complete that task, a number of methodologies have been employed. The first 
was undertaking a thorough and extensive historical assessment of the peace process. The 
peace process started with the United States' efforts to get talks going in 1990, Israeli 
conditions for participating in the talks with Palestinians, and the manner in which the 
Palestinian leadership dealt with that initiative. It culminated with the establishment of a 
parallel Oslo track of negotiations directly with the PLO leadership, and the reaching and 
implementation of an agreement that included the establishment ofthe Palestinian 
Authority. 
This historical assessment of the above described events helps put the main developments 
of the peace process and the behaviour of the main actors in context. It also allows better 
understanding of the motives of the different positions, parties and leaders. Finally, it 
relates agreements and disagreements between the parties to their relative political 
contexts, thereby providing a more comprehensive analysis. 
Since the structure and behaviour of the Palestinian leadership is essential in this research, 
the historical assessment undertaken here includes the emergence and the evolution of the 
modem Palestinian leadership, both inside the Palestinian Occupied Territories (West 
Bank including East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip- hereafter OPT) and in the Diaspora, 
neighbouring Arab counties in particular. 
In addition, the methodology includes extensive textual analyses of almost all the basic 
documents related to the process including: letters of invitation and assurances, exchanged 
negotiations proposals, all the signed agreements, and exchanged letters of recognition. 
More importantly, the research uses published and unpublished minutes of Palestinian-
Israeli negotiations, and of meetings between the Palestinian leadership with the 
delegation. (When the Palestinian and Israeli delegations to the Washington negotiations 
failed to agree on recording the negotiations sessions, I was assigned by my side to take the 
minutes. These have not been published and are still in the possession of the author.) Some 
of the references used might not appear in the appendices, partly because of the length of 
some ofthe complete agreements, and partly because some ofthe minutes remain 
unpublished. 
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Furthermore, the methodology of this thesis includes a wide range of qualitative research 
interviews, including the main leaders and participants in the process. The range of 
interviewees includes leaders and negotiators from inside and outside the OPT, from 
various political perspectives, different geographic locations, different stages of 
negotiations and varying ages, religions and sexes. These interviews shed light on both the 
Palestinian leadership and aspects ofthe negotiations. The interviews were done in two 
different stages; most of them were recorded and transcribed, the rest were recorded 
through note-taking. Notes and records are in the possession ofthe author. 
The first stage of interviews was completed in March 2000; the second was conducted 
between May and July 2007, both with the objective of obtaining the views of participants 
on the peace process and related matters discussed in this thesis. A representative list was 
chosen, and a list of questions prepared. 
Interviewees were selected in a manner that ensures a representative sample of participants 
in the Palestinian negotiating delegations to Washington, DC and Oslo. The selection 
process aimed at including all the relevant political strains between those individuals 
involved in the negotiations. The criterion included the following: whether participants 
were from inside the occupied Palestinian territories or outside and where they were from; 
whether they were PLO officials or not; their political affiliation (Fatah, other faction or 
independent), their professional background, and their sex and religion. 
In addition, some of those participants who wrote about their participation in the peace 
process were excluded, particularly when those views expressed in the books have been 
included elsewhere in this thesis. Examples of these are Hanan Ashrawi and Mahmoud 
Abbas (Abu Mazen). 
The total number of the delegation members was not fixed; it can be estimated, however, at 
about 30 members. Thirteen participants, more one-third of that total, were selected for 
these interviews. 
Following is the list ofthe participants interviewed, with a brief biography of each: 
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1. Ahmad Qurei: Born in Abu Dis (near Jerusalem) in 1936; Member of the Fatah 
Central Committee from 1989; was in charge of the PLO economic department 
starting in 1982; head of the Palestinian delegation to the multilateral negotiations; 
head of Palestinian delegation to Oslo negotiation; head ofthe Palestinian 
delegation to the Paris economic negotiations; minister of economics from 1996; 
elected member in, and elected speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council 
(PLC) in from 1996 to 2003, prime minister from 2003 to 2005. 
2. Hassan Abu Libdeh: Born in Jenin refugee camp in 1954; spent four years in 
Israeli prisons; graduated from Birzeit University in 1982 with a PhD in 
mathematics and statistics; head ofthe department of mathematics at Birzeit 
University before the peace process; Fatah member; member ofthe Palestinian 
delegation to the Madrid conference and the Washington bilateral negotiations; 
founder and head of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics until 2002; cabinet 
secretary from 2002 to 2004; minister of labour and social affairs from 2004 to 
2005. 
3. Saeb Erekat: Born in Jerusalem in 1955; raised and educated in Jericho; MA 
from the UK; PhD in political science from the US; editorial writer in al-Quds 
newspaper; associated professor at al-Najah University before joining the 
Palestinian delegation to the Madrid conference and becoming deputy head of the 
Washington bilateral negotiations delegation; Fatah member; minister of local 
councils from 1996 to 2003, elected legislative council member; head of the PLO 
negotiations department from 2004. 
4. Nabil Kassis: born in Ramallah in 1945; PhD in physics from Germany; was 
associated professor and assistant to the president at Birzeit University before the 
peace process; Christian and political independent; member of the Madrid 
conference delegation and deputy head ofthe Washington bilateral negotiating 
delegation; founder and president of MAS (Economic Policy Research Institute) 
from 1996 to 1999; head of Bethlehem 2000 (millennium) project; minister of 
tourism and planning from 2002 to 2004; president of Birzeit University from 2004 
to date. 
4 
5. Mamdouh al-Aker: Born in Nablus 1943; medical doctor (urologist) educated in 
Egypt and the UK, politically independent; was active in the first Intifada and 
became a public political figure; member of the delegation to the Madrid peace 
conference and Washington bilateral negotiations; after the peace process he 
returned to practice medicine; head of The Palestinian Independent Commission for 
Citizen's Rights from 2003 to date. 
6. Sami Kelani: Born in Jenin in 1952; worked as a lecturer at al-Najah University 
before joining the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid peace conference and 
Washington bilateral negotiations; was politically affiliated with the Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine and active during the first Intifada, spent three 
years in Israeli prisons; after the Washington negotiations he went back to teaching 
at the university. 
7. Camille Mansour: Born in Haifa in 1945; became a refugee with his family in 
1948, lived in Lebanon; educated in France with a PhD in international relations; 
before the negotiations was professor of international relations at Paris University; 
Christian; Fatah-affiliated; member of the Palestinian team to the peace process; 
member of the steering committee of the Palestinian delegation to Washington; he 
moved to work at Birzeit University and founded and was the first director of its 
Law institute; is now dean ofthe faculty of public administration and law. 
8. Suad al-Amiry: Born in Amman in 1951, female lecturer in the architecture and 
engineering faculty in Birzeit University; not affiliated but close to the Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine; became part of the Palestinian delegation to 
the Madrid conference and Washington bilateral negotiations; subsequently 
founded and became the director of a Palestinian heritage renovation non-
governmental institution (Riwaq). 
9. Hassan Asfour: Born in Gaza in 1953; was working in the PLO in Tunis; was 
member of the Palestinian Peoples' Party until Oslo; participated in the Oslo 
negotiations; was elected to the PLC in 1996, appointed as a cabinet minister in 
1998. 
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10. Marwan Barghouti: Born in Ramallah, in 1958; was head of the West Bank 
Fatah Higher Committee; was elected as president of the student council in Birzeit 
University in the '80s and then deported by the occupation to Jordan; was elected to 
the PLC and became very active in the second Intifada until he was arrested where 
he remains today. 
11. Khaled Sallam: Born in Iraq in 1952; Fatah member; became economic adviser 
to President Arafat and in that capacity was head of the Palestinian Services 
Company which dominated Palestinian monopolies in the '90s. 
12. Waleed Najjab: From Ramallah; born in 1946; businessman; director of 
Management Consultancy Company; politically independent. 
13. Ali Husseini: Palestinian Jerusalemite; was head of the Jerusalem Electricity 
Company; politically independent. 
The interviews were not intended to be tightly-structured, but a list of questions was 
prepared as a guide for conducting the interviews. Following is a list of the guiding 
questions that were used: 
What did the PLO 'mean' at the time ofthe Washington and Oslo negotiations; was 
it a symbol of nationhood? Or a framework for unity? Or actual leadership taking 
care of day-to-day leadership requirements? Or what? 
What was your understanding ofthe nature of the relationship between the PLO 
leadership outside, and the political leadership inside the occupied territories before 
and after the peace negotiations? 
How did this relationship affect, positively or negatively, the negotiation 
performance of the Palestinian delegations in Washington and Oslo? 
During the negotiations, did you notice any differences between the 'inside' and 
'outside' members of the delegation, particularly over political positions? 
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Did you observe that the inside and the outside had different priorities concerning 
specific political requirements, demands, and positions? 
What is your view of the leadership's acceptance of two simultaneous channels of 
negotiations, Oslo and Washington? 
Why do you think the Oslo track came to an agreement while Washington did not? 
And why did same leadership approve different negotiations positions in each 
channel? 
When, from your point of view, did the Palestinian leadership make unjustifiable 
compromises: in accepting the terms of reference for the Madrid conference, 
accepting the Oslo agreements, or in the subsequent implementation of the 
agreement? 
How do you explain that the Palestinian position in Washington insisted on an 
Israeli cessation of all Israeli settlement activities, while the Oslo agreement did not 
incorporate that? And why did Israel refuse to talk to the PLO in Washington, but 
did so in Oslo? 
What do you thing was the weight of the shortcomings in the performance of the 
Palestinian negotiations, compared to the weight of objective factors such as an 
imbalance of power, the biased American position, etc in determining the poor 
outcome of the negotiations. 
The discussion around these questions was intended to introduce the details needed to 
inform this thesis. However, interviewees were given the opportunity to guide the 
discussion in the directions they saw as useful and significant according to their special 
status. The questions and the manner in which the interviews were conducted were flexible 
in order to extract as much information as possible, while simultaneously guiding the 
discussion towards the needs of the thesis. 
As such, the interviews flowed with additional questions that arose in discussion. 
Additionally, some interviews introduced ideas that subsequently enriched the following 
7 
interviews. Needless to say, the interviews were not identical, not least because ofthe 
different personalities of the interviewees. 
The first stage of the interviews incorporated four interviews where written notes were 
taken. In the second stage of nine interviews, information was fully recorded, including the 
biographical data. Later, these audio records were transcribed into a text. The audio and the 
text records, in addition to the notes, remain available. 
I myself have been involved in political and public life in the OPT as a political activist 
and member of the National Front of 1974, the National Guidance Committee of 1979, the 
Political Committee of the first Intifada of 1987, a member of the negotiations delegation 
to Washington talks in 1991, and a member of the Palestinian cabinet from 2002 to 2006. 
This unique experience has given me the necessary contacts and inside information needed 
for conducting this research. 
In addition, native Arabic skills provided the author with access to references, minutes, 
documents, and persons that would otherwise be impenetrable. Indeed, while Israeli 
politicians have written and published intensively in English (among them Shimon Peres, 
Yossi Beilin, Uri Savir and others), Palestinians, who wrote detailed and useful books, 
published only in Arabic. Examples are books and texts by Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), 
Ahmad Qurei (Abu Ala), Mamdouh Nofal and others. 
Hebrew references were not necessary for the writing of this thesis. Most Israeli key 
players have recorded their experiences in English. Israeli newspapers and other means of 
mass communication exist in English and Arabic. In addition, the negotiations themselves 
and the negotiations proposals and documents were conducted in English. 
I am also the founder and director of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, a 
research and media organization specialized in conducting surveys and public opinion 
polls in the OPT. This role provided me with a wealth of data, and enabled me to use the 
highly credible and widely used survey methodology and results of that centre. These were 
useful in assessing public opinion reactions to different agreements and leadership 
positions throughout the period of the research. 
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Having said all that, and despite this exceptional access to information, I must add that I 
was aware of the limitations ofthe chosen methodology. Coming to politics from academia 
and with a research background put me in the position of being a 'participant observer'; I 
was constantly aware of the need to maintain objectivity to protect the integrity of this 
research. 
The persons I interviewed were colleagues or friends that I worked with. Sometimes we 
agreed; other times we disagreed. I was also aware of the need to maintain objectivity in 
order to prevent influence from my personal or political relationships. In a same manner, 
using notes and minutes that I myself took was also tricky; it required vigilance to ensure 
distance and a critical eye. 
Aware of all these risks, I took precautions to maintain objectivity. First, the use of 
multiple methodological tools and approaches enabled me to minimize the impact of these 
conditions on my research. My own extensive historical assessment of both the historical 
development of the Palestinian leadership outside and the history of the peace process were 
weighed against textual analysis in the form of the documents of the peace process, the 
minutes of both the Oslo and Washington negotiations, public opinion poll research and 
finally, qualitative research interviews. The implementation of a variety of methodological 
tools assures objectivity by allowing for checks and balances against what might be 
otherwise construed as the researcher's personal views. 
In addition, the extensive interviews with other negotiators were used with the intention of 
further checking conclusions and observations resulting from my own direct experiences. 
The design of the questions was intended to examine the views ofthe interviewees on 
particular aspects of the research hypothesis, particularly those that might have been 
influenced by the personal experience and observations of the author. 
Structure of Chapters 
The thesis is comprised of six chapters, in addition to a conclusion and this introduction. 
Chapter One is a literature survey that reviews much of what was written and published on 
both the Palestinian leadership and the negotiations. It will assess the literature on the 
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background and structure of Palestinian Leadership in both the OPT and the Diaspora, in 
addition to the relations between them. It will expose the literature's gaps and weaknesses 
in understanding the nature of that leadership, particularly the relations between its inside 
and outside components. In addition, it will show how the literature dealt with the 
leadership's negotiations performance during the peace process, which will mean, for our 
purposes, the Madrid Conference and subsequent Washington negotiations in 1991, and 
the Oslo negotiations process from 1992 to 1997. It will be structured on the basis of the 
literature's emphases: the role ofthe leadership, and the structure and outcome of the 
process. 
Chapter Two will examine the emergence and the evolution of the Palestinian leadership 
since 1949, and will take an historical approach. It will study the environment and 
circumstances in which the Palestinian leadership emerged in the Diaspora in the 1960s, 
and what effect being in exile, particularly in the Arab countries, had on the leadership's 
immediate objectives and priorities. This chapter will also show how the Palestinian 
leadership inside the OPT ultimately emerged and developed during the 1970s and '80s, 
and the effect of the hostile environment of the Israeli occupation on the nature and 
priorities of that leadership. Chapter Two will also focus on the relationship between the 
two components of the same leadership and, using the conclusions from Chapter One, will 
attempt to correct some of the flaws observed in the literature. It will ultimately prove that 
the two leaderships maintained a complementary relationship rather than the competitive 
relationship hypothesized in the literature. 
Chapter Three shows how the Palestinian leadership faced the challenge of the conditions 
imposed on Palestinian participation in the Madrid peace process by drawing on the 
complementary relationship between the inside and the outside leaderships. The 
confidence and loyalty that existed between these two parts resulted from their common 
political objectives and were helpful in avoiding the PLO's exclusion from the substance 
of the process. 
The chapter shows, however, that despite their common political positions and objectives, 
the different realities that shaped the two parts of the Palestinian leadership allowed for 
different priorities in negotiations. While the outside wanted above all to achieve 
recognition, a direct role in negotiations and financial support, the inside wanted to give 
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the priority in the negotiations to reducing the suffering of the Palestinian population under 
occupation, stopping expansion of settlements and gradually dismantling the occupation. 
The flexibility the Palestinian leadership showed in forming the delegation according to 
Israeli requirements ultimately was not reciprocated; Israel exploited the imbalance of 
powers by continuing to create facts on the ground that consolidated the occupation. 
Chapter Four will focus on the changes in the outside PLO leadership's negotiations 
performance, as represented by the Oslo negotiations. It will show how changes in the 
composition of the delegation and priorities led to the marginalization and later exclusion 
of the Palestinian inside leadership and its priorities. This chapter will demonstrate the 
detrimental effects of that change on the leadership's performance in negotiations and on 
Palestinian interests in general. The Oslo delegations focused on generalities, skipping 
over vital details, as it lacked the knowledge and expertise of the leadership from inside the 
OPT which had better knowledge of the territories and the Israelis. This ultimately affected 
the talks' outcome, resulting in a weak agreement. 
Chapter Five will show how the PLO leadership outside changed the style of negotiation 
and the composition of its delegation after reaching the Oslo agreement. It used the 
strength and popularity that resulted from achieving an agreement with Israel, together 
with its status and position as leader and legitimate representative, to further marginalize 
and almost exclude the inside leadership in the following negotiations. In addition, it will 
also show the negative effect of that process on subsequent agreements and their 
implementation. 
This chapter will also explain in detail the formation of the new Palestinian elite that 
followed and shaped the agreement. This was composed of leading Fatah personalities who 
controlled the security forces, the ministries and bureaucracy, and newly-established 
monopolistic companies. In addition, it chapter will show the patrimonial nature of the 
leadership after its return to the OPT, and the negative effect of all these changes on 
subsequent relations with Israel, including negotiations. 
Chapter Six will show how the return of the Palestinian leadership in accordance with the 
weak agreements ended the dichotomy ofthe inside/outside leaderships, and created a 
dependant, compromised and transformed leadership that started to lose its public support 
11 
to the benefit of the opposition. The failures ofthe leadership, found in expressed in 
dwindling public support, economic decline and an inability to prevent Israeli oppressive 
and illegal measures, made the PA hostage to Israel. This further deterioration in the 
balance of powers was reflected in the negotiations that followed, and resulted in even 
weaker and more flawed agreements. This chapter will show that the structure and 
behaviour of the leadership, both in governance and negotiations, had a clear effect on the 
negotiations and their outcome. 
The overall conclusion of this thesis is that the continuous changes made by the leadership 
in the composition of its negotiating teams, in particularly the marginalization of the 
internal leadership (and later its exclusion), displaced previously complementary relations 
and led to subsequently poor negotiating performance and ultimately flawed agreements. 
These, in turn, (and bearing in mind a continuously hostile negotiating environment) led to 
a still poorer performance in the on-going negotiations. A vicious cycle of weak 
performance and flawed agreements was established, which is- at least in part-
attributable to the composition and behaviour of the Palestinian leadership as it was 
represented in the negotiating teams. 
The composition and behaviour of the Palestinian leadership were not the only factors that 
had an impact on the process and outcome of the negotiation. As this thesis will show, 
there were other factors that impacted the outcome of the process, including the imbalance 
of power with Israel, Israeli pressure on Palestinians in the OPT, American bias in favour 
of Israel, and Arab financial pressure on the PLO. These factors will be indicated in the 
research when relevant, but will not be elaborated upon as they are beyond the scope of the 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER ONE: The Literature Survey 
Introduction 
This chapter will look at the current literature on the peace process, which has been the 
subject of extensive reporting and analysis. For our purposes, 'peace process' means the 
Madrid Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid (October 1991 ), the subsequent 
Washington bilateral negotiations (December 1991- July 1993), and the Oslo negotiations' 
process and agreements (December 1992- September 1993). The reason for examining the 
two tracks of peace negotiations together is that both Madrid and Oslo, though carried out 
through different delegations and in different locations, were ultimately supervised and led 
by the same Israeli and Palestinian leaderships that dealt with them as related processes. 
For practical and methodological reasons, the chapter will be divided into sections based 
on the areas emphasized by the various writers. The chapter will demonstrate that the 
existing literature examines three aspects of the peace processes: the actual processes of 
negotiation and their structures; the outcomes of the negotiations, and the relative 'blame' 
that could be attached to the Israeli or Palestinian sides- and therefore, implicitly, aspects 
of leadership- for failures of the peace process. The chapter will argue that, while all three 
aspects are relevant, there has been a general failure to properly understand the nature of 
the Palestinian leadership and therefore to appreciate fully the relationship between the 
three aspects ofthe process. The currently available literature will be presented here with 
its weaknesses and strengths in mind, as it explores these select aspects ofthe Middle East 
peace process. 
Generally, the literature leaves the impression that many researchers and writers 
approached the peace process by examining where the blame lay for difficulties in the 
process, and its ultimate failure. Another approach was to concentrate on the role of the 
major players in the process, with special focus on the Palestinian side and the dynamics of 
the relationship between the inside and outside leadership. The third approach was to 
analyze and evaluate the process based on its outcome. In other words, optimists judged 
the process positively due to the positive aspects of its outcomes, and pessimists 
Qustifiably) deemed the process a failure because of its negative results. In fact, these 
writers missed or misunderstood key issues pertaining to the process. One of these 
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inaccuracies appeared in analyses ofthe relationship between the Palestinian leadership 
inside and the leadership outside. Most writers presented one in opposition to the other, 
exaggerating their differences and thereby missing their complementary roles and common 
denominators. There was also a great deal of misunderstanding about the impact of the 
process' structure, and how the various leaderships manoeuvred within this structure. The 
isolation of the Oslo talks and the absence of third-party terms of reference and 
transparency played an important role and contributed to its outcome. This aspect was 
missing in nearly all of the literature. In conclusion, a review of the literature leaves the 
impression that few authors recognized the actual defects in the process and causes for its 
failure, such as the isolation of the negotiations and negotiators from actions taken on the 
ground. In particular, the crucial element of Israel's settlement expansion gets barely a 
mention. 
A Focus on the Process 
Many writers approach the peace process as one determined more by leadership issues than 
by structure (structure might include issues such as whether the negotiations were bilateral 
or multilateral, secret or open, involving a third party or not). 
David Makovsky was among the first to research and publish on the process of Palestinian-
Israeli peace talks. His book Making Peace with the PLO provides a typical example of 
how the process has been analyzed and assessed through the moves made by Palestinian 
and Israeli leaders. In his analyses, the move from Washington to Oslo was a decision 
made by the Israeli government, motivated by the behaviour of the Palestinian leadership. 
Makovsky wrote: 
A critical element in [then-Prime Minister Yitzhak] Rabin's decision to pursue the 
Oslo track seriously was the fact that [Palestinian negotiator Faisal] Husseini 
showed no inclination to making new proposals when the Washington talks 
resumed; half the time the talks were in session, Husseini was in Tunis at Arafat's 
behest. 1 
1 David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to Oslo (Washington, DC: 
Westview Press, 1996) p. 38. 
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In addition, he fell into the habit of blaming the behaviour ofthe other interlocutor, 
specifically how the other side handles the process or the implementation. When 
Makovsky was trying to examine why the public was not satisfied with the implementation 
of the Oslo agreements, he wrote: "For the Rabin Government, [the agreement] meant 
reducing violence and Arafat's failure to prevent terrorist attacks against Israelis resulted in 
friction with the PNA and widespread Israeli dissatisfaction with the peace deal that 
increased with every attack." 2 
In spite of the fact that Dennis Ross, James Baker's undersecretary of state, took part in 
designing the peace process, he also did not consider relevant the structural differences of 
the Oslo negotiation process as compared to those in Washington. His book summarized 
the reasons for the process' failure by blaming Palestinian President Arafat for not 
accepting the 'offer' of then-US President Bill Clinton. In his conclusions of the reasons 
why peace was not realized, Ross wrote: 
By this time, however, I had grave doubts that an agreement remained possible. 
After all, Arafat was equivocating in circumstances in which there was no more 
time, at least for Clinton; in which he had the backing for accepting the Clinton 
proposal from nearly every significant Arab leader ... ; and in which [then-Israeli 
Prime Minister] Ehud Barak's acceptance of Clinton's ideas would disappear in the 
near-certainty of his looming election defeat- a defeat that might only be averted 
by Palestinian acceptance of the president's ideas and the conclusion of a peace 
agreement. The stakes were clear and the choices stark, or so they should have been 
to Yassir Arafat. 3 
Dennis Ross says that he wrote this_ book not only to provide a source of information and a 
chronology, but to make sure that the participants' roles are known: "Ultimately, that is 
why I have to tell this story"4. Ross was careful to distribute blame to both sides, albeit 
disproportionately. 
The lack of public conditioning for peace, the reluctance to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of the other side's grievance and needs, the inability to confront 
comfortable myths, the difficulty of transforming behaviour and acknowledging 
mistakes, the inherent challenge of getting both sides ready to move at the same 
2 Ibid., p. 143. 
3 Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004) p. 5. 
4 Ibid., p. 14. 
15 
time, the unwillingness to make choices, and the absence of leadership, especially 
among Palestinians [emphasis added], are all factors that have made peace difficult 
to achieve.5 
Another original source of information and analysis is The Process, by Uri Savir, the chief 
Israeli negotiator in the secret Oslo negotiations. Savir gives a very thorough description of 
the contacts that led to the talks. In addition, he describes the internal Israeli orchestration 
of the two tracks, those managed in secret in Oslo alongside the more open Washington 
negotiations. His analysis combined the structural aspects of the process with issues 
regarding leadership. In one example, he refers to a difference in the Palestinian position 
between the two tracks: "Nevertheless, they [the Palestinians] sharpened their demand to 
include Jerusalem in the autonomous area. Once again, we sensed that Arafat was 
signalling to us that only in Oslo, only in direct talks with the PLO, only with Abu Ala and 
his colleagues, would it be possible move forward."6 In addition, he is perhaps the only 
observer to describe the internal dynamics in the relationships that developed between the 
relatively-isolated individual negotiators in Oslo. 
Hence, The Process is very valuable in explaining the internal goings-on of the talks, as 
well as the internal dynamics between the parties and negotiators, particularly on the Israeli 
side. However Savir also places blame: "Arafat failed to understand the effect of these 
scenes. He was obsessed with his own domestic predicaments, and we ourselves did not 
attempt to enact a dialogue with Palestinian public opinion for similar reasons of self-
centeredness." 7 
On one hand, Savir illustrates some of the constraints on each side, and on the other hand, 
he shows explicitly how Israel took advantage of some of the Palestinian limitations, as 
well as their weaknesses and the weakness of their leadership. For example, Savir 
describes how the Israeli side tempted the Palestinians with possible Israeli recognition of 
the PLO as a way out of a major crisis in the negotiations: "What do you think about 
5 Ibid., p. 14. 
6 Uri Savir, The Process (New York: Random House, 1998) p. 27. 
1 Ibid., p. 252. 
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holding parallel talks on mutual recognition between Israel and the PL0?"8 Savir asked 
Ahmad Qurei at a crisis point in the Oslo negotiations. 
Behind Savir stood a group of like-minded Israeli politicians who led the negotiations in 
Oslo, one of which was Yossi Beilin. He was obsessed with the idea of the secret 
negotiation process of Oslo. Admitting that the Oslo talks were introduced to supersede the 
Washington track, he wrote: "The road (Washington) was too exposed to the media, too 
official, too orderly, whereas the bypass route (Oslo) enabled us to skip the sloganizing and 
talk to the point."9 This admission raises a very important point about the structural aspects 
of the process ofthe Oslo talks. In Washington, surrounded by the press and with the 
public feedback from their constituencies, Palestinians were close to their sources of 
power: international legitimacy, third party intervention, and the important truths of what 
their public would accept. Isolated in Oslo, Israeli negotiators were able to better wield 
Israeli sources of power: facts on the ground, military strength and economic force. 
Beilin was very confidant at the time he wrote his book of the success ofthe Oslo process. 
He wrote: "We could have done more in the period of the Rabin-Peres government. But we 
did make it very hard, if not impossible, to turn the clock back." 10 Why then was he 
wrong? Beilin himself has a possible answer. "We were ... mistaken in that we didn't show 
the public what we envisaged at the end of the process, and we thereby exposed ourselves 
to unnecessary accusations and questions." 11 (Indeed, both leaderships left the process 
open-ended. They told the public whatever could make their leaders more popular). 
The Israeli politician most involved in the peace process and most enthusiastic about the 
Oslo secret channel was Shimon Peres, deputy prime minister at that time. He began his 
Memoirs by confirming his renowned positive attitude: "I was born an optimist and have 
remained one through my life." 12 The optimism in his book, and writings ofthis group of 
8 Ibid., p. 49. 
9 Yossi Beilin, Touching Peace (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1999) p. 268. 
10 Ibid., p. 268. 
11Ibid., p. 3. 
12 Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace (London: Orion Books Ltd, 1995) p. 415. 
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politicians, seems to stem in part from what was perceived at the time as the success of the 
Oslo channel. 
Peres acknowledges one important structural feature of the Oslo process: that the Israeli 
side was able to take advantage of Palestinian weakness and isolation due to the secret 
nature of the talks in Oslo. In his memoirs, he states: "I began by pointing out that the PLO 
had made significant concessions which the Palestinian delegation had constantly rejected 
in the I Washington talks." 13 (As this thesis will demonstrate, this proved to be a short-
sighted policy, because the Washington delegation was more reflective of what could work 
in the OPT and in wider Palestinian society). 
A conceptual problem laid the ground for these mistakes. The Israelis seem not to have had 
any sense ofthe illegality of their control ofthe Palestinian people and land. They believed 
that their 'giving up' of any part of Palestine should be considered a gift by Palestinians. It 
is ironic to read Peres musing, "How strange it is, I found myself thinking, that we Israelis 
are now the ones granting the Palestinians what the British had granted us more than 
seventy years ago, a 'homeland in Palestine', in the words of Balfour Declaration of 
November 1917."14 Peres' quote is indicative of a further structural aspect of the process: 
the fundamentally-differing perspectives from the two sides as to what was being 
negotiated. 
A further structural consideration in the literature refers to the presence of a third party. 
Some observers have attributed the initial success of the Oslo process to the Norwegian 
government and its strategy. Jane Corbin described a number of factors contributing to the 
breakthrough in the Oslo track. Among these are well-known factors such as the weakness 
and isolation of the PLO after the Gulf War, the fall ofthe Soviet Union, and Israel's need 
for political and economic stability. In addition to these conventional factors, Corbin 
appends the Norwegian diplomacy and approach, including secrecy, neutrality and 
intensity. "This was essential for creating the sense of mutual dependence and intimacy 
13 Ibid., p. 411. 
14 Ibid., p. 409. 
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that were the talks' special trademark."15(The constructive role ofNorway must be 
appreciated. However, it should not be exaggerated. It is possible to agree that these 
features ofNorwegian involvement were influential, but we cannot attribute it with the 
breakthrough. There were other substantial factors that made the Oslo channel more 
successful. These factors will be discussed later in this thesis). 
A less positive external influence is recognised in pessimistic assessments of the peace 
process. Edward W. Said, in The End ofThe Peace Process, attempted to explore the 
prospects of the Oslo process, predicting that "it can neither lead to a real peace nor likely 
provide for one in the future." 16 This is a common view of Said's expressed in this 
compilation of articles. He suggested that Y asser Arafat and his supporters would not be 
able to resist American (and Israeli) pressure and were therefore doomed to give 
concessions compromising the basic rights of the Palestinian people. He incorrectly 
predicted that the Palestinian leadership would accept "a 'permanent interim agreement'-
minus any resolution to the problem of refugees, the status of Jerusalem, exact borders, 
settlements, and water in the year 2000." 17 (What Said described was indeed the maximum 
that Israel was willing to offer at that time, but it is difficult nevertheless to justify his 
conclusion that the Palestinian leadership would have accepted that. Looking backwards, 
and taking into consideration the fact that the Palestinian leadership was by then once more 
living within and amongst the Palestinian society, and that Palestinian society was 
establishing a democratic political regime and had held an uncontested election, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to predict as Said did that the Palestinian leadership would 
accept this offer. In fact, subsequent developments showed that the leadership would reject 
such a deal. Moreover, this leadership paid a heavy personal and political price for this 
position.) It is interesting to note that Said, too, links questions regarding third-party 
political pressures with questions regarding the leadership (in this case, the Palestinian 
leadership). 
15 Jane Corbin, Gaza First: The Secret Norway Channel to Peace Between Israel and the PLO (London: 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 1994) p. 212. 
16Edward W. Said, The End of the Peace Process (New York: Random House, 2000) p. xii. 
17 Ibid., p. xii. 
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In the end, it can be said that most writers were initially excited by the Oslo negotiations 
because they led to an agreement. Their assessments of the process by which negotiations 
took place and agreement was reached focused on a combination of leadership issues and 
other structural aspects (such as secrecy versus openness, the relative power/weakness of 
the parties, and the role of external actors). Discussions ofthe Palestinian leadership raise 
the question as to the roles and relative status of the Madrid/Washington negotiating team 
and the Oslo 'team', which may be thought of already as an inside-outside dichotomy. 
A Focus on the Outcome 
Many writers evaluated the peace process on the basis of its outcome, rather than the 
leadership or the process of the talks. Savir writes that, from an Israeli point of view, the 
venture was a great success. "Not a week went by without the visit of a foreign prime 
minister or foreign minister to Jerusalem. The State of Israel had left the West Bank towns, 
but more important, it had emerged from the international wilderness to which it had been 
exiled for twenty years. In the Middle East, our delegations in Oman, Qatar, and Tunis 
commenced diplomatic activities." 18 
Edward W. Said, on the other hand, pointed out that- for the Palestinians- it was not. 
Critical of the Palestinian negotiators' performance, he argued that the PLO gave 
unnecessary concessions, thereby removing leverage from its negotiators' hands. He then 
went on to argue that, judging by its outcomes, the peace process was not successful for 
either Palestinians or Israelis. He measured this in three ways: the continued deaths and 
other kinds of suffering; persistence of illegal and harmful Israeli settlement policies; and 
finally, the emergence of an authoritarian Palestinian regime in the Palestinian 
"autonomous areas". "Far from bringing peace, [Oslo] brought greater suffering for 
Palestinians," he wrote, "and assured harm to the long-term interests of the Israelis and 
their people."19 
18 Savir, The Process, p. 253. 
19 Edward Said, Peace and its Discontents (London: Vintage, 1995) p. 147. 
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Jimmy Carter adopted a similar approach in his latest book, Palestine: Peace Not 
Apartheid. Criticising the negotiation performance of the PLO, which he judges by its 
results, Carter writes that: 
Arafat had failed to obtain other specific concessions concerning a timetable for 
Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. In effect, what he got from the 
Oslo Agreement was the assurance of organizing a form of Palestinian government 
and staying in power so that he could administer Palestinian affairs in the West 
Bank and Gaza. The Israelis wanted and achieved much more.Z0 
Carter argues clearly that the Palestinian side was disadvantaged in the negotiations. He 
writes that: "A key advantage that the Oslo Agreement gave to Israel was the shedding of 
formal responsibility for the living conditions and welfare of the territories' rapidly 
increasing population, still completely dominated by Israeli forces." 21 Carter also observes 
that even Rabin expressed the position that the Oslo Agreement was an improvement on 
the Camp David accords, from the Israeli point of view. He thus argues that Palestinians, 
who rejected the Camp David agreement, later accepted a worse deal.22 
Carter notes the impact of Jewish settlement expansion in the territories. "As President 
Clinton made efforts to promote peace, there was 90 per cent growth in the number of 
settlers in the occupied territories, with the greatest increase during the administration of 
Prime Minister Ehud Barak."23 In a more explicit reference to the Israeli policy of 
consolidating the occupation through these settlements, Carter quotes Ariel Sharon; then-
foreign minister, stating during the Oslo peace process that "Everybody has to move, run 
and grab as many hilltops as they can to enlarge the settlements because everything we 
take now will stay ours ... everything we don't grab will go to them."24 
Menachem Klein raises an interesting aspect ofthe outcome of the peace process. The 
agreement laid a trap for the Palestinian leadership, he writes. The PLO derived its 
popularity and power from its role in leading the Palestinian struggle for political, social 
20 Jimmy Carter, Palestine Peace not Apartheid (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006) p. 135. 
21 Ibid., p. 137. 
22Ibid., p. 136. 
231bid., p. 151. 
24Ibid., p. 147. 
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and economic rights. The agreements created high expectations among the Palestinian 
people, but gave little powers to the Palestinian Authority. The result was a dramatic 
decline in the public position of the leadership. Kline says in this regard: 
The dilemmas that the PLO has faced since the [Declarations of Principles] stem 
from the need to change its raison d'etre from representation to administration. In 
more than thirty years existence, the most impressive success of the PLO was tore-
establish the political centre of the Palestinian people after the 1948 catastrophe. 
Indeed the PLO failed to liberate Palestine by using the armed struggle but 
succeeded in building a legitimate and recognized authority in Palestine, hoping to 
transform that authority into statehood. 25 
Indeed this new role adopted by the PLO under the agreement required it to care for not 
only the political and symbolic needs of its people, but also their day-to-day social and 
economic needs. Kline describes:" ... Palestinians have become confused and frustrated 
with the wide gap between their expectations and the misery of the quality of their lives."26 
It is rare to find observers who state that the peace process failed due to Israel's continuing 
expansion of illegal Jewish settlements in the OPT. Jerome Slater concludes, however, 
that, "Contrary to the prevailing view, Israel rather than the Palestinians bears the greater 
share of the responsibility, not only for the latest breakdown of the peace process but for 
the entire course ofthe Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 1948." 27 Slater further observes: 
Astonishingly, under Rabin the growth of the Jewish settlements was greater than it 
had been under the previous hard-line government ofYitzhak Shamir. And even 
the most fanatical settlements, located in the heart of heavily Palestinian areas and 
presumably destined to be removed in a permanent agreement, were maintained. 
Rabin rejected the recommendation of his own cabinet to remove small settlement 
in the Palestinian city of Hebron, following the Massacre by Jewish fanatic of 
twenty-Seven Palestinians praying in a mosque. 28 
Slater also remarks on the Israeli policy of weakening the Palestinian leadership, thus 
making it more difficult for it to fulfil obligations. He says, "By the time Ehud Barak took 
25 Menachem Kline, "Quo Vadis? Palestinian Authority Building Dilemmas since 1993," Middle Eastern 
Studies 33, no. 2 (April 1997) p. 40 I. 
26 Ibid., p. 402. 
27 Jerome Slater, "What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process," Political 
Science Quarterly, volll6, no 2 (Summer 2001) p. 171. 
28 Ibid., p. 178. 
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office in 1999, not only were Israel actions nullifying the Oslo process, but they had also 
gravely undermined Arafat's position among Palestinians, who were now in worst shape-
politically, economically, and psychologically- than they had been when the agreements 
were signed in 1993."29 
Joel Benin and Rebecca L. Stein are another exception in blaming Israel: "The Oslo 
process consigned Palestinians to an inferior status for at least the five-year interim period 
and established no countervailing mechanism to prevent Israel from taking unilateral 
measures- such as the expiation of the West Bank settler population by 70 percent- to 
extend its domination indefinitely."30 
They come to this conclusion after reviewing the history ofthe process between 1991 and 
2000. Their study showed that Arabs and Palestinians, especially after the Gulf war, 
needed a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that would lead to stability. The Palestinian 
problem was seen as a factor of instability. The American administration felt obliged to its 
Arab allies "and pressed a reluctant Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to open 
negotiation with the Palestinians and the Arab states at a multilateral conference convened 
in Madrid in October 1991. "31 
Although only a few observers noticed the significant impact of Israeli settlement 
expansion on the peace process, those who had access to the real players were alarmed. 
Graham Usher wrote that the most dangerous crisis facing the peace agreement since its 
inception in September 1993 was the Israeli plan to build new settlements in the West 
Bank. In March 1997, at the climax ofthe implementation of the interim agreement, Israel 
decided to construct the Har Homa settlement in the occupied West Bank on Jebel Abu 
Ghneim. According to Usher, that move sparked Palestinian public protests over the 
following four months. He also observed that this development led to a decline in the 
public support ofthe Palestinian authority and leadership, including President Yasser 
Arafat, in opinion polls. 
29 Ibid., p. 179. 
30 Joel Beinin and Rebecca L. Stein, "Histories and Futures of Failed Peace" in Joel Benin and Rebecca L. 
Stein (eds) The Struggle for Sovereignty (Stanford: California, 2006) p. 35. 
31 Ibid. 
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Usher was able to come to these conclusions because he lived in Israel and Palestine for 
years as a writer and journalist. He quotes Palestinian leader Marwan Barghouti as saying: 
... [Israel is] committed to increasing settlements, especially in Jerusalem and 
regardless of Palestinian, Arab and word opinion .... Many Palestinians- including 
inside Fatah - are questioning whether we are right in making the strategic choice 
of peace with Israel ... Netanyahu's policy is to strengthen Hamas and the 
opposition on the Palestinian street... Only Netanyahu can stop this escalation, by 
reversing his policies on settlements and adhering to the agreements."32 
As in any political process, the financial aspect, including foreign aid, played a significant 
role. Scott Lasensky tried to study the limitations that American foreign aid placed on the 
Oslo process. He explained the primary objectives of American aid as that of building 
public constituencies that would support the negotiations. With the peace process' 
deterioration, the role of foreign aid became to stop this deterioration. He believes: 
It could be argued that the more than one billion dollars America has spent on 
Palestine since 1994 has been wasted. But, as this article argues, during the Oslo 
years aid was a necessary and important instrument of American diplomacy. Given 
the watershed of Oslo in Israel-Palestinian history, the positive knock- effect it had 
on wider Arab-Israeli relations, and the prospect of a full and final Arab-Israeli 
settlement, on the whole US aid was a sound and logical, if ultimately sour 
investment. 33 
In conclusion, judging the peace process through its outcomes is tricky. The positive 
outcomes for one party might be negative for the other. And, as will be argued later, the 
assessment of the outcome can change over time, being positive initially but then souring. 
What the literature on outcomes does show, however, is the persistence of questions 
regarding the blame that can be attached to leaderships, and the importance of 
environmental factors beyond the negotiations themselves but intricately connected to the 
aspirations ofthe parties engaged in the negotiations, in this case most explicitly the 
question of continued settlement expansion. Structural aspects such as the greater relative 
power of the Israeli side and the impact of external forces (US support) also played a role 
in determining outcomes. Thus, as with literature on the process, we see in the literature on 
32 Graham Usher, "Fatah, Hamas and the Crisis of Oslo: Interview with Marwan Barghouti and Ibrahim 
Ghosh", Dispatches from Palestine (London: Pluto Press, 1999) p. 138. 
33 Scott Lasensky, "Paying for Peace: The Oslo Process and the Limits of American Aid," The Middle East 
Journal, vol 58 no 2, (Spring 2004) p. 233. 
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outcomes, that the relationship between issues of leadership, structure and environment is 
complex, yet remains to be properly explored. 
The Palestinian Leadership and the Peace Process 
When it comes to the coverage ofthe Palestinian leadership in literature on the peace 
process, the leadership is characterised as having two principal dimensions: it is a target for 
blame and it is considered to have been divided. In the case of the first dimension, from a 
Palestinian viewpoint, the leadership performed badly, while from an Israeli perspective, 
the leadership was a poor partner for peace. From both viewpoints, an emphasis on 
performance suggests some responsibility for the outcome. In the case of arguments that 
there was a divided leadership, the emphasis is on an outside and an inside leadership, 
characterised by competition rather than complementarity. 
A good example can be seen in the work of Jamil M. Hilal, who suggested that the PLO 
was convinced to enter into peace negotiations with Is rae I as a resu It of weaknesses, 
including the impact of its position on the Gulf War, Israeli policies in the OPT, and other 
pressures upon the movement. 
The main import of the changes in Diaspora communities was the shrinking (in some 
cases, the obliteration- as witnessed in some Palestinian camps in Lebanon and the 
Palestinian community in Kuwait) of socio-political space on which the PLO relied for 
political mobilization. Support and influence in the occupied territories, all attempts by 
Israel to weaken the influence of the PLO and create alternatives to it. 34 
Hilal, like many writers overestimated the political differences between Palestinians, and 
failed to notice their common denominators, particularly the loss of their homeland and the 
desire to return to it. In addition, the PLO was mistakenly perceived as a bureaucratic 
entity, rather than a movement backed by public opinion. Thus political pressures could 
(mistakenly) be deemed to weaken it fundamentally rather than simply pose strategic 
dilemmas for the movement. (This thesis will argue conversely that the PLO, in fact, had 
34 Jamil Hila!, "The PLO: Crisis of Legitimacy," Race and Class, vol. 37 (October-December 1995) p. S. 
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replaced the lost homeland as a source of unity and a common reference point, giving the 
Palestinians' cause legitimacy and recognition. The emergence of a 'distinct' inside 
leadership was therefore not so much a competitive alternative as a complementary 
appendage). 
Hilal concludes that signing the Oslo agreements with Israel weakened the PLO further, 
especially among Palestinians in the Diaspora. The Oslo agreements deferred the refugee 
issue, and the PLO's legislative and bodies were marginalized in favour of new Palestinian 
National Authority institutions. 
To suggest that Hilal overstates the decline of the PLO leadership is not to deny the 
emergence in the 1970s of a leadership within the OPT that was operationally identifiable 
from the PLO leadership in Jordan, Lebanon and later Tunis. The emergence of the inside-
outside dichotomy will be examined in depth in the next chapter. However, it is important 
to note that much of the existing literature on that dichotomy misunderstands its origins, 
nature and relationship, particularly when it comes to the inside. 
Although a great deal of academic work covers Palestinian society in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip under occupation, emphasising its political elites and their behaviour, the bulk 
of this work has been carried out by non-Palestinians (a great deal of them Israelis). Often 
these writers grasped certain aspects ofthe Palestinian political reality, but failed to 
perceive others. In the early stages ofthe occupation, for example, most Israeli writers and 
researchers failed to discern the attitudes and political realities of Palestinians in the OPT. 
Symbolic indicators of this lack of understanding are glimpsed in the common reference at 
that time to 'Israeli-administered territories' or to the' Arab population in the West Bank 
and Gaza' or 'the inhabitants of the territories' rather than referring to 'Palestinians' with a 
common identity under Israeli military occupation. 
Part of this scholarly misunderstanding grew out of the broader Israeli illusion that the 
defeat of Arab governments in the war of 1967 would bring about changes in the attitudes 
and political positions of Palestinians in the occupied territories. A moderate but prominent 
Israeli writer expressed that: "Nevertheless, we can safely conclude that following the 
Arab defeat in the Six-Day war, a considerable number of the Arab population on West 
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Bank concluded that it is in the best interest of the Palestinians to recognize the reality of 
Israel and strive for peaceful relations with her."35 
This view was typical in Israeli literature at the time. "Later, after the Six-Day War we 
assumed that we could compel them to make peace within a number of weeks," wrote 
Israel Kollat.36 It also appears in the writings ofShlomo Avineri, Yehoshafat Harkabi, 
Chaim Hertzog, Elad Peled, ArieL. Eliav, and Mattityahu Peled. These writers did not 
observe a Palestinian sense of nationhood, desire for self-determination and the 
implications of international law. The writings also failed to link Palestinians in the OPT 
with those outside Palestine as part of the same people. This resulted in a skewed view of 
the PLO, which actually illustrated that unity as a body representing all Palestinians. 
Further, it might be argued that this Israeli perspective actually contributed to the sense of 
unity among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, as they sought to protect their 
cohesion with the outside as a means of pursuing freedom and self determination. 
Most Israeli observers ofPalestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip failed to understand 
the effect of occupation on the behaviour and positions of the Palestinian leadership in the 
Occupied Territories. This was reflected in a common theme that sought to 'make good' 
with 'moderate' Palestinians. At the same time, these observers did not discuss the impact 
oflsraeli control and occupation. Moshe Dayan, member of Knesset and defence minister 
during the early stages of the occupation, put it this way: 
We have to see the inhabitants ofGaza, Judaea and Samaria as citizens and not 
enemies. There are enemies among them, and all of them would like to get rid of 
us. But if we, on our part, do not want to see another government there, we have to 
be their government. And if we are the government, we have to supply the people 
with employment and services, give them civil rights, and not treat them as 
enemies.37 
35 Shimon Shamir, "The Myth of Arab Intransigence", in Shlomo A vineri ( ed) Israel and the Palestinians, 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971) p. 28. 
36 Israel Kolatt, "The Chance for Peace and the Right to a Homeland" in Shlomo A vineri ( ed) Israel and the 
Palestinians, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971) p. 74. 
37 Moshe Dayan, "The Challenges of Coexistence," in Shlomo Avineri (ed) Israel and the Palestinians (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1971) p. 72. 
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In this way, many Israeli researchers missed the developing Palestinian consensus within 
the OPT that rejected Israeli occupation and was creating a political leadership that would 
resist it and its expressions. 
An exception was perhaps Moshe Ma'oz, a professor of Middle East history at the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, who rightly argued that the formation of the political elite in the 
OPT was based on its function of rejecting and resisting the occupation. 
Until their ouster by the Israeli government in March 1982, this leadership strived 
to achieve the following objectives: to crystallize the Palestinian national 
community; to organize and carry out an intense struggle against the Israeli 
occupation; and to prepare the political infrastructure for a future Palestinian state 
on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.38 
But Ma'oz went on to incorrectly link the intensification of the Palestinian struggle against 
the Israeli occupation with the practices of Israel's Likud-led government, which according 
to him sought continuous and complete Israeli control over the occupied Palestinian 
territories. "Thus, the West Bank, which is considered by most Israelis as the underbelly of 
Israel," Ma'oz writes, "should be, according to the Likud, devoid of an Arab military 
presence of any kind and indefinitely controlled by the IDF [the Israeli military]."39 (In 
other words, Ma'oz is implicitly criticizing the Likud, suggesting that other policies 
[Labour policies] would ease Palestinian resistance to the occupation and thus stymie the 
new leadership in the OPT.) 
In fact, Palestinians in the OPT have been virtually unable to distinguish between the 
political positions and behaviour oflsrael's centrist left, as represented in the Labour Party, 
and its centrist right, as represented by the Likud. For example, both parties have been 
consistent in their support for expanding illegal Jewish settlements in the OPT, which have 
been viewed by the Palestinian people as Israel's main tool for consolidating Israeli control 
over the land. For that reason, Palestinian rejection of and resistance to the occupation did 
not fluctuate according to changes of governments from Likud to Labour or visa-versa. 
38 Moshe Ma'oz, Palestinian Leadership in the West Bank (London: Frank Cass, 1984) p. xii. 
39 lbid., p. 203 
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A new Palestinian elite had begun to emerge in the 1970s (this will be fully discussed in 
the next chapter). The early assessments that it would prove to be more moderate than the 
PLO leadership in exile, and that it might serve as an alternative leadership to be cultivated 
by Israel, were disproved by its close association with the PLO, by the positions taken by 
the National Front in 1974, the municipal elections in 1976, the National Guidance 
Committee in 1978, and then, finally, by its role in directing and sustaining the Intifada in 
1987. 
The Intifada changed that situation and created a new emphasis for Israeli researchers. The 
popular Palestinian rejection of Israeli occupation, boldly expressed in the new uprising, 
challenged Israeli academics to produce explanations (and, by implication, suggest 
solutions). One of the most prominent approaches taken in this quest was to explore the 
periodically difficult relationship between the inside and outside leaderships of the PLO. 
A typical example ofthis focus can be found in the work of Matti Steinberg, as illustrated 
in the following quote, which places the onus for the uprising on Palestinians outside. "The 
PLO originated outside of Palestine," writes Steinberg. "The liberation of Palestine was 
envisioned by the leaders to be a dynamic process which would devolve 'from the outside 
inward,' with the Palestinian armed struggle serving as the main catalyst." 40 
Steinberg argues that the PLO, which gained legitimacy through recognition by Arab states 
as Palestinians' sole legitimate representative, influenced Palestinians inside. He writes, 
"The direction of influence was thus from the outer environment inward."41 Steinberg later 
goes on to argue that it was the PLO outside that opposed implementing the Palestinian 
part of the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt. Steinberg then repeats an 
argument that appears frequently in the literature, that the inside, which gained some 
strength as a result of the Intifada, influenced the outside towards moderation on this issue. 
40 Matti Steinberg, "'You Can't Clap with Only One Hand': The Dialectic between the PLO 'Inside' and 
'Outside'" in Barry Rubin, Joseph Ginat and Moshe Ma'oz (eds) From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations 
1973-1993 (Brighton: Sussex Publishing, 1994) p. 112. 
41 Ibid., p. 113 
29 
Another typical example is found in the work of Barry Rubin, who wrote: "For the PLO, 
the Intifada (uprising) came out of the blue and forced the organization for the first time to 
consider seriously, albeit hesitantly and inconsistently, recognizing Israel, rejecting 
terrorism, and accepting a two-state solution.'"'2 He insisted that the PLO leadership 
outside was generally extremist, while the inside was genuinely moderate, and that 'new' 
moderate tendencies in the leadership outside resulted from pressure from the inside- now 
more influential as a result of the Intifada. Another reason Rubin gives for the periodically 
moderate positions of the PLO is that these were tactical, resulting from weakness and 
desperation, rather than genuine transformations. 
Other writers closer to the Palestinian political experience observed that, in fact, the 
outside was undergoing a healthy and vigorous debate between moderates and non-
moderates, in parallel with a similar debate underway in the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories. Instances of 'moderation' of Palestinians in exile may have stemmed from the 
outside leadership's specific circumstances. 
Indeed, if one of these two expressions of Palestinian political leadership was more 
moderate than the other, it was the leadership outside. The best example for this is the 
leadership's position vis-a-vis the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt. The 
Palestinian leadership outside was fraught with debate and hesitation over to how to 
approach the Egypt-Israel talks, while the political inside took the initiative and organized 
widespread public conferences and demonstrations against the visit of Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat to Israel and the subsequent Camp David Accords. This, in turn, made it very 
difficult for the PLO's top leadership to take a contradictory stance. 
One could argue that the fundamental problem that persists in much of the literature is the 
pitting of the Palestinian inside against the outside. For example, Steinberg writes that "the 
uprising blunted the dimension of coercion and veto power in the leadership in the outside 
on the inside." 43 As subsequent chapters of this thesis will show, this is not how 
Palestinian leaders perceived their mutual relationship; they saw their roles as 
42 Barry Rubin, "The PLO and the Palestinians: A Revolution Institutionalized" in Robert Sadoff (ed) The 
Politics of Change in the Middle East (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993) p. 146. 
43 Steinberg, "You Can't Clap ... ", p. 119. 
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complimentary rather than competitive, despite natural differences. Indeed, when one 
carefully examines the real political positions of the political inside and inside, it is 
difficult to perceive fundamental political differences. But before looking at the political 
common ground, it is useful to fully explore how researchers have analyzed the inside-
outside relationship. 
The first Palestinian uprising was interpreted in ways that further illustrate problems in the 
literature covering inside-outside PLO relations. Some writers exaggerated the 
independence of the inside leadership during the Intifada and considered it more 
empowered than the outside. A typical example lies in the analysis of Zeev Schiff and 
Ehud Yaari, who argued that the Intifada was invented and led by the inside and that the 
outside attacked this internal leadership politically, in parallel with Israeli arrests and 
deportations. Schiff and Yaari viewed the growing role of the Palestinian leadership inside, 
which resulted from the Intifada, as a sign of a changing balance of power between the 
'rival' inside and outside leaderships, in favour of the inside.44 
Other observers took the other extreme; a representative example is Hillel Frisch who 
argued that the Palestinian leadership outside was in complete control ofthe Intifada. The 
Palestinian leadership, according to him, neutralized the role of the top leadership in the 
occupied territories because ofits potential independence from the PLO. This, he says, 
coincided with Israeli attempts to weaken this top leadership inside through deportations 
and other means. Frisch also argued that the PLO encouraged what he refers to as the 
"middle command"- insiders that were more 'controllable'. These "were not 'new men' 
but veteran members of PLO factions involved in Palestinian institution-building and 
political mobilization long before the outbreak ofthe lntifada."45 
44 See Zeev Schiff and Ehud Y'ari, Intifada (New York: Shoken, 1990). 
45 Hillel Frisch, "The Palestinian Movement in the Territories: The Middle Command," Middle Eastern 
Studies, vol. 29 no 2 (April 1993) p. 254. 
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This middle command had little chance of acting independently of the PLO, with neither 
the status nor the financial resources to do so. His study led him to conclude "that the PLO 
succeeded in creating a middle command long before the Intifada."46 
Another example of this view is found in the writing of Glenn E. Robinson, who went so 
far as to state that the authoritarian nature of the post-Oslo Palestinian Authority derived 
from the earlier policies ofthe PLO. The Palestinian outside had given the inside 
leadership the freedom to manoeuvre, and the flexibility necessary for it to carry out the 
Intifada, he argued. That, in turn, empowered this inside leadership. Therefore, "the PLO's 
first act upon returning to the Occupied Territories was to suppress the local institutions 
that were the sources of power for the internalleadership."47 
Likewise, Muhammad Muslih, in his study of Palestinian civil society in the OPT, 
exaggerated the competition that existed between the inside and outside leaderships vis-a-
vis Palestinian civil society institutions and argued that "the PLO began to refocus its 
attentions on the occupied territories especially after its defeat in Lebanon in 1982. The 
PLO's growing influence thereafter resulted in sharp rivalries that culminated in major 
contests to control the labour movement."48 He also wrote that "the PLO's methods of 
cooptation are a typical case of patronage politics ... "49 
One would conclude from these and other writings that the relationship between the inside 
and outside Palestinian leadership was mechanical and one-way, and that each was 
separate and competing to control the other. If one party happened to agree with the other, 
an observer could conclude that the consensus was formed through domination and co-
option. 
These impressions could have been created through the manner that the PLO sought to 
produce political gains and achievements out of the Intifada in favour ofthe Palestinian 
cause as a whole, rather than on behalf of the outside leadership and at the expense of those 
46 Ibid., p. 257 
47Glenn E. Robinson, "The Growing Authoritarianism of the Arafat Regime," Survival, vol. 39 no 2 (Summer 
1997) p. 42-56. 
48 Muhammad Muslih, "Palestinian Civil Society," Middle East Journal, vol. 47 no 2 (Spring 1993) p. 262. 
49lbid., p. 272. 
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leaders inside. Mohamed Heikal described how the Palestinian leadership postured for 
greater political gains. He wrote, "In the early stages of the Intifada, Arafat said that orders 
for the uprising had come from himself. .. " Heikal then quoted Egypt's President Mubarak 
as telling the Palestinian leader, "Abu Ammar, I doubt that you gave the orders, but even if 
you did you should not say so openly. Let the people take the credit."50 
One ofthe general problems of the literature on the inside-outside Palestinian leadership 
dichotomy is that it fails to appreciate the effect of a very major factor in shaping the 
position and behaviour of the Palestinian leadership: the Israeli occupation and its 
behaviour. On the one hand, the Israeli occupation created the same challenges for the 
Palestinian leadership, whether inside and outside, and on the other hand, it created 
complementary roles for both. The Palestinian leadership inside never felt that there were 
serious political differences between its politics and the politics ofthe Palestinian 
leadership inside. The writer who expressed this best was Emile Sahliyeh, writing that 
"many continue to identify and extend support to the PLO's mainstream, Fatah. Indeed, 
many West Bank politicians believe that Fatah's political stance is realistic and reasonable 
and reflects their own political attitudes."51 Sahliyeh rightly expected that the inside was in 
need of maintaining a complimentary relationship with the leadership outside, especially 
because of its "psychological, physical and political vulnerability in the face of a 
formidable adversary- the occupation- and because of the mounting Jewish threats to the 
culture and physical presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip."52 He concludes: 
it is unlikely that the West Bank urban elite, moderate and hard-line alike, will 
develop an indigenous leadership that can address the narrow interests of the 
Palestinian community in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Over the years, the West 
Bank political elite has been sensitive to charges that they were attempting to 
pursue a separate solution to the problem of the occupied territories, independent of 
the majority of Palestinians. Indeed, this sensitivity has been behind their frequent 
assertions that the Palestinian question is indivisible and that Palestinians inside 
and outside the occupied territories are united. 53 
50 Mohammad Hasaneen Heikal, Secret Channels (London: HarperCollins, 1996) p. 386. 
51 Emil Sahliyeh, "The West Bank Pragmatic Elite: The Uncertain Future,'' Journal of Palestine Studies 15, 
no. 4 (Summer 86) p. 44. 
52 Ibid., p. 45 
53 Ibid,. p. 44 
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In addition, being under the direct control ofthe occupation, the inside leadership has 
always understood that it cannot negotiate politically with its occupier. Sahliyeh wrote: 
"Moreover, they are concerned that they cannot negotiate effectively and freely as long as 
they live under the conditions of military occupation."54 
Sahliyeh noted some changes, however, in inside-outside relations during and after the 
Intifada. He explained in later writings that the Intifada empowered the inside leadership, 
but left it disadvantaged through its likely exclusion from any future political process. But 
even in these new conditions, he argued: 
[T]he vast majority of these Palestinians envisage the PLO as a symbol of 
Palestinian national unity. Many West Bank youths strongly identify with the 
ideology of Palestinian nationalism, are firmly committed to finding a solution to 
the problem of the Palestinians in and outside the occupied territories, and consider 
the PLO their legitimate representative. 55 
There were, however, subtle differences between the leaderships inside and outside in their 
prioritization and attention to various issues. These differences grew out of immediate 
concerns driven by daily life realities. The need to confront Israeli settlement expansion, 
for example, which was an immediate threat to Palestinians inside, was only an abstract 
political problem to those Palestinians living outside. The refugee issue, on the other hand, 
is a converse example, with the outside being more concerned with its immediate 
implications than Palestinians in the occupied territories. Fundamentally, however, both 
groups maintained similar political positions on these two issues, despite differences in 
immediacy or application. 
It can be argued that observers' weaknesses in understanding the leadership's behaviour 
and positions resulted in part from a failure to understand exactly who the leadership was. 
In the Palestinian public's perception (and especially in the '80s with the intensification of 
both Israeli occupational oppression and Palestinian resistance) the role of individuals and 
groups in the struggle against occupation increasingly became its most important driving 
54 Ibid., p. 45 
55 Emile Sahliyeh, In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics Since 1967 (Washington, D. C.: The 
Brookings Institute, 1988) p. 184. 
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factor. Those who had a prominent role in the resistance had a higher chance of playing a 
role in leadership. Similarly, the clearer leaders were in rejecting the occupation, the more 
credible they were considered to be. As the Intifada approached, the struggle against the 
occupation was widely organized by 'the political forces', a general term used at that time 
to refer to political factions in and out of the PLO. 
As such, those Palestinians who were interacting or collaborating with Israelis, including 
researchers and journalists that promoted moderate tendencies, were not rising leaders. 
Those political scientists better able to understand this phenomenon are likely those living 
the complicated Palestinian political reality. Writings describing the Intifada from within 
were collected in a volume edited by Nassar and Heacock, Intifada: Palestinians at a 
Crossroads. Ali Jarbawi wrote there that the leadership inside had credence due to: 
... prestige born from its long history of struggle against the occupation. Most of the 
element of this leadership have long been in confrontation with the occupation, 
which has used various means against them, including town arrest, imprisonment, 
and deportation. This increased respect for them on the part of broad sector of 
Palestinian society in the occupied territories and abroad."56 
To consolidate that leadership role, and to heighten the opportunity to achieve the national 
objectives of the Palestinian people, leaders in the OPT genuinely needed good relations 
with the PLO leadership outside. Both sides understood the importance of unity and clear 
political positions. Indeed, this unity and clarity was responsible for Israel's failure to 
promote an alternative leadership with alternative political views. This in tum convinced 
first the international community, represented by the United Nations, and then Israel, to 
recognize this leadership and what it stood for: Palestinian identity and self-determination. 
Many observers missed what the PLO meant to Palestinians inside, and thought of it as a 
bureaucracy or organization existing outside. In fact, Palestinians in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip saw the PLO as an expression of unity, legitimacy, representation, and 
nationhood. Moreover, they saw themselves as partner to it, rather than its opponent or 
competitor. Understanding this helped Jarbawi to come to the correct conclusions as to 
55 Ali Jarbawi, "The Palestinian Elite in the Occupied Territories", in Jamal R. Nassar, Roger Heacock, (eds) 
Intifada (New York: Praeger, 1990) p. 289. 
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how the Intifada had impacted the Palestinian leadership, writing that "(I) The national 
forces, and particularly their organizational leadership, maintained predominance over all 
other Palestinian elites; (2) the relationship between the PLO on the inside and the PLO 
outside is stronger than ever; (3) the attempts to foster an alternative leadership is therefore 
doomed to failure."57 
To sum up, most writers exaggerated the political differences that existed between the 
inside and outside leadership. They also failed to appreciate their complimentary and 
mutually beneficial roles. It will be argued later that the political commonalities between 
the inside and outside Palestinian leadership were greater than the differences. Moreover, 
the umbrella of the PLO embodied the legitimacy required by both. In addition, the 
consensus that grew between the inside and outside resulted from a dynamic, healthy and 
two-way relationship- not one of domination. As we will see later, the support of the 
inside for the broader offices of the PLO empowered the organization, protecting it from 
those who would pressure it, especially during negotiations. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the literature on the peace process from Madrid to Oslo adopts 
a number of approaches, focusing variously on the processes of negotiation, the outcomes 
and the apportioning of blame when outcomes are deemed to be negative. Throughout 
these approaches, the impact of leadership appears to be crucial. Leaderships are at least in 
part responsible for their performance within processes of negotiations and thus- to some 
extent at least- for outcomes. When it comes to the Palestinian leadership, the literature 
available demonstrates a great lack of understanding over its real nature and 
characteristics, notably in terms of the leadership from within the OPT but also in terms of 
that leadership's relationship to the leadership outside Palestine. Most researchers assumed 
that the two groups had contradictory political positions, rather than a unified stance, and 
competitive roles rather than complimentary activities. Many writers also wrongly 
confused public figures with a great deal of media visibility or those who had a social, 
economic or charitable role with the real leadership, which grew out of the networks that 
57 Ibid. 
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managed the lives of the Palestinian people under occupation in ways that sought to end 
that occupation. 
This thesis will demonstrate that, while there are sometimes significant political 
differences between different factions and tendencies within the Palestinian leadership 
inside and outside, there was no significant political difference between the inside and the 
outside as distinct groups during the peace process from Madrid till the Interim Agreement 
in 1996. 
Observers also seem to have misunderstood the meaning of the PLO for Palestinians in 
general, including those Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. They approached the 
PLO as an organization defined by its being located physically outside. In fact, both 
Palestinians inside and outside had the same feeling of belonging to the PLO, which 
embodied their nationhood and was an expression of their united determination to achieve 
statehood. It was an essential way of encompassing the identity and unity of the Palestinian 
people. 
In dealing with the peace process and its outcome, much of the literature concentrates on 
the behaviour of both leaderships and their negotiators, placing blame. Although there 
were differences over who bears the greater blame, this manner of analyzing events has 
shortcomings. A handful of observers referred to structural issues surrounding the 
negotiations, particularly when the talks changed from open negotiations in Washington, 
DC (talks that were multi-lateral with third party support and based on specific agreed-
upon terms of reference, including the relevant Security Council resolutions), to closed or 
secret negotiations in Oslo (where negotiations were bilateral, lacking third-party 
involvement, using no terms of reference, and isolated from the publics that would 
ultimately be asked to accept their outcome). 
The other aspect missing from the literature, albeit to a lesser degree, is the environment in 
which the negotiations were taking place, particularly the imbalance of power between the 
two sides and the bias ofthird party players such as the United States. The main illustration 
of that problem and its effect can be seen in Israel's insistence on continuing those kinds of 
activities that jeopardized the outcome of the talks. Foremost here was illegal Jewish 
settlement expansion, especially in and around occupied Jerusalem. In addition, no third-
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party succeeded in playing a deterrent role (indeed, it can be argued that third party 
involvement in the form of US political pressures and international aid played an entirely 
opposite role). Thus, two incompatible processes proceeded in parallel: the peace process 
and the settlement expansion process. Researchers and writers underestimated the 
destructive effects ofthe second on the first. 
The task of this thesis, therefore, is to provide a more nuanced and corrective 
understanding of the Palestinian leadership during this time, particularly ofthe relationship 
that existed between its inside and outside components, and to demonstrate how the issues 
relating to leadership interacted with the structural and environmental defects ofthe peace 
process. In doing so it becomes possible to ascertain to what extent the composition and 
behaviour of the Palestinian leadership had an impact on the processes and outcomes of 
negotiations. 
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CHAPTER TWO: The Emergence and Nature of the· 
Palestinian Leadership 
Introduction 
This chapter will explicate the development of the Palestinian leadership from 1948 
onwards, taking into consideration the weaknesses in the literature described in the 
previous chapter. It will take an historical approach, relating how the leadership evolved, 
considering its background and environment. It will demonstrate the influences that exile 
and close class affiliations with Arab officials had on the developing leadership, which 
emerged initially in the Diaspora, two factors which ultimately led to a distancing of that 
leadership from its revolutionary ideals, and a tendency to make compromises with the 
Arab regimes at the expense of Palestinian political independence. The chapter will relate 
how, as time progressed and as a consequence of the nature of Israeli occupation, a related 
Palestinian leadership developed inside the OPT. The chapter will relate how the 
leadership inside and outside served different functions and drew their legitimacy from 
different sources: the outside from its armed activity and negotiations, and the inside from 
activism against occupation. It will also relate how the leadership inside and the leadership 
outside each drew strength from each other and were integrated together. 
The ultimate outcome was to create a leadership 'across' the outside (those in exile) and 
inside (those who remained in OPT), rather than two separate leaderships. Crucially, the 
relatively late emergence of the leadership inside the OPT, despite some differences in 
style and priorities, and contrary to the assumptions of the writers discussed in Chapter 
One, complemented and consolidated the positions of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) outside. Indeed, this inside leadership perceived itself as being a 
genuine component of the PLO leadership rather than separate from it. 
The Formation of the Palestinian Leadership Post-1948: Building 
the Outside 
In the period preceding 1948, Palestinian society was characterized by a Palestinian 
political elite and leadership whose characteristics and roles were shaped by traditional 
39 
social and economic factors, as well as the political realities ofthe British mandate. In the 
pre-1948 period, Palestinian society was underdeveloped and traditional. The vast majority 
were living in rural areas and a minority of the population was in urban centres. There was 
a large gap in social-economic development between the two sectors. 
Traditional notable families in urban areas were owners of most of the land in the rural 
areas. The political elite was mostly rooted in these notable families and the last two 
decades before 1948 witnessed the emergence of political parties representing their 
interests. The first and the most popular was the Arab Party, established in 1935 and 
headed by Jamal ai-Husseini and led by the land-owning family notables and their allies, 
the rural muktars. The base for this party was its rural membership. The second party was 
the Defence Party, "established in 1934, and founded and headed by Ragheb al-
Nashashibi. Its leadership was derived from prominent urban families that worked in 
commerce, and its popular base was in urban areas. It was relatively moderate in its 
political positions compared to the other party."58 These two parties dominated Palestinian 
internal politics for two decades and reflected the two main political tendencies within 
Palestinian society. The first tendency built hopes on developing ties with Arab nationalist 
movements and parties, and thus adopted hard-line politics towards the British Mandatory 
Government and the Jewish yishuv. The other encouraged compromise with the British 
Mandate. That was well-illustrated by lllan Pappe: 
The Husseinis hoped that pan-Arabism would help them to resist any compromise 
with the Zionist leadership, while the Nashashibis relied on Abdullah in 
Transjordan to assist them in countering Jewish power and to influence British 
politics in Palestinians' favour. They did not hesitate, when they deemed it 
necessary to follow the pragmatic stance of Abdullah, who from the early 1920s 
was prepared to divide Palestine between himself and the Zionist entity and the 
British mandate.59 
These elites led Palestinian opposition to and resistance against British occupation and 
Jewish attempts to control the land and establish a state. The development of that 
leadership was interrupted, however, by Israel's establishment on part of the land of 
58 Emile Touma, Al-A 'mal if Kamila vol. 4 (Haifa, 1995) p. 247. 
59 Jlan Pappe, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land. Two Peoples (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) p. 86. 
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historic Palestine, which forced 800,000 Palestinians to seek refuge in neighbouring 
countries, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel's establishment deprived most of 
these notable families oftheir land, which was their source of power, and fragmented 
Palestine into three parts. The population, including the elite, was divided between Israel, 
the West Bank under Jordanian control, and Gaza under Egyptian control. This 
fragmentation prevented the continuity of a coherent leadership and divided the elite 
politically. Some followed the nationalists in the Arab world Jed by Jamal Abdel Nasser 
and established thefadayeen movement. Others built ties with those having moderate 
tendencies, i.e., the Jordanian regime, and encouraged the merging of the West Bank 
within the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan. As Rex Brynen writes: 
[Palestine's] elite structure was severely disturbed by the establishment of Israel: 
urban notables found their power weakened both by loss of lands and by their 
political failure, and much ofthe entrepreneurial elite was exiled. In Gaza, 
administrative control rested in the hands of Egyptian military authorities, leaving 
only a narrow support role for local elite. In the West Bank, Jordan rule focused on 
co-opting individual notables while, at the same time, fragmenting the notable class 
as a whole by emphasizing (and manipulating) local interests and rivalries.60 
The structural collapse of Palestinian society following the 1948 war, and the migration of 
the majority of the population to neighbouring Arab countries meant that Palestinians had 
lost a political leadership that could organize them to regain their rights. Moreover, the 
policies of some Arab countries, particularly some of those countries hosting Palestinian 
' . 
refugees, created expectations that a return to Palestine would be achieved through Arab 
state military and political efforts. This situation remained virtually unchanged from 1948 
through the mid-1960s. Thus during this early period, there was little organized Palestinian 
leadership. 
Some individual leaders (most in Gaza) renewed their activities, with some coordination 
with Arab nationalist leaders, such as the Egyptian leadership. Others, particularly in the 
West Bank, were incorporated into the leadership of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
60 Rex Brynen, "The Dynamics of Palestinian Elite Formation," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol 24 no 3 
(Spring, 1995) p. 33. 
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Still others opposed the Jordanian attempt to control the West Bank but were crushed by 
Jordanian security. 
After ten years of waiting, however, patience among Palestinians began to diminish, and 
their confidence in Arab regimes began weakening. This thinking may have been 
exacerbated by some Arab governments' positive responses to international schemes for 
expatriating the Palestinian refugees.61 In addition, there were systematic Arab attempts to 
undermine the Palestinian identity, the best example of which was Jordan's annexation of 
the West Bank and the extension of Jordanian citizenship and passports to its residents.62 
Moreover, certain Arab legislation and policies were aimed at suppressing Palestinian 
identity, banning activities or factions with Palestinian features, to the extent that some 
Arab governments viewed "the mere term of'Palestinian' as a crime".63 
In Lebanon, "the isolation of refugee camps was part of a policy adopted by the Lebanese 
authorities to control the Palestinians. Those authorities resorted to a public policy of 
tracking down all those who participated in Palestinian meetings in order to prevent 
Palestinian activists from visiting the camps".64 Then, in 1961, the collapse of the 
Egyptian-Syrian unity scheme shattered all hopes of a unified Arab approach. 
The late 1950s consequently witnessed two parallel attempts to respond to growing trends 
among the Palestinian people towards national self-reliance. One of them was led by 
Ahmad Shuqeiri, with the official blessing of Arab countries, and the second was headed 
by Yasser Arafat, with the blessings ofthe Palestinian and Arab publics. 
On 9 March, 1959, the Arab League made a decision that included "reorganizing the 
Palestinian people to highlight their entity as a unified people and not mere refugees, with 
a voice to be heard on international and national levels through representatives they choose 
61 See Rosemary Sayigh, ai-Falahoon a/-Filistiniyoon min a/-lqti/a' ita Athora (Beirut, Arab Research 
Institute, 1980). 
62 Issam Sakhnini, 'Dam Filistin al- Wusta ilia Sharq ii-Ordun 1948-1950 Shu 'un Filistiniyya, no 40, 
(January, 1974) p. 59. 
63 Sayigh, al-Falahoon, p. 187. 
64 Ibid., p. 186. 
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.... and the establishment of Palestinian army in Arab host countries"65. Ahmad Shuqeiri 
was commissioned by the Arab League Council to follow up this initiative, which was 
realized on 28 May, 1964 in the landmark meeting that declared the birth of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization. In that meeting, Palestinian tendencies towards self-reliance 
grew, also in reaction to official attempts to contain these growing sentiments. "The Arab 
summit entrusted Ahmed Shuqueiri as the Palestinian representative to the Arab League, 
with the implementation of this resolution. Pursuant to this mandate, Shuqueiri drew up the 
text creating this political organization, which was called the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization," describes Omar Massalha.66 Shuqeiri was a Palestinian lawyer born in 
Akko, Palestine in 1908, who had been politically-active as the head of the High National 
Committee of Akko in 1936 and head of the 'Arab Offices' in New York and Jerusalem. 
He was made a refugee in 1948 and subsequently employed in the Syrian and Saudi 
diplomatic corps (representing the latter at the UN) before being employed by the Arab 
League, which led to his position with the PL0.67 
When the PLO held the first session of the Palestinian National Council or PNC in May 
1964, most of its members, who were selected by Shuqeiri, were upper-class and bourgeois 
Palestinians who had successful businesses in the Arab states, in addition to representatives 
ofthe middle classes and professional trades. The membership also included a few 
representatives of the Palestinian political and military groups, including Fatah. The fifth 
session of the PLO's PNC, which became as a parliament-in-exile, in February 1969 
witnessed a take-over of the council by Fatah, which over time had achieved greater 
representation culminating in a majority.68 
The Fatah movement (Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filistim) comprised the second 
initiative of self-reliance, first expressing itself in 1959 through an underground leaflet 
called Our Palestine. The leaflet included articles written by fictitious individuals, real-life 
authors who later became Fatah leaders. From that point on, the group began a series of 
organizational and military activities, openly declaring itself for the first time in a 
65 Arab League Council resolutions, (Arab league publications, Cairo, 1959) 
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statement issued on 28 December, 1965, signed by Al-Asefa [The Storm]. The statement 
read, in part: "We will not put down our arms as long as Palestine is not liberated and until 
Palestine occupies the status it deserves in the heart of the Arab nation".69 
There was an explicit and blatant contradiction between the two initiatives. Salah Khalaf 
(Abu lyad), one of the founding members ofFatah, said: "Fatah founders have sworn to 
confront any attempt by any Arab government that aims to subdue the Palestinian national 
movement, and to make sure that no 'brotherly' country takes it back under its custody".70 
However, there have always been those who do not see any major difference between the 
two initiatives. This was reflected by Barry Rubin: "Both Shuqayri's PLO and Arafat's 
Fatah shared this belief that the Arab states would destroy Israel and set the stage for the 
refugees' return and the establishment of Palestine. But Shuqayri thought Arab 
governments would do this by themselves; Arafat argued that Palestinian guerrilla action 
was needed to push them into war."71 
The PLO and Fatah shared another trait: like the PLO, Fatah elites had close class 
identities with corresponding groups in Arab regimes. Fatah's leadership was composed 
mostly of middle-class professionals who were Palestinian refugees educated in Arab 
universities, especially in Egypt, and working in Arab countries, particularly Kuwait and 
other Gulf countries. Some of these leaders were members of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
such as Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), Muhammed Yusif al-Najjar, Salim Zanoun, and Fathi 
Balawi. Abdel Ra'ufai-Qidwa al-Husseini (better known as Yasser Arafat or Abu Ammar) 
was also linked to the movement. 
Most of the movement's leaders were connected to Arab governments through work, 
education, training and location. Here we may quote Salah Khalaf(Abu lyad), one ofthese 
leaders. 
It is not by coincidence that Fatah has grown and been nurtured in Kuwait. For 
many of us had excellent positions there: Yasser Arafat was an engineer who 
69 Salah Khalaf, Filistini billa Hawiyya (Muassassat Siyam Ia ad-Di'a wa an-Nasher) p. 83. 
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enjoyed a great deal of respect and admiration in the Ministry of Public Works; 
Farouq al-Qadoumi (Abu al-Lutut) was the director of one department in the Public 
Health Ministry; Khaled al-Hasan and 'Abdul Muhsen Qattan were highly-placed 
state administrators. As for Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) and myself, we were high 
school teachers. Nimer Saleh (Abu Saleh) was a technician with widespread 
popularity among workers".72 
All of them became members of Fatah's Central Committee. 
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) went to Qatar, where he found work as a director of 
personnel in the civil service, a post that allowed him to hire many Palestinians as teachers 
and bureaucrats. There he also met with former Muslim brotherhood members from Gaza 
such as Yusifal- Najjar, Kamal Udwan. 73 
This 'class' feature of Fatah was to have an impact on later political strategies. Despite the 
fact that the Fatah leadership offered itself in service to the Arab and Palestinian people, 
and even though its way of thinking was contradictory to official Arab positions and 
thinking on revolutionary action, time showed that this leadership, by its nature, could not 
move far from the ruling parties in most Arab countries. Therefore, if the structure, 
mentality and approach of the Arab regimes led to the defeat of 1967, then the enjoyment 
ofthis same structure and mentality by the Palestinian leadership would necessarily also 
led to the defeat of the revolution and its inability to succeed where the Arab governments 
failed. In reality, the Palestinian leadership was merely a convenient extension of the Arab 
regimes. It was obvious to those more aware in the struggle that the movement as a whole 
seemed, on all levels (social, military, ideologically), to be heavily burdened by its 
inheritance of those past and present Arab lifestyles that had led to the inevitable collapse 
in 1967.74 
However, ifthe Palestinian leadership was merely an extension of the structure of the Arab 
governments, what explains their differences in policies, slogans and practices? Sadeq Jalal 
al-Athem answers this question with the opinion that the contradiction was merely lip 
71 Khalaf, Fi/istini, p. 74. 
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service, and that the slogans of both did not reflect reality. He compares these slogans and 
positions, which exaggerated the revolution and its strength, to the statements and slogans 
by Arab governments prior to the 1967 war-which did not hold up to reality. Al-A them 
demonstrates the superficiality ofthe contrasts in Fatah's slogan "Return is the way to 
unity" and the official Arab slogan "Unity is the way to return". According to al-Athem, 
both slogans start from the same thinking, one that artificially separates two missions: 
social struggle for Arab unity, and the national struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Both 
slogans are equally distant from logical revolutionary thinking, which is based on a close 
bond between unity and return; each concept reinforces the other. Setting one as the 
condition for the other, therefore, imposes a level of superficiality and lack of 
revolutionary thought. Hence, there is actually no contradiction between the two slogans. 
In any case, Fatah and all other Palestinian organizations joined the PLO during the 
organization's National Council session, which was held I 0-17 July, 1968. By the fifth 
session, held on l-41h February 1969, Fatah representatives constituted a majority and a 
new leadership for the PLO was elected, headed by Yasser Arafat. In this way, the overlap 
between the two initiatives was removed, leaving one leadership and framework for the 
Palestinian people. The framework was the PLO while the leadership was the Fatah 
leadership. 
Once Fatah controlled the PLO, its leadership enjoyed both the official Arab recognition 
which came with the Arab states' endorsement of the PLO, (which had after all been 
established by Arab regimes), along with the grassroots recognition that Fatah enjoyed, 
giving it great momentum. 
In summary and regarding the emergence of an outside leadership in this period, two main 
factors are important: the loss ofthe homeland and the refugee life that Palestinians found 
themselves living and, secondly, attempts by Arab regimes to take advantage of the fact 
that Palestinian people and leaderships were living under their control and were dependent 
upon them for logistical, financial and political support. 
The emergence of the Palestinian leadership came as a result of, and in response to, the 
beginnings of the fading of a distinct Palestinian character and the dissolution of the 
Palestinian character and identity. Exile strengthened the feeling of belonging to the 
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homeland, and the need to consolidate the Palestinian identity. It also strengthened the 
aspiration for independence and to resist domination. Many Palestinians believed this 
fading resulted from the policies of Arab governments, who tried to shade the Palestinian 
cause with Arab features, rather than allow it a unique Palestinian character. This was 
reflected in the Arab strategy for the liberation of Palestine, which promoted preparing 
Arab armies to the level required to achieve victory over Israel, and emphasized Arab 
relations that would generate the power required to liberate Palestine through methods of 
classical war. 
Thus, the Palestinian leadership strongly emphasized the Palestinian national identity 
(while maintaining its Arab sense of belonging), as well as its own independence from 
Arab regimes. This emphasis grew out of two major incidents: the 1961 collapse of the 
Egyptian-Syrian unity scheme; and the 1963 Algerian revolution fought successfully by 
the Algerian people, independently but with Arab support. "The demand to highlight the 
Palestinian character was the main aspect of Palestinian revolutionary insurgence and the 
early landmark of Palestinian political thought. Fatah took on this responsibility; the 
demand to stress the independent Palestinian identity was dramatized then through the call 
for establishing a Palestinian entity that portrayed the Palestinian character".75 
The inclination to highlight the independent Palestinian nature of the conflict was made at 
the expense of its 'Arabization', especially in the changes to the PLO National Charter 
introduced by Fatah when it constituted a majority. For example, the first item in the 
Charter stipulating that "Palestine is an Arab homeland united with all other Arab countries 
by ties of Arab nationalism, to make the Great Arab Homeland" was changed by Fatah to 
read "Palestine is the homeland ofthe Palestinian people who are a part ofthe Arab world 
and nationality." 
Waning Palestinian patience with the Arab strategy of unity and classical war was reflected 
in its concentration on popular liberation and guerrilla war, and by highlighting the slogan 
15 Ibrahim A brash, "Athawra al-Filistiniya be ina lstiqlaliyat al-Qarrar wa Masalat at-Tadaakhl al-Qawmi", 
Shu 'un Filistiniyya 158-159 (May-June 1986) p. 13 
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"Return is the path to unity." Hani ai-Hasan, one ofFatah's prominent advocates, made 
this clear: 
Fatah 's firm position contradicts the wider Arab belief through the set of slogans suggested 
at the beginning of Fatah 's establishment. The slogan of an armed popular revolution as 
the way to liberate Palestine is a contradiction to and rejection of the idea of a classical 
war ... and the slogan of 'liberating Palestine is the road to Arab unity' is a rejection of the 
time sequence postponing the battle for repossession until the achievement of Arab unity, 
and is an independent slogan in opposition to the attempts by Arab regimes to impose 
custody and adoption on Palestinians. 76 
Thus, the main focus was on highlighting Palestinian independence, illustrating the 
Palestinian identity and saving it from dissolution. This basic compound in the character of 
the Palestinian leadership directly resulted from its exile. This is visible in the way they 
understood Palestinians as a group, yet belonging to an Arab nationality. Article 12 ofthe 
Palestinian National Charter stipulates: "The Palestinian Arab people believe in Arab 
unity, and in order to play their role in achieving it, Palestinians should preserve their 
national identity and its components in this stage of national struggle, to enhance the 
realization of its existence, and to resist any schemes aimed at liquidating or weakening 
it". 77 
As intimated earlier, the second set of circumstances that played a role in shaping the 
character of the Palestinian leadership was its, and its constituency's, exile in the Arab 
world. These circumstances forced the Palestinian leadership to take into consideration a 
host of issues that would gain the facilitation of their Arab host countries-first, to make 
residency and work possible, but also, to a lesser degree, for financing and status. 
The launching of military activities against Israel from neighbouring regions was the 
original core ofFatah's initiative. Undoubtedly, that required the establishment of military 
bases for organizing, recruiting and training Palestinian volunteers. However, initial 
76 Hani al-Hassan, "Fatah beyn an-Nathariya wa Tatbiq", Shu 'un Filistiniyya 7 (March 1972) p. 58. 
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attempts to do this faced obstacles from Arab regimes, which arrested anyone suspected of 
being a member in any Palestinian military group preparing to attack Israel. 
The arrest of Palestinian guerrilla groups by Syria, Jordan and Lebanon in 1965-67 
convinced Fatah leaders from the outset of the need to improve relations with Arab 
regimes whose practices almost suffocated the Palestinian armed struggle at birth. The 
leadership was thereby persuaded to pursue accommodating relations with Arab 
governments as the price for continuing its mission. 
It was apparent that we couldn't carry on with our mission, unless we returned the 
ties with the Arab states to normal. So we adopted several measures that aimed at 
pleasing the Syrian government, and we mandated Yasser Arafat and Farouk 
Qaddoumi to conduct contacts with the Egyptian authorities whom we learned, 
from experience, to have a convincing impact on a number of other countries in the 
region. 78 
Arab pressures on the Palestinian resistance movement have always had an impact on the 
Palestinian leadership based in Arab lands, although the leadership has sought to balance 
its beliefs on one hand, with the pressures of certain Arab countries on the other. The major 
example of this is the way that Fatah and the PLO's second man, Salah Khalaf, or Abu 
Iyad, proposed developing the Palestinian strategic goal from the establishment of a 
democratic state in all of Palestine, to a state in part of Palestine. After this was rejected by 
his colleague, Farouk Qadoumi, during a Fatah meeting, Abu Iyad was moved to describe 
how the PLO's defeat by the Jordanian government in 1970 led to his conviction that 
Palestinians should accept a partial solution: 
It is Jordan's tragic incidents (1970-1971) that opened the eyes of fighters to the 
facts. It was evident after the massacres of Amman, Jarash and Ajloun, especially 
after the expulsion of the last fighters from the Hashemite Kingdom, that the 
Palestinian revolution could not depend on any ofthe Arab states to guarantee a 
secure shelter and a base for its operations against Israel. In order to move towards 
the democratic pluralistic society we envision, we should establish our special state 
even on an inch of Palestine.79 
78 Salah Khalaf, Filistini Bila Hawiyyah (Moa'ssasat Siyam leddia'ya wannashr) p. 87. 
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Arab regimes resorted to a variety of means of pressuring the Fatah /PLO leadership. There 
were more active forms of influence, including major financial support from a number of 
Arab countries, namely oil-exporting states, because they feared the Palestinian revolution, 
respected it, or wanted to control it. The excessive funds provided to the Palestinian 
leadership had an impact on its structure and behaviour. The actions ofthe leadership 
became reliant on spending, as its struggle and organizational strategies became adapted to 
the financial support of some Arab governments. As a result, the structure of the resistance 
and its tactics became dependent on continuous financial support. This had a major impact 
on the extent ofthe movement's revolutionary nature and the degree of adherence to its 
original positions, as well as its relationship with the general population. 
A situation was created where an: 
[O]verflow of material human and financial capabilities (and what follows of 
financing weapons), ma[d]e the Palestinian leadership plan high-cost military 
operations. Although the preference for a high-consuming military operation 
reflected the abundance of the resistance movement's resources on one hand, it also 
was an attempt to buy quick results via material capacity rather than through tactics 
appropriate to the Palestinian's actual capability.80 
These conditions unconsciously weakened the Palestinian leadership, not simply affecting 
its behaviour, but the education and mentality of its followers. When the PLO began to 
adopt a style of"solving problems with money"81 , it helped create a situation whereby 
individuals were incapable of acting unless provided with equal resources. The choice to 
use financial resources in abundance and indiscriminately also restricted tactical creativity, 
independent thinking and the spirit of initiative, and reinforced a mercenary attitude.82 
These policies of Arab governments towards the PLO leadership, and the PLO leadership's 
awareness of the need to accommodate Arab regimes to at least some degree had an 
important effect. Despite rhetorical and ideological commitments to independence, the 
Palestinian leadership was forced at a practical level to surrender elements of that. The 
Arab political pressure combined with financial and logistical support slowly ate away at 
80 Yezid Sayigh, Shu 'un Filistiniyya (October 1985) p. 37. 
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the organization's strength. Gradually, the PLO began to protect its interests by gaining 
Arab support, or protect its presence in any given Arab state by showing flexibility on its 
goals in favour of that state's policies. 
Consequently, the PLO began to lose its revolutionary characteristics and began to act like 
a state itself. Also, "it started to use military hardware like any other Arab state. In other 
words, the resistance movement became a part of the political game on the regional and 
Arab levels and began to depend on alliances of interest for self-protection".83 
Thus, the Fatah leadership was duped by Arab regimes that succeeded in dragging the 
movement into a situation where it had lost its fundamental characteristics-namely, its 
revolutionary nature, and a power based on support from the Palestinian people. The 
Organization's embrace of financial and official structures led to its expansion and the 
creation of a state-like bureaucracy, which protected and ensured its own continuation, 
while obliging the Organization to give concessions on its behalf 
It might be said that the leadership of the Fatah movement took the bait ofthe Arab 
regimes, perhaps as a result ofthe makeup ofFatah's own leadership, referred to 
previously, which resembled the social and class structure of many Arab regimes. 
Nonetheless, in hindsight one can argue that the Palestinian leadership failed to understand 
the reasons for Arab government cooperation, which in fact was a direct outcome of their 
defeat in 1967. The Palestinian leadership thought that Arab cooperation came out of fear, 
respect or admiration for the Palestinian revolution, rather than widespread Arab public 
anger at the defeat. In fact, the Arab regimes sought to draw attention away from their own 
incompetence and the miserable living conditions of their own people. 
Ibrahim Abrash supported this explicitly: 
The Palestinian revolution was deceived by the acceptance of its presence by the 
Arab regimes after the defeat during the war of Jun 1967. That was not an 
acceptance of the idea of the revolution, as much as it was a manoeuvre to absorb 
the public anger that resulted from the defeat. In addition, to distract the attention of 
83 Ibid., p. 45 
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the Arab people away from their bad conditions, the Palestinian revolution also 
created unrealistic expectations among the Arabs that it can compensate the loss 
and the defeat of the June wore and that the victory is coming soon. That even 
created arrogance among Palestinians who started to believe that their revolution is 
the only revolution which, in turn, added negatively to their relations with the 
Arabs. 
But when the moment oftruth came, the Palestinian revolution was unable to defeat 
Israel (which is supported by the United State). It was also unable to maintain its 
bases in the Arab countries. It was also tied or restricted by the Arab money and by 
its unprincipled relations with the Arab regimes who recognized the PLO as the 
legitimate representative, but told them: you are on your own, go and fight alone. 84 
The many official dealings between these regimes and the PLO as if it were in fact a 
government, the PLO's recognition by the Arab League, and the provision of financial 
assistance sufficient to transform the organization into a semi-state all contributed to 
limiting its flexibility as a revolutionary movement, and made it resemble instead the Arab 
regimes. Some analysts in the Arab world consider these Arab policies to have been 
deliberate. 
The plan of the Arab bourgeoisie was to inflate the revolution and transform it into 
legitimate institutions, to a system among systems, part of the Arab League and 
influenced by its presence within it and its committees. It was not enough to 
contain it, but it gave it a stronger driving force. However, in the long run, it 
weakened the revolutionary aspect of it.85 
Or as Kareem Mruwa puts it: "The Arab bourgeoisie drowned the revolution with experts, 
advisors, intelligence, and military, financial, organizational and administrative specialists. 
It then gradually drowned it with money, arms and military men. This flooding flowed 
over the revolution at a time when Fatah and its historical leadership opened its doors wide 
to it."86 While Fatah achieved a leading and revolutionary role, it was unable to develop 
further. It had become a phenomenon that both contradicted Arab policies, and was 
integrated with them. It is relevant to recall Abrash who reminded us of a well known 
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Palestinian wisdom: "previous Palestinian uprisings particularly that under the British in 
1936 concluded that all revolutions born in Palestine are aborted in Arab capitals".87 
Salah Khalaf(Abu Iyad) acknowledged the impact ofthis dilemma on the Palestinian 
leadership and the PLO: 
Palestinians live under various political and social systems which are sometimes 
contradictory, and which necessarily influence their perceptions. They are subject 
to the conflict between the host state and the resistance, which leaves them only 
one choice before them. This choice is to submit voluntarily or by force to official 
propositions or to become neutral in order to avoid vengeful reactions. We are 
forced to appease the Arab governments to exempt our citizens from these dangers. 
This limits our freedom of movement to some extent.88 
Abu Iyad does not excuse the Fatah leadership from responsibility for this outcome. 
"Bureaucracy has overcome our movement and the struggle with which we gained 
'respect' has been lost: We now have tasted negotiation with governments and men in 
authority. We take their opinions and wishes into consideration". 89 Nor does he deny that 
the Fatah leadership was swept away by its relationships with the Arab governments at the 
expense of the movement's revolutionary stance, relationships that caused the Palestinian 
leadership to ally with governments against the people who rebelled against the Arab 
regimes. "Most of the time, we believed that with regards to a conflict in a certain Arab 
country, it would be best for us to maintain our relationship with the presiding government 
at the expense of our relationship with the people who were opposed to it". 90 
In the light of all this, it can be concluded that changes-particularly towards 
moderation-in the political positions of the Palestinian leadership outside the Palestinian 
territories were due to the combination of first the experience of exile, secondly the nature 
and makeup of the leadership, and thirdly their presence in the Arab states. 
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The Impact of the 1967 War: Fatah Wins Over the Arab States 
The Arab defeat in the 1967 war, and the outstanding performance of Fatah fighters within 
it, allowed Fatah to overcome these tensions to some extent. Rosemary Sayigh expressed 
this in the following excerpt: 
It is very hard to isolate the Palestinian Resistance Movement from the historical 
environment that surrounded it after the six-day war, from which the movement 
arose like the Phoenix from the ashes, shaking a whole nation, which was 
mesmerized by the defeat of the Arab armies. This significant emergence gave the 
resistance respect and appreciation of1arge sectors among the public to a point that 
elite intellectuals described them as angels or saviours. 91 
It is worth exploring this period in more detail, to determine the scope of the 'room to 
manoeuvre' which became available to Fatah in the wake of the war. 
As the Fatah movement succeeded in mobilizing popular support for armed struggle and 
fida 'i (freedom fighting) action, it was able to seek control over the PLO. "In the National 
Council's fourth session held in Cairo between 10 and 17 of July 1968, Fatah entered in 
PLO Commissions with full force and was able to amend some items in the PLO National 
Charter to match its own policies, as we have mentioned earlier.'m 
In the fifth round in February 1969, a new PLO Executive Committee was elected, 
including a Fatah majority, and Yasser Arafat, Fatah's leader, was elected chairman ofthe 
PLO. 
Because the majority of Palestinian refugees were in Jordan, and since Jordan has the 
longest border with Israel, it became the main headquarters for the Palestinian political and 
military presence. Because of the history of competition between Jordan and the PLO over 
who should represent the Palestinians on the West Bank (Palestinians constitute a majority 
in Jordan), the fact that the Palestinian leadership was based in Jordan escalated this 
competition into fierce conflict. 
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The background to this competition goes back to the establishment of the PLO by the Arab 
states. At the Arab League Council's 40th session in September 1963, "it was clear that 
King Hussein was insisting that the summit's concluding statement would not mention the 
term 'the Palestinian entity"'.93 Because ofthe Arab regimes influence in the PLO 
structure then, a concession was made to King Hussein. Shuqayri was quoted as saying: 
"The Palestinian entity does not aim to disjoin the West Bank from Jordan nor does it 
intend to exercise any regional sovereignty".94 
The PLO under Fatah's leadership, in light of the increasing popularity of the resistance 
movement and Arab (including the Jordanian) regimes' agreement to allow military action 
from their lands, was not ready to make compromises. For example, the resolutions of the 
National Council in its fifth session in 1969 called for: "Firm confrontation against all 
peaceful and submissive solutions and the total rejection of all agreements, resolutions and 
projects that contradict with the Palestinian people's right for self-determination in their 
homeland, including UN Resolutions and UN Security Council Resolution 242 and the 
Soviet Union Project and similar projects."95 
However, despite these strident positions at a time when resistance was at its peak, the 
Fatah majority in the PLO insisted on opposing any frameworks or policies that might 
harm the relationship between the PLO and Arab states (which were in the same breath 
described as 'reactionary' and having close ties with Israel's ally, the United States of 
America). The conflict that arose at the National Council's sixth session in September 
1969 illustrated these positions. Fatah representatives disagreed with other members over 
the wording for describing the enemies of the Palestinian revolution, and whether the Arab 
reactionary forces should be mentioned or not. According to Hourani: "Although the 
recommendation submitted by the Political and Information Committee did not categorize 
the Arab reactionary forces as a separate group hostile to the Revolution, and grouped 
93 Sakhnini, Dam Filistin alwusta /'Ia sharqi a/urdon, 1948-1950, p. 7. 
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them within the forces categorized as bases for international imperialism, Fatah did not 
yield and continued opposing the announcement of such a categorization".96 
Fatah had several reasons for adopting this position, but one was certainly the fact that the 
PLO and Palestinians were residing in the Arab countries. One of the most important factor 
was the financial relationship, which was shrouded in mystery. Salah Khalaf said in an 
interview with Al-Safeer newspaper on 7 July 1997: "As for funding the guerrilla factions, 
it is considered a top secret issue that should never be disclosed". 97 
Despite the lack of clarity in this relationship, and in some cases because of the covert 
relationship, many experts and analysts believed that this funding policy impacted the 
Palestinian factions, especially Fatah. This was expressed by Hourani: 
Therefore, needs in terms of financial resources of all factions increased year after 
year. Part of the needs were covered by other Arab parties, mainly governments, 
and in this particular area lies the major pressure exerted by those governments, 
aside from the other sources of pressure defined by social, geographical and 
political conditions related to Palestinians' work in the Arab countries.98 
However, Fatah's readiness to be flexible in its relations with Arab states, including the 
"reactionary" ones, was not enough to avoid conflict with the Jordanian government (a 
conflict in part inspired by Jordan's demographics), and because acts of Palestinian 
resistance against Israel led to friction between Israel and Jordan. It may be that the most 
important factor was US diplomatic efforts through the Roger's Initiative99 that were 
accepted by Jordan (and Egypt) in July 1970. The PLO, in contrast, rejected this initiative, 
considering it a serious threat to the revolution's achievements, and condemned it along 
with its US backer. 
The arrogance resulting from the PLO's power and exceptional popularity during the three 
years following the 1967 war drove the PLO's reaction to the Rogers project and the Arabs 
96 lbid., p. 165. 
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who supported it to an extent that an exceptional session of the National Council in 
Amman on 27 August 1970 resolved to pursue: "Forming an Arab committee representing 
our Arab people in their struggle against Imperialism, Zionism and collaborators." 100 This 
phrasing reflected the PLO's feelings of power, which stemmed from its public support 
and the comparative weakness of Arab governments after the 1967 defeat. 
These three years, after the defeat of Arab armies, were the apex of PLO popularity and 
strength outside of Palestine. The leadership was perceived as the viable alternative to the 
defeat. In the same period, however, the true fabric of the PLO leadership outside was 
proven less than revolutionary, and the slogans of the leadership exposed. The 
confrontation with Jordan was a significant setback. It showed Palestinians the limits of 
working in an un-conducive non-supportive environment. In the OPT, there were still few 
signs that an effective leadership was emerging. The heavy oppression oflsrael's 
occupation, and the years of Jordanian control of the West Bank discouraged Palestinian 
political activity. 
1970-1982: The Decline of the Outside and the Rise of the Inside 
Jordan exploited poor relations between the PLO and Egypt that resulted from the latter's 
position on the Rogers Initiative, launching a major military attack that led to the defeat of 
the PLO and its evacuation from Jordan. This defeat was a great shock to Palestinians and 
their leadership, especially since the event underscored that none ofthe Arab states 
supported the PLO in the battle to "liberate Palestine", as described in the PLO literature. 
This was the beginning of the defeat of one of the ideological pillars of the Fatah 
leadership-namely that guerrilla action against Israel would bring about solidarity and 
union among Arabs, who will be dragged into battle against Israel. Thus, the PLO 
leadership moved into a new phase that had a greater emphasis on defence, but not without 
suffering shaken self-confidence and a retreat. 
Abu Iyad explained that this clash resulted from Fatah 's failure to weigh its principle of 
not interfering in the affairs of the Arab countries against its other principle of military 
100 Ibid., p. 171. 
57 
action against lsrael. 101 More directly, the political reasons for the contest were embodied 
in the contradiction between Jordan's desire to engage positively with the American 
initiatives for a political solution to the crisis, and Palestinian goals and visions. The first 
of these competing interests were the Roger's plan and Palestinian rejection ofthis 
initiative. 
The clash also derived from competition between Jordan and the PLO in representing the 
Palestinian people. Reinforcement for this analysis comes from King Hussein's initiative in 
March 1972 to establish the United Arab Kingdom so that "this proposed kingdom would 
consist of two regions, each enjoying its own independence. One would be Jordanian in the 
East Bank and the other would be Palestinian in the West Bank. They would be connected 
by a unified federation under his authority". 102 
The defeat of the PLO in Jordan, the Roger initiative and Arab support for it, in addition 
for the Jordanian 'united kingdom plan' shocked the PLO, causing two major changes in 
the thinking ofthe PLO leadership. The first was its insistence on continuing the quest for 
Palestinian independence. This was evident in the results of the 11th and 12th sessions of 
the Palestine National Council, which were convened under the influence ofthe Jordanian 
plan to establish a united kingdom. In the words of Hourani, "First, they drafted a number 
of resolutions that reflected Palestinian policy after the results of the September war. They 
[the PLO] were dedicated to continuing a course of no return [in the direction of] 
Palestinian national independence". 103 
Nevertheless, new events alleviated some of the Palestinian leadership's anxiety. The OPT 
(the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip) was the site of a growth in 
support for and status of the PLO, which King Hussein attempted to compete with. The 
first event was victory of lists supporting the PLO in the municipal elections organized by 
Israel in the territories in 1973. The second was the announcement on 151h August 1973 of 
the establishment of a Palestinian National Front in accordance with a resolution from the 
11th Palestinian National Council. Fatah, the Palestinian Communists, and independent 
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personalities played a prominent role in the National Front's formation. "It considered 
itself a part of the national movement represented in the PLO and it affirmed its rejection 
to the projects ofthe civil administration and autonomy and the project of the United 
Kingdom". 104 
This period also witnessed another reassuring development: the PLO's success at creating 
political and military bases in Lebanon as a substitute for those lost in Jordan. 
The nightmare of siege and fear of a pending liquidation that these parties lived 
immediately after leaving Jordan were lessened to some extent, especially after the 
resistance succeeded, despite the difficulties and complexities in gathering its 
fighters in southern Lebanon, and was able to reinforce the political presence of the 
PLO in the OPT105• 
The other reassuring element was the failure of American efforts starting with the Rogers 
plan. That occurred not because of the PLO's resistance, but rather because oflsrael's 
refusal to give any concessions that would help this initiative. "In his memoirs of this 
period, Kissinger's one regret concerning his Middle East policy was that he was unable to 
win any concessions from the Israelis for his old friend in Jordan, the 'tough little King', 
Hussein." 106 
The second major outcome ofthe afore-mentioned developments was the start of 
discussions within the Palestinian leadership concerning the principle of a 
transitional/interim settlement, and the concept of establishing a Palestinian state on part of 
historic Palestine. Faisal Hourani concluded, from the way the national council resolutions 
were worded on the 2nd and 3rd of February, 1971, that there was a serious discussion of 
the idea. These resolutions called for, "a strong stance against the call for a Palestinian 
state on part of Palestinian national soil." From this, Hourani concludes that "issuance of 
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this resolution proves that the call for the establishment of a Palestinian state immediately 
after September is a call deserving discussion and response"107. 
Actually, the debate over an interim settlement, and a retreat from positions that prevailed 
before Black September (the term given to the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan) can be 
attributed to the fact that the expulsion of the Palestinians from Jordan made them feel the 
need for a foothold where they could live and operate freely. 108 Also, the support that the 
PLO received from the Palestinian people inside the OPT gave the PLO outside more self-
confidence, which enabled the PLO to be more pragmatic. The growing political weight of 
the inside that resulted from the continuous waves of resistance and increasing public 
support for this struggle (which was characterized by clear and pragmatic political 
positions based on the two-state solution, right-of-return and international legality) was 
used by the PLO outside to convince its close constituencies of its evolving political 
positions. The leaders of Fatah and the PLO attempted to counterbalance relatively more 
radical constituencies in Fatah outside by increasing the weight of Palestinians from the 
OPT in PLO policy discussions. This reflected the complementary roles of the internal and 
external components of the PLO. In any case, during this period, discussions began to 
press for compromise with the official Arab thinking at that time. "By this, and while 
preparations by the Arabs were being conducted in secrecy for the waging of the October 
war in 1973, Palestinian political thinking, which began to change course in the direction 
of adopting the phased concept in its struggle, was preparing to enter a new phase in the 
history of its development" 109 
The core position of Palestinians from inside the OPT was most clearly represented in the 
message of the National Front, a coalition of the four major factions active in the OPT, 
namely Fatah, the DFLP, the Communist Party PCP, and the Ba'thist Palestinian Saiqa) to 
the PLO leadership, which included the Front's explicit demand that the PLO participate 
on behalf ofthe Palestinian people in the Geneva conference (The first international 
middle east peace conference, convened without Palestinian participation) . The 
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conference, it was decided, would be held according to resolution 338 of the UN Security 
Council. 110 
This period witnessed the emergence of a genuine leadership in the OPT. This 
development came as a relief for the PLO leadership, which was facing difficult 
challenges, particularly in its vital claim to represent the Palestinian public. The clear and 
firm loyalty ofthe leadership inside to the PLO outside, and its growing role in 
orchestrating the struggle against occupation and establishing PLO legitimacy, created new 
conditions where relations were balanced and complementary between the two. 
The October war of 1973 between Israel and Egypt and Syria-with additional Arab 
support-sketched the outlines of the next period. The goal ofthe war was to move 
conditions in the Middle East from a state of stagnation to a state of active peaceful 
negotiations. At least this is what former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat said to two 
leaders in the PLO. Khalil at-Wazir (Abu Jihad) retells, in the words of Sadat: "This war 
will not be completed. Its goal will be to help the Arab-Israeli problem out of its 
crisis ... after that, we will go to a peace conference." 111 
What catches the attention and gives a picture of the atmosphere of the relationship 
between the leadership of the PLO/Fatah and Sadat, is that he insisted on their presence in 
his headquarters days before the beginning of the October War. He kept them there with 
him during the crucial days of battle. Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) explains this as Sadat's 
desire to have the PLO participate in the peace conference planned for after the war. 
Despite Sadat's request that these leaders participate, when they did come to him with their 
answer, he wasn't interesting in listening, according to \Khalaf: "It gradually became 
apparent that Kissinger had convinced the Egyptian president of excluding the PLO from 
the peace process." 112 
If the October War influenced the Arab-Israeli conflict by creating a new balance that 
allowed the transition to peaceful negotiations, the Arab-and especially the Egyptian-
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governments' stance influenced the stance ofthe PLO leadership. "They [PLO leadership] 
hoped that they would be able to achieve a number of transitional demands. They had 
received absolute promises from the Egyptian leadership that it would support the demand 
for an independent Palestinian state established on parts of the Palestinian lands which the 
Israeli occupation forces would withdraw from according to a settlement"113 • 
Thus, the policies and interests of Arab governments on one hand, and the absence of PLO 
room to manoeuvre governed a new adjustment in the PLO leadership's political position. 
The leadership was obliged to adapt its thinking in order to meet the needs of Arab 
governments. Khaled al-Hasan wrote: 
We came to a decision that the best for us is that the West Bank and Gaza should be 
a Palestinian state ... The way to have a sort of freedom either now or after I 0 years 
is when we have our own land; talking also into account that in spite of the fact that 
we were dominated by our independence in our relation with the Arabs, we also 
discovered that so long as we do not have our own land, we cannot be 90 or 80% 
independent when we are working on the land of the others. 114 
In the PLO committees, many arguments ended in division, yet debate continued until an 
agreement was achieved consisting of a ten-point program approved by the Palestine 
National Council and including for the first time PLO official agreement on the principle 
of stages. The program itselfwas called the interim political platform. Its second point 
reads: "PLO practices all kind of struggle, namely the armed struggle, to liberate 
Palestinian lands and establish the fighting national authority for the people on any 
liberated part of Palestinian lands."115 
Ultimately this was the price to be paid for PLO participation in the Rabat Arab summit on 
October 1974, which issued its famous decision recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people. This act marked a change in which the PLO no 
longer represented policies at odds with the Arab regimes' consensus, but rather reflected 
that consensus. What attracts the attention here is that this transformation of the PLO 
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leadership did not originate from a series of evaluations or lessons learned in an open 
manner. According to notes and writings by senior Fatah leaders, the change resulted from 
pressures from Arab governments and ties between PLO leadership and Arab regimes. It 
also resulted from the gradual adoption of a style that depended on Arab governments' 
facilitation. 
In this period, Arab pressure on the PLO began to bear fruit. The war of 1973 created new 
opportunities for political pressure on Palestinians. The United States wanted to exclude 
the PLO from new initiatives. Again, the leadership inside was in a position to strengthen 
the Palestinian political position. The growing role of the inside, together with the 
weakening of the outside, pushed the leadership outside to build bridges and develop 
influence inside. This, in turn, developed into differences between the inside and outside 
over the nature of their relationship. These differences continued and increased with new 
political proposals and projects, many of which actually sought to play off the differences 
between the two wings of leadership. 
This period was characterized by other numerous difficulties faced by the PLO leadership 
because of its rejection of the Camp David accords, which permitted no role for the PLO, 
instead giving this role to an elected leadership of Palestinians from inside the OPT. In 
addition, the PLO wished to protect some ties with Egypt, which had always been a source 
of support. On the other hand, losing Egyptian support and Egypt's exit from the circle of 
confrontation with Israel coincided with the military attack launched by Israel against the 
Palestinian presence in Lebanon. 
[D]uring this period the PLO had lost the political and diplomatic initiative. Israel, 
on the other hand, having succeeded in freezing the Egyptian front, turned its entire 
military efforts in the direction of southern Lebanon. The passivity of the Arab 
states, whether 'moderates' or 'progressives', at the time of 1978 invasion had 
already shown Israel how little Arab solidarity meant. 116 
Yasser Arafat worked to resolve the situation on various levels. He attempted to improve 
the unity and coordination between PLO and Arab countries, particularly Syria, Saudi 
Arabia and Libya. On the other hand, he worked on maintaining his relations with Egypt. 
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Also, he carried out an initiative to improve relations with Europe. He paid his first visit to 
the European capital, Vienna, on July 1979. Also, he worked on improving his relations 
with the Soviet Union and announced more than once his support for the US-Soviet 
declaration that was issued on 1 October, 1977. 
Finally, Arafat worked on improving and enhancing PLO and Fatah ties with Palestinians 
inside the OPT who had been active in various aspects of the struggle. That effort was 
made despite conflicting feelings among the leadership related to the escalating role and 
power of Palestinians inside the OPT, which came in parallel to the weak and retreating 
role ofthe PLO outside. Although that increase in coordination and cooperation between 
inside and outside was a positive sign from a Palestinian prospective, some writers looked 
at it differently. Barry Rubin commented: "By far the most important development was the 
increasing activism of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. PLO support swept the 
1976 elections held by Israel, but the fact that the new mayors now held an independent 
mandate reinforced the PLO's mistrust ofthem." 117 
The year 1979, and subsequent years, was crucial in the OPT. The intense protests against 
the Camp David Accords and before Sadat's visit played an important role in positioning 
the PLO against these events. The protests' major goals were to confront the Camp David 
Accords and the Civil Administration scheme that Begin's government attempted to 
implement; resist the construction of settlements, which were increasing at that time; as 
well as support the PLO. That was done in a more unified and organized way by 
establishing a new local leadership body in the OPT called the "National Guidance 
Committee". 118 
The National Guidance Committee was a culmination of efforts to unify and intensify the 
popular struggle against the Israeli occupation, and to unify the political position. It was 
composed of representatives of elected mayors of major cities (Bas sam a-Shaqaa, Kareem 
Khalaf, and Fahid Qawasmi); elected representatives of professional associations (Ibrahim 
Daqqaq and Jiries Khouri); the elected director-general of the trade union federation (Adel 
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Ghanim); editors-in-chief of the three main nationalist newspapers (Akram Haniyeh, 
Ma'moun al-Sayyid, Bashir Barghouthi); elected representatives of the university student 
movement; and elected representatives of women's organizations (Samiha Khalil). 119 
This new body was able to unify and assert the commitment of the Palestinians in the OPT 
to the leadership of the PLO, and encourage the various geographic areas and social strata 
of Palestinians to participate widely in popular resistance against the Israeli occupation. It 
also demonstrated the complete failure of Israeli policies to co-opt Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, in addition to the Israeli claim that Palestinians in the occupied 
territories had politics different from the PLO bodies outside. As a result, Israel responded 
viciously to this guidance committee and its members, sacking the nationalist mayors from 
their posts and appointing Israeli military officers instead. Israel also deported and arrested 
the vast majority of this leadership. Finally, a Jewish terrorist organization attempted to 
assassinate some of its leaders, which lead to the maiming of two of them. 
This National Guidance Committee led the struggle against the occupation in general, and 
in particular the occupation's illegal practices. Israeli settlement expansion activities, 
violations of human rights; Israeli attempts to develop alternative leadership to the PLO; 
and Israeli promotion of the so-called Jordanian option were among the main targets ofthe 
initiatives and struggle under the leadership of that committee. The close grass-roots ties 
that this leadership had (the vast majority were elected by respective constituencies) 
ensured direct responses to the specific conditions of occupation. 
That period marked the beginning of debate among Palestinians over the inside and outside 
and the formation of relations between the two groups. There were political debates 
underway reflecting the breadth of political tendencies found in both the inside and 
outside, but these did not pit the two groups against each other. Rather, the discussion that 
position the inside and outside in opposition to one another was over roles, processes, 
priorities and procedures-not political substance. The inside perceived itself as part ofthe 
PLO leadership, not a mere extension of certain aspects of the struggle, as the outside 
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seemed to propose. Fatah 's mainstream had limited political bases in, and influence over 
public associations within the OPT, due to its main focus on military action and its 
negligence of grassroots action. Nonetheless, the leadership inside clearly and consistently 
identified themselves with the national objectives of the PLO leadership outside and the 
symbolic role ofthe PLO as a focus for national unity and identity. 
Factions, including Fatah, used their ties with their partner factions in the OPT to 
strengthen their position relative to another. This was reflected in the manner Fatah 
adopted in order to increase its influence on the inside quickly. "Fatah even reached the 
point of precipitating a split in the trade union movement and directing PLO financial aid 
to 'reliable people'." 120 
In other words, the leadership outside wanted the legitimacy afforded by ties to this 
successful uprising and the leadership inside, at the same time, maintaining complete 
control and autonomy. On this, Alain Gresh agrees with Rubin regarding PLO sensitivity 
to the developing role of the inside leadership. "The PLO in Beirut had not wished to see 
installed a leadership of occupied territories that was truly capable of casting on the 
struggle,"121 he writes. Indeed, this is the opinion of most researchers on the issue. 
In any case, various pressures were exerted on the PLO until they culminated in Israel's 
invasion and occupation of South Lebanon and a siege on Beirut, which started on 6 June, 
1982, and sought to destroy the military and administrative infrastructure of the PLO. In 
addition, Israel sought to release itself from Camp David dues owed the Palestinians when 
the withdrawal from Sinai was completed. 
This aggression was committed with the support of the US, which, according to Sheila 
Ryan, was informed about the war plan. 
The conjunction had occurred between a US strategic hostility to Palestinian 
nationalism, springing from the highly debatable concept that its advance is to the 
advantage of the Soviet Union and to the detriment of US interests; and the 
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imperative apprehended by the Israeli government to obliterate the PLO as a 
prelude to expansionist and exclusivist plans for West Bank and Gaza. 122 • 
Thus, the PLO's presence in Lebanon ended like its initial staging ground in Jordan. The 
Palestinian cause had lost many of its core components, however. "Once again, Arafat had 
to retreat in order to survive. He agreed to leave Beirut if PLO forces and their weapons 
received safe passage, plus a US promise to protect the Palestinians left behind." 123 
In summary, in that period, and out of desperation, the various PLO factions competed to 
strengthen their influence inside the OPT. This was driven by the various problems faced 
by the leadership outside, including the Camp David Accords and the PLO's expulsion 
from Lebanon. In addition, the inside took the initiative for the first time in launching a 
large campaign rejecting first Sadat's visit, and then the Camp David Accords, while the 
PLO outside still vacillated. Also in that period, the growing political strength and 
legitimacy of the inside political leadership and movement compensated for the weakness 
of the outside in a manner that was in the favour of the PLO leadership in general. This 
again demonstrated their complementary relationship. 
1982- 1991: The Intifada Consolidates the Inside Leadership and 
Revives the Outside Leadership 
After the PLO defeat in Beirut at the hands ofthe allied Israel and Lebanese right-wing, a 
phase of diplomatic efforts began in an attempt to reap the fruits of this defeat. This 
eventually led to the PLO's erasure from the political context, in the same way it had been 
removed from the military and geographical context. This political campaign began with 
US President Ronald Reagan's initiative on September I, 1982: "My fellow Americans, 
today has been a day that should make us proud. It marked the end of the successful 
evacuation ofthe PLO from Beirut, Lebanon,"124 
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The talking points in Reagan's proposal as they were sent to Israeli Prime Minister Begin 
emphasized the position that the US was committed to Camp David as the basis for any 
solution, and that these were the conditions his administration required in order to 
recognize and negotiate with the PLO. In his proposal, the idea of offering autonomy to 
Palestinian 'inhabitants' was introduced, as well as the participation of Palestinian 
inhabitants of East Jerusalem in the election of the West Bank- Gaza authority. 
On the final status issues, the talking points stated: "The preference we will pursue in the 
final status negotiations is association of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan; we will not 
support the formation of a Palestinian state in this negotiation." 125 
The Palestinian formal position on this project was discussed in the 16th session ofthe 
Palestine National Council in Algiers on February, 14-22, 1983. This session rejected the 
Reagan project because: 
it [did] not fulfill, in its tone or content, the inalienable national rights of the 
Palestinian people because it denies the right of return, self-determination and the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state. It also does not recognize the 
PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and it 
contradicts international legitimacy .126 
Because the core of the Reagan project was based on Jordan taking a representative role, 
the PLO leadership pre-empted this endeavour by developing its relationship with Jordan 
and reaching an agreement that Jordan would not negotiate alone over the Palestinians, and 
that Palestinian participation in any peaceful negotiations would take place through a joint 
Palestinian-Jordanian statement, resulting from the Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Accord 
signed by both parties on 111211985. It included the following: "The Palestinians will 
exercise their inalienable right to self-determination when Jordanians and Palestinians will 
be able to do so within the context of the formation of the proposed confederated Arab 
states of Jordan and Palestine." 127 
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Despite official rejection of the Reagan project, the accord sought to meet it halfway by 
allowing participation of the PLO in any peace conference through a joint delegation. (The 
Reagan proposal had refused negotiations with the PLO and sought to annex the West 
Bank to Jordan.) With this, the PLO abandoned its basic mission of being the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, as well as its slogan of establishing an 
independent Palestinian state. 
It seems that these were signs that encouraged the United States to enter, for the first time, 
into a direct and official dialogue with officials in the PLO. These communications 
entailed the PLO's readiness to recognize UN Security Council resolution 242. This was 
expressed by Yasser Arafat in his speech to the non-aligned summit in Hariri on 5/9/1986 
and coated by Alain Gresh: "It [the conference] would be based on international law and 
all resolutions ofthe UN general assembly and security council resolutions dealing with 
the Palestinian problem, including resolutions 242, 338, 465 and 471 ... " 128 
With this first official recognition of these resolutions, the PLO had moved one step closer 
to American conditions. There only remained the final step by PLO Chairman Vasser 
Arafat of renouncing terrorism. 
The thing that is significant in reviewing the positions of the PLO leadership is that they 
received nothing in return for these concessions, except survival and the promise of 
recognition. The US administration refused to recognize their right to self-determination, 
i.e., the right to an independent Palestinian state. In answer to a question asked by a 
member of Congress, the US Department of State answered: "The explicit reference to the 
PLO to resolution 242 and 338 and to Israel are new ... But in the Middle East content the 
term 'self-determination' is loaded; it could mean the creation of the Palestinian state ... and 
the US is not in favour of an independent Palestinian state." 129 
These concessions by the PLO leadership also did not succeed in extracting gains from the 
Israeli side either, despite the PLO's acceptance of all the US and Israeli conditions. 
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However the latter refused to recognize the PLO: "Regarding the inclusion of the PLO in 
any talks, he [Rabin] remained non-committal by stating that if the PLO accepted 
Resolution 242, the bases for negotiations; it would no longer be the PL0."130 This might 
be considered an accurate description of the PLO's concessions on its primary mission. In 
March of 1987 Begin took power and made it clear that Israel absolutely refused to 
recognize the PLO. 
The irony of this period is that the PLO leadership outside took positions that contradicted 
its original mandate. This resulted from US and Israeli attempts to take advantage of the 
weakness of the PLO. In order to survive, maintain its role, and remain relevant, the PLO 
outside made some political concessions that were not echoed by the inside leadership, 
especially concerning the agreement with Jordan, which ultimately compromised PLO 
representation of Palestinians. 
The Palestinian uprising or Intifada that began in the OPT on 9 December, 1987 had two 
dramatic but contradictory effects on the PLO leadership. The first was to rescue it from 
the retreat in power and role experienced in the immediately preceding years. The second 
was the growth in position and role of the inside in Palestinian policy and the relative 
marginalization of the position and role ofthe outside, represented by the PLO. 
Clearly, the Intifada had shifted the focus to the 'inside', more so after the double 
blow the PLO had received: in 1982 when they were expelled from Lebanon, and 
as a result ofthe Gulf War. The persistence of these divergent attitudes created 
internal tension and suspicion through the duration of the negotiations, and in turn 
distorted the decision-making process. 131 
The Intifada restored the importance of the PLO, especially after the formation of the 
Unified National Leadership of the Intifada (UNLU), which joined the major organizations 
of the PLO (Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestinian 
Communist Party (PCP) and the Democratic front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) 
in a unified structure. The status of the PLO began to improve in the Arab world and "the 
Intifada pushed the Jordanian government to reconsider its stance concerning ties between 
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the east and west banks [of the Jordan]. It also made an active contribution to ending the 
refugee war in Lebanon and lifting the siege imposed by the Amal Movement on the 
Palestinian population since 1985."132 
The Intifada also contributed to improving the image of the Palestinian people, generating 
sympathy in international public opinion and many world governments. This arose out of 
its status as a widespread grassroots movement based on non-violent struggle with obvious 
and realistic political content. "It is clear now that the Intifada is primarily a political act of 
resistance seeking the achievement of political objective. It derives its major values, 
aspirations, and premises from the collective existential experiences ofthe Palestinian 
people." 133 
From the first joint leaflet issued in Gaza on 16 December, 1987, the Intifada was 
characterized by clarity in its goal for independence and its loyalty to the PLO. This leaflet 
stated the following: 
The rulers of Israel deluded themselves into thinking that they had come closer to 
creating an alternative to the PLO, and that with their empty talk of direct 
negotiations with Jordan, that they had won the final round ... The Palestinians' 
strong belief in their legitimate rights embodied in the PLO provides them with the 
spiritual force behind their daily struggle. 134 
The Intifada also contributed to encouraging the PLO towards political conduct and 
negotiations. Its strength and self-confidence contributed to protecting the PLO from 
marginalization in any idea by any party on a negotiated solution. An example of this was 
written in the tenth leaflet of the Unified National Leadership (UNLU) of the Intifada: "We 
have made it clear that no other party can speak on our behalf. We will not allow any of the 
Arab countries to betray the Palestinian cause by preventing the PLO from attending an 
international conference. The PLO must be represented by an independent delegation." 135 
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The Intifada contributed to making the peace process a possibility. It transformed the 
nature of the conflict from conditions that were difficult for the Palestinians in the OPT, 
while acceptable for Israelis, to a situation unbearable for both sides. This pushed both 
parties to search for a way out of the difficult conditions. Abu Lughod clarified this 
change, writing: "The Intifada and its leadership understood the fundamental law 
applicable to the achievement of independence in colonial situations: a colonial system can 
be defended and maintained successfully as long as the benefits a colonial power derives 
from the colonized exceed the costs."136 
Israel and the US recognized how difficult it would be to avoid a political solution for 
conditions arising from the Intifada. However, both still attempted to propose political 
initiatives bypassing the PLO. Both failed. US Secretary of State George Shultz made a 
visit to the region in mid-1988 in an attempt to hold contacts in Jerusalem with traditional 
Palestinian leaders. The leadership of the Intifada rejected this initiative, however, and 
Shultz failed. Leaflet No. I 0 of the Unified Leadership read: "The Intifada sent Shultz 
away empty handed, has increased the international isolation of Israel and has swept away 
those who have tried to undermine the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of our 
nation. America has been exposed as being not a mediator but rather our main enemy."137 
The second attempt to change the conditions was Israeli, and was represented by Shamir's 
four points of 14 May, 1989, and the peace initiative ofthe national coalition government 
two days later. The initiative included the following: "Israel will not conduct negotiations 
with the PLO. The parties participating in the negotiations for the first stage shall include 
Israel and the elected representation of the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria 
and the Gaza district."138 
The PLO, which was carried by the Intifada from the no-mans-land it occupied between 
1982 and 1987 to a forefront position in Middle Eastern politics, always sought to appear 
as the commanding force of the Intifada, possessing it to use later as a winning card. The 
example that best expresses this is Chairman Arafat's famous statements that leaflet No. 75 
136Abu-Lughod, "Intifada", p. 7. 
137 Facts Information Committee, Towards a State of Independence, p. 96. 
138 Ibid. 
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ofthe Unified National Leadership of the Intifada was in his pocket. The PLO said it must 
invest these political gains in order to regain control over the initiative that had begun in 
the West Bank and Gaza and not in Tunisia. Helga Baumgarten concludes that Arafat and 
his leadership "from early on in the Intifada were clearly determined to achieve the utmost 
political capital from the popular uprising" 139 
The PLO felt the value of a political solution resulting from the Intifada. It worked towards 
new gains in its political stance. Its strived for a position that would enable it to be 
accepted as a political party in any negotiations initiative. This change resulted in the 
resolutions of the 19th Palestine National Council convened on 15 November, 1988 which 
ratified, for the first time, the principal of a two-state solution. "Despite the historical 
oppression subjected to Palestinians through their exile and denial of their right to self-
determination due to the UN General Assembly resolution 181 in 1948 which divided 
Palestine into two Arab and Jewish states, this decision still provides the conditions for 
international legitimacy which guarantees the Arab people's right to sovereignty and 
national independence." 140 
However, what weakened the stance of the PLO and its potential for participation in up-
coming negotiations was the Gulf war, which weakened the Arabs in general and restored 
sympathy for Israel. More important, however, was the PLO's support for the hard line 
position of Iraq, which once again led to international isolation. This, in turn, allowed the 
US to exclude the PLO, and the PLO could not refuse since its refusal might threaten the 
movement's very existence. Consequently, it gave instructions to its supporters in the OPT 
to cooperate with the US initiative launched by President George Bush on 6 March 1991, a 
decision which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
139 Helga Baumgarten, "Discontent People'' and "Outside Agitators" in Jamal R. Nassar, Roger Heacock 
(eds) Intifada, p. 222. 
140 Mahdi Abdul Hadi, "The Palestinian Declaration of Independence", in Documents on Palestine, Volume 
I, p. 331 
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Conclusion: One Leadership in Two Parts 
This chapter shows that, in fluctuating circumstances, the Palestinian leadership inside and 
outside maintained complementary rather than competitive relations throughout the years 
leading up to the Madrid peace process. That was especially true when Israel and the 
United States tried to bypass the PLO and prevent it from playing the role of 
representative, using the inside leadership instead. Consensus on this issue was especially 
important considering the fact that legitimacy as the representative of the Palestinian 
people was the main, if not the only, achievement ofthe PLO. The role ofthe inside in 
protecting that achievement is best expressed by Hanan Ashrawi: "We (the inside) become 
the umbilical cord of the PLO, at once linking it to the rest of the word, while granting it 
the legitimacy of a constituency on the land of Palestine."141 
This interdependency was a direct result of the realities faced by each part ofthe political 
leadership. The inside leadership emerged in a very aggressive atmosphere. The Israeli 
occupation continued to kill, arrest and deport the leaders of the political movement. In the 
early stages of the formation ofthe leadership inside, the PLO outside provided it with 
lungs to breath. At the same time, the outside needed the support and legitimacy of the 
inside. Even when American diplomacy avoided dealing with the PLO directly, the inside 
forced its presence at the table. Faisal Husseini, the most popular leader in the territories 
started his first meeting with James Baker in Jerusalem by saying: 142"We are here at the 
behest ofthe PLO, our sole legitimate leader." 
What is most important, then, in studying the formation of the leadership inside and 
outside is not competition between them but rather how they pursued their differing 
political priorities (sometimes through different political behaviour) within a 
fundamentally complementary framework. Differences in priorities and behaviour can be 
explained by their differing environments and circumstances. Living 'within' Palestinian 
society and under direct occupation prevented the inside leadership from deviating from 
the 'correct' politics of its immediate constituency. The priority was the ending of the 
141 Ashrawi, This Side of Peace, p. 58. 
142 Ibid., p. 82. 
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occupation and stopping Israeli settlement expansions. In exile, on the other hand, the 
leadership outside was concerned with its relations with Arab governments, its status as a 
recognized leadership, and financial considerations. 
Thus, an interesting dichotomy existed: neither the inside nor the outside was able to 
survive without the other. At times they expressed differences in interest, bordering even 
on occasion in tension or suspicion, but at the end of the day the commitment ofthe two 
sides to one another, and their co-ordination with one another, remained secure. 
Given this conclusion, which differs substantially from conventional understandings of the 
Palestinian leadership, it is now possible to re-evaluate the processes and outcomes of the 
peace process. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Palestinian Participation in the Peace 
Process: The Madrid Conference and Washington Negotiations 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine how the Palestinian leadership dealt with the joint American-
Soviet invitation to participate in the peace process. Because the timing and conditions of 
the invitation took advantage of the weakness ofthe PLO outside, the complementary 
relationship between inside and outside became crucial. The loyalty ofthe inside to the 
PLO leadership outside, and the harmony that existed in their political positions enabled 
the leadership to have its cake and eat it, too. It did this by appointing a delegation from the 
inside (thus getting around prohibitions on PLO participation in the talks) that would 
present PLO negotiating positions. Similarly, this delegation had no difficulty in 
maintaining the role of loyal emissaries. This has never been properly understood in the 
literature, which mistakenly viewed the inside and outside as competitors. 
This chapter will show that despite the political harmony that existed between the inside 
and outside, each group nonetheless had different emphases and priorities, coloured by 
their specific realities. The outside wanted the delegation to the talks to pursue tactics that 
would restore the direct representative role of the PLO outside, including bringing it to the 
negotiating table. The inside, on the other hand, preferred a negotiations approach that 
would help stop illegal Israeli activities, especially those consolidating the occupation and 
oppressing Palestinians in their homeland. In sum, while the structure of the negotiations 
was determined according to Israeli preferences, the Palestinians were to some extent (but 
not entirely) able to overcome this problem. 
Finally, this chapter will demonstrate that the flexibility of the leadership over issues of 
representation, the formation of the delegation to the talks, and the negotiations' structure 
and process did not succeed in offsetting the negative political environment. The 
imbalance of power, continued Israeli provocations, and impartial attitude ofthe talks' 
sponsors all prevented the negotiations from succeeding. 
76 
The scope of this chapter will cover the international Middle East peace conference in 
Madrid on 31 October, 1991, and the subsequent bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations 
in Washington, DC that started in December 1991. The conference was called by joint 
invitation from the United States and the Soviet Union. The joint letter of invitation and 
letters of assurances from the United States to the parties to the talks served as terms of 
reference and were based on United Nation Security Council resolutions 243 and 338, and 
the principle of land for peace. These also stipulated that the peace process would have two 
phases; an interim phase that would produce agreement on Palestinian autonomy, and a 
final agreement addressing a final and comprehensive peace. 
This peace initiative had a particular historical context. During the Gulf War, in which 
many Arab states sided with the US against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the US was 
accused of double standards, i.e. being comparably tolerant oflsraeli occupation of Arab 
land. As a result, the American government wanted to compensate its Arab allies. Another 
motive was the weakness and isolation ofthe PLO leadership, which convinced the 
American administration that it could either bypass the PLO or encourage an alternative 
leadership from the OPT, an objective sought by Israel from the early stages of its 
occupation. In other words, the United States thought that the regional political 
environment was conducive to a process Israel could accept, and the Palestinian leadership 
could not reject. 143 
In order to best demonstrate these arguments, this chapter will be divided into sections that 
describe the Palestinian leadership's performance during the various stages of the Madrid 
conference and the subsequent Washington negotiations. The first section will answer the 
question why the Palestinian leadership decided to accept the invitation and participate in 
the negotiations, despite restrictions and conditions it considered unfair. The second 
section covers how the Palestinian participation was formulated, including the American-
Palestinian discussion that took place over the composition of the delegation and its terms 
of reference, related Israeli conditions, and the dynamic Palestinian debate among the 
leadership and public over participation. Section three will present what happened in the 
143 See Emma C. Murphy, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict in the New World Order", in Haifa Jawad, The Middle 
East in the New World Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997 2"d edition) pp. I I 0-139. 
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negotiations and the discussions over the leadership's performances that were generated 
between the inside and outside, on one hand, and among the public, on the other. The final 
section will attempt to answer the question as to why the Washington negotiations failed to 
reach an agreement. 
The Palestinian Leadership's Decision to Participate in the Peace 
Process 
Many previous US attempts to start a peace process based on Israeli conditions-non-
recognition of the principles ofPLO participation and the Palestinians' right to self-
determination-had ended in failure because the PLO had the power to reject them. Even 
when the PLO was still rebuilding five years after leaving Beirut weak and defeated, the 
Intifada (the Palestinian popular uprising against the Israeli occupation that started in 
December I 987), came to the rescue, enabling it to reject Schultz Plan 144, which ignored its 
existence. 
The American administration started preparations for the peace process at a time when the 
PLO outside was at its weakest, having experienced the fall of its superpower ally; the 
defeat of its Arab ally, Iraq, and the subsequent loss in Arab financial support; and finally, 
the increase in the political weight of the Palestinian leadership in the OPT. The PLO was 
left with the impression that it was required to facilitate the Palestinian participation in the 
talks at the expense of its positions and its existence. That was best expressed by PLO 
Chairman, Y asser Arafat: 
Dear brothers, the Americans will not forgive us our previous positions, especially 
during the Gulf War. In the eyes of the Americans, you are a terrorist organization. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Americans will focus on fighting the so-
called terrorism; they want Yasser Arafat to be the drone that stings once and then 
dies. 145 
144 An American plan promoted by Secretary of State Georg Schultz, aimed at initiating political process of 
negotiations between Israel and the Arab States that by passes the PLO. 
145 Mamdouh Nofal, Qissat Itifaq Oslo (Amman: Alahliya, 1995) p. 32. 
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These statements were made within the context of Arafat explaining why the PLO had to 
agree on Palestinian participation in the peace process under restrictions that directly 
contradicted fundamental PLO principles and positions-particularly representation of the 
Palestinian people by the PLO. 
The loss of a superpower ally, the Soviet Union, was a major factor in weakening the 
Palestinian leadership and cause. The Soviet Union had been an indispensable supporter 
and ally ofthe Palestinian leadership cause since the mid-50s. It had been the PLO's main 
source of arms and weapons since its establishment. Furthermore, within the context of the 
Cold War, the Soviet Union was the main ally and supporter of those Arab countries 
interested in fighting Israel in support of Palestinians. In addition, political achievements, 
such as supportive resolutions at the United Nations and other international arenas would 
not have been possible without Soviet support. For that reason, losing this ally left the PLO 
vulnerable to international pressure. 
The dependence of Palestinian politics and the PLO leadership on the support of the Soviet 
Union stemmed originally from the need to balance the strategic alliance between the US 
and Israel. Historically, Arab and Palestinian dependence on Soviet support dates back to 
the Suez crisis and war, which Arabs called the "tripartite aggression" and which ended 
with Israel occupying the Palestinian Gaza Strip. During this period, Arab revolutionaries, 
particularly Egypt, could find no ally but the Soviet Union. 
Many Palestinian historians and analysts believe that the Soviet warning of intervention 
was one ofthe key factors leading to the termination of the Israeli-British-French 
aggression and to Israel's withdrawal from Gaza. According to Palestinian historian Emil 
Touma: 
The steadfastness of the Arab Egyptian people, the solidarity ofthe Arabs and the 
Soviet Union's warning may have been the decisive measures that forced the 
governments of Britain, France and Israel to retreat and withdraw from the 
Egyptian territory. 146 
146 Emil Touma, ai-Aa 'mal ai-Kamelah, vol. 4 (Haifa: I mil Tam a Centre for Political and Social Research, 
1995) p. 396. 
79 
As the PLO grew in power and authority, a strong relationship emerged between the PLO 
and the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the Soviet Union's provision of arms to the PLO at 
the end of 1972. 147 Moscow received Chairman Arafat in February 1970, in October 1971 
and in July 1972. 148 
Salah Khalaf, the second man in the PLO, quoted on the relationship with the Soviet 
Union: 
We have friends in the world, first and foremost the Soviet Union and other 
socialist countries. Not knowing who one's friends are is not a [wise] political 
attitude. If the USSR is our friend, we must keep its friendship and strengthen it, to 
do that, maintain the dialogue with it... 149 
The most recent example ofthe PLO's dependence on the support of the Soviet Union was 
the attempt to reject the US-Schultz initiative during the Intifada in 1988. After the 
Executive Committee of the PLO and the Intifada leadership had succeeded in getting the 
Palestinians to boycott Secretary of State Schultz's visit and reject his proposal, Vasser 
Arafat headed straight to Moscow on April 7, 1988, accompanied by a large delegation. 
There, the Soviets' declaration of opposition to the Schultz plan encouraged the PLO and 
Arafat to reject the initiative openly. Prime Minister Gorbachev expressed his opinion that 
there was a: 
need to reject the Schultz initiative because it does not meet the requirements of a 
permanent and just peace, and it does not deal with the PLO as the sole and 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and it does not talk about the 
self-determination of the Palestinian people' ... The Soviet leadership called on the 
Palestinian leadership to hold on to the idea of an international conference and total 
withdrawal from Arab and Palestinian occupied lands and to the right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination and the establishment of an independent 
state. 150 
A decline in Soviet support for the PLO began when Gorbachev started shifting Soviet 
policy away from the emphasis on the Middle East and the ideologically-motivated support 
147 Gresh, PLO, p. ISS. 
148 lbid. 
149 lbid., p. 14S. 
150 Mamdouh Nofal, Alinqi/ab (Amman: Dar Alshoroq, 1996) pp. 19-20. 
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for governments and revolutionary movements of the Brezhnev era, toward improved 
relations with Israel and Western-oriented Arab countries. Gorbachev recognized the state 
of Israel and facilitated the immigration of Jews to Israel, and started pressuring the PLO to 
amend certain of its positions. This transformed Palestinian-Soviet relations into a liability, 
in the view of the PLO. According to Palestinian scholar Naseer Aruri: 
Soviet policy under Gorbachev, in effect, revised the I 98 I Brezhnev Plan in order 
to accommodate US and Israeli demands .... The new Soviet approach was designed 
to take some wind out of the sails of the US-Israel special relationship, having gone 
a long way towards meeting the US position and bringing with it a refional 
alignment, most ofwhose components were traditionally pro-West. 15 
According to Mamdouh Nofal, the loss of Soviet support for the PLO position, and the 
transformation of that support into a tool used to pressure the PLO to accept US demands, 
had an enormous effect on the PLO's acceptance of the peace process under US 
conditions. Arafat summarized the position as follows: "Dear brothers, God bless those 
who know their real status. We cannot confront the Americans, Russians and Arabs all at 
the same time." 152 
The Gulf War of I 99I and the PLO's position on that war was another factor in weakening 
the Palestinian leadership. After the Gulf War, the power balance in the region shifted. The 
US exploited this new imbalance, and the PLO's pro-Iraq position in the war, to sharpen its 
attack against the PLO leadership and to set the stage for excluding the PLO from any 
upcoming peace initiative. Aruri quoted President Bush, saying: "The PLO had 'backed the 
wrong horse', said President Bush, implying that it should not, therefore, expect an 
. . . h . . ,153 
mvitation to t e post-war negotiations. 
This concentrated campaign targeting the credibility of the PLO leadership, particularly 
that ofYasser Arafat, had an impact on the leadership and its positions. It was in this 
period that a number of analysts predicted that the US, after its victory in the Cold War, 
151 Naseer Aruri, The Obstruction of Peace (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995) p. 121. 
152 Nofal, Alinqilab, p. 41. 
153 Aruri, The Obstruction, p. 163. 
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and its later victory over Iraq, would keep striking at remaining pockets of Eastern Bloc 
influence, such as Cuba and the PLO. 
Mamdouh Nofal best described the condition and status of the PLO when he said: 
In February-March 1991, the PLO became exposed politically, reaching its weakest 
condition yet. The status of the PLO had become extremely vulnerable; the PLO 
lived in a state of turmoil and anxiety over the future, including its very survival. 
The Gulf war ended in the defeat of Iraq and all those who stood supporting it, and 
the US with its allies won. The strong US propaganda launched against the PLO 
leadership and against Abu Ammar personally intensified the concern and anxiety 
within the PLO Ieadership. 154 
Within this context came the US peace process initiative, which was based on the 
understanding that the imbalance left by the Gulf War-particularly the lack of support 
from the Soviet Union-was precisely what was needed to ensure the success of the 
initiative. 
The Washington Institute for Strategic Studies, a non-government think tank very close to 
the US administration at the time, reflected that understanding in expressing its support in 
Pursuing Peace, which laid out the American strategy for the Arab-Israeli Peace process: 
The demise ofthe Soviet Union and the destruction of Iraq's offensive capabilities 
in the Gulf war have broken the back of the 'Rejection Front' so instrumental in 
preventing progress in the peace process since the early 1980s. The most powerful 
Arab forces once opposed the peace are either defeated (Iraq), or discredited (the 
PLO) or unable to count on previous strong Soviet support (Syria). This has created 
the most favorable regional and international environment for Arab-Israeli 
peacemaking in living memory .155 
The results ofthe war also included a change in the positions of the Arab states vis-a-vis 
the PLO and the resolution of the Palestinian issue. The (united) Arab position was 
demonstrated in summit conferences in Rabat in 1974, in Fez in 1982, in Amman in 1987 
and in Algeria in 1988. In all ofthese summits, the Arab governments stressed the need to 
recognize of the PLO, an end to the Israeli occupation, a solution to refugees problem 
154 Notal, Alinqilab, p. 36. 
155 Washington Institute for Strategic Studies, Pursuing Peace (Washington, DC: 1992) p. iii. 
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according to UN resolution 194, and an international peace conference as the mechanism 
to achieve a just peace. 
After the war, however, there was a general retreat from these positions and division 
among the Arab states. Aruri noted that: "The erosion of official Arab support for the PLO 
began to result in a clear distancing from Palestinian national rights, including self-
determination."156 There was also a drastic decline in support, especially financial, from 
Arab states angered by the PLO's pro-Iraq stance during the war. This was exacerbated by 
the indirect costs of the War for Palestinians, including the retaliatory expulsion of 
Palestinian migrant workers from the Gulf Arab countries. 157 
All this helped establish the new policy ofthe PLO leadership-and helped ensure the 
success of that policy-which was to save itself from the US-led anti-PLO campaign by 
making further concessions. As Mamdouh Nofal recalled: 
As the tanks and planes ceased their activities in the Gulf area, the US 
administration made renewed moves towards peace making in the region. The PLO 
leadership welcomed those moves and attempted to participate in them by 
expressing its willingness to adapt and respond positively to the 'New World 
Order' and to the Americans' post-Cold War Middle East policy. 158 
One of the main ramifications of the Gulf war on the PLO was the sharp decline in 
previously generous Arab financial support to the PLO. The Gulf States wanted to punish 
the PLO because of its support for Iraq. In addition, the United States encouraged its Arab 
allies to up the financial pressure as a tool for extracting further political concessions from 
the PLO. 
The Intifada was an important factor contributing to Palestinian participation in the peace 
process. It strengthened the Palestinian political position and made it difficult to ignore. In 
156 Aruri, The Obstruction, p. 166. 
157 Sara Roy argues that in 1987 total remittances from the Gulf countries amounted to $250 million or I 0% 
of the OPT's GNP. The expulsion of Palestinian workers from the Gulf: as well as the loss of up to $1 5-20 
billion of Palestinian savings amassed in Kuwaiti banks but lost through Iraqi plundering, and the knock-out 
effects of the Jordanian economic crisis incurred as a result of the war, inflated Gazan unemployment to 
40%, and led to an immediate 10% decline in the Gazan economy alone. (Roy, Failing Peace, p. 45.) 
158 Nofal, Alinqi/ab, p. 36. 
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addition, the Intifada leaders' loyalty to and support for PLO representation ofthe 
Palestinian people reinforced the PLO's position and gave it much-needed self-confidence. 
The popular and non-violent nature of the Intifada lent Palestinians the support and 
sympathy ofthe international community, compensating for deteriorating Arab and 
international passion for the PLO. That is especially relevant in light of the fact that the 
PLO had thus far pursued solely armed struggle. 
The strength of the Intifada, in which 389 Palestinians were killed by the Israelis in the 
first year, lay in the tactics used against Israel. The Intifada exploited Israel's weak points 
and effectively neutralized its source of power-its planes, tanks and trained army-which 
could not fight against a grassroots peaceful popular struggle. Taken from another angle, 
this style of struggle gained huge international sympathy and support and in the race for 
international public opinion was able to come out ahead of superior Israeli public relations 
skills. 
The Intifada was completely different from traditional PLO methods, which had always 
favoured armed struggle and military tactics. In Lebanon, the PLO had come close to 
resembling a classic army, with heavy weaponry such as tanks and artillery. This 
characteristic was hugely in Israel's favour in influencing international public opinion, 
reaping the PLO few gains; by comparison, the Intifada achieved a great deal. 159 
The style and methods of the Intifada had an impact, for the first time, on Israel's official 
position on the OPT, creating a desire to rid Israel of the burdens of the Intifada through 
political means, since all military methods had failed. As Rubin says: "After over 20 years 
of Israeli occupation, Palestinians-through a continuous rebellion that began in December 
1987-quickly made the Occupied [Palestinian] Territory impossible for Israel to 
govern."160 
159 For details of the Palestinian strategies and tactics during the Intifada, and an assessment of their impact, 
see Geoffrey Aronson, Israel, Palestinians and the Intifada: Creating Facts on the West Bank (London: 
Kegan Paul International, 1990) pp. 323-343. 
160 Rubin, Revolution until Victory, p. 58 
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The PLO leadership was well aware that the Intifada offered it an important card for 
negotiations. As such, it helped to make the peace process and Palestinian participation 
possible by placing pressure on Israel to relieve the situation, which it seemed unable to do 
with military means. Second, the Intifada projected and promoted a political solution. PLO 
leader Salah Khalaf correctly stated: "'Ifthey [the inside] had not requested that political 
initiative, it would not have happened.' Another PLO leader called the Intifada 'the real 
mother of the peace process."'161 
It is useful to further clarify this issue by trying to understand the mentality of the leaders 
of the Intifada concerning the relationship between the inside and outside at this time. Most 
Intifada leaders did not address this issue because of its sensitivity and because most of 
them were imprisoned, with little opportunity for freedom of expression. However, Bassam 
al-Salhi, a member ofUNLU, discussed the issue in a book on political and religious 
leadership in the OPT. In his book, he explained the differences on the role ofthe inside 
that occurred between the Unified Leadership and the PLO leadership: "there seemed to be 
some differences in understanding the role ofthe UNLU between the inside and the 
outside. Particularly, whether it is merely an arm of the PLO in the occupied territory, just 
a coordination committee, or a political front that has under its command political 
personalities." 162 
In the early stages of the Intifada, the UNLU succeeded in becoming the "undisputed 
commander of the various daily and field struggle activities in the Palestinian Occupied 
Territory. It succeeded in filling the leadership vacuum in the territory." 163 
This situation was not very comfortable for the PLO leadership outside because it led to 
differences in political priorities with the inside leadership. The PLO needed to exploit the 
Intifada's achievements to regain its political status at Arab and international levels. 
According to al-Salhi, this caused the 
161 Nofal, Alinqilab, p. 92. 
162 Bassam al-Salhi, Az-za 'amah a-Siyasiyeh wa Diniyehji-1-Ard ii-Muhtellah, 1967-1991 (Jerusalem: Dar il-
Quds 1-il-Nashir wa Tawzia', 1993) p. 124. 
163 Ibid., p. 128. 
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PLO on the outside to increase its demands on the Intifada leadership to take into 
consideration the working conditions of the PLO, its status and the various 
positions that were different from the statements and activities of the Intifada 
leadership, particularly with regard to the PLO's relations with Arab countries. 
There was also joint [inside and outside] desire to utilize the Intifada by both the 
PLO and the UNLU, not only inside but also outside; with the purpose of removing 
the effect created by the media that denies any relation of the PLO with the 
Intifada. In fact trying to remove this imprison brought the PLO to try to have a 
hand-on approach in its relation with the Intifada. 164 
Media claims, particularly in the Israeli media, that the Intifada was independent of the 
PLO made the latter anxious to demonstrably control the Intifada. The Intifada leadership 
was also in a difficult position, tom between wanting freedom of movement and 
maintaining its connections with the PLO, and aware ofthe importance of strengthening 
the status of the PLO as the symbol of Palestinian unity and nationhood. 
Through these two desires, the Intifada laid the groundwork for Palestinian participation in 
the peace process. In order to harvest the uprising's political achievements, the PLO 
leadership encouraged loyal public figures to play the role of spokespersons for the 
Intifada. They were mostly leading figures in the same factions that were represented in the 
UNLU, in addition to a few independent political figures. The most prominent example 
was Faisal Husseini, a leading Fatah activist in Jerusalem. Having political prominence, 
public credibility, visibility, and connections with foreign diplomats and press people, they 
were easily engaged in American efforts to prepare for the peace process. Of this, ai-Salhi 
says: 
The third stage of the Intifada witnessed an increase in the status [ofthe national 
figures] at the expense of the status ofthe leadership of the Intifada, and the PLO 
gave its blessing to the committee of national figures in the occupied territory 
whose status gradually increased once again in an overwhelming fashion. This 
coincided with the declaration of the US peace project and Baker's visits to the 
region, and later the convening of the Madrid conference and the rounds of 
negotiations that followed. 165 
To summarize, in 1991, the PLO leadership found itself facing difficult choices. The peace 
process seemed to be inevitable, but the PLO was too weak to influence the conditions for 
164 Ibid. p. 129. 
165 ai-Salhi, Az-za 'amah a-S(vasiyeh, p. 137. 
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the talks, and would be further weakened if others were to negotiate the Palestinian future 
in its absence. The way out was to use the inside in a manner that again complemented the 
roll of the outside, all the time serving the Palestinian interest and gaining popularity. 
Thus, the Intifada strengthened and rescued the PLO. The PLO, as the symbol of the 
Palestinian struggle, was reinforced externally by the renewed interest in and support for 
the national cause, which resulted from events on the ground. The PLO leadership, running 
the PLO bureaucracy, felt nevertheless that the balance of power was moving to the inside 
and consequently sought to increase its own direct influence on the inside leadership by 
cultivating prominent Fatah personalities therein. 
The Nature of the Palestinian Participation in the Peace Process 
The year 1991 provided a new opportunity for the United States to successfully pursue its 
plan for a peace process in the Middle East. In this regard, a report from the Washington 
Institute for Strategic Studies, a non government but close to the administration stated that: 
"In the aftermath of Desert Storm, America possessed unique strengths: prestige as 
the victor in the Gulf; status as sole superpower; an ability to rally an international 
coalition; and a special relationship with key Middle East states, especially Egypt, 
Israel Saudi Arabia and Turkey ... the US might be able to do much more than in the 
past, and at a lower cost."166 
In general, this opportunity was supposed to "make the region safer for US interests". 
Specifically, those vital interests stemmed from the following analysis: 
The US will grow more heavily dependent on Persian Gulf Oil. Israel's survival, a 
bipartisan, decades-old US commitment, will still be at risk in the absence of peace. 
The danger of future proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction 
has been highli~hted by Iraq's quest for the bomb and Iran's current pursuit of the 
nuclear option. 67 
To serve these vital American interests a wide variety of political, economic and military 
actions needed to be planned and organized, including changes in regional security, arms 
control, economic development and political arrangements. For these reasons, President 
162 Washington Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 3. 
167 Ibid., p. 2. 
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Bush and Secretary of State Baker indicated that: '"business as usual' would no longer be 
the order of the day. Instead there would be a determined, US-led attempt to create 
regional security for the Persian Gulf, a negotiated Arab-Israeli peace, new controls on 
arms transfers to the Middle East, and broader economic development."168 
The three official documents that formally specify the nature of the American peace 
process initiative that was launched 31 October, 1991 were: the American and Soviet 
letters of invitation to the Madrid conference; the American letters of assurance to the 
parties to the conference, including the Palestinians and the remarks by President Bush at 
the Madrid conference itself. 
The joint US-USSR letters of invitation stated concerning the Palestinian-Israeli part of the 
process that: 
With respect to negotiations between Israel and Palestinians who are part of the 
joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, [these] will be conducted in phases, 
beginning with talks on interim self-government arrangement with the objective of 
reaching agreement in one year. Once agreed, the interim self-government 
arrangement will last for a period of five years. Beginning the third year of the 
period of interim self-government arrangements, negotiations will talk place on 
Permanent Status. These permanent status negotiations, and the negotiation 
between Israel and the Arab States, will take place on the basis of Resolutions 242 
and 338. 169 
In his opening remark to the Madrid conference, President Bush reiterated the basic 
principles of the invitation, such as basing the negotiations on United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the phased structure of the process. Bush also stated: 
In our view, something must be developed, something acceptable to Israel, the Palestinians 
and Jordan, that gives the Palestinian people meaningful control over their own lives and 
fate and provides the acceptance and security of Israel. 170 
164 Ibid., p. I. 
169 The American-Soviet Letter of Invitation to Madrid Peace Conference [http://www. jmcc. 
org/documents/madridinvite. htm] 19 October 1991 
170 The opening speech of President Bush at the Madrid Peace Conference [http://www. jmcc. 
org/documents/bushmadrid. htm] 
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The American letter of assurances to the Palestinians dated 18 October, 1991 was the most 
detailed of all, and may be the most significant. However, it was technically less important 
than other documents because it was not binding on Israel. This letter describes the basis 
for the entire peace initiative: 
... [T]he United States continues to believe firmly that a comprehensive peace must 
be grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the 
principle of territory for peace. Such an outcome must also provide for security and 
recognition for all states in the region, including Israel, and for the legitimate 
political rights ofthe Palestinian people. 171 
The letter also stated, "The US believes that there should be an end to the Israeli 
occupation which can occur only through genuine and meaningful negotiations ... We 
believe Palestinians should gain control over political, economic and other decisions that 
affect their lives and fate. " 172 
By accepting Palestinian participation on the basis spelled out in the three documents, the 
PLO had already given major concessions. The PLO was not to represent the 
Palestinians-the United States had no intention of"bring[ing] the PLO into the process or 
to make Israel enter a dialogue or negotiation with the PL0."173 The negotiations were 
about self-government arrangements rather than self-determination, as the United States 
did "not support the creation of an independent Palestinian state."174 Furthermore, by 
accepting these conditions and an invitation that restricted Palestinian representation to 
"Palestinian residents ofthe West Bank and Gaza,"175 i.e., not East Jerusalem and not 
outside, including the PLO, the PLO had agreed to the negation of several of its 
fundamental principles. Moreover, the Palestinian delegation would be part of a joint 
Palestinian-Jordanian delegation and not independently recognized. These condition 
represented severe structural constraints for the PLO leadership. 
171 The American Letter of Assurances to the Palestinians [http://www. jmcc. org/documents/usasurelet. htm] 
18 October, 1991. 
mlbid. 
173 The American Letter of Assurances to Israel [http://www. monde-diplomatique. fr/cahier/proche-
orient/madrid-garantie-en]18 October, 1991. 
174 1bid. 
175 Ibid. 
89 
Furthermore, these terms of references for the peace process, which in fact arose out of 
Israeli conditions, did not allow the negotiations to go beyond the parameters of the 1979 
Camp David Accords that had been rejected at the time by Palestinians. The Camp David 
accords dealt with Palestinian inhabitants in the West Bank and Gaza only, excluded the 
PLO and Palestinians outside Palestine, and left out of the scope of negotiations all 
unilateral Israeli actions, mainly Israeli settlements. While the Camp David Accords 
between Egypt and Israel included a section on Palestinian-Israeli future relations, this had 
been rejected by the Palestinians because it failed to guarantee them the right to self-
determination, an end to occupation and ultimately statehood. The Camp David Accord 
was the original source of the two-stage approach: interim self-government arrangements, 
and a final status. 
Israel was keen to impose many conditions on the participation ofthe Palestinians in the 
peace process. The Americans found the Likud-led Israeli government reluctant to take 
part in the process, and to soften that reluctance, they tried to accommodate these 
conditions. This included restricting the Palestinian participation to a joint Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation, and insisting that the Palestinian members in that delegation had to 
be only from Gaza and the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem. 
Hanan Ashrawi noted this Camp David-style of setting conditions for the Palestinian 
participation in the peace process: 
With resuscitated copies of the Camp David Accords, and taking points prepared 
by his team, Baker leaned on us hard. Faced as well with a hard-line Israeli Likud 
government led by the brittle and caustic Yitzhak Shamir, he thrust his energies full 
force toward what he considered the point of least resistance, the Palestinians. 176 
The American team, led by Baker, shuttled back and forth between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians using the American stick-and-carrot policy, applying pressure on the 
Palestinians to accept the Israeli conditions on their participation. As Ashrawi said: 
The Israelis were granted all their demands: just some of those being that the UN 
would be excluded, that there would be no participation by Palestinians from the 
176 Ashrawi, This Side of Peace, p. 48. 
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outside or by Palestinian Jerusalemites. We were informed that this was the only 
way to stop the settlements and to bring about the devolution of the occupation. 177 
In attempting to get the Palestinians to agree to the Israeli restrictions, James Baker used 
three different tactics over the course of his 18 visits to the region. First, he gave the 
impression that refusing Israel's conditions would result in the peace process taking off 
without the Palestinians. On one occasion, in a meeting with Faisal Husseini, Hanan 
Ashrawi and Zakaria ai-Agha, Baker said bluntly: "You guys had better get your act 
together, or you'll prove Abba Eban true-'The Palestinians never miss an opportunity to 
miss an opportunity.' Everybody's on board except you, and it you don't accept, we'll go 
ahead without you." 178 
A second tactic was the argument that the peace process would be the Palestinians' only 
opportunity to stop settlement expansion and end the occupation. Responding to Abdei-
Shafi's concern that "there can be no peace process while settlements continue", and 
Bethlehem mayor Elias Freij's question, "how can you expect our delegation to negotiate 
with the noise of bulldozers in the background?" Baker said: "Begin negotiations and the 
settlements will stop."179 And when confronted with the Israeli violations of Palestinian 
human rights and the need to respect the Geneva conventions, Baker responded: "That's 
why you should negotiate to end the occupation and all its practices."180 
Baker's third tactic was the argument that Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was 
insisting on the restrictions in order to push the Palestinians to "reject" the negotiations, so 
that Israel could avoid a peace process in which it was not interested, the Palestinians 
would be embarrassed, and Israel would not take any blame for the failure of the initiative. 
Baker expressed this view several times, advising Palestinians not to "let the cat die at your 
doorstep." 181 
177 Ibid., p. XX. 
178 Ibid., p. 127. 
179 Ibid., p. 84. 
180 Ibid., p. 83. 
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In fact, it was the Israeli leadership that was less than enthusiastic about Palestinian 
participation and had formulated the "terms of understanding" for the Madrid conference 
together with US Secretary of State James Baker during his second tour of the region. 
Baker justified US acceptance ofShamir's conditions as the basis for the Madrid 
conference, saying that this was the only way to ensure Israel's participation. The formal 
terms of understanding included the following: 
• To hold a regional (not international, as specified by the Palestinians) peace 
conference sponsored by the United States (not the United Nations), a ceremonial 
event with no decision-making mandate, which was to culminate in direct 
negotiations between the parties. 
• To have two direct negotiations tracks, one between Israel and the Arab countries, 
and another track to engage in direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinians. 
• No participation by the PLO in the direct bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; 
no participation by Palestinians from outside the Palestinian Occupied Territory or 
from East Jerusalem; Palestinian participation to be limited to representatives from 
the West Bank (without Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip as part of a joint Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation. 
• Direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians to be conducted 
according to the Shamir Plan of May 1989, which included "negotiations in two 
phases, with the first phase containing negotiations on autonomy, to be followed 
after three years with negotiations on the final settlement."182 
Most of the terms of understanding, which became the general framework of the peace 
process, clearly had been taken from the 1979 Camp David Agreement, as the following 
excerpt from the agreement illustrates: 
182 Yitzhak Shamir: Interview on the Peace Process, Tel Aviv, 17 April 1991 (excerpts), Journal of Palestine 
Studies, vol. 20, iss. 80 ( 1991) p. 180. 
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... There should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a 
period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the 
inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its 
civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as self-governing authority has 
been freely elected ... as soon as possible, but no later than the third year after the 
beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the 
final status ofthe West Bank and Gaza and its relations with neighbours. 183 
Camp David was also clear in terms of Palestinian representation: "The delegations of 
Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other 
Palestinians as mutually agreed."184 
In a meeting held in Algeria, 23-28 September 1991, the Palestinian National Council 
(PNC), issued new resolutions with the objective of responding to the Israeli-American 
conditions on Palestinian participation in the peace process. The response welcomed the 
American initiative, but in the same time qualified this with the well-known political 
principles of the PLO's political stand. The Council's Political Committee report included 
the following: 
In line with the Palestinian peace initiative in 1988 as well as the Arab legitimacy, the PLO 
has responded positively and effectively to the positive ideas and proposals contained in 
the declaration made by US president George Bush ... The PLO welcomes the current 
peaceful efforts and views them in a positive way. The success of these efforts to hold a 
peace conference requires resumption ofwork with the other parties to achieve the 
following principles: 
To base the peace conference on [the principles of] international legitimacy, 
including UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, with compliance to 
implement them, thus ensuring Israel's withdrawal from Arab and Palestinian 
occupied lands, including villages, and to uphold the principle of 'land for 
peace' ... To stop settlements in occupied territory, including Jerusalem, to answer 
the urgent need for a calm atmosphere in the peace process ... The PLO, which is 
considered the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, will have the 
183 International Communication Agency, A Framework for Peace in the Middle East, pp. 3-4. 
184 Ibid., p. 3. 
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right to form the Palestinian delegation from inside and outside the homeland, 
including Jerusalem. 185 
It is worth noting here the flexible language used by the PNC. There are no pre-conditions 
for participation: stopping settlements is not a condition for Palestinian participation but is 
required in order to have a "calm atmosphere" for the peace process. The PLO does not 
insist on participating in the negotiations and representing the Palestinian people but 
maintains the right to select the delegation. 
A review of a PNC Political Committee statement from the 19th session, held three years 
before in Algeria, 12-15 February 1988, serves to better highlight the change in the level of 
flexibility: 
The National Council emphasizes the PLO's determination to reach a 
comprehensive political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its core-the 
Palestinian cause ... until this aim is achieved, the National Council asserts the 
following: 
The need to hold an effective international conference concerning the Middle East 
conflict and its core, the Palestinian cause, under the supervision of the United 
Nations and with the participation of the permanent member countries in the UN 
Security Council and, on an equal basis, all parties involved in the conflict in the 
region, including the PLO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people. Israel's withdrawal from all Arab and Palestinian territory occupied since 
1967, including Arab Jerusalem. The cancellation of all forms of annexation, and 
the removal of all settlements established by Israel on Arab and Palestinian lands 
since 1967. 186 
Thus, the concerns for the PLO's own survival, their weakness resulting from the Gulf War 
and the loss of the Soviet Union as an international ally, led the PLO leadership to: first, 
show further flexibility in its respond to the conditions and restrictions on the Palestinian 
participation, and secondly rely on the loyal and reliable component of the leadership 
inside. In accepting the conditions for the Madrid Conference, however, they were 
demonstrating their vulnerabilities in a political environment shaped by American 
international dominance, American compliance with the hard-line positions ofthe Israeli 
185 Palestine National Council, 20'h session, PNC publication, pp. 70-71. 
186 Palestine National Council, 19'h session, PNC publication, pp. 83-84. 
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Likud Government, and a weak, divided and unsupportive Arab world. Neither the 
structures nor the environment were in their favour. 
Strategies to Offset Structural Vulnerabilities: Selecting the 
Palestinian Delegation 
On the formation of the delegation to the conference and negotiations, the PLO leadership 
was also flexible. Certain methods were pursued to offset and compensate for its own 
absence. The PLO and the delegation never wasted any opportunity to announce that the 
PLO leadership had nominated the delegation as its own. It was also decided that the 
delegation-which was restricted to non-Jerusalem residents ofthe OPT-would be part of 
a larger Palestinian team to the peace process. That team included members of the PLO 
outside, and politicians from Jerusalem. Of course, they were not allowed to take part in 
the actual negotiations, but their presence reminded others of who was absent. 
Following are the names of the delegation team, including the negotiators: 
Delegation members: 
Dr. Haidar Abdui-Shafi, 70 years old, physician, independent from Gaza 
Dr. Samir Abdulla, 42 years old, academic, Peoples Party, from Ramallah 
Freih Abu-Meiden, 47 years old, lawyer, Fatah, from Gaza 
Dr. Zakaria Agha, 49 years old, physician, Fatah from Gaza 
Dr. Mamdouh AI Aker, 48 years old, physician, independent, from Nablus 
Dr. Saeb Erekat, 36 years old, academic, Fatah, from Jericho 
Elias Freij, 71 year old, Mayer, independent, from Bethlehem 
Dr. Abdulrahman Hamad, 46 years old, academic, Fatah from Gaza 
Dr. Nabil Ja'bari, 45 years old, dentist, Fatah, from Hebron 
Sameh Kanaan, 37 years old, activist, Fatah, from Nablus 
Dr. Nabil Kassis, 46 years old, academic, independent, from Ramallah 
Ghassan Khatib, 37 years old, academic, People's Party, from Nablus 
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Sami Kilani, 39 years old, academic, Fida Party, from Jenin 
Mustafa Natsheh, 61 years old, Mayer, Fatah from Hebron 
Jerusalem support members: 
Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, 45, academic, independent, from Jerusalem 
Faisal Hosseini, 51, Activist, Fatah, from Jerusalem 
Zahira Kamal, 46 years old, activist, Fida party, from Jerusalem 
Dr. Sari Nussseibeh, 42 years old, academic, Fatah, from Jerusalem 
Advisers from outside the OPT: 
Dr. Anis Kasim, 46 years old, lawyer, independent, refugee in Jordan 
Dr. Rashid Khalidi, 42 years old, academic, Fatah, refugee in the United States 
Dr. Kamil Mansour, 46 years old, academic, Fatah, refugee in France 
Dr. Yazid Sayigh 43 years old, academic, Fatah, refugee in the United Kingdom 
Dr. Ahmad ai-Khalidi 42 years old, academic, Fatah, refugee in the United 
Kingdom 
Clearly, the leaderships' positions on the participation and composition of the delegation 
were subject to debates between the various Palestinian political factions, both outside and 
inside. It sparked serious discussion among the public and organizations forming the PLO 
leadership; out of this debate emerged three main trends. 
Those in the mainstream, including the PLO Chairman Arafat, were afraid that starting a 
peace process attended by a majority ofthe Arab countries with no Palestinian presence 
could lead to solutions being reached to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestinian 
issue, without any PLO or Palestinian input. Arafat also believed that the importance 
placed on the peace process by US politicians would bring the US government to 
eventually agree to Palestinian participation, and that this could be a way for the PLO to 
secure its role. Therefore, Arafat accepted Israel's conditions in order to ensure even an 
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indirect role for the PLO, all the while pursuing the later expansion of this role. As Yazid 
Sayigh put it: 
... Arafat calculated that if Palestinian participation in the peace process was crucial 
for the success of US Middle East policy, then there was an opportunity to carve 
out a direct role for the PLO. This perception seemed to be borne out by US 
willingness both to allow PLO officials to accompany the Palestinian delegation to 
Washington and resume official contacts ... but for the next year Arafat used 
delaying tactics and measured obstruction of the peace talks to compel the US to 
deal with him directly. 187 
The second trend was represented by a party which had limited influence on the political 
decision being made-the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine led by George 
Habash. The PFLP believed that the PLO represented the Palestinian people and thus was 
the symbol of their nationhood, and that any concession in PLO representation would be a 
concession in everything the PLO stood for, particularly the principle of the right to self-
determination and statehood. Abu Ali Mustafa, the second in command in the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), explained his factions' position: 
Keeping the seat of Palestinian representation through its legitimate party, the PLO, 
in an equal and independent way is the only guarantee to ensure rights. The formula 
of representation within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation will lead to 
abolishing the concept of a Palestinian nation. 188 
Those supporting this approach formed the secular side of the opposition to the peace 
process that was based on a rejection ofthe US-Israeli conditions. The remainders of those 
opposed were the religious opposition-the Hamas movement-which would later become 
the major opposition party to the peace process and Palestinian participation in it. The 
Islamic Resistant Movement (Hamas) movement issued a statement outlining its position 
in the debate as follows: 
Attending a conference to sell the Holy Land and Palestine according to a 
humiliating US-Zionist formula and conditions, in exchange for illusory promises 
and getting a submissive autonomy as well as denying the right of future 
187 Yazid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) p. 655. 
188 Abu Ali Mustapha, Shu 'un il Filistiniyya, ed. 221, p. 7. 
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generations to fight for liberation, is an ille~itimate delegation and presence which 
does not represent the Palestinian people. 18 
The third trend, which also had only limited influence inside the PLO leadership, was 
represented by the Palestinian People's Party, through its secretary general Bashir 
Barghouthi, who wrote in an internal letter to officials in the party: 
This is a historic chance to achieve US recognition of the PLO. The US believes 
there is a historic chance to hold a peace conference in the Middle East; it is also 
aware ofthe difficulties that would arise if there were no Palestinian participation. 
If Palestinians, especially those inside, insist on rejecting any response to the US 
initiative except through direct contacts with the PLO, this will lead to breaking the 
isolation imposed on the PLO and to its recognition, with all that signifies to the 
Palestinian people. 190 
It is possible that the US might have clearly recognized the PLO if it found that this was 
the only way to secure Palestinian participation. However, this approach would have 
required steadfastness and self-confidence. It entailed a certain amount of risk, which the 
PLO could not afford to take. 
Syria's agreement to participate in the conference and the peace process in July 1991 
helped neutralize the opposition to the participation. Syria was encouraging the opposition 
groups that once had Damascus as their base. This was followed by the issuance ofajoint 
US-Soviet statement in July 1991 that declared their intention to extend invitations to a 
bilateral and a multilateral peace conference in November 1991 with the aim of achieving 
peace in the Middle East. 
Differences in priorities among Palestinians started to emerge with the preparatory 
negotiations. The PLO leadership outside, and some Fatah leaders such as Faisal Husseini 
inside were focusing on trying to improve the conditions governing Palestinian 
representation in the peace process. Others, particularly the independents from inside the 
OPT like Abdel Shafi were focused primarily on improving conditions with regard to basic 
189 Leaflet signed and distributed by Hamas, October 1991 
190 Internal letter, Palestinian Peoples Party, October 1991 
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concerns ofthe Palestinian people living in the OPT. That included the need to stop 
settlement activity as a prerequisite to beginning negotiations. 
Abdel Shaft is not affiliated with Fatah, but is an independent whose strength is based on 
his popular support in the OPT. His first priority was stopping ongoing illegal Israeli 
settlement expansion policy, which consolidated the occupation that the peace process was 
to end. In the Palestinians' initial meeting with James Baker, Dr. Abdel Shaft informed 
him: "I have agreed to come to this meeting to talk about one thing only-Israeli 
settlement activities in the OPT must stop. There will be no peace process while the 
settlements continue. You can count on hearing this from me all the time." 191 
These differences in focus and priorities were to become clearer later on during the 
negotiations, when the PLO leadership concentrated on achieving gains related to its role, 
status and authority over everything else, while the negotiators coming from inside the 
OPT were concentrating on achieving gains on substantial issues of concern to the 
population in the OPT. This will be discussed further later on. 
Palestinian Negotiation Performance at Madrid and Washington 
The peace process was officially inaugurated on 30 October 1991 with the Middle East 
Peace Conference in Madrid, Spain. Shortly thereafter, the bilateral Palestinian-Israeli 
track of the negotiations began in Washington, with the opening of the first round on 12 
December 1991. The tenth and last round took place on July 1993. The ten rounds ended 
without reaching any agreement, and it was later revealed that since the beginning of 1993, 
"back channel" secret talks had been underway between Israel and the PLO in Oslo, 
Norway. 
One of the conditions imposed on the Palestinians was that they appear as part ofajoint 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. For that reason, the two sides had to attend the same 
negotiating sessions. That was an initial point of difference between the Israelis and both 
the Palestinians and Jordanians, who each wanted separate tracks. The result was later 
191 Ashrawi, This Side of Peace, p. 83. 
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called 'corridor diplomacy'; the three parties could not agree on that logistic problem, so 
they refused to enter the negotiating room and continued talking in the corridor. The 
compromise was that the three parties would start each round with a plenary of the joint 
Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, before splitting into two tracks. Then, each separate 
Israeli-Palestinian group would contain at least one Jordanian, and each Jordanian-lsraeli 
group would include at least one Palestinian. 192 
The actual Palestinian negotiating delegation-the 'kosher' members of the Palestinian 
team-had to be careful and maintain balanced relations with four parties. The first was 
the 'unofficial' rest of the team, some of whom were PLO leadership figures, experts from 
outside and representatives of occupied Jerusalem. The second was the PLO leadership in 
Tunis. The third was the Palestinian public, which the delegation members had to face after 
every round. And finally, there was the Israeli delegation. 
Before every round of negotiations, the entire team met with the PLO leadership in Tunis 
or in Amman. They consulted, strategized, and otherwise consolidated the impression that 
this was the PLO delegation. While in Washington, the delegation formed a leadership 
committee that met every day to revise plans and proposals. After every negotiations 
session, the whole team would meet, listen to the minutes of the session as read by one of 
the delegation members, receive any documents or negotiation proposals, and then split 
into working groups to prepare for the next session. In between, frequent calls and faxes 
were underway with the PLO leadership in Tunis. 193 
The negotiations were taking place at the State Department; however, there was no 
American presence inside the negotiation rooms. Instead, the Americans received regular 
briefings from all the delegations, and made suggestions when they felt them necessary. 
The Palestinians frequently asked for more intervention in order to gain enforcement of the 
terms of reference and to offset the imbalance of power between the two parties, while the 
192 For details on the 'corridor diplomacy' see: Abdul Salam A. Majali, Jawad A. Anani and Munther J. 
Haddadin, Peace Making, the Inside Story of the 1994 Jordanian-lsraeli Treaty (London: Ithaca press, 2006). 
193 The author of this thesis, who was a participating delegate in the negotiations, recalls how these meetings 
were well understood by the delegation at the time as being as important for projecting the image of co-
ordination, as they were for their consideration of substantive matters. 
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Israelis usually resisted it. The talks were subject to intensive media coverage. Media and 
public relations were a crucial part of the work of all delegations, especially that of the 
Palestinians and Israelis. First, both were competing to influence international public 
opinion. Further, each was trying to send messages back home to gain public sympathy and 
support. 
In the course of the ten rounds of negotiations, the Palestinian and Israeli delegations 
exchanged drafts ofthree types of documents: draft agendas; descriptions of an interim 
self-governing authority; and a declaration of principles. The main differences between the 
two sides are consistently clear in all draft documents. 
The main objectives the Palestinian delegation tried to achieve included bringing the PLO 
directly to the negotiation table and achieving its recognition. That was important because 
it would embody recognition of what the PLO stood for, including nationhood and self-
determination. Another objective was to ensure a cessation of Israeli settlement expansion, 
and other illegal activities. 
Knowing that the terms of reference restricted the Palestinian side from raising the 
settlement issue, which was considered an issue for final status talks, the delegation 
pursued strategies that would overcome these limitations. The legal adviser of the 
Palestinian delegation, Raja Shehadeh, worked on this at the request of delegation head, 
Haidar Abdulshafi. Shehadeh recalled: 
It was clear that any successful Palestinian strategy would have to bring those 
settlements within the negotiations. It was my belief, therefore, that the first 
objective of the Palestinian side should be to force fundamental issues that 
primarily related to land and water, as well as the administration ofthe settlements, 
to be brought into the negotiations as preliminary matters, which would be justified 
fi . . . If t94 as a necessary ust step tn any negotiations over se -government. 
These preliminary matters included access to information, the right to review Israeli 
extraterritorial legislation, a ban on the Israeli military commander's issuance of new 
194 Raja Shehadeh, "Weight of Legal History: Constrains and Hops in the Search for Sovereign Legal 
Language", in Eugene Cotran and Chibli Mallat (ed) The Arab-Israeli Accords: Legal Perspectives (Camel 
Soas, London, 1996) p. 5. 
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military orders while negotiations on the future of the OPT were continuing, and 
revocation of the military order that suspended Palestinian land registration. These ideas 
aimed at introducing, in an indirect way, the issue of the Jewish settlements to the 
negotiations despite the restrictions. 
The most comprehensive Palestinian negotiating proposal was the "Expanded Outline of a 
Palestinian Interim Self-Government Arrangement: Concepts, Preliminary Measures and 
Elections Modalities"195 presented in March 1992, later on known as the "PISGA". The 
Palestinian negotiating position as illustrated in this document is based on the principle that 
the territory subject to negotiations is 'Occupied Territory' that falls under international 
law. The position of the Palestinian delegation in Washington was clear on the substantive 
linkage between any interim phase arrangements and the final status. The introduction to 
the PISGA document states: 
The interim self-government arrangements are also intended to provide the bases 
for the second stage of negotiations on the permanent status of the West Bank 
including Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and ai-Himah. According to United Nations 
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, the Fourth Geneva Convention and the 
Hague Regulations, these areas are occupied territory, and Israel is a belligerent 
occupant. 
A major focus of the Palestinian position in this document was jurisdiction: 
The jurisdiction ofthe PISGA should extend to all ofthe occupied Palestinian Territory 
including its land, natural resources, water, sub-soil, territorial sea, exclusive economic 
zone and air space. The PISGA shall exercise its jurisdiction throughout the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory. 
The approach taken by the Palestinian delegation concerning the settlements, land 
confiscation and other unilateral Israeli practices was based on the illegality of these 
actions. PISGA position toward settlement in particular was stated clearly: 
195 PISGA was the main negotiation proposal presented by the Palestinian delegation at the Washington 
negotiations. 
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The Israeli authorities have introduced illegally a large number of substantial 
changes into the body of law applicable in OPT, which have made possible the 
establishment and expansion of illegal Israeli settlements. These changes have 
resulted in the creation of a system approaching apartheid. 
PISGA demanded the dismantling of the legal framework of this discriminatory system as 
a necessary prerequisite for a successful transition into an interim phase and suggested a 
preliminary phase which would require that Israel, among other things should: 
Cease all settlements activity, including construction of new settlements or 
expansion of existing ones, road construction and other infrastructure 
activity .... Cease acquisition, by any means, of land, water and other natural 
resources .... Refrain from any and all unilateral actions affecting the legal, 
demographic or geographic status quo in the OPT. 
The official on-record Israeli response to PISGA came in a letter dated 26 April, 1992 
signed by the head ofthe Israeli delegation, Eliyakim Rubinstein, in which he stated that 
"there is no way whatsoever to accept on any basis your expanded outline, which would 
have foreclosed any option for the permanent status other than a Palestinian state." 
The Israeli delegation submitted their ideas on the interim arrangement in a comprehensive 
counter-proposal entitled: "Interim Self-Government Arrangement Negotiations: Further 
Ideas and Proposals, which later became known as the ISGA" 196• That document laid down 
the Israeli ideas of the interim period as follows: 
The concept of the Interim Self-Government Arrangement and its application 
should, in our view, be based on a fair and reasonable attitude towards the functions 
of the administrative council. It will definitely deal with vast list of administrative-
functional powers and responsibilities. At the same time, for obvious reasons its 
powers in various spheres must, in our view, include agreements on coordination or 
cooperation with Israel, sometimes amounting to sharing of responsibility. 
That document, presented on 21 August, 1992, actually expanded on another document 
which had been presented one day prior under the title: "The Administrative Council of the 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements, An Outline". It dealt with, among other things, 
the issue of jurisdiction as follows: "In operating their designated spheres of operations, the 
196 ISGA was the main Israeli negotiation proposal at the Washington negotiations. 
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freely-elected Administrative Council will have jurisdiction in the framework of the agreed 
administrative-functional arrangements." 
The significance of this concept of jurisdiction is that it does not include the land but is 
limited to a functional and administrative jurisdiction related to people only. The furthest 
the Israelis would go in this respect was a negotiating proposal submitted on 10 December 
1992 by the Israeli delegation which summarizes their concept of jurisdiction: 
The concept of jurisdiction during the interim period of self-government arrangements 
should be that of a 'mixed model'-a combination of executive-functional powers and 
responsibilities, and infrastructure aspects, which means that the elected Palestinian 
Administrative Council will wield its executive power and responsibilities and have 
relevant infrastructure aspects to be negotiated, such as issues of land and water, within the 
territory under Israeli military administration. 
The same document restricted the Palestinian relation to the land in the interim period to 
the management of land use and excluded any geographic or territorial dimension to the 
jurisdiction ofthe Palestinian Council. Moreover, Israeli settlers' relation to the land was 
defined in the following way: 
Land situated, or allocated to, localities inhabited by Palestinians, will be administered by 
the Palestinian Administrative Council; Land situated in or allocated to, localities inhabited 
by Israelis will be administered by organs designated by Israel; land under Israeli security 
use will be administered by the Israeli military as appropriate. Administration of other 
lands will be jointly conducted by Israel and the Palestinian Administrative Council. 
This issue of Israeli settlements in the OPT was a major point of difference in the 
negotiations. In the first place, the Israeli delegation refused any discussion on settlements 
and banned the issue from all Israeli draft agendas. Furthermore, during the fifth round, in 
May 1992, the Israeli delegation presented a paper entitled: "Jewish presence in the 
Administered territory" which stated that: 
Israel views Jewish settlement in the territory as the exercise of an historical and 
legal right, which if now curtailed, would entail long-term negative political and 
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security consequences .... Historical Judea and Samaria have always been identified 
as the historic homeland of the Jewish people. 
These positions stemmed from the Israeli understanding that the OPT are not actually 
occupied but rather "disputed". The same document explained their view as follows: 
"Judea, Samaria and Gaza cannot be considered 'occupied territory' according to 
international law, and Jewish settlement there is not illegai...The legal status of these 
territory is undetermined." 
The relationship between the delegation and the PLO was always an important concern for 
the Palestinian delegation. The two sides of the leadership, inside and outside, understood 
the significant of the national unity at that time. In addition, both recognized the attempts 
by other parties, particularly Israel, to divide them. 
Despite the fact that the PLO leadership outside was responsible for appointing the 
Palestinian delegation to the Madrid conference and the Washington negotiations, it also 
implemented a number of administrative and organizational decisions in order to ensure 
coordination between the leadership and its delegation. In spite of the agreement on 
fundamental political issues, relations were not always smooth between the two. The 
reasons for this included the simple fact that the leadership outside had been excluded and 
was afraid of its own marginalization. Another reason was the different weight each party 
applied to different political positions. 
The PLO representation of the Palestinians was a priority for the PLO. One of the tactics 
the leadership pursued was to push the delegation to take hard-line positions, so they 
would not be able to reach an agreement in the negotiations and the PLO might then appear 
more flexible and thus a more suitable negotiating partner. Legal advisor to the delegation 
Raja Shehadeh concluded: 
The organization (PLO) seemed so dominated by its main objective of attaining 
recognition that it could not even benefit from the work or experience which the 
delegation to the Washington talks had achieved. Its primary concern was to prove 
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that if chosen as a partner, it would be more flexible and easier to conclude a deal 
with than the delegation in Washington. 197 
Thought of overriding the PLO was never mentioned in its discussions and was simply not 
thought of. The reason for this was the delegation's complete faith in the importance of the 
role ofthe PLO and the importance ofthe unity ofthe Palestinian people As for the 
delegation itself, it remained loyal to the leadership of the PLO and the in order to achieve 
their goals. The delegation was devoted to helping get the PLO to the negotiating table. 
Nevertheless, the Israeli delegation and other Israeli politicians tried to encourage the 
Palestinian delegation to ignore the PLO. American officials made efforts to convince 
leading members in the Palestinian team to behave independently. The delegation, 
however, believed that any split or even lack of coordination or lack of trust would come at 
the detriment of the Palestinian position, and consequently weaken both the inside and the 
outside. That was eloquently expressed by the delegation's legal adviser Raja Sehadeh: 
We have to say that the adherence of the negotiating delegation, headed by Faisal 
Husseini and Haidar 'Abdel Shafi, to the PLO leadership and their care in carrying 
out its orders satisfactorily was a determining factor in reinforcing the unity of the 
Palestinian people inside the territory and abroad, maintaining the Palestinian 
leadership after the Gulf war and reinforcing its status at the Arab and international 
levels. It also helped in creating the conviction, first in Peres and then in Rabin, that 
there was no escape from direct negotiations with the PL0. 198 
The delegation was also very keen to maintain strong ties with the public in the OPT. The 
delegation members were neither political officials nor employees, their only source of 
strength and political survivor was there public stand. In order to gain widespread support 
for the peace process from the Palestinian public and because of the strong Israeli-
American opposition to its official participation, particularly prior to the Madrid 
Conference, the PLO leadership took care to form the Madrid delegation from people with 
strong street credibility. Hence, the delegates had strong connections with the Palestinian 
public in the OPT, and the strength of the delegation came from this public support. The 
delegation tried always to take positions consistent with public opinion inside the OPT, and 
197 Raja Shehadeh, From Occupation to Interim Accords (Cimel/SOAS, 1997) p. 122. 
198 Ibid., p. 31. 
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delegates were careful to maintain contact with the public in order to sustain their strength 
and popularity, even when- at times- this meant maintaining positions which were 
considered less important priorities by the outside leadership. 
On the eve of its departure from Jerusalem to Washington, the delegation distributed a 
statement addressing the public in the OPT. In this statement, the delegation stated 
positions that combined a commitment to the resolutions of the Palestinian National 
Council, with the promise to achieve an end to oppressive Israeli practices and other 
violations, particularly construction of Jewish settlements. This statement, issued prior to 
their departure for Madrid on October 25, 1991, is representative of the attitude of the 
delegation towards the public. Following are excerpts: 
We depart from our occupied homeland and its capital, Jerusalem, keeping in our 
hearts and minds the goals and aspirations of our people for liberation and self-
determination, to struggle for those objectives in a new arena-the Madrid 
Conference. We are not ready or prepared to go into this new arena with any 
compromises of those goals, nor should this arena be considered an alternative to 
other arenas of struggle, which are lit with sacrifice, heroism and steadfastness. We 
will place the demand to stop settlements in the occupied territory at the top of our 
agenda ... We head to Madrid with goodwill and confident determination to achieve 
a just peace. We face this historic moment fully committed to the resolutions taken 
by the National Council in its 19th and 20th sessions. We will keep nothing back 
from our people regarding the events transpire in the conference, but instead we 
will brief our people on all developments. We will look for counsel and guidance in 
rich national experience and wisdom of our people. 199 
In the period following the Madrid Conference, members ofthe delegation would return to 
the OPT after each round of talks in Washington and, from the moment they arrived, 
would be occupied with popular meetings on an almost daily basis. They were invited to 
speak to the public or participate in mass rallies in order to explain directly to the people 
the developments and difficulties ofthe negotiations, and to state clearly the delegations' 
position. Their degree of proximity to public opinion was the main factor gaining them 
widespread acceptance and support from the public, and this in tum consolidated the 
personal popularity and strength of delegation members. Often, these mass rallies or public 
t99 Statement issued and distributed as a leaflet by the Palestinian delegation a day before departure to 
Madrid. 
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lectures took the form of debates-and sometimes heated arguments-between members 
ofthe delegation and leading political figures from the Palestinian opposition, with the 
public acting as judge. 
Meanwhile, the front pages ofthe local newspapers were filled with interviews and news 
about the work of the delegation, and its position and role in the negotiations. The 
delegation gradually became a point of reference for people in the OPT, taking on the role 
of a political leadership. People began bringing their problems to the de legates, or asking 
them to mediate in disputes. A strong bond was forged between delegation members and 
the public, creating a situation whereby the strength of the delegation was dependent on 
whether or not the public was satisfied with their negotiating positions. 
There were numerous examples of this, the most striking in December 1992, when Israel 
deported 415 Palestinians from the OPT to South Lebanon on grounds that they were 
Hamas supporters. The deportation caused support for the negotiations to decline, and 
there were calls from the public for the delegation not to return to the negotiations. Hanan 
Ashrawi, in her book This Side of Peace, cites various examples ofwomen's 
demonstrations which were led by wives of the deportees demanding that the delegation 
not return to the negotiations as long as the deportees were exiled away from their 
homeland, Palestine.200 
This popular pressure resulted in a proposal to the Palestinian leadership in Tunis that 
Palestinians suspend their participation in the negotiations, and this decision was in fact 
taken. The decision of the PLO leadership was taken not only because ofthe pressure 
exerted by the delegation and the general public in the OPT, but also because it conformed 
with the PLO's own principles and all the Arab countries (Jordan, Syria and Lebanon) 
participating in the bilateral negotiations had agreed with the decision and expressed their 
willingness to join in. Thus, the Arab-Israeli bilateral negotiations were suspended. 
However, three months later, the Arab countries participating in the negations agreed to 
comply with a US request to resume negotiations and they began putting pressure on the 
200 Ashrawi, This Side of Peace, p. 229. 
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PLO leadership to do likewise. At this point, Yasser Arafat had decided to agree, but the 
negotiating delegation insisted on maintaining the suspension oftalks until Israel brought 
back the 415 deportees. Minutes of a key meeting held in Amman on April 20, 1993 
between the PLO leadership headed by Yasser Arafat and several leading figures in the 
delegation, illustrate the nature of the bond between the delegation and the people and 
popular sentiment in the OPT. Responding to Yasser Arafat's proposal that, because ofthe 
pressure from the Arab states and the US, the negotiations should be resumed, delegation 
head Haidar 'Abdul Shaft responded: 
Dear brother Abu Ammar, we should not fool ourselves. We cannot return to the 
negotiations under these conditions. Even if we could, we would be unable to 
convince our people to agree. In answer to your question, Mr. President, of whether 
there is any other option, the answer is that we have to look at our youth inside 
[inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory] who are holding firm to their position 
despite the current circumstances. Maybe we should convene the National Council, 
maybe we should hold a referendum-but in any case, we cannot take such a 
decision simply because President Assad demands it... We have to think how to 
mobilize the potential of our Palestinian people. 201 
At the end of the day, Arafat chose to order the delegation to return to the negotiations. 
Most of the delegates complied, partly out on over-riding concern to maintain Palestinian 
unity, partly as acknowledgement of Arafat's ultimate authority, and partly as a result of 
tremendous pressure which was applied by the Tunis leadership on individuals within the 
delegation. Only two delegates, including the author of this thesis, refused to return to the 
negotiations and boycotted the final round. 
Conclusion 
The huge gap between the negotiating positions of the two delegations (Israeli and 
Palestinian) on many issues-especially the concept of the interim period, the jurisdiction 
of the Palestinian elected council and the issue of Israeli settlement in the OPT- was the 
ultimate reason for the failure of the ten rounds of negotiations. 
201 The minutes of that meeting were taken and kept by the author of this thesis and have not yet been 
published. 
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However, the structural aspects of the peace process made it unlikely that the parties could 
reconcile their positions. The vagueness of the terms of reference, which resulted from the 
American attempts to bridge the gap between the two sides during the preparation for the 
process, contributed to the failure. The term 'constructive ambiguity' frequently used by 
Baker enabled him to overcome many obstacles during the preparations to the process; but 
it backfired later, not least when the US opted not to intervene to clarifY or enforce these 
terms of reference. The replication of the attributes of Camp David (the staged nature of 
negotiations, the reference to autonomy rather than self-rule for the Palestinians, and the 
exclusion of Palestinians from either Jerusalem or the Diaspora) all required that the 
Palestinians engage with a peace process that did not have clearly stated objectives 
compatible with their national aspirations. Their political weakness in the meantime gave 
them little choice but to participate regardless. 
The conditions imposed upon the Palestinian delegation also inhibited its performance. 
Although Israeli and American efforts to exclude the PLO were partially overcome by the 
close co-ordination of the inside and outside leaderships, and the former's deference to the 
latter, the two leaderships found their respective priorities could not be championed 
equally through the negotiations, leading at times to tensions between them. 
It was not only the structure but also the environment of the negotiations which hampered 
the Palestinian delegation's performance. The biased position ofthe United States, 
especially after the dramatic changes in the position and political weight of the other 
sponsor of the process, the Soviet Union, who was supposed to balance the American 
unbalanced position, worked constantly in Israel's favour. The United States did nothing to 
hinder Israel as it continued to consolidate its occupation in spite of the negotiations over 
the future of the OPT. The continuous and illegal expansion of Jewish settlements, 
confiscation of land, the ongoing Israeli policies of arresting, imprisoning or deporting 
Palestinians, the demolishing of Palestinians homes were all examples of these policies and 
practices. One effect of that was the decline in the credibility ofthe process in the eyes of 
the Palestinian public. This in turn weakened the position of the inside leadership insofar 
as it was obliged to prioritize the concerns of occupation over the concerns of recognition 
in order to retain credibility at home. 
II 0 
In sum, the structural and environmental aspects of the peace process at this stage only 
exacerbated the weak position ofthe Palestinian delegation and highlighted the differences 
in priorities between the inside and outside leaderships, despite their own efforts to work 
closely together and the recognition by the inside leadership of the authority, the symbolic 
role and the national unity that the PLO in Tunis represented. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: The Oslo Agreement - 1993 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine the performance of the Palestinian delegation in the negotiations 
for the Oslo Agreement, within the context of the structure and environment of the 
negotiations. In so doing, it will focus on the impact of the inside-outside dichotomy, and 
their effect on the Palestinians' performance. 
It will begin by explaining how and why contacts between the PLO and Israeli officials 
started, even as alternative negotiations were already taking place in Washington. The 
various stages of the process leading up to and including the signing of the Oslo Accords in 
September 1993 will be presented alongside related crises which shaped their environment. 
There will be an emphasis on the Palestinian leadership's conduct of both tracks at the 
same time, and to what extent there was cooperation and coordination between the inside 
and outside leaderships in these two tracks. 
This section will also include a detailed examination of the Oslo Accords: the Declaration 
of Principles (DOP) (including their structure, logic, strengths and weaknesses) and the 
exchanged letters of mutual recognition, which were an integral part of the agreements. 
The chapter will demonstrate that this period saw the outside leadership adopting strategies 
to gain its own international recognition which both undermined and excluded the inside 
leadership and which ultimately led them to signing a set of documents which 
fundamentally altered the very nature and role of the PLO (to its detriment). While the 
inside leadership were still committed during this period to the PLO and the outside 
leadership, the actions ofthe latter began to profoundly challenge the basis for that 
commitment. The impact of this was that the outside leadership embarked on a peace 
process in which it would consistently exchange generalised symbolic gains for particular 
substantive losses, the latter being principally a consolidation and expansion of Israeli 
occupation despite the peace process itself. 
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The Oslo Process and the First Agreement 
The repeated rounds of negotiations in Washington started gradually to lose the interest of 
the media, and both politicians and analysts lost hope of possible progress. Then suddenly, 
the Oslo breakthrough hit the news. It took everybody by surprise, and filled the headlines, 
and the cover pages of newspapers and magazines. 
The story of Oslo began in London, which was playing host to one of the multilateral 
negotiations sessions in December 1992. Members ofthe Palestinian delegation from the 
OPT informed Ahmad Qurei (Abu Ala'), who was supervising the multilateral negotiations 
for the PLO, that two Israeli Labour party members who were advisors on the PLO to both 
foreign minister Shimon Peres and Peres deputy Yossi Beilin, were interested in seeing 
Qurei. 
The meeting took place in London on 3 December 1992. The Israelis were Dr. Ya'ir 
Hirschfield, a Haifa University historian and Ron Pundik, Labour Party activists whom 
were close to deputy Labour Party foreign minister Yossi Beilin, the PLO's representative 
in London. Afif Safi attended the meeting. It was Qurei's first meeting with an Israeli, 
despite having been appointed by the PLO leadership to head the Palestinian team to the 
multilateral talks. Ahmad Qurei had not personally participated in any of the sessions 
because Israel had successfully barred PLO officials from being present at any of the 
negotiations. 
When Ahmad Qurei reported to Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas on his meeting with 
Hirschfield, Abbas realized that this might be the opening of a secret back channel between 
Israel and the PLO, for which he had long been waiting. 
After the PLQ-particularly Arafat, Abbas and Qurei-had studied the report of the 
London meeting, they decided to take this possible back channel seriously and to proceed, 
since in any case, they believed it could do no harm. Abbas recalls feeling that, "for us, this 
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channel carries no risks. We have nothing to lose. If it's productive, then this is what we 
have been after. Just chatting can't hurt. "202 
The discussions between the three who knew about the Oslo channel-Arafat, Abbas and 
Qurei-led to the inclusion of Hassan Asfour, and another PLO member, Maher ai-Kurd, 
who was chosen for his proficiency in English, since the others did not speak English well. 
Later, according to Abbas, ai-Kurd was replaced by another PLO member named 
Muhammad Abu Kosh. 
Ahmad Qurei (Abu Ala') was born in Silwan, near Jerusalem, in 1935. He had been based 
in Beirut, where he headed Samed, the PLO's employment project for assisting families of 
refugees and PLO martyrs. In 1982, after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and together with 
Arafat and the rest of the PLO leadership, Qurei moved to Tunis, where his financial 
expertise led to his heading up the PLO's Economic Department. When the Washington 
negotiations began, he was appointed to the PLO committee supervising the talks, and 
from there he went on to take charge of the Palestinian teams to the multilateral 
negotiations. Qurei was also a member of the Fatah Central Committee and a close 
confidante of Y asser Arafat. 
Hassan Asfour, the second and secondary member of the Oslo team, was born in Gaza, 
educated in Baghdad, and joined the PLO in Beirut. He also relocated with the PLO and 
settled in Tunis, where he worked in the Arab and International Department of the PLO, 
which was headed by Mahmoud Abbas. As four gained Abbas' confidence and was 
appointed rapporteur for the Washington talks from within the Tunis-based committee 
supervising the negotiations, until being selected by Abbas for the Oslo talks. Asfour was 
originally a member of the Palestinian People's Party, but was first loyalty to the PLO and 
was sacked by the party when his role in the Oslo talks was discovered. 
The Oslo negotiations, which began with an initiative from the Norwegian governmene03, 
can be divided into three stages according to changes in the composition ofthe Israeli 
'·' Mahmoud Abbas, Tareeq Oslo (Beirut: Almatboa't Publishing & Distribution Co., 1994) p. 181. Abbas' 
book is interesting not only for his personal recollections, but because he included the official minutes of the 
Oslo discussions which had not been released elsewhere. 
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delegation, which also reflected substantive changes in position. The first five rounds were 
attended only by the two Israeli academics who had initiated the talks-Hirschfield and 
Pundik-who hinted that they had connections with Yossi Beilin. 
The Oslo negotiations lasted for eight months, and were divided into thirteen rounds. The 
first meeting took place in Saresburg, Norway on 20 January 1993. The Israelis were Dr. 
Ya'ir Hirschfield and Dr. Ron Pundik, a British-educated historian. The Palestinians were 
Ahmad Qurei, assistant Hassan Asfour, and a translator. The final round, the thirteenth, 
took place on 20 August 1993, when the Declaration of Principles was initialled by Qurei 
and Uri Savir. 
After each round, the Palestinian delegation would report to Abbas and Arafat, and in the 
later stages, to Vasser Abed Rabbo, another PLO Executive Committee member. Neither 
the PLO Executive Committee nor the Fatah Central Committee was informed or gave 
directions, guidance, or approval to the delegation. The negotiating positions were decided 
by the individuals involved, in addition to Arafat and Abbas, without supervision or 
counsel from any official body. 
In the early rounds, the main Palestinian demands included points such as resolving the 
deportees issue-the 400 Hamas activists that Israel had deported to southern Lebanon-
recognition of the PLO, stopping settlement expansion, and withdrawal from Gaza. In his 
first response, Hirschfield noted the Gaza demand, encouraging expansion of the 
discussion by asking to whom the Israelis should hand the keys ofGaza. Qurei's answer 
was to the United Nations or, more appropriately, to the sponsors ofthe peace process. 
Hirschfield then said that the Israelis expected to give it "to you" (the PLO). But Qurei 
continued to insist that Gaza should be handed over to the peace process sponsors.204 
After the fourth round, on 20 March 1993, Ahmad Qurei presented to Arafat not only the 
minutes of the meeting, but his own written comments, in an effort to highlight the major 
203 Norwegian Academic Terje Larson ofFAFO research institute, encouraged by Foreign Minister Johan 
Jorgen Holst, initiated and nurtured the Oslo takes. The Norwegian unbiased reputation, and generous aid 
policy was believed to have contributed to the success of that initiative. 
204 Ahmad Qurei, Ar-Riwayah al-filisliniyya al-kamilah, p. 415. 
115 
points of the Israeli position as he had understood them. As reported in Abbas' book, 
Qurei's notes included the following points: 
Rabin and the Israeli foreign ministry team are being kept informed ofthis channel; 
The PLO has proved that it is a serious negotiating partner; 
The Israelis expect and do not object to the return of the Palestinian leadership from 
Tunis to Gaza; 
The document they are presenting was drafted by Peres himself. 205 
All the Israelis would concede in the first five rounds were new policies in the OPT that 
would improve the standard of living, and some promises to allow a limited number of 
PLO leaders, such as Abbas and Qurei, to participate in the elections ofthe Palestinian 
Council. In addition, they allowed the discussions to include a draft declaration of 
principles, but the discussion was not conclusive. The Palestinians had different priorities. 
Abbas has said in this regard: "The main concern of our delegation was to make sure that 
this channel enjoyed the support of the Israeli government." 206 Hirschfield confirmed in 
the fourth round that the US government had "blessed this channel, Egypt supported it, and 
we achieved Rabin's blessing to a great extent."207 
The sixth round witnessed a new development in the expansion of the Israeli delegation to 
include Uri Savir, director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry who was close to both 
Yossi Beilin and Shimon Peres. 
Savir's contribution included the assurance that the Israeli government was following up 
the Oslo channel and that they were reducing some settlement activities and intending to 
release some prisoners. But Savir tried to keep the Palestinian side worried about possible 
Israeli recognition of the PLO by mentioning that "the Americans and some Arabs had 
warned Israel off the PLO and advised Israel not to negotiate with the PLO because it lacks 
credibility and does not honour its commitments."208 He also questioned the PLO's ability 
200 Ibid., p. 208 
'·'Abbas, Tareeq Oslo, p. 204. 
y.v Ibid. 
'·'Ibid., p. 228. 
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to implement an agreement and said that the Israelis had doubts in this regard, particularly 
Rabin, who kept comparing the Palestinians unfavourably with Syrian president Hafez al-
Assad, who could be counted on to implement agreements to which he committed himself 
and Syria. 
The dramatic development occurred during the sixth round, which started on 13 July, 1993, 
when Joel Singer joined the Israeli delegation as a close associate ofYitzhak Rabin, then 
the Israeli prime minister. His participation gave the impression to the Palestinian side that 
Rabin was fully engaged in the Oslo channel, and that things were getting serious. 
However, Singer's contribution left them feeling pessimistic, because he presented 40 
questions, which gave the impression that the negotiations were being brought back to 
square one. 
The strategy employed by Singer on behalf of the Israelis was obvious: since recognition 
ofthe PLO was inevitable, and since the PLO was so eager for this recognition, Israel 
should extract the highest possible price for agreeing to this formal recognition. In this 
regard, Raja Shehadeh quoted David Makovsky: 
Singer told Rabin emphatically that he favoured negotiating mutual recognition 
with the PLO because it would likely be the result of the negotiations anyway, and 
therefore Israeli should use it early on as a bargaining chip to extract concessions 
on issues that it deemed important.209 
Based on this strategy, Singer conducted parallel talks in the Oslo channel, one on the 
mutual recognition issue-on which he stalled-and another on the substantive issues, 
which he tried to advance as fast as possible. The 40 questions he brought to the 
negotiating table were designed to extract the maximum concessions from the Palestinians. 
They included among other issues: the status of Jerusalem; the principle of a two-phased 
solution; comprehensive security; the settlement issue; the transfer of authorities; and 
jurisdiction. While the Palestinian response to these questions is not available, the 
questions themselves are detailed fully in Abbas' book. He says only that the Palestinian 
delegation tried to answer the questions as best they could and that Singer told them that he 
'·' Shehadeh, From Occupation to Interim Accords (The Hague: Cimel, 1997) p. 122. 
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would go back to Rabin with their answers and get his response. Abbas did not go beyond 
this in detail. Shehadeh quoted Rabin in an attempt to fill in this gap: 
On four or five major issues, they agreed to [things] I have doubted they would 
agree to. First [keeping all of] Jerusalem under Israeli control and outside the 
jurisdiction of the Palestinians for the entire interim period. Second [retaining all 
Israeli] settlements ... Third, overall Israeli responsibility for the security of Israelis 
and external security. Four, keeping all options open for the negotiations of the 
permanent solution.210 
On 24 July 1993, the eleventh round was resumed, at which the Israeli delegation 
presented Rabin's acceptance of the "Gaza-Jericho First" plan. This plan originated as 
"Gaza First," a suggestion suggested informally in discussions surrounding the 
Washington talks that Israel should withdraw from Gaza, a more problematic and less 
historically (religiously or strategically) significant area to Israelis than the West Bank. 
The PLO had consistently refused the "Gaza First" option. However, in Oslo, Israel 
resurrected the suggestion; Arafat suggested the addition of the West Bank town of Jericho 
and Israel accepted. 
The two topics subsequently dominating the Oslo negotiations were the drafting of and 
agreement on a declaration of principles, and the reaching of an agreement on "mutual 
recognition". The declaration of principles concentrated on and tried to include objectives 
ofthe negotiations, the structure and phasing of the peace process into interim and final 
phases, the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority and the elections and preparatory 
transfer of powers and responsibilities to that authority. It also included postponing the 
major and substantive aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the final status 
negotiations, such as refugees, Jerusalem, borders and settlements. 
The negotiations brought out differences in some of these areas, some examples of which 
can be useful in illustrating the atmosphere and content of the talks on the DOP. One 
difference was over the way Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 should be 
mentioned: the Israelis wanted to say that the final status negotiations should lead to an 
I I. Ibid., p. 126. 
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implementation of resolutions 242 and 338 as agreed by both parties. The Palestinians 
insisted that the resolutions were to be implemented in full without any qualifications. 
Another difference was over the security issue: the Israeli delegation insisted that Israel 
would continue assuming the security responsibility against any external threat, any 
terrorist threat, or any anti-Israeli action or threat to the security of the Israeli public. The 
Palestinians, on the other hand, wanted to limit Israel's security responsibility to defence 
against external threat only. 
Difficulties and sharp differences also appeared over other issues, such as those that would 
be postponed to the final phase, and the future ofthe Israeli civil and military government, 
as well as the level of involvement of neighbouring Arab states and the Israeli withdrawal 
from Gaza and Jericho. 
The other major topic ofthe Oslo talks was Israel's recognition of the PLO. Although the 
Palestinians repeatedly raised the whole issue of recognition from the very beginning, the 
Israelis only agreed to address it in the eighth round oftalks in June 1993, when Singer 
presented the Israeli conditions for such recognition, as follows: 
I. The PLO recognizes the right oflsrael to exist and is committed to coexistence 
with it. 
2. The PLO accepts resolutions 242 and 338. 
3. The PLO denounces terror and aggression against Israelis. 
4. The PLO declares that it will stop practicing all forms of terror. 
5. The PLO will not support any parties which conduct acts of terror or incitement 
to terror. 
6. The PLO declares that all articles in its charter that contradict with this process 
are null and void. 
7. The PLO is committed to the peace process as stipulated in the letter of 
invitation. 
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8. The PLO, and after the assumption of responsibilities ofthe temporary Council 
of authority, will call for a halt to the Intifada. 
9. The PLO will call on Egypt and other states to end the Arab boycott of Israel.211 
In his letter to Rabin dated 9 September 1993, Arafat met all the conditions and demands 
presented to his delegation in Oslo by Joel Singer which are detailed earlier. Arafat's letter 
included the following: 
The PLO recognizes the right ofthe state of Israel to exist in peace and security. 
The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 
The PLO renounces the use ofterrorism and other acts of violence and will assume 
responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their 
compliance prevent violations and discipline violators. 
The PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's 
right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the 
commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently 
the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestine National Council for formal approval 
of the necessary changes with regard to the Palestinian Covenant.212 
In addition, Arafat sent another letter to Rabin committing the PLO to stop the Intifada. It 
included: 
In light ofthe new era marked by the signing ofthe Declaration of Principles, the 
PLO encourages and calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip to take part in the steps leading to the normalisation of life, rejecting violence 
and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and participating actively in 
shaping reconstruction, economic development and cooperation.213 
It is useful to add here that Israel prevailed on almost all of these points, and delayed the 
amendment of the language of the text ofthe agreement until literally the final hours, when 
time constraints would not allow even the typing of a new draft, but only the amendment 
of"Palestinian team" to "PLO team" with the word "Palestinian" crossed out, and that 
change was initiated by Singer and Ha'el ai-Fahoum, a PLO official. 
"'Abbas, Tareeq Oslo, p. 237. 
"'Letter from Yasser Arafat to Yitzhak Rabin, dated 9 September 1993. 
nr Letter from Yasser Arafat to Johan Jorgen Holst, dated 9 September 1993. 
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The Israeli delay in accepting the inclusion ofthe PLO in the text was also confirmed and 
explained by Hanan Ashrawi, who did the last-minute contacts to insure the amendments 
in the text, because of the Americans' hurry to get to the signing. According to Ashrawi: 
"Rabin had consented to the changes, and we had to run. It was already after I 0:00 a.m. 
We piled into the waiting cars, all decorum forgotten, and were driven at breakneck speed, 
sirens wailing, people gaping, to the White House."214 
In order to avoid confusion, it should be clarified that the agreement that is being dealt 
with here is the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (the 
"DOP"215 that was signed in Washington DC on 13 September 1993. This was the first 
agreement to be signed by the two parties, but it was followed by others: the Paris 
Protocol, the agreement on economic relations signed on 29 April 1994; the Gaza-Jericho 
agreement signed in Cairo on 5 May 1994; the Agreement on the Preparatory Transfer of 
Powers and Responsibilities signed at the Erez checkpoint between Gaza and Israel on 29 
August 1994; and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip-also known as "Oslo II", signed in Washington on 28 September 1995. Oslo II 
superseded all previous agreements except the DOP. The sixth and last agreement signed 
between the two parties was the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron of 15 
January 1997. 
The DOP was signed by Shimon Peres on behalf of the Israeli government, Mahmoud 
Abbas for the PLO, and by two witnesses: Warren Christopher, then US Secretary of State; 
and Andrei Kozyrev, foreign minister ofthe Russian Federation. The DOP comprises 17 
articles, four annexes, agreed minutes, and three letters, two of which were 
acknowledgments of formal recognition which were exchanged between Rabin and Arafat. 
214 Ashrawi, This Side of Peace, p.270 
,. The reference to the DOP is to the text distributed by the PLO Negotiations Department, which is 
identical to the text published by the Israeli Foreign Ministry. 
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The Impact of Internal-External Leadership Relations on the Oslo 
Process and First Agreements 
On the face of it, it appears that when ten rounds of negotiations in Washington elapsed 
without any real progress, both the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships were under pressure 
to seek alternative channels. However, the reality of how the talks developed a back 
channel is much more complex. The lack of progress in the Washington negotiations and 
the subsequent creation ofthe Oslo channel can be attributed to two sets of factors. One 
stemmed from the inside-outside dynamic within the Palestinian leadership, such as the 
exclusion ofthe PLO, the growing role of the inside, and differences in priorities between 
the two. The second resulted from objective environmental factors such as the imbalance 
of power between Israel and Palestinians, the election of a pro-peace Labour government 
in Israel, and the bias of the US sponsor. 
The Palestinian leadership-the PLO-had long been eager for another, direct, channel for 
negotiations with the Israeli government. In his book Tareeq Oslo (The Road to Oslo), 
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), the Palestinian leader who eventually signed the Oslo 
Agreement, details the lengthy process of official Palestinian efforts to entice the Israeli 
government into direct talks with the PLO. One example was Abu Mazen's attempt to get 
Ariel Sharon to talk (in) directly with him personally, using an anonymous Palestinian 
from the West Bank. When asked why, the unidentified envoy responded: "You know, the 
talks are not showing any results and he [Abu Mazen] wants negotiations to be directly 
with the PLO, where everything could be negotiable."216 
Abbas, who was then in charge of the negotiations with Israel for the PLO, concluded 
during the eighth round of the Washington talks that: 
On our side, we [the PLO leadership] realized that the Washington talks were going 
to go nowhere, so we sent messages to [Israeli prime minister] Yitzhak Rabin and 
[foreign minister] Shimon Peres asking them to open a back channel in order to 
"'Abbas, Tareeq Oslo, p. 71. 
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save the Washington talks from crisis. Rabin turned down the suggestion; we tried 
several times, once through the Egyptians and once through the Russians. 217 
On the Israeli side, the Likud government was not interested in seeking out alternatives to 
the Washington talks since it was not interested in progress. It was only after the Labour 
Party won the Israeli elections in 1992 that a positive response to the PLO proposal 
became a possibility. Israeli political analyst Ziva Flamhaft concludes that: 
Certainly, if Labour had not won the 1992 elections in Israel, the regional and global 
situation would not have been enough to produce a breakthrough. The Labour government 
was more receptive than its predecessor to making the concessions necessary for 
meaningful negotiations.218 
The underlying factor convincing the Israeli government to advance to the secret Oslo 
negotiations was its familiarity with the Palestinian delegation to the Washington talks. 
The Israelis recognized that the Palestinian team in Washington was not prepared and was, 
in fact, unauthorized to make any changes in their positions on key issues, which were 
unacceptable to the Israelis. Ziva Flamhaft states that the failure of the Washington talks 
and the lack of authority of the Palestinian delegation there to negotiate on its own were 
the most important reasons behind the Israeli decision to recognize the PLO. 
While this was correct (the delegation did not have decision-making power), like any 
delegation (including the Israeli) it was convinced of the positions it was conveying 
because they were believed to be vital to the Palestinian cause. However, it was also the 
case that the PLO leadership was encouraging the delegation to continue insisting on these 
'hard line positions'. That was noted by Dr. Muhammad Said Ahmad, the head of al-
Ahram Strategic Studies Centre, who wrote: 
[t]he Palestinian leadership [itself which] had confined the delegation to extremely 
hard-line positions, while making concerted efforts both directly and indirectly to 
convince the Israelis, particularly Rabin and Peres, that the prospects of reaching a 
settlement based on a moderate, realistic and 'soft-line' position lay only in the 
m Ibid. p. 151. 
,. Ziva Flamhaft, Israel on the Road to Peace (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996) p. 93. 
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hands of the PLO. In this way, the PLO got the opportunity it had been waiting for, 
after the Israelis realized that direct dealing with the Palestinian leadership was the 
best way to deal with the Palestinian issue ... 219 
Apparently, this belief was shared by a vast majority of the members ofthe Palestinian 
delegation to Washington. Interviews conducted with some of them demonstrate this 
perception. Camille Mansour, member of the negotiation team, said: 
Yes, the same leadership in Tunis was giving directions to the Washington 
delegation and asking them to take firm positions on settlements, for example. They 
wanted things to be difficult to agree on in Washington in order to make it easy to 
agree in Oslo ... At the same time, in that period, Israel under Rabin was interested 
in reaching an agreement, and found the PLO in Oslo weak and desperate for an 
agreement. In other words, there were common interests between Rabin and Arafat 
in reaching an agreement in Oslo?20 
Other members of the delegation were even more explicit in expressing this conclusion, 
although they thought that it was not necessarily a negative way of proceeding. Saeb 
Erekat said: 
As I told you, the Washington delegation was the most disadvantaged in the history 
of negotiations since Adam negotiated Eve. Our leadership kept testing the loyalty 
ofthe delegation, even asking them to refer to UN resolution 181 in negotiations, 
while the delegation wanted to seek a breakthrough. Tunis' directions to the 
delegation were about closing the door for any progress by the Madrid 
[Washington] delegation, in order to help open the back channel to the PLO 
delegation, and, in my belief, that was a good thing.221 
The back channel, led by and conducted by PLO officials, directed by PLO officials, and 
known of by PLO officials, seemed to Arafat to be the solution to the most pressing 
problems he was facing at the time: the growing importance and rising profile of the 
delegation from inside the OPT. Yazid Sayigh noticed that with the first appearance of 
success from the Oslo channel 
"' Muhammad Sa'id Ahmad, "Arab-Palestinian Relations" in Majalat al-Darasat al-Falastini, vol. 34 (Spring 
1998) p. 16. 
220interview with Kameel Mansour, Ramallah, May, 2007 
221 Interview with Saeb Erekat, Ramallah, May, 2007 
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the PLO chairman obstructed the formal talks in Washington with even greater 
insistence ... and utilised the objections of the confused delegation to suggest that 
Faisal Husseini and other key figures entertained personal political ambitions and 
were being used by the US administration as a 'Trojan Horse' to supplant the 
PL0.222 
There were other, less important, reasons behind the shift in attitude, such as the realization 
on both sides of the need for secrecy. The openness of the Washington talks, and the easy 
media access provided to the delegations, provided a degree of transparency and 
accountability before the public, which was particularly relevant for the Palestinian side. 
However, while this accountability provided the delegates with legitimacy, it also placed 
pressure on them not to make concessions for which the Palestinian public were not in 
favour. 
Non-Palestinians involved in the peace process also observed by then another difficulty 
facing the Palestinian delegation, its questionable ability to deliver. That became an issue 
after the elections in Israel, which brought the Labour party and Rabin to power. 
Abdulsalam ai-Majali, the head of the joint Jordan ian-Palestinian delegation to the peace 
process said in this regard: 
With the premise that the Palestinian-Israeli track succeeded in arriving at mutually 
accepted arrangements, who would sign that agreement? What authority and 
legitimacy, if any, did the Palestinian delegation have? Would Dr. Abdul Shafi sign 
an agreement with Israel, and what commitment could he deliver on? These factors 
were springing up in the minds of the American officials as we11.223 
External factors facilitating the change in approach included the realization by third parties 
that the Washington talks were fast reaching an impasse and their subsequent offers of 
mediation, one ofwhich worked. Norway, a small country enjoying good relations with 
both Israel and the Palestinians, seized the initiative at a time when both parties were ready 
for it. According to Abu Mazen: 
It was not our choice, and I do not think it was the Israelis' choice that Oslo be a 
secret base for back channel negotiations between us and them [the Israelis]. In 
"' Sayigh, Armed Struggle, p. 656. 
223 Abdul Salam A. Majali, Jawad A. Anani and Munther J. Haddadin, Peace Making, the Inside Story of the 
/994 Jordanian-lsraeli Treaty (London: Ithaca press, 2006) p. 202. 
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fact, it was a Norwegian initiative that was directed first at the Israelis, who 
accepted it in principle. Then they or~anized a meeting in London which led to an 
understanding between the two sides. 24 
Another factor motivating Arafat, according to Sayigh, was the pressure put on the PLO 
leadership, in particular as result of the financial crisis that had been precipitated by the 
PLO's pro-Iraq stance during the Gulf War, which peaked on the eve ofthe peace process. 
For these reasons, and perhaps others, Arafat was desperate for a direct channel to the 
Israelis that would be under his control. Yazid Sayigh concluded that: 
Arafat was not averse to dealing directly with Israel. He actively pursued several 
parallel lines of contact, and by the end of 1992 had come to the preliminary 
conclusion that the PLO would ultimately take full charge of Palestinian autonomy 
in the Palestinian Occupied Territory, which it would police with PNLA 
[Palestinian National Liberation Army] units from exile. Arafat believed that such a 
solution could only be found through secret negotiations and so responded 
favourabl~ when Abbas and Qurei disclosed that a back channel had been 
opened.22 
With Israel's agreement on the 'Gaza first' approach in Oslo, Arafat became excited, 
because it addressed his prime concern, the direct role and authority of the PLO leadership, 
in addition to establishing the PLO's international status (with the possibilities for reviving 
Arab financing which that entailed). These concerns took precedence over the priorities of 
the Palestinian delegation in Washington, which included the cessation of settlement 
expansion, defining the legal status ofthe OPT, the applicability of international law, and 
the inclusion of Jerusalem in the interim stage. 
The following exchange between Arafat and Mamdouh Nofal, another PLO leader who 
quotes the dialogue between the two men in his book, reflects Arafat's priorities and the 
way in which he perceived the primary results ofthe Oslo talks: 
When I entered Arafat's office and found him alone, he shouted to me with great 
excitement and happiness: 'They agreed to Gaza-Jericho, they agreed to Gaza-
Jericho!' I said this was significant because it could lead to a Palestinian state even 
"'Abbas, Tareeq Oslo, p. 163. 
"" Sayigh, Armed Struggle, p. 655. 
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it takes time to accept the idea, but what was more important was for that state to be 
led by the PLO. Arafat then sat behind his desk, and suddenly he raised his red pen 
and said, 'Either the agreement will be signed by this pen or there is no agreement.' 
Then I asked him, 'What about the Israeli settlements and the issue of jurisdiction 
and security in the land?' Arafat answered: 'After they've accepted Gaza-Jericho, 
these become just details. The most important thing now is to succeed in the second 
step, which is making sure that it is this pen that does the signing.' Then he raised 
his red pen again and said: 'A signature by this pen means a state; a signature by 
another means ... God knows what. ' 226 
This illustrates, on the one hand, the harmony between the conduct ofthe Oslo delegation 
and the priorities of its leadership and on the other hand the differences in priorities of the 
Washington delegation-which had been approved by the same PLO leadership--and that 
of the negotiators in Oslo. The explanation for this clearly rests on two points: first, the fact 
that the Oslo delegation was accountable directly and secretly to Arafat and Abbas, while 
the Washington delegation was accountable openly to both the Palestinian public in the 
OPT as well as the PLO as an institution. Secondly, Arafat encouraged the Washington 
delegation to take hard-line positions, in order to encourage Israel to deal directly with the 
PLO, and later to allow the breakthrough to occur in the direct PLO-Israel channel-
namely, Oslo-in order to give the PLO as an institution a direct role, which was his 
priority. 
It should be noted, however, that no Palestinian on the delegation would have objected to a 
direct PLO/Israel channel. In fact, the Washington delegation contributed to the realization 
of this channel on the understanding that it would be conducted on the basis ofthe PLO's 
public and official positions. 
Indeed, most delegation members interviewed said that one of the group's objectives was 
to contribute to the recognition of the PLO. They also confirmed that that they saw no 
harm in the PLO opening a channel of direct talks with Israel, as long as the PLO 
delegation adopted positions serving the interests of the Palestinian people and cause. Dr. 
Hassan Abu Libdeh, a Fatah member ofthe delegation, spoke about the delegation's 
loyalty to the PLO leadership, and his view ofthe Oslo channel: 
"'Nofal, Qissat ltifaq Oslo, p. 94. 
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The delegation was loyal to the PLO leadership; there was no chance that the 
delegation would disobey the leadership. The delegation did not come out of a 
vacuum, it was chosen by the PLO leadership because we were members of that 
PLO; each one of us was part ofthe PLO. Accepting the PLO in negotiations was 
just a matter of time. I believe that opening the Oslo channel was good politically 
and not the problem; the problem was the unjustified political price that was paid 
later on. 227 
Although both Palestinian delegations, in Oslo and in Washington, were equally interested 
in getting the PLO recognized by Israel and the United States, as has been noted 
previously, they had differing motivations and were willing to pay different prices to 
achieve that objective. The Washington delegates did begin to express their concern about 
the lack of attention to detail in the Oslo negotiations, something which remained an issue 
when the interviews for this research were conducted even though the interviewees were 
not generally willing to question the logic of the negotiations themselves. 
Hassan Abu Libdeh, for example, said, "The Palestinian political kitchen was never 
concerned with the details, including that of the Oslo agreement and how it would be 
implemented successfully to offer a good impression about us and gather support behind 
our desire for a state". In a different part of the same interview, he also said: "I used to feel 
that outside [the PLO leadership outside] they were not excited about details; they were 
only worried about generalities-a Palestinian state, but how, and in what context and of 
what nature, they did not care. "228 
The same point was approached in a different way by Camille Mansour. He said: 
One way of understand the difference [between Oslo and Washington]; in Oslo 
they did not negotiate on the details. I remember we [in Washington] were together 
working on the details of the settlements. We were trying to specify what 
settlements exactly are, for examples in terms of build up areas, borders, zones, 
roads, and services. In Oslo they agreed that settlements are outside the 
negotiations without deciding what settlements are [what exactly was the thing that 
was excluded].229 
227 Interview with Hassan Abu Libdeh, May, 2007. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Interview with Camille Mansour, May, 2007. 
128 
Almost all the negotiators who were interviewed were in agreement with the description 
given by Nabil Kassis, one of the two deputy heads of the negotiating delegation. 
The Washington delegation included members from inside the Palestinian Occupied 
Territory, and outside. These brought with them the knowledge and experience ofthe 
complicated realities ofthe Palestinian Occupied Territory, and the political and 
sophisticated experience of the PLO outside, respectively. They included members of 
different political backgrounds. In addition, they included advisers of legal and strategic 
backgrounds, and from different international experiences.230 
The Palestinian delegation to Oslo differed from the Washington pattern in many respects. 
It lacked any structure that could have ensured a collective effort; it was composed of only 
two persons. It was not accountable to any official body-either at the party (Fatah) or 
institutional (PLO) level-but rather to individuals who, although influential, were not 
mandated to run the negotiations by any oftheir institutions, which, in any case, were not 
even aware ofthe Oslo channel. 
The justification for that was the need to maintain secrecy. A !though the delegation in Oslo 
was small, there was a political kitchen or "cell" in Tunis that was supervising the Oslo 
delegation. It was doing the necessary analyses, proposals and counter proposals. And 
contrary to the delegation inside Washington, the Oslo delegation had no popular 
constituency. They were rather like diplomats of a government. They saw themselves as 
accountable to their PLO leadership. 
Ahmad Qurei explains why the PLO outside leadership acted this way in terms of its 
historical experiences in the ten years before Oslo: 
There is no doubt that the Palestinian political movement went through great 
difficulties after leaving Beirut. The doors were closed before the Palestinians; 
there were no options in front of them, including the option of armed struggle, 
230 Interview with Nabil Kassis, May, 2007. 
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which had restored their identity and gave them a prominent position in the 
political map. 
This situation led to debates that ended with polarized minorities that insisted on 
not changing their vision of the world according to what had befallen them, and the 
rubble that was blocking their way. A majority was more receptive to the deep 
regional and international changes that had dramatically affected the Palestinian 
cause, moving us from being the first Arab priority to the Iast.231 
In this precarious situation, and as Israel sought to use the Washington peace process to 
further marginalize the PLO (and in the PLO's view, the Palestinian cause which was its 
raison d'etre) the PLO leadership was tom. If it insisted on a representative role and 
simultaneously refusing to accept Israel's conditions, it risked being bypassed entirely. 
Better then to take recognition, and swallow some of the terms of that recognition, even if 
that meant compromising fundamental principles of the PLO. The decision was made to 
accept the Israeli conditions at Oslo conditions, but in a way that the PLO hoped would be 
allowed to change over time. 
When I interviewed Qurei, I asked him if the PLO leadership outside had paid a heavy 
political price for "improving" the conditions of negotiations in Oslo as compared to 
Madrid in this way. He had a ready and spontaneous answer: 
Let me clarifY this, the price was not paid in Oslo, the price was paid earlier, the 
price was paid in the Egyptian Camp David; the price was paid when we accepted 
[resolutions] 242 and 338; the price was paid when we accepted to go to 
Washington in an incomplete delegation [without PLO and Jerusalemites]; in a 
delegation that was the 'Jordan ian-Palestinian' delegation and to negotiate interim 
phase self-government rather than a final solution. This is how the price was paid, 
if there was a price. Oslo came after that price was paid, and improved its 
conditions. 232 
In addition to the need to avoid marginalization, there was another factor motivating the 
PLO leadership to move quickly from Washington to Oslo's direct negotiations. This 
factor was the growing political prominence of the inside discussed earlier. Faisal 
Husseini's headquarters in East Jerusalem, The Orient House, became the centre of gravity 
for Palestinian internal and international political activities. It became an address receiving, 
231 Qurei, ArRriwaya, p. 372. 
232 Interview with Ahmad Qurei, Ramallah, May, 2007. 
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almost weekly, heads of state, prime ministers, and foreign ministers. Hanan Ashrawi 
became the star Palestinian spokesperson with her picture on the cover of major magazines 
and newspapers. Given the well-known suspicious nature ofYasser Arafat, it is easy to 
understand the hasty move from Washington to Oslo, and the pace of the Oslo talks. 
In spite ofthese differences, between inside and outside, both were equally loyal to the 
PLO. However, it was becoming clear that the PLO did not mean necessarily the same 
thing to both of them. To the Washington delegates, the PLO meant national unity towards 
a common objective- the end of occupation and independent statehood. To the Oslo 
negotiators, the PLO meant the individual leaders, status, and role of the organisation. 
Their respective priorities sprang from these differing understandings. For the inside 
leadership, reversing the constituent policies of occupation were the first priority but for 
the outside leadership the Israeli acceptance to negotiate with them directly was seen as a 
major achievement in itself and a substantive concession from the Israelis. As a result, the 
Oslo negotiators concentrated less on substantive details as settlements, territorial 
jurisdiction, sovereignty, legality, human rights, integrity, contiguity, linkage, and instead 
concentrated more on symbols, control and raising the profile of the PLO-both its 
personnel and as an institution. 
Hanan Ashrawi recorded a discussion with Arafat in which he told her about the Oslo 
channel after the Declaration of Principles had been initiated: 
The Palestinian state will start from Gaza-Jericho and from there I will negotiate 
with the Israelis to end the occupation in the rest of the Palestinian territories. Trust 
me, we will soon have our own telephone country code, stamps and television 
station. This will be the beginning ofthe Palestinian state. 
Ashrawi added, "The general conversation then turned to a discussion of the symbols of 
sovereignty. "233 
Ashrawi also noted the relation between the Oslo Declaration of Principles and the Oslo 
team of negotiators, when she responded to her first reading of the agreement: 
m Ashrawi, This Side of Peace, p. 259. 
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It is clear that those who initiated this agreement have not lived under occupation. 
You postponed the settlement issue and Jerusalem without even getting guarantees 
that Israel would not continue to create facts on the ground that would pre-empt and 
prejudge the final outcome ... What about all our red lines? Territorial jurisdiction 
and integrity are negated in substance and the transfer of authority is purely 
functional. 234 
Abbas responded by saying: "We made strategic political gains, particularly the fact that 
this is an agreement with the PLO and not just a Palestinian delegation."235 In her response, 
Ashrawi illustrates clearly the difference between the two perspectives-Washington and 
Oslo-when she said, 
It is not who makes the agreement, but what it is. I have no ego problems about 
being excluded or kept in the dark, or even about being used. My main concern is 
about substance ... Strategic issues are fine, but we know the Israelis and know that 
they will exploit their power as occupier to the hilt and by the time you get to 
permanent status, Israel will have permanently altered realities on the ground.236 
Did Oslo Demonstrate Poor Performance and a Weak Agreement? 
The criteria of evaluating Oslo agreement should be derived from the objectives of the 
Palestinians in the negotiations, within the context and constraints of the Middle East peace 
process. It should also take into consideration the potentials and expertise that accumulated 
in other places, including Washington. Given that these negotiations were about interim 
arrangements that should lead to final settlement, the three main objectives that follow 
should have governed the Palestinian negotiating strategy. 
First was how to make the interim arrangements and agreement conducive to the kind of 
final status that was anticipated. The final status, from a Palestinian perspective, had to 
allow for ending the occupation, establishing an independent Palestinian state, and 
ensuring the return of refugees. That meant the agreements had to link the interim 
arrangements with such a final status, accept the principle of Palestinian self-
HI Ibid. 
H• Ibid. 
m Ibid., p. 261. 
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determination, acknowledge that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were-according to a legal 
status-occupied and that the occupation should and would be ended 
The second issue should have been ensuring that the interim arrangements would limit (as 
much as possible) the Israelis from using that period to further creating facts on the ground 
that might pre-empt the desired final status, such as practices that consolidate the 
occupation, including stopping the expansion of settlements. 
The third issue would have been to use the interim period and arrangements to end or 
reduce the suffering of the Palestinian people in the OPT, including, for example, by 
creating an agreement that recognizes the applicability of international humanitarian law. 
The preamble to the DOP specified the parties to that agreement as "the Government of the 
State oflsrael and the PLO team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle 
East Peace Conference (the 'Palestinian Delegation')." The preamble also sets out the 
general form and strategic objectives of the agreement by stating that the parties 
Agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontations and conflict, 
recognizes their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful 
coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and 
comprehensive peace settlement and historical reconciliation through the agreed 
political process. 237 
This preamble marks a dramatic departure for the Israelis to recognition of the PLO as the 
representative of the Palestinian people, however, it has yet to be seen if this recognition 
can, in reality, encompass what the PLO believed it included: a recognition of what the 
PLO means for the Palestinian people-namely, a symbol of their nationhood and 
consequently the rights that accrue to nations, particularly self-determination and 
statehood. 
It can be argued that this Israeli recognition was much less loaded with meaning than the 
PLO believed, and that the PLO recognized by Israel was not necessarily the PLO Israel 
237 The Declaration of Principles [http://www. jmcc. org/research/series/dop. html#declare]l3 September 
1993 
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had previously refused to recognize. A close look at the second part of the preamble shows 
that if the PLO stands for the nationhood of the Palestinian people and is struggling to 
achieve their national rights, then this is not the context within which the PLO is 
recognized. When that paragraph specifies the rights that are recognized, it speaks only of 
legitimate and political rights and not national rights. 
As such, the significance of this mutual recognition remained controversial. To Ahmad S. 
Khalidi, a prominent Palestinian intellectual and one ofthe advisors to the Palestinian 
delegation in Madrid and Washington, the most important thing about Oslo is: 
that Israel and the Palestinians have for the first time met, recognized each other. .. 
Oslo's virtue (indeed, to many, perhaps its only virtue) is that it broke all the taboos 
and freed both sides from the furtiveness, the hypocrisy and the futility of mutual 
denial.238 
On the other hand, other Palestinian intellectual warn of the dangers of over-estimating this 
recognition and hint at the possibly risky aspects underlying this recognition. Burhan 
Dajani, a leading Arab economist and intellectual and board member ofthe Institute of 
Palestine Studies, believes that: 
This is the real danger, for Israel, having recognised the existence ofthe Palestinian 
people and the PLO's right to negotiate for them, may be tempted to substitute the 
self-rule authority for the PLO in the negotiations precisely because, as already 
mentioned, recognising the PLO implies an indirect recognition of the Palestinian 
people itself. 239 
In the first article of the DOP, Israel achieved one of its most important objectives by 
specifying the first phase of the negotiations but leaving the future and the ultimate 
resolution so vague that it might encompass many different possibilities, including 
reversibility. Israel had always wanted all options to be open in terms of a final resolution, 
and not to have to commit to any specific fate for the OPT. This seems to have been 
achieved. Article I included: 
238 Ahmad Khalidi, HCurrent Dilemmas, Future Challenges," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XXIV, no. 2 
(Winter 1995) p. 6. 
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the aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace 
process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government 
Authority, the elected council (the 'Council') for the Palestinian people in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading 
to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338?40 
The only description of the final or permanent settlement is that it is to be based on these 
two resolutions, and the entire text does not go much beyond that. 
The third article deals with elections, which also were perceived as a significant 
achievement for the Palestinians because elections could be seen as closely linked to the 
idea of self-determination. However, the text is carefully crafted in what it excludes when 
it states in the third point of Article III: "These elections will constitute a significant 
interim preparatory step toward the realisation ofthe legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people and their just requirements." This paragraph appears to try and prevent any possible 
explanation of these elections as a potential exercise in self-determination, which is what 
the PLO was aiming for. 
Jurisdiction is dealt with in Article IV and in Section B of the Agreed Minutes, which are 
an integral part of the agreement. Both sections indicate the areas covered under the 
Palestinian Council's jurisdiction. There are two major problems with this, the first being 
the lack of clarity on whether the jurisdiction referred to is territorial or functional, 
particularly since the exclusions are referred to as "issues" and the excluded issues are both 
territorial and functional in nature. The Agreed Minutes specified these issues as 
Jerusalem, settlements, military locations-which are territorial-and Israelis, which is a 
functional issue. 
The significance of this point is that this vagueness weakened the territorial meaning and 
of the jurisdiction being turned over in a way that the reference to the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip in the paragraph beginning "[j]urisdiction of the council will cover West Bank and 
Gaza Strip territory" does not necessarily have a strictly territorial sense. It can mean some 
territorial and some non-territorial jurisdiction in these areas. 
240 The Declaration of Principle [http://www. jmcc. org/research/series/dop. html#declare] 13 September 
1993 
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The jurisdiction issue was one of the stumbling blocks in the Washington negotiations. The 
Washington delegation was insisting on the importance of giving the Palestinian interim 
self-government authority jurisdictions over all the OPT. The following paragraph is part 
of the expanded outline submitted by the Palestinians in Washington DC on 3 March 1992; 
their position included: 
There should be no limitations on the powers and responsibilities ofthe PISGA 
[Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority], except those which derive from its 
character as an interim arrangement...the jurisdiction of the PISGA should extent to 
all of the OPT, including its lands, natural resources, water.}41 
That is why the text of the DOP was not satisfactory in this regard, from the point of view 
of the legal adviser of the Washington delegation. Raja Shehadeh noted that: "According to 
Article IV, the 'jurisdiction ofthe council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory 
except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.' The definite 
article has been dropped to indicate that what is meant is not the whole of the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip."242 
Article Number V, Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations, specifies the 
timeframe ofthe transitional period of five years, and that the final status negotiations 
should start as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the 
interim period. What is more important is that this article specifies the subjects of the final 
status negotiations in its third point as follows: 
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, 
including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, 
relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of common 
interest. 243 
One positive aspect in this paragraph is that Israel admits, for the first time officially and 
on record, that Jerusalem, refugees, and settlements are negotiable. 
"' Expanded Outline: Palestinian Interim Self-Government Arrangements: Concept, Preliminary Measures 
and Elections Modalities [http://www. jmcc. org/documents/pisga. htm]3 March 1992. 
"'Shehadeh, Weight of Legal History, p. 20. 
m Article V, Declaration of Principles. 
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However, the negative aspect is that while Israel agreed to discuss settlements and 
Jerusalem, nothing in the article or the DOP in general states clearly that Israel is barred 
from continuing its illegal policies in these two areas, namely the policy of creating illegal 
facts on the ground both in Jerusalem and settlements which are intended to pre-empt the 
outcome of negotiations over these issues. 
In interviews with most of the Washington delegation, this was the main criticism made of 
the Oslo agreement. A representative example is found in the interview with Mamdouh ai-
Aker, who said: 
I can charge that they [Oslo negotiators] did not understand the essence ofthe 
struggle that we were fighting. Postponing the issue of the Jewish settlements 
without freezing settlement activities for five years gives the Israelis cart blanche 
to continue creating facts on the ground. Not only this, but the bypass roads for the 
settlements that were accepted by the leadership were tantamount to a crime. Even 
if they assumed good will, why they did not shout five months after the 
implementation of the agreement when Israel continued the expansion of 
settlements?244 
When I asked the chief negotiator ofthe Palestinian delegation to Oslo why the same 
leadership that approved the Washington delegation's insistence on Israel's stopping 
settlement expansion did not demand the same of the Oslo team, Ahmad Qurei said: 
Ifyou go to the minutes of Oslo negotiation, you will find that the issue of 
settlements occupies the largest space of the discussion. We continued to insist that 
they should stop the expansion of settlements, and that point remained disputed 
until the end when it was solved by brother Abu Ammar and brother Abu Mazen in 
last-minute contacts between them, Peres, and the Norwegian foreign minister. I 
was not happy with the result. In the end, I accepted because there was no 
alternative. What was agreed on in the end was that none of the parties would take 
unilateral steps pre-empting the final status negotiations?45 
In the final analysis, the Palestinian delegation failed to establish in the agreement the 
difference between the need to postpone the negotiations on the fate of these issues, and 
the vital need to stop the continuous Israeli expansion of settlements, including inside 
244 Interview with Mamdouh al-Aker, Ramallah, May, 2005 
245 Interview with Ahmad Qurei, Ram allah, May, 2005 
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occupied East Jerusalem. What magnifies this mistake is the fact that the DOP does not 
specifY the size or borders of these settlements. 
Israel based its control over the OPT on a wide-ranging set of military orders that were 
invested with the full power of law. Article IX point 1 gave the elected council the power 
to legislate. However, in point 2 it recognizes the existing body of laws which naturally 
includes the more than 1,300 Israeli military orders in the West Bank and over 1,000 in 
Gaza, "which regulate every single aspect of daily life in general with the objective of 
forcing out, through various means, the majority of Palestinians, and subjugating the 
remainder of the population. "246 
The second part of Article IX states: "2. both parties will review jointly laws and military 
orders presently in force in remaining spheres."247 The problem here is not simply the 
recognition of the known Israeli military orders, but that there were many military orders 
in force which were not made public, and according to this article the Palestinians are 
recognizing and accepting orders that that they did not yet know about. In addition, this 
article gave the Israelis the right of veto over changes to these orders by saying "both 
parties will review ... " 
In Articles VIII and IX, the DOP deals with the issue of withdrawal and redeployment. 
Article XIV states: "Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed 
in the protocol attached as Annex II. 248 
Article XIII addresses the issue of redeployment of Israeli forces: "a redeployment of 
Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to 
withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV."249 The article 
goes on to specifY that this redeployment will be guided by the principle that military 
forces should be redeployed outside populated areas and, in addition, at a later stage, a 
further redeployment to specified locations will be gradually implemented. 
m Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, Israeli Military Orders in the Occupied Palestinian West 
Bank: 1967-1992 (Jerusalem, JMCC, 1993) p. iiv. 
"v Declaration of Principles, Article IX, Point 2. 
"'Declaration of Principles, Article XIV. 
'"Declaration of Principles, Article XIII, Point 2. 
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The positive aspect of these two articles is that they establish the principle ofwithdrawal 
and redeployment, something that Israel had previously refused to recognize. These 
articles therefore set a precedent and signify a break in the Israeli ideological position on 
the OPT being part of historical Israel not to be surrendered. 
The negative aspect of these two articles is that the term "withdrawal" is used only for 
Gaza and Jericho, while for the rest of the West Bank, the weaker term "redeployment" is 
used. In addition, the further redeployment will be to "specified locations". This is vague 
language and can be taken to mean anything, and the result of this language is that the real 
meaning remains to be negotiated. 
Article XV, Resolution of Disputes, is an example of one characteristic ofthe DOP-the 
weight it places on the agreement of both parties to issues, meaning that each side 
essentially has veto power. Section 3 of Article XV states: 
3. The Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the 
interim period which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the 
agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.250 
Again, Israel retains veto power in resorting to arbitration; which makes it almost 
meaningless to the Palestinians. Arbitration is very important to the Palestinians because 
they are the weaker party. Experience had taught the Palestinians that Israeli behaviour in 
the OPT was always a function of their superior power and that constraining that power 
was an urgent necessity. By assigning Israel veto powers, the Palestinians failed to do so. 
The regional dimensions are dealt with in Articles XII and XVI. Article XII states that: 
"The two Parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in 
establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements .. .to promote cooperation 
between them."251 Article XVI emphasises the need for regional cooperation through the 
, •. Declaration of Principles, Article XV, Section 2. 
,., Declaration of Principles, Article XII. 
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multilateral bodies: "Both Parties view the multilateral working groups as appropriate 
instruments for promoting the 'Marshall Plan. '"252 
The exchanged letters of recognition between Rabin and Arafat are an integral part ofthe 
agreement. In fact, they made the agreement-and specifically an agreement with the 
PLO-possible and marked a dramatic change in the political position of the PLO. In the 
letter from Arafat, the PLO recognises Israel despite Israel's lack of commitment to 
recognise the right of self-determination and statehood for Palestinians. It further commits 
the PLO to stopping what it formerly considered legitimate struggle tactics without an 
Israeli commitment to end its occupation of the OPT. 
The only Israeli demand which was not met in Arafat's letter was fulfilled in another letter, 
also signed by Arafat but directed to Johan Jorgen Holst, the Norwegian foreign minister, 
and also dated 9 September 1993. In the letter to Holst, the Chairman of the PLO fulfilled 
the Israeli demand to stop the Palestinian popular uprising (the Intifada) against the Israeli 
occupation in the OPT 
In return for these commitments by the PLO, Israel recognised the PLO and agreed to enter 
into negotiations with the organisation. This recognition, however, did not involve any 
commitment towards principles formerly held by the PLQ-the right to self-determination, 
the right to a state, ending the occupation, or the right of return of Palestinian refugees. The 
Israeli letter reads: 
In response to your letter of9 September 1993, I wish to confirm to you that, in 
light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has 
decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and 
commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.253 
This exchange of letters meant that the PLO had given up much of what it stood for in 
return for being recognized. Therefore, the PLO that was recognized by Israel was not 
exactly the same PLO Israel previously refused to recognize previously. It was subject to 
,., Declaration of Principles, Article XVI. 
, •• Letter from Yitzhak Rabin to Yasser Arafat [http://www. mfa. gov. 
i 1/MF A/Peace+ Process/Guide+to+the+ Peace+ Process/Israel-PLO+ Recognition+-
+Exchange+of+Letters+betwe. htm] 9 September 1993. 
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many criticisms, especially from Palestinian intellectuals; the following comment from 
Edward Said is an example: "Arafat's recognition of Israel's right to exist carries with it a 
whole series ofrenunciations--ofthe PLO's charter, ofviolence and terrorism, of all 
relevant UN resolutions except 242 and 338, which do not contain one word about the 
Palestinians. "254 
While this analysis highlights the weaknesses of Oslo, it has to be acknowledged that the 
Oslo negotiations and agreement also marked some improvements in conditions for 
negotiations compared to those of Madrid and Washington, including a direct role for the 
PLO in the talks and implementation of the agreement. In addition, Oslo committed Israel 
to the principle of withdrawal, and eventually negotiating issues such as Jerusalem, 
refugees, and settlements. 
An example of this improvement was that the Israeli delegation responded to the 
Palestinian demand in Washington that issues such as Jerusalem, settlement and refugees 
be included in the second phase of negotiations, saying: " ... the concept of the permanent 
status should remain undefined and the interim arrangements should leave all options open 
for the agreement on the permanent status."255 By contrast, in Oslo, Israel accepted the 
inclusion ofthese issues in the agenda ofthe final status negotiations. In addition, Oslo 
enabled the Palestinians to establish their first authority on their own territory, including 
holding the first ever democratic elections. 
But fundamentally, the agreement had profound flaws which have been detailed here and 
elsewhere.256In addition, it failed to define the legal status of the OPT, which prevented the 
Palestinian side from benefiting from many legal aspects. Moreover, the agreement was 
vague and open-ended, which are features that usually benefit the stronger party. 
,., Edward Said, "Palestinian Versailles" in Progressive (December 1993) p. 2. 
,., Informal compilation of israeli ideas on the concept of the Interim Self-Government Agreement. 
Presented to the Palestinian delegation in Washington on I 0 December, 1992. 
256 For example, Laura Drake, "Between the Lines, A textual Analysis of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement" in 
Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No.4, Fa111994, pp. 1-36. 
141 
The Impact of Objective Factors 
The Palestinian-Israeli negotiations were not taking place in a vacuum. They were affected 
by other objective factors, including Israeli behaviour on the ground and the suffering of 
the Palestinian people under occupation; the imbalance of powers between the two sides 
and its effect on negotiations; the attitude and behaviour of the United States as the main 
sponsor and mediator of the peace process, and the influence of the United States on Arab 
governments, which then financially pressured the PLO. 
It is useful to note that the shift from the Washington channel to the Oslo back channel was 
an Israeli decision in principle and timing. The Palestinian leadership, which would have 
welcomed such a back channel at any time, was unaware of when and why the Israelis took 
the decision to open such a channel. Mamdouh Nofal, PLO official and analyst wrote: 
None ofthe members ofthe Palestinian leadership, including those who. signed the 
agreement and member ofthe cell that led the negotiations knows exactly when or 
why Israel took the decision to open negotiations with the PLO leadership or why 
Oslo was selected as the place for it.257 
While this indicates the strong effect of Israel on determining the process, it also indicates 
the vulnerability of the Palestinian side to changing conditions within Israel. Fuad Ben 
Eliezar, former Israeli Labour Party cabinet minister and former Israeli commander of the 
OPT, and Ben Haze, former assistant to the head of the Israeli Shabak (Intelligence), 
explained in part the change in Israeli positions, particularly the shift in its attitude toward 
the PLO, in an interview with the Israeli daily Yediot Ahranot on I December 1992: 
Most of the people negotiating with us are PLO by definition because they hold the 
same political views as the PLO ... Arafat might be problematic, but there are 
pragmatists in the PLO that we can talk to, like Abu Mazen (Abbas), Nabil Sha'ath, 
and Farouq Qaddoumi. The peace process is moving very slowly; if we do not talk 
to the PLO, we will find ourselves facing Hamas. We have to isolate the extremists 
by making progress in the peace process and strengthening the moderates. We have 
,.. Mamdouh Nofal, Alinqilab (Amman: Dar Alshoroq, 1996) p. 239. 
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to stop and think why most of our former intelligence officers support negotiations 
with the PLO-it is because they know the PLO so wel1.258 
The Oslo negotiations were heavily influenced by the imbalance of powers between the 
two sides. In fact, taking the talks from Washington, where the weaker Palestinian party 
could to some extent be protected by public opinion, and international legality, to Oslo, left 
the Palestinians at the mercy of this imbalance of power. 
It is clear that the negotiators felt the imbalance of powers in the Oslo negotiations. When 
Ahmad Qurei described the main features and characteristics of the Oslo process and 
agreement, the balance of power was included. He wrote: 
The imbalance of powers was strongly in the favour of one party against the other. 
This imbalance was always in the back ofthe mind of the negotiators. It was 
embodied very clearly in the mind of the Israelis, and was noticeable in the way the 
Israelis presented their view on any of the negotiations' issues, which regardless 
were marked by differences, disputes, and outcries. That implied that the 
Palestinian negotiator would have to play his limited cards with patience, strength, 
and cleverness?59 
Although the Palestinian representatives to the Washington negotiations realized the 
impact ofthe balance of powers on the negotiations, they have more nuanced views that 
are worth examining. All were asked in the interviews about that point, answering in a 
manner slightly different from Ahmad Qurei. 
Sami Kelani said: 
We should not bow to this subject [balance of powers], and assume that things are 
pre-determined by the balance of powers. I admit there was an imbalance of 
powers, but I always believed in the abi I ity to change in a gradual way ... I believe 
there were two killing factors for the peace process: poor Palestinian performance, 
and Israeli crimes of continued aggression. 260 
'"' Yediot Ahranot, 19 December 1992. 
259 Ahmad Qurei, Ar-Riwaya al-Filastiniyya, p. 380. 
260 Interview with Sami Kelani, Nablus, Jun, 2007 
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There is an interesting way of approaching the objective versus subjective factors affecting 
the negotiations' outcome, one presented by Nabil Kassis, deputy head ofthe Palestinian 
delegation to Washington: 
It should be inconceivable that we enter such a huge thing [the negotiations] 
without complete preparation. We should not make mistakes and blame it on the 
other factors. We can blame the other factor only when we do advance correctly. 
Our performance was not perfect; it had many deficiencies ... the letters of 
invitations and assurances and our acceptance ofthem restricted the outcome. The 
PLO had to change in order to be recognized. Even if we blame [Yitzhak] Shamir 
and American support for Israel, we cannot escape our own blame, because we did 
not make the utmost out of the given circumstances.261 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it appears that the move from Washington to Oslo resulted from common 
interest between both the PLO leadership outside and the government of Israel. The PLO 
wanted a direct role and primary role, which depended on its recognition by Israel, while 
Israel wanted more flexible negotiation positions, and an interlocutor that could deliver. 
Therefore, this led to a trade-off between the PLO and Israel. 
The PLO compromised some of the positions that had hindered an agreement in the 
Washington talks in exchange for Israel's acceptance of a direct role for the PLO in both 
the negotiations with Israel and also as the implementing party ofthe agreement. The PLO 
back-slid on demands for a halt to settlement activity in the interim phase, agreed to put on 
hold the status of Jerusalem, agreed to amend the Palestinian National Charter, and agreed 
to end the Intifada without a reciprocal commitment to an end to the occupation. 
Israel recognized the PLO but only after the PLO had distanced itself from some of what it 
stood for, in effect becoming a 'new' PLO. Israel agreed to the principle of an Israeli 
withdrawal or redeployment, but only in heavily-populated Palestinian areas, not in all of 
the OPT. Finally, Israel agreed for the first time to the idea that issues such as the status of 
Jerusalem and settlements could be negotiable, all the while retaining the freedom to make 
261 Interview with Nabil Kassis. Ramallah, May, 2007 
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changes during the interim period that could predetermine the final outcome prior to 
negotiations. 
Having two tracks of negotiations, one in Washington with the inside leadership, and one 
in Oslo with a delegation only from the outside, in addition to the decline in coordination, 
proved to be unhealthy for the Palestinians, particularly when the PLO leadership outside 
did not consult with the inside leadership or take into consideration their practical 
experience of occupation and their primary concerns. Although the inside leadership 
remained supportive of the decisions and role of the outside, the period witnessed a decline 
in the complementary nature of relations that had characterized the relationship between 
inside and outside leadership up to that point, and elevated competition between the two. 
Both of these outcomes were new, appearing only with Oslo. 
The differences in priorities, together with the outside's absence in Washington and the 
inside's absence in Oslo, contributed negatively to overall Palestinian negotiating 
performance. The PLO outside leadership focused on generalities and symbolic 
achievements but neglected the particular and detailed issues which had been represented 
by the inside leadership, with the result being that they signed a flawed and problematic set 
of agreements. 
The structure ofthe Oslo negotiations, in which the PLO outside leadership exchanged a 
direct role in return for negotiations which were secret and unmediated, left the Palestinian 
negotiators vulnerable to the power imbalance between the two sides, while the exclusion 
of their technically qualified advisors (who had been present at Washington talks) left them 
ill-equipped to recognise all the weaknesses and potential problems with the texts 
themselves. 
Throughout the negotiations, Israel continued with its occupation policies, expanding 
settlements and expropriating land. The Palestinians remained subject to an unfavourable 
international climate, including a weak and divided Arab world and a pro-Israeli American 
administration. 
The consequence, as Edward Said noted, was that: 
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The DOP consolidated Israeli occupation with Palestinian acquiescence; it gave the 
Israelis sovereignty, control over water, security, external relations, and the veto 
power in everything of consequence occurring in the autonomous areas. Jerusalem, 
the settlements, and the roads remain in their hands, with no restrictions at all.262 
The bitterness could also be seen in the way most Palestinian intellectuals inside perceived 
the agreement. George Giacaman, a prominent Palestinian intellectual and Birzeit 
University Dean, expressed that feeling: 
The two Israeli-Palestinian agreements (Oslo I and Oslo II) represent the terms of 
settlement after the defeat, or specifically after the acceptance of defeat by the 
Palestinians. The acceptance ofthe defeat was a process with many stages, 
inasmuch as the Oslo agreements themselves constitute a process that continues to 
unfold and may not clearly end its results and implications.263 
"'Edward W. Said, "Symbols Versus Substance: A Year After the Declaration of Principles" in Journal of 
Palestine Studies, vol. XXIV, no. 2 (Winter 1995) p. 61. 
m George Giacaman, "In the Throes of Oslo: Palestinian Society, Civil Society and the Future," in George 
Giacaman and Dag Jorund Lonning (eds) After Oslo, New Realities, Old Problems (London: Plato Press, 
1998) p. I. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: The Negotiations over tlh.e Implementation of 
the Declaration of Principles 
Introduction 
As soon as the PLO leadership achieved Israeli recognition and was accepted as 
negotiations interlocutor, it took on a different style of negotiating and changed its 
delegation composition. This chapter will demonstrate how the credibility of the PLO as 
the leader and legitimate representative of the Palestinian struggle, combined with the 
achievement of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) agreement, now enabled the PLO 
leadership in exile to co-opt the inside leadership and create a 'new' elite. This elite, on the 
one hand, had invested heavily in, and was dependent on, the relationship with Israel, and 
on the other hand was influential in the subsequent negotiations over the implementation of 
the DOP. The new elite, the way it shaped the Palestinian Authority, its performance in 
subsequent negotiations, as well as the transformation oflsrael from an international 
lawbreaker to a party in peace talks all meant that Israel had a more advantageous position 
in those subsequent negotiations. The result was again a poor performance by the 
Palestinian negotiators, and agreements which did little to achieve the Palestinian ultimate 
atms. 
This chapter will examine the Palestinian response to the Oslo Agreement, as embodied in 
the DOP, including the response of the PLO, the Palestinian public, and the opposition. 
Palestinian public opinion will be examined, as well as violent reactions to the agreement, 
to demonstrate the scale of the 'room to manoeuvre' which was now open to Arafat's 
'kitchen' in negotiations in terms of Palestinian public opinion. 
It will also focus on the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations that followed the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles, the purpose of which was to reach agreement on the mechanisms 
for implementation of the DOP. This will include changes in the composition ofthe 
delegation, the style of negotiations, and the decision-making process, in addition to the 
effects ofthese changes on inside-outside leadership relations. This discussion will 
highlight the structural weaknesses of both the Palestinian negotiating strategy and the 
negotiations format itself. 
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The DOP was supposed to be implemented in two stages; the first stage was embodied in 
the "Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area" (Gaza-Jericho Agreement), because 
the DOP was to be implemented in the Gaza Strip and the small West Bank town of 
Jericho. The second stage was specified in the "Interim Agreement on Self-Government 
Authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" (Interim Agreement). 
The Palestinian Authority established by these agreements employed an elite class; the 
composition of that elite, its effect on the negotiations and the implementation of the 
agreements will also be looked at in this chapter. This helps to explain the behaviour of the 
Palestinian negotiators and its effect on the nature of the agreements, their implementation, 
and the subsequent weakening of the leadership. 
With the PLO leadership's return to the OPT, and the establishment of a political system 
based on elections, public opinion began to carry important weight. This chapter will 
present data on and analyses of the basic trends in public opinion after each agreement and 
after implementation, as well as these trends' impact upon the positions ofthe leadership. 
The Palestinian Response to the Declaration of Principles 
This section will examine the immediate reaction to the signing of the Declaration of 
Principles within the decision-making bodies ofthe PLO. Then, public debate and opinion 
about the agreement, especially that in the OPT, will be discussed. Finally, this section will 
explore the reaction of the Palestinian political opposition. 
The highest body in the PLO structure, the Executive Committee, was not informed ofthe 
Oslo negotiations. Several weeks before the signing of the agreement, PLO Chairman 
Vasser Arafat started gradually briefing key figures ofthe leadership. On 9 September, 
1993, the Executive Committee approved the agreement by exchanging letters of 
recognition between the PLO and Israel. 
The PLO Executive committee presented the agreement for debate and ratification at a 
meeting ofthe Central Council on 11 October, 1993. Sixty-three members voted for it, 
eight opposed it, and nine abstained-the DOP was approved. 
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That session of the Central Council witnessed a number of interesting debates which would 
significantly influence the two subsequent agreements on implementation of the DOP-the 
Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the Interim Agreement. Although the DOP was approved by 
a comfortable majority of the PLO Central Council, this majority expressed their 
reservations about how it was to be implemented, with many arguing that the text of the 
DOP was at times so vague that it could give rise to several different interpretations. 
Because ofthis, they reasoned, what was of primary importance were the negotiations on 
implementation and the actual implementation itself. It was at this Central Council session 
that the magic words 'the Palestinian reading of the DOP' were first uttered, by which was 
meant that in the upcoming negotiations the PLO was to insist on its own interpretation of 
the DOP's vaguely-worded articles in order to avoid any potential pitfalls. 
The most articulate speech given, and one that reflected the mood of the majority of those 
voting to approve the DOP, was that of Mahmoud Abbas. In his speech, Abu Mazen said: 
This agreement-the DOP-can have different interpretations, can have different 
ways of implementation, can lead to two different outcomes. It can lead us, 
possibly, to achieving our goal of an independent Palestinian state, but it can also 
take us to hell. And ifyou ask me where it will lead us, I would say ... my hand is 
on my heart [I am worried]?64 
The significance of this speech on the subsequent negotiations was that the approval of the 
majority of the Central Council's 107 members was based on a specific understanding of 
the DOP and the awareness that giving up this interpretation could be risky. 
The negotiations and the implementation which followed justified the Central Council's 
worries to a great extent, as will be demonstrated in this chapter. 
On the eyes ofthe public, the DOP that was signed at the White House on 13 September 
came as a positive surprise to most of the Palestinian people. The few months preceding it 
had witnessed a deadlock in the Washington talks and the peace process was viewed as 
stagnant. 
264 Qurei, Ar-Riwaha ai-Filistiniyya, p. 295 
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The new breakthrough was accompanied by some symbolic achievements, such as 
allowing the Palestinian public to carry Palestinian flags (previously, this had been reason 
enough for Israel troops to open fire). On the other hand, it was accompanied by a large 
media campaign that exaggerated the achievements of the agreement to the public. 
The Palestinian public received the DOP positively, and expressed that in visible ways, 
taking to the streets and celebrating the grand national achievement. A more scientific way 
of understanding the public opinion surrounding the agreement is to look at public opinion 
polls conducted after its signing. These polls demonstrated clear public support for the 
agreement and for the PLO leadership that negotiated it. In addition, it showed heightened 
optimism that this agreement would lead to an independent Palestinian state. 
The Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, a Palestinian Jerusalem-based 
independent research centre specializing in polling, conducted a public opinion poll on the 
Palestinian public's attitudes towards the DOP on the 191h and the 201h ofSeptember 1993. 
The poll surveyed 1505 Palestinians aged 18 years and above in the West Bank including 
East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip on their attitudes towards the DOP. The survey, which was 
conducted face-to-face, included 920 interviewees in the West Bank and towns and 
villages, and 585 interviewees from Gaza. The margin of error in this poll was +-3. 265 
The questioner examined in a direct way the position of the respondents to the agreement 
by asking: "The PLO Leadership and the Israeli Government reached an agreement 
(Agreement on a declaration of principles about interim arrangements). Do you support 
this agreement?" A majority of 68.6% responded yes, 66.4% of them from West Bank and 
only 27% from Gaza (27.8% responded no, and 3.5% said that they had no opinion). 
Another question aimed at understanding the reasoning behind this support or lack thereof 
asked if the respondent considered that "The agreement constitutes a step that might lead to 
a Palestinian state?" Just over 60% said they agreed, and only 33% said they don't agree 
and 6.9% had no opinion on this. 
"• JMCC Public Opinion Poll No.3, Published on 23 September, 1993. 
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The same poll also showed support for the negotiations themselves. Nearly 80% said they 
support the continuity of the negotiations between Israel and the PLO. This is especially 
significant in light of the fact that an earlier poll conducted before the DOP was signed by 
the same centre with the same sample frame and methodology had found that only 37.5% 
approved continuing with negotiations with Israel. A majority of 55.9% rejected 
continuing negotiations and 50.1% supported stopping the negotiations and Palestinians 
withdrawing from the talks266 • The polls thus reflected a clear increase in public support 
for the PLO that had negotiated and signed this agreement. Question 9 stated: "Did the 
agreement affect your attitude towards the PLO?'' Over 46% of respondents said that it had 
increased his or her support for the PLO, and only 19.1% said the agreement had decreased 
its support for the PLO. Nearly 25% said that the agreement didn't affect their attitude 
towards the PLO, and 9.8% had no opinion. 
On another level, when the news of the agreement reached in Oslo between the PLO and 
the Israeli government came out, Palestinian political factions and political personalities 
were divided between opponents and supporters of this agreement. The two main secular 
political groups which led the popular opposition were the Popular Front for the Liberation 
ofPalestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). That 
is, of course, in addition to the other two Islamic groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. 
On the other hand, two secular political groups supported the agreement: the Palestinian 
Peoples Party (PPP) and the Palestinian Democratic Union-FIDA. Fatah was the main 
supporter of the agreement, as the faction that carried out the negotiations. Its leader, 
Arafat, was also head of the PLO that negotiated and signed the DOP. However, although a 
majority of Fatah members and supporters accepted the agreement, a minority of that 
group were also critical of the agreement. 
During that period, due to the fact that most of these political organizations were 
underground and lacked sophisticated means of communications, such as television of 
radio at their disposal, many groups communicated with the public through the distribution 
of leaflets. The PFLP, the second largest political component of the PLO, convened a 
"'JMCC Public Opinion Poll No.2, Published on 2 August, 1993. 
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meeting of its central committee on I 0 October 1993 and issued a leaflet expressing its 
opposition towards the agreement (the DOP). 
The communique that was released after that meeting included the major arguments that 
the opposition groups, factions and persons were using in their efforts to gain the support 
of the public to their views. This communique considered the recognition of Israel to be a 
political crime, and that the signing of the DOP meant the Palestinian cause was entering a 
new dangerous phase because it means that the Palestinian leadership had collapsed in the 
face ofthe American-supported Israeli occupation. 
The PFLP, according to the communique, opposed the agreement for the following 
reasons: 
First: By signing this agreement the PLO gives up its political program calling for 
self-determination and statehood, with Jerusalem as its capital, in addition to the 
right of return to the refugees. Instead, it adopts a position that accepts less than the 
autonomy that Camp David peace treaty came up with. 
Second: By excluding Jerusalem and maintaining the Israeli settlements in the 
Palestinian territories, the agreement will disintegrate these territories into 
fragmented pieces. 
Third: This agreement will end the Intifada before achieving anything significant in 
return. 
Fourth: Recognizing Israel and its right to exist means leading legitimacy to its 
record since its creation and questions the legitimacy of the Palestinian struggle for 
freedom and self-determination. 
Five: The Agreement undermines international legitimacy and UN resolutions, 
which will be replaced by Israel's agreements with the PLO. 
Six: This agreement will enable Israel to approach Arab countries and isolate the 
Palestinian people and cause from its Arab dimension and depth, further weakening 
the Palestinian position vis-a-vis Israel. 
The communique stated that: 
The Palestinian leadership that signed this agreement and exchanged recognition 
with the Zionist entity began to see that the realization of its political and economic 
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interests is though direct connection with and dependency on imperialistic plans 
and the Zionist entity. This has led the leadership to end the struggle against the 
occupation.267 
The leaflet called upon the masses to oppose the agreement and unite forces and efforts to 
continue the Intifada and the struggle against the Israeli occupation as their response to the 
DOP. 
In a later attempt to unite their positions, the PFLP, DFLP and Hamas issued another 
leaflet in September 1993 outlining their opposition to the DOP. It stated that: 
The agreement that was reached between the aggressive Zionist entity and the 
individuals dominating the decision-making in the PLO does little more than make 
the Palestinian side a department working within the [occupying state], thus 
replacing the Israeli civil administration according to Israeli direction. It will 
resemble the Lahad militias in southern Lebanon and will be a guardian of our 
enemy, the settlements and the roads leading to them?68 
The leaflet addressed Fatah members and supporters, calling on them to rescue the country 
by rejecting the agreement and calling for national unity over the agreed-upon political 
program that the groups perceived as violated by the DOP. 
Some of the independent members ofthe Palestinian delegation to Washington, including 
the popular Palestinian personalities Haidar Abdulshafi, Hanan Ashrawi, and Mamdouh ai-
Aker, were also critical ofthe DOP. They particularly questioned the change in PLO 
position that had occurred in the change in venue between Washington and Oslo. The 
positions that were transformed were those on settlement expansion, jurisdiction, the 
inclusion of Jerusalem, and the integrity of the OPT. Haider Abdulshafi said in this regard: 
the reason we could not reach an agreement with Israel in the Washington talks was 
that we insisted that all Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 should come under 
the jurisdiction ofthe Palestinian interim government, we refused to exclude the 
settlements [from this jurisdiction], and we insisted that Israel had to halt the 
expansion ofthese settlements. [This agreement] will implicitly recognise a 
separate and independent legal and administrative status ofthe Israeli settlements 
nv Communique released and signed by the Central Committee at the PELP. Early October 1993. 
'"Leaflet distribution in the occupied Palestinian territories in September 1993 and signed by the joint 
leaderships ofPFLP and DFLP, and Hamas. 
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that were built ille~ally on Palestinian land, and [the settlements] will remain under 
Israeli jurisdiction. 69 
Finally, it can be argued that the immediate and overwhelming support for the DOP 
allowed Arafat the freedom to decide how to proceed in both future negotiations 
and the establishment ofthe Palestinian Authority. Apparently, he took advantage 
ofthe agreement's element of surprise, which prevented both supporters and 
opponents any time to assess events before the next stage of negotiations. 
Negotiations over Gaza-Jericho (The Gaza-Jericho Agreement) 
and the Paris Protocol 
This section will deal with changes in the composition ofthe Palestinian negotiating team, 
and new the conditions and environment surrounding the talks over Gaza-Jericho and the 
Paris Protocol, all of which came after the Declaration of Principles. In addition, this 
section will examine the resulting behaviour and performance of the PLO leadership. 
The fact that between the two negotiations tracks, Washington and Oslo, the later came to 
agreement, in part established the composition of the Palestinian teams to negotiate the 
agreements on implementation. Another factor was Israel's recognition of the PLO that 
had resulted from the DOP. Members of the PLO outside leadership dominated the 
negotiations teams, and the inside leadership, including the Washington delegation and 
experts, were gradually marginalized. 
Chairman Arafat appointed Nabil Sha'ath as chief negotiator for the implementation 
negotiations, particularly the Gaza-Jericho arrangements. Sha'ath convened the first 
meeting with his counterpart, Shahak, in October 1993. Arafat also convened his first talks 
with Rabin on 6 October, 1993. The higher liaison committee convened its first meeting 
with the membership of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Shimon Peres on 13 October, 
1993. 
When these negotiations faced difficulties, meetings were convened in Oslo. These 
included, on the Palestinian side, Ahmad Qurei (Abu Ala), Yasser Abed Rabbo, Hassan 
269 Haidar Abdel Shaft, 'The Challenges of the Interim Period to Palestinian Society,' Lecture published by 
JMCC (1994). 
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Asfour, and Nabil Sha'ath. These talks were followed by several meetings ofthe same 
team, with the addition of Akram Haniya, in the period between December 1993 and 
February 1994, in Paris and Cairo. Still there was no progress. 
It thus became a habit, that whenever negotiations bore no fruit and the Israelis failed to 
convince their Palestinian counterparts, they would ask Israeli Prime Minister Shimon 
Peres to call for a meeting with Arafat to smooth the way. Ahmad Qurei presented one 
example: 
Again, Uri Savir approached Peres and asked him to solve the problem with 
Arafat. Peres called Arafat while he was having dinner with Martin Indyk and Terje 
Roed Larsen, both of whom were interested in a summit meeting between Arafat 
and Peres. Abu Am mar agreed to meet on I 0 August, 1994. I went mad when I 
knew that Arafat had agreed. The meeting included Peres, Abu Ammar, myself, Uri 
Savir, Abdui-Rizaq ai-Yahya, Yasser Abed Rabbo, Uzi Dayan and Zinger ... and 
when the Israeli position was presented, particularly that the farther redeployment 
would take place once every six months, and to the astonishment of the Palestinian 
delegation, brother Abu Ammar accepted the Israeli position.270 
Between the signing ofthe Declaration of Principles, and the signing ofthe Gaza-Jericho 
agreement, the negotiations were handled only by members of the leadership outside. The 
only exception was when the chief negotiator on the economic protocol, Ahmed Qurei 
included in his delegation a few technical experts from inside; Hassan Abu Libdeh, Ameen 
Haddad, Samir Huleileh, Samir Abdullah, and Hiba al-Husseini. Otherwise, the political 
leadership inside was marginalized, both in negotiations, and in decision-making. 
The same political 'kitchen' continued sharing information, follow-up, and decision-
making regarding the negotiations. But now, the members of that kitchen were also the 
negotiators, with a few additions, including Nabil Sha'ath, Yasser Abed Rabbo, Abdui-
Rizaq at-Yahya, Akram Haniya as well as the previous members: Arafat, Abbas, Qurei, 
and Asfour. There was almost no one from inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip involved, 
and minimal involvement from the official decision-making bodies of the PLO. 
270 Qurei, Ar-Riwaha af-Filistiniyya, p. 348 
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The absence of both structure and inside leadership participation was the main 
determinants of negotiations performance in that period. These factors greatly reduced the 
level of accountability and transparency. Moreover, as will be shown later, these were 
major contributors to the talks' poor outcomes. The approach was intended to allow the 
leadership a lot of room to manoeuvre. Adhering to PLO institutional decision-making 
requirements, or including the inside leadership with its links and accountability to its 
public, could have restricted the negotiators in positive ways. 
The fact that the PLO entered into the negotiations on implementation of the DOP without 
proper preparation and lack of structure or strategy may have been one reason why the 
negotiators from the inside were also wary of participating. For example, the author of this 
thesis participated in the Washington delegation and was invited to join the Palestinian 
delegation in negotiating the implementation of Oslo, talks that were to take place in Cairo, 
Egypt. 
On that occasion, the author asked Vasser Arafat about the structure and composition of 
the delegation-who among the PLO leadership in Tunis would be supervising the 
delegation and giving it direction, and what strategy the delegation would be following in 
Cairo. In answer to all these questions, Arafat said: "There is no time for this now. 
Tomorrow is the opening of the talks. Just go, and you will find Nabil Sha'ath there and 
others. And when you come back, we will have time to deal with questions like this. 271 
The author subsequently declined to take part, and those questions remained largely 
unanswered. 
Camille Mansour, another member of the Washington delegation, agreed to join Nabil 
Sha'ath in Cairo. He explained his resignation several weeks later by pointing to the lack 
of organization and clear structure in the delegation. 
While the inside leaders were unhappy with their marginalization, criticizing the 
negotiators' performance, they were unable to influence the leadership's approach. First, 
271 Arafat speaking with the author in Tunis, October 1993. 
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the PLO enjoyed overwhelming popularity in the OPT, a fact that the inside leadership had 
contributed to over decades. Second, because those leaders inside continued to identifY 
with the PLO's representation, political position, and symbolic role, they were less 
empowered to cultivate differences over relatively detailed issues. And third, as shown in 
last section, the DOP enjoyed huge popular support. 
Having said that, lack of strategy, structure and preparation were not the only reasons for 
the poor performance and outcome. Israel was not forthcoming in the talks and all the 
while was continuing its illegal practices, thereby embarrassing and weakening the 
Palestinian leadership. Qurei explained that, "although Rabin was saying that he 
differentiated between Fatah men and Islamic fanatics, he started a policy of closure and 
collective punishment. He refused to release prisoners, especially from Fatah, which 
encouraged the opposition and gave it ammunitions. 272 
The Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho 
The first mention of withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho is contained in Article 14 of the 
DOP, which stipulates: "Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as 
detailed in the protocol attached as Annex 2." 
On 6 October 1993, Vitzhak Rabin and Vasser Arafat held their first summit meeting 
following the signing of the DOP, in Cairo. At this meeting, the two agreed on mechanisms 
for the negotiations on implementation of the Gaza-Jericho stage of the DOP. Accordingly, 
on 13 October, a ceremonial opening session of the Senior Joint Liaison Committee took 
place in Cairo, headed by Mahmoud Abbas/Abu Mazen and Shimon Peres. They decided 
to hold the Gaza-Jericho negotiations in Taba, in the Egyptian Sinai, with two delegations 
headed by Nabil Sha'ath on the Palestinian side and Gen. Amnon Shahak on the Israeli 
side. 
The Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, signed in Cairo on 4 May 1994 by 
Vasser Arafat, head ofthe PLO, and Vitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, is composed 
272 Qurei, Ar-Riwaha ai-Filistiniyya, p. 33 I 
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of I) the body of the agreement; 2) four annexes on withdrawal, civil affairs, legal matters, 
and economic relations; 3) exchanged letters between the PLO and the state oflsrael; and 
4) six maps, showing respectively the Gaza Strip, the Jericho area, the proposed safe 
passage routes between the Gaza Strip and Jericho, the deployment ofthe Palestinian 
police in the Gaza Strip, the deployment of the Palestinian police in the Jericho, and 
maritime activity zones. 
The signatories to this agreement are the government of the State of Israel and the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation, the PLO, as the representative of the Palestinian people. 
The preamble of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement depicts it as the beginning of the 
implementation ofthe DOP: "Desirous ofputting into effect the Declaration of Principles 
on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed in Washington, DC on 13 September 
1993." 
The parties to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement also reaffirmed their understanding that it is an 
integral part of the peace process as a whole and that the negotiations on permanent status 
will lead to the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 
338. 
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement included a schedule of the withdrawal oflsraeli military 
forces, describing it as accelerated, and stating that this withdrawal should begin 
immediately after the signing of the agreement and should be concluded by three weeks 
from that date. 
The Palestinian police, according to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement "shall be deployed and 
shall assume responsibility for public order and internal security of Palestinians in 
accordance with this Agreement and Annex I".273 
Article Ill of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, which deals with the transfer of authority, 
excludes from that authority any powers that are not specifically transferred in the 
273 Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Article II 
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agreement. Similarly, although the military government was to withdraw, "the withdrawal 
of the military government shall not prevent it from continuing to exercise the powers and 
responsibilities specified in this Agreement". 274 
Article IV details the structure, size and powers ofthe Palestinian Authority, which is 
supposed to include 24 Palestinians who would undertake to act in accordance with the 
agreement. This Authority "shall carry out and be responsible for all the legislative and 
executive powers and responsibilities transferred to it in this agreement". 275 
Article V deals with jurisdiction; The Palestinian Authority would have territorial, 
functional and personal jurisdiction. There are exceptions to each of these areas of 
jurisdiction. Settlements and Israeli military locations are not included in the territorial 
jurisdiction to be turned over; functional jurisdiction is limited to the specific powers and 
responsibilities transferred to the Palestinian Authority in the agreement; and personal 
jurisdiction excludes Israelis. 
The powers and responsibilities ofthe Palestinian Authority are limited to those transferred 
to it by the Israeli authorities according to Article VI ofthe agreement. These include 
legislative, administrative and judicial powers; the power to formulate policies and 
supervise their implementation; employ staff; establish departments; sue and be sued; and 
in addition, the power to keep and administer registers and records of population and to 
issue certificates, licenses and documents. 
Article VI of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement also excludes: "any powers or responsibilities 
for foreign relations, which sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies, 
consulates or other types of foreign mission or posts or permitting their establishment in 
the Gaza Strip or Jericho area.276 
The same article, however, allows the PLO to have specific foreign relations powers. 
274 Ibid., Article III 
275 Ibid., Article IV 
276 Ibid., Article VI 
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The PLO may conduct negotiations and sign agreements with states or international 
organisations for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority in the following cases 
only: (I) economic agreements as specifically provided in Annex IV ofthis 
Agreement; (2) agreements with donor countries .... ; (3) agreements for the 
purposes o~ implementing the. regional devei<Wfent plans detailed in Annex IV; (4) 
cultural, sctenttfic and education agreements.-
On the legislative powers granted to the Palestinian Authority under the DOP, Article VII 
imposes substantial restrictions: 
Legislation promulgated by the Palestinian Authority shall be communicated to a 
legislation subcommittee to be established. During the period of 30 days from the 
communication of the legislation, Israel may request that the legislation 
subcommittee decide whether such legislation exceeds the jurisdiction of the 
Palestinian Authority or is otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Agreement. 278 
The result of Article VII is that the Palestinian Authority can legislate, but Israel retains 
veto power on any Palestinian legislation, through joint bodies that are mandated to 
examine any objections, and to come up with a decision by consensus. And until the 
Palestinians managed to put new legislation into effect, they were to abide by the existing 
Israeli military laws. The article states: 
Laws and military orders in effect in the Gaza Strip or Jericho area prior to the signing of 
this Agreement shall remain in force, unless amended or abrogated in accordance with this 
Agreement (Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Article VII). 
The agreement guaranteed the Palestinians safe passage between the Gaza Strip and the 
Jericho area. One annex is devoted solely to the modalities and arrangements related to 
safe passage. 
Annex 2 deals with the transfer of civil authorities from Israel to the Palestinians. Article 2 
in Annex 2 specifies the spheres to be transferred, which are based on the structure of the 
Israeli Civil Administration in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel. These spheres 
include: internal affairs, including municipal affairs; fisheries; surveying; statistics; 
277 Ibid. 
278 Ibid., Article VII 
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control; Civil Administration employees; legal administration, including the administration 
ofthe Palestinian legal system in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area; labour, education; social 
welfare; assessments; housing; tourism; parks; religious affairs; employee pensions; 
commerce and industry; health; transportation; agriculture; employment; land registration 
(except in settlements and military installations and nature reserves); electricity; public 
works; postal services; population registry and documentation; state land and absentees' 
property and other immovables; telecommunications; archaeology; water and sewage; 
direct taxation; indirect taxation; environmental protection; gas and petroleum; insurance; 
treasure; and planning and zoning. This last sphere is subject to severe restrictions 
tantamount to Israeli veto power. The Palestinian Authority should respect and keep in 
effect previous planning schemes; it can amend them but only if these amendments are 
consistent with the agreement, and Israel has the right to object to any new schemes or 
amendments which in any event should not be implemented before being considered by the 
joint coordination committee that, of course, must arrive at a decision by consensus. 
Annex 3 of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement covers legal matters and gives the Palestinian 
Authority criminal jurisdiction over all offences committed in the areas under the 
Palestinian Authority, but states that: "Israel has sole criminal jurisdiction over the 
following offences: a) offences committed in the settlements and military installation 
areas; and b) offences committed in the Territory by lsraelis."279 
One ofthe key annexes to the agreement is the Protocol on Economic Relations. 280 
Economic relations have always been a significant factor in relations between Israel and 
the OPT. 
The main difference to emerge during the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations over the 
Economic Protocol, which was signed in Paris on 29 April 1994, was the extent to which 
the Palestinian economy could move away from being controlled by and dependent on the 
Israeli economy. The Economic Protocol concentrated on three major aspects of economic 
relations: cooperation and coordination; importing; and taxes, both direct and indirect. The 
279 Ibid., Annex 3 
280 Economic Protocol, Annex 4 
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tensions surrounding cooperation are clear throughout the Economic Protocol: several joint 
committees are established to deal with this issue. The Joint Economic Committee (JEC) is 
the main committee, and consists of an equal number of Palestinians and Israelis. This 
committee is required to take decisions by consensus, to oversee the implementation of the 
Economic Protocol, has the power to establish other subcommittees, and is to resolve any 
disputes which may arise in the implementation of the Economic Protocol and the 
economic relations between the two sides. "The JEC and its subcommittees shall reach 
their decisions by agreement". 281 In effect, this amounted to an Israeli veto! 
On the issue of imports, the Economic Protocol determines the amounts of goods which 
can be imported by the Palestinian Authority, and specifies two categories: "one list 
including the goods and the amounts that can be imported from Jordan and Egypt 
particularly, and from other Arab countries" (Article 3, Economic Protocol); and "goods on 
list A2, attached hereto as Appendix II from Arab, Islamic and other countries, which the 
Palestinians will be able to import in quantities agreed upon by the two sides ... ".282 
Customs and value added tax (VAT) are to be the same in both Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority areas. Point 5.a of Article 3 of the Economic Protocol states: 
With respect to all goods not specified in Lists A I, A2 and B, and with respect to 
quantities exceeding those determined in accordance with paras 2(a) and 3 above, 
the Israeli rates of customs, purchase tax, levies, excises and other charges 
prevailing at the date of signing ofthe Agreement as changed from time to time, 
shall serve as the minimum basis for the Palestinian Authority. 
Point 7 of the same article also fixes the VAT at a percentage very close to that in Israel: 
"The Palestinian Authority will levy VAT at one rate on both locally produced goods and 
services and on imports by the Palestinians (whether covered by the three lists mentioned 
above or not), and may fix it at the levels of 15% to 16%." 
Point 3 in Article VI states also: "The present Israeli VAT rate is 17%. The Palestinian 
VAT rate will be 15% to 16%." 
281 Ibid., Article 2 
282 Ibid., Article 3 
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Finally, it should be noted that the Economic Protocol excludes from the Palestinian 
Authority any jurisdiction over economic activities in the settlements and restricts it to the 
areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority as specified in the 
agreement. The implications of the Economic Protocol are discussed in the next Chapter of 
this thesis, but it should be aide here that analysts concluded that the Protocol was 
weighted heavily in Israel's favour, to the point of excluding possibilities of sustainable 
Palestinian economic recovery.283 
The Gaza-Jericho Agreement also included a letter from Vasser Arafat, chairman of the 
PLO, to Vitzhak Rabin, and two from Rabin, prime minister of Israel, to Arafat. The first 
two exchanged between the two leaders contained the same text, most of which concerned 
undertakings by the PLO, including function in accordance with the agreement and 
activating the cooperation and coordination mechanism; helping Israel to locate missing 
soldiers, changing certain articles in the PLO Charter in accordance with Vasser Arafat's 
letter of9 September 1993; agreeing not to call Arafat by the title of President but rather 
Chairman or Ra 'ees (in Arabic); and to notify Israel of the names of the members of the 
Palestinian Authority. 
The letters also contained an agreement by both sides to enter into negotiations on early 
empowerment of the Palestinians and to begin as soon as possible, following the guidelines 
of the dates set out in the DOP for negotiations on the interim arrangements. In addition, 
the two sides reiterate their commitment to begin permanent status negotiations as soon as 
possible, but no later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period. 
Furthermore, both sides agree in the letters to have the Gaza-Jericho Agreement ratified by 
their respective legislative bodies. 
In addition, letters discuss the need for both parties to continue discussions on those issues 
which had not yet been finalised: a) the size of the Jericho area; b) the positioning of a 
Palestinian official at the bridge; and c) additional arrangements in the Rafah passage; and 
d) all outstanding issues specified in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. 
283 Emma Murphy, "Stacking the Deck: The Economics ofthe lsraeli-PLO Accords" in Middle East Report. 
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These two letters were signed 4 May 1994. A third letter, signed four days later on 8 May 
1994 by Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, was merely a reiteration ofthe Israeli 
readiness to continue discussions on the four points raised in the two previous letters. 
Finally, six maps were included in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, as detailed above. These 
maps, which comprise a part of the agreement, were signed by Rabin and Arafat. However, 
Arafat, who objected to certain details-particularly the size of Jericho-personally wrote 
next to his signature the following words in Arabic: "still subject to discussion in 
accordance with the attached letter." 
Before analyzing the Gaza-Jericho agreement, it is worth mentioning two main Israeli 
strategies used in the negotiations, which are also illustrated in the agreements that 
followed the DOP. The first could be termed 'the phasing strategy'. Using this approach, 
the peace process was divided into interim and permanent phases; the interim phase was 
itself phased into the Gaza-Jericho stage and everything remaining; what remained was 
phased into the Hebron negotiations and everything remaining. From this, redeployment 
was isolated and broken down into redeployment from the main towns prior to Palestinian 
elections, and a later redeployment with exceptions. The later redeployment was then 
broken down into three phases, one every six months. 
The irony here is that this process appears endless. For example, the Israeli position on 
implementation ofthe third phase of further redeployment is that this third phase should 
itself occur in three phases. 
The second strategy adopted by the Israelis was 'compromising the compromise'. This 
approach complements the phasing strategy, and is clear in the majority oflsraeli 
negotiating positions and tactics, as will be demonstrated in this chapter. One obvious 
example is visible in the handling ofthe West Bank town of Hebron. The Palestinians had 
already accepted a compromise on redeployment from Hebron: in the Interim Agreement, 
Hebron was not included in Area A along with all the other towns from which the Israeli 
army was to withdraw first. Then, when the time came for redeployment from Hebron-
i.e. implementation of what was already a compromise-it was compromised even further. 
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This excessive inflexibility in the Israeli positions following the signing of the DOP was 
not only noticeable to Palestinians. Uri Savir, the Israelis' chief negotiator in the Oslo 
talks, noted in his book, The Process, that interference by the military in the talks which 
followed Oslo resulted in a hardening of the Israeli negotiating position. He wrote: "That 
the Israeli approach was dictated by the army invariably made immediate security 
considerations the dominant ones, so that the fundamentally political process was 
subordinated to the short-term military needs".284 
Savir supports his argument by citing his Foreign Ministry report to Yitzhak Rabin, which 
states that: "[t]his Israeli approach necessarily limits Palestinian freedom of movement, 
which undermines their own interest in cultivating ties [with the Israelis]. This model is a 
prescription for hostile relations".285 
It should also be noted that the way in which the implementation negotiations began 
marked a significant shift away from the Palestinian understandings of the DOP and 
towards the Israeli concept ofthe peace process. Hassan Asfour, one of the two 
Palestinians who negotiated and concluded the DOP, noted that: 
The fact that the negotiations on the implementation of Oslo, namely on Gaza-
Jericho and on the interim agreement, went in subsequent order is a contradiction of 
the DOP, which required them to be parallel. This stemmed from the Israeli 
concept that each step in the peace process should be based on the experiences 
. d . I . 286 game m t 1e prev10us step. 
Asfour explained that while the DOP required that the sides immediately embark on 
implementation of the Interim Agreement, Israel delayed this until after the actual 
implementation ofthe Gaza-Jericho Agreement, which for them served as a "test" of the 
Palestinians. They wanted to be able to use the experience of the Gaza-Jericho example in 
building the Interim Agreement, which they insisted must follow Gaza-Jericho rather be 
concurrent, as required by the DOP. 
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In fact, this understanding was clear in a statement by Yitzhak Rabin which is quoted by 
Uri Savir in describing the way in which Rabin introduced the agreement to the Israeli 
public. Rabin said: "Ifthe Palestinians do not pass the test of reality, we can instantly 
control any diversion by them from the path we have agreed on ... ".287 
The negotiations exposed the huge gaps between the Palestinian and Israeli readings ofthe 
DOP, but an examination of the major differences between the negotiations and the 
outcome, namely the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, leaves little doubt that the Israeli 
interpretation was the dominant force in shaping the agreement. One important example 
was the question of with which side residual powers would lie. The Palestinians 
understood that Israel should withdraw from Gaza and Jericho, giving up its powers and 
responsibilities and that discussion should focus on the few exceptions remaining with the 
Israelis. The Israelis, by contrast, understood that Israel was to be the "source of authority" 
and according to Savir, "would grant the Palestinians limited powers and, most important, 
retain direct control of the crossing in and out ofGaza to Israel and Egypt"?88 
The impact of these conflicting concepts, and the ambiguities of the agreements thus far, 
was that it was up to the outcome of the next round of negotiations to determine whether 
the agreement on implementation would specifY clearly the powers and responsibilities 
transferred to the Palestinians, leaving anything remaining in the hands ofthe Israelis, or 
whether the agreement should stress the withdrawal and transfer of authority to the 
Palestinians, clearly specifYing only those which were to remain with Israel-in other 
words, anything not mentioned as an exception would be transferred to the Palestinian 
Authority. Uri Savir explains: 
What's more, they [the Palestinians] demanded that civil powers be transferred to 
them wholesale, not piecemeal. As their demands were a function of their strategic 
goal in the peace process, one of the papers they presented in Taba explicitly stated: 
'Our aim is the establishment of a Palestinian state in accordance with the 1967 
borders. ' 289 
281 Savir, The Process, p. 96. 
288 Ibid., p. 98. 
289 Ibid. 
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In actuality, as demonstrated by the Gaza-Jericho agreement, the Interim Agreement 
specified in detail the powers and responsibilities to be transferred from Israel to the 
Palestinian Authority and anything that is not mentioned, residual powers, remains within 
the Israeli authority. Savir does not deny that "the gap was narrowed, mostly to the benefit 
of the stronger side".290 
Another major difference arose over control of border crossing points, particularly the 
Allenby Bridge on the River Jordan which separates the West Bank from Jordan. This 
issue was particularly important because one of the reasons that Arafat had insisted on 
adding Jericho to Gaza when the Gaza Strip had first been offered to him, was that Jericho 
lies on the border of the West Bank. Arafat's intention was that the Palestinians, by 
controlling Jericho, would be controlling the crossing point to Jordan. For this reason he 
responded to Israeli demands to keep the crossing points under their control by saying, as 
reported by Savir, "I cannot go for Bantustans. Please find another formula. You don't 
trust me!".291 
The solution to this issue was arrived at by dividing the crossing point into two terminals, 
one for people arriving to Gaza and Jericho, and one for all the rest. The second terminal 
was to be managed totally by the Israelis, the first to be managed jointly in such a fashion 
that the Israelis, by working behind a one-way mirror, could see but would not be seen by 
those arriving. Such a compromise solution, which became typical, addressed the 
fundamental Israeli needs and the symbolic Palestinian needs. 
The Protocol on Economic Relations, also known as the Paris Protocol, also falls shorter 
than Palestinians had hoped and does not adhere to their reading of the Oslo Declaration of 
Principles. The Palestinian objectives in the negotiations, according to the head of the 
delegation, Ahmad Qurei, were "to reach an agreement that ensure two objectives: first, 
allowing economic development and easing the suffering of the Palestinians in the 
territories, showing them the dividends of peace; and second, to allows to move another 
step towards independence in the economic sphere and to move toward reducing the 
290 Savir, The Process, p. 99 
291 Ibid., p. I 03. 
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dependence on the Israeli economy as part of our strategy for achieving independence in 
general. 292 
The Israelis had a completely opposite strategy presented by the head of the Israeli 
delegation, Avraham Shohat, the minister of finance. That strategy was described by Uri 
Sa vir: 
Thus Shohat proposed that the Palestinian autonomous areas remain in a single 
customs union with Israel; that their trade with Jordan and the rest of the Arab 
world be limited to a list of products determined in advance .. .In short, the 
Palestinians would be wholly dependent on Israel's economy and security-or, to 
be more precise, on Israel's sense ofsecurity_293 
The Economic Protocol, as illustrated earlier in this chapter, ensured the maintenance of 
the same pricing system in both Israel and Palestine by fixing and synchronising taxes and 
customs. This, of course, contradicts the objectives as stated by Qurei, serving to maintain 
the dependency and the difficulties ofthe Palestinian economy. This is particularly 
important given that a sound economic development policy for a newborn economy such 
as that in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would require a tax policy and pricing system 
quite different than that of an advanced economy like Israel's. In fact, the VAT rate was set 
at that of Israel, making Palestinian products relatively over-priced. Israel was allocated the 
role of collecting customs revenues for goods moving into and out of the OPT, giving it 
enormous power to withhold those revenues from the Palestinian Authority as was their 
due. The restrictions on Palestinian trade and the imposed customs union ensured that the 
OPT remained a largely captive market for Israeli products, while being unable to 
capitalise on their potential to act as a conduit for products from third countries to make it 
into the Israeli market. 
It was only later realised by officials in the Palestinian Authority that the Economic 
Protocol would allow neither economic development nor economic independence. Khalid 
Salam, Vasser Arafafs economic advisor and in charged with overseeing much ofthe 
economic activities ofthe Palestinian Authority, stated two years after implementation of 
292 Interview with Ahmad Qurei, May, 2007 
293 Savir, The Process, p. I 00. 
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the Protocol had begun that: "The experience has taught us that the restrictions imposed by 
unified taxation, on import-export activities and on the pricing system, are a bottleneck for 
any economic development or disengagement from the Israeli economy".294 
In sum, comparing the differing Israeli and Palestinian 'readings' of the DOP and their 
contradicting objectives in the negotiations over the text of the Agreement on the Gaza 
Strip and Jericho Area leaves the clear impression that the agreement is based on Israeli 
assumptions and incorporates Israeli views far more than those of the Palestinians, 
particularly on issues of major difference, such as the crossing points, transfer of 
authorities, and the size of Jericho. 
The fact that the Palestinian leadership started with the right positions, raised the right 
concerns and used the right arguments, but in the end accepted the Israeli positions can 
only be interpreted as weakness rather than ignorance. It can be seen as a continuation of 
the weakness that has characterised the political behaviour of the Palestinian leadership in 
the peace process in general. 
The Gaza-Jericho negotiation and agreement strengthened the position of Arafat and the 
core leadership in 'the kitchen' in many ways. By avoiding any structure for the 
delegation, restricting the participation in the delegation to his closest associates, and 
avoiding any accountability to the PLO structure and transparency to the public, Arafat 
maintained vast manoeuvring room and enough power to tackle the decisions he felt 
convinced about. In addition, the return of Arafat to Gaza and Jericho accompanied by 
PLO fighters in police uniform increased his popularity. Israel allowed the return of 30 
West Bank grassroots leaders who had been deported out of the OPT. 
Nevertheless, this negotiation strategy and Arafat's subsequent strength was a double-
edged sword, making him vulnerable to the Israeli partner. He was unable to protect his 
positions through decisions of the PLO decision-making bodies, nor was he able to do so 
through Palestinian public opinion. Israel, on the other hand, referred to these constraints in 
negotiations all the time. 
294 Interview with Khalid Salam, March, 2000. 
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After the DOP's signing and the start of implementation, Israel continued the practices that 
had marked its tenure as occupier, violating Palestinian rights and humiliating them 
through checkpoints, arrests, house demolitions, land confiscation, and illegal settlement 
expansion. Moreover, any economic benefits which might have come from the Economic 
Protocol or the international aid that accompanied the peace process were progressively 
eroded by the Israeli policy of closure, whereby the Palestinians would be confined for 
days, weeks or months on end to the West Bank or Gaza, unable to move either labour or 
goods to their markets. 
Between 1993 and 1996 (considered the euphoric height ofthe Oslo process), the 
Israeli government imposed 342 days of total closure in the Gaza Strip and 291 
days of total closure in the West Bank. Thus, for almost one third of a each year, 
between 1993 and 1996, Palestinians were prohibited from any physical or 
economic movement outside the West Bank and Gaza, and on the remaining days 
b. I . I ., 29s were su ~ect to c osure m a ess extreme 10rm. 
As Roy makes clear, the losses amounting from these closures totalled nearly 40% of 
Gaza's GNP in 1996 alone, and 19% ofthe West Bank's GNP. The international 
community was slow and ineffectual in responding to these Israeli policies. For example, 
closures led to poverty, but the international donors chose to meet !his with poverty-
alleviation measures rather than to insist that Israel cease its destructive policies.296 
The continuation ofthese Israeli policies and practices defied the Palestinian public's high 
expectations. Meanwhile the donor countries, who were themselves proving to be very 
slow in contributing financially as promised, now began to impose additional pressures. 
According to Qurei: 
[T]he donors started to insist on transparency in the way we spent the money, 
which complicated our situation .... and in this context, the Palestinian Authority 
started to face very serious and complicated security, economic, and political 
conditions. At the same time, the Israeli government also started to face 
d d I. . I . 297 unprece ente po Itica cnses. 
295 Sara Roy, Failing Peace, p. 242. 
296 Christian Aid, Losing Ground: Israel, Poverty and the Palestinians (London: 2002) p. 21. 
297 Qurei, Ar-Riwaha ai-Filistiniyya, pp. 331-332 
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Israel seemed to have understood Arafat's reality, and transferred his strength into 
weakness. It recognized his lack of structure, the absence of accountability, the public's 
high expectations, and his individualistic style of leadership and decision-making. Israel 
took advantage of that by taking hard-line negotiations positions, assuming that he had 
flexibility and room to manoeuvre. That, in tum, forced him to make additional 
concessions in order to show immediate progress that would maintain his public support 
and strength. 
Indeed, while Israel denied Arafat substantial achievements, such as stopping the 
settlement expansion policy, they reinforced the patrimonial298 features of Arafat's 
leadership. Israel allowed Arafat monopoly over imports of basic commodities, which 
provided him with the necessary cash to compensate factions, personalities, Fatah cadres 
and other influential persons and groups in the absence of any substantial political or 
economic progress. 
Another aspect of weak Palestinian performance resulted from the absence of Palestinians 
from the OPT in the delegations to the talks and the decision-making process. That was 
crucial because many of the issues being dealt with were practical issues with which the 
inside leadership and experts were simply more familiar. One example, which was rather a 
scandal at the time, was the incorrect mapping of the size of Jericho. Another was the 
negotiating of arrangements for border crossings by individuals who had never even been 
there. 
In sum, two factors reinforced each other to bring about weak agreements and ineffectual 
implementation. One was the leaderships' poor performance in running the negotiations. 
The second was Israeli inflexibility and continuation of oppressive practices. 
298 The concept 'patrimonial' is used according to the meaning developed by M. Weber and adopted to the 
Arab reality by: Hi sham Sharabi, New-Patriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in the Arab Society (USA: 
Oxford University Press, 1988). 
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From Cairo Agreement to the Interim Agreement 
The Israeli Knesset's approval ofthe Gaza-Jericho Agreement on II May, I994 opened 
the doors for the beginning of implementation of the signed agreements between Israel and 
the PLO. 
On I3 May, I994, the ai-Aqsa Brigades of the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) entered 
the Palestinian territories and took up duties as Palestinian policemen in Jericho. On I 0 
May, I 57 Palestinian policemen crossed into the Gaza Strip from Egypt at Rafah crossing. 
On 31 October and I November respectively, Palestinian police took positions at the Rafah 
border crossing in Gaza and the Allenby Bridge in the West Bank. Soon after, on I July, 
Arafat made his historic return to the homeland of Palestine, crossing the Rafah border. 
On I3 November, 1994, Israel transferred the Social Affairs Authority to the Palestinian 
Authority, followed by the Tourism Authority on I5 November. The Health Authority and 
Tax Authorities were transferred to the PA on the first of December and on 6 February 
1995, the PA became responsible for the Postal Authority. On 29 March, the Palestinian 
Interior Ministry started distributing Palestinian passports. A Palestinian television station 
started broadcasting for the first time in the Palestinian areas on 6 June. 
These developments opened the doors for a new era. The Palestinian leadership had moved 
to the Palestinian territories, established the first Palestinian authority with security and 
civil responsibility in Gaza and Jericho, and civil responsibilities (only) in the populated 
areas ofthe rest of the OPT, save Jerusalem. The PLO leadership continued to enjoy 
overwhelming public support as a result of the implementation ofthe agreement, including 
its return and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from parts ofthe occupied territories. That 
gave the PLO leadership credibility, and Arafat was perceived as a leader who delivers. 
That period witnessed the establishment of the Palestinian security apparatuses including 
national security forces, intelligence, and the preventive security. The last was especially 
important because it recruited mainly Fatah activists, including the street leaders ofthe 
Intifada and-ex prisoners who had power and credibility. In addition, the leadership started, 
with financial and technical international aid, establishing public civil institutions. That 
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included the creation ofvarious ministries, and non-ministerial authorities over land, water, 
energy, and the environment. 
During this establishment phase, as mention above, Israel allowed the newly-established 
authority monopoly rights over imports on certain commodities from Israel, including fuel, 
tobacco, and cement. That gave Arafat a huge financial windfall. A small number of close 
aides ofthe president managed these businesses on his behalf. 
After assuming authority in Gaza and Jericho, the first Palestinian cabinet was formed in 
28 May, 1994 (before elections were held for the Legislative Council). The cabinet was 
dominated by PLO leaders who had returned with Arafat-Fatah personalities, almost half 
ofthem from the outside (these outsiders began to be referred to as 'returnees'). 
That first cabinet included 17 ministers, including Arafat, who also assumed the ministry 
of interior. A prominent analyst said: 
The [first] Palestinian cabinet of28 May 1994 was, for instance, a blend of 
outsiders and insiders. Out of seventeen ministers (including Arafat with the 
portfolio of Interior ministry), seven were outsiders and nine were insiders. The 
outsider ministers were: Vassir Amr (Minister of Education), Vasser Abed Rabbo 
(Minister of Culture and Arts), Samir Ghosheh (Minister of Labour), Ahmed Qrie' 
(Minister of Economic and Trade), Muhammad al-Nashashibi (Minister of 
Finance), Nabil Shaath (Minister of Planning and International Cooperation), and 
Intisar ai-Wazir (Minister of Social Affairs). 
Insider ministers were: Abd al-Hafiz al-Ash'ab (Minister of Communication), 
Azmi al-Shu'abi (Minister ofVouth and Sport), Riyad al-Za'nun (Minister of 
Health), Zakariya al-Agha (Minister of Housing), Frieh Abu Medien (Minister of 
Justice), Saeb Erekat (Minister of Local Government), Ilyas Frayj (Minister of 
Tourism), Hassan Tahboub (Minister of Islamic Waqf), and AbdelAziz ai-Haj 
Ahmad (Minister of Transportation). 
Of these 16 ministers, eight were affiliated with Fatah-Ahmed Qurei, Nabil 
Shaath, Saeb Erekat, Intisar ai-Wazir, Frieh Abu Medien, Zakariya al-Agha, Riyad 
al-Za'nun, and AbdelAziz al-Haj Ahmad. Five had been categorized as 
independents (close to Fatah); two ministers (Vasser Abd Rabbo & Azmi ai-
Shu'abi) were affiliated with Fida (a splinter group of the DFLP) and one, Samir 
Ghosheh, attached himself to the Popular Struggle Front. 
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Consequently, Fatah dominated the major Palestinian executive body. 299 
Its overwhelming popularity, jobs and opportunities in both civil and security institutions, 
financial expansion from monopolistic activities, and contacts with the Israeli government 
enabled the PLO returnee leadership to co-opt the leadership inside. That was not difficult, 
because the leadership inside, which had begun to express unhappiness with the way the 
negotiations and the authority were running, had no differing political platform of 
substance with which to justify an opposition stand. 
Meanwhile, a new elite was in the making. This elite was no longer 'inside' or 'outside', 
but rather mixed, although dominated by the PLO returnees. It was composed of powerful 
individuals from the returnee political elite, the newly-appointed high-ranking civil 
servants and minister/bureaucratic elite, high-ranking security officers/military elite, and 
the economic elite often connected to the monopolies. That enabled the outside to co-opt 
the insiders, also excluding others, and asserting the PLO leadership's domination over the 
new combined leadership. The details of this crucial development and its effect on the 
leadership and its negotiation's role follow in the coming chapter. 
On the other hand, and while the PLO leadership was cultivating what would be later 
viewed as short-term achievements, Israel was cultivating the long-term dividends of the 
peace process. On 24 October 1994, Israel signed a peace treaty with Jordan. In 22 
November, 1994, Yitzhak Rabin, accompanied by a large Israeli official and business 
delegation, represented Israel in the first regional economic conference for government and 
non-governmental businessmen. 
In addition, Israel was no longer perceived as an occupying power in violation of 
international law (thus deserving of boycott), but rather the party to a peace process and 
agreement with its rival the PLO. That gave Israel the political, economic, and ethical 
advantage for building a new image and new political and economic achievements as will 
be detailed in the next chapter. 
299 Azmi Bishara, 'Rellection on the Realities of the Oslo Process,' December 2000. pp. 7-8. [online] 
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The agreement and its implementation nonetheless created some opposition in Israel. This 
opposition culminated in a huge demonstration led by Benyamin Netanyahu, the leader of 
the right-wing Likud party. Incitement by the opposition encouraged extremists to act 
violently and the Israeli leadership started to show less flexibility towards Palestinians. 
This was reflected in a slow-down on implementing the agreement, and a resumption of 
restrictions on Palestinians. These events in turn provoked the Palestinian opposition, and 
generated internal difficulties for the PLO leadership in the OPT. Thus, the respective 
opposition groups began to reinforce each other in a series of chains of bloody actions and 
reactions aiming in most cases to sabotage the peace process and prevent its progression. 
The first and most deadly event came only four months after the PLO signed the DOP 
when Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein opened fire on Muslim worshippers at Haram al-
lbrahimi Mosque in Hebron, killing 29 Palestinians. In 18 March, the United Nations 
Security Council issued Resolution 904 condemning that became known as 'the Hebron 
Massacre'. The Islamic resistance movement Hamas promised in a leaflet to avenge the 
deaths with counterattacks. 
The Hebron Massacre was followed by one of the bloodiest waves of violence in decades. 
The period from 6 April, 1994, to 8 September, 1995 witnessed the killing of not less than 
70 Israelis, mostly in suicide bombings, and at least 20 Palestinians by Israeli soldiers and 
settlers. 
From the discussion above, it is clear that the PLO leadership, while achieving return and 
the establishment of the first Palestinian Authority in the Palestinian territories, also faced 
serious challenges. 
In addition to the limitations that resulted from shortcomings in the agreements itself, the 
Palestinian leadership was faced with unfavourable objective circumstances. In particular, 
Israel was adding difficulties. In the year of the implementation ofthe Cairo (Gaza-
Jericho) agreement, Israel showed no respect for agreed-upon dates of implementation. 
The media, including the Palestinian press, repeated once and again the famous quote of 
Rabin: "There are no sacred dates." 
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Israel also started to restrict the movement of Palestinians, preventing Palestinian workers 
from reaching their workplace in Israel. The Palestinian population began to face economic 
difficulties rather than the economic prosperity promised by the leadership. In addition, the 
donor community, led by the United States, delayed promised aid and used it as a leverage 
to extract farther concessions. The Palestinian leadership was desperate for the aid in order 
to meet public expectations, given growing opposition, and the additional requirements of 
building the capacities of authority institution. 
In that year, the Palestinian leadership was handling major tasks, one in implementation of 
the agreement, including the establishment of an authority that was a quasi-government. 
The other was continuing negotiations with Israel for the interim self-government 
authority. Difficulties in implementation were created with the objective of affecting the 
Palestinian negotiations performance, as will be shown below. 
The Interim Agreement: Negotiations, Content, Analysis and 
Implementation 
This section will focus on the way the Palestinian leadership negotiated the Interim 
Agreement, and the interrelation between these negotiations and the implementation of 
previous agreements that were ongoing. It will also present the content of the Interim 
Agreement and analyze it. In addition, it will examine public attitudes and behaviour 
towards the agreement and its implementation. Light will be shed on the difficulties facing 
the Palestinian leadership resulting from Israeli positions in the negotiations, and Israel's 
behaviour during implementation. Palestinian public opinion and Palestinian and Israeli 
violence will be examined, with special attention for its effect on the Palestinian 
leadership. 
While the Declaration of Principles and the Gaza-Jericho agreements were negotiated 
almost entirely by PLO leaders from outside, Palestinians from inside participated in 
negotiating the subsequent agreements. Their role, however, was mostly that of providing 
technical support, or lending the process credibility through their Fatah loyalties (for 
example, Jamil Tarifi entered the talks; he was a Fatah contractor who had made a fortune 
from contracts with the Israeli civil administration on infrastructure projects). Tarifi headed 
the Palestinian team on the agreement on preparatory transfer of powers and 
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responsibilities. Nabil Kassis, previously deputy head ofthe Washington negotiations, was 
an inside participant of a different mind. He said in an interview with me that he 
participated in the start of the negotiations, but soon was unable to tolerate the performance 
of the team and decided to quit.300 
It is difficult to discern a structure to that period of negotiations. There were tens of 
negotiators working in various places at once. Qurei described one of these negotiations: 
"Contrary to Oslo, the two delegations consisted of about 200 persons from different 
sectors. "301 
Another example of the overlapping negotiations of multiple layers came from the same 
source: 
We [Qurei and Savir] agreed on the principle of complete secrecy because in our 
experience, this was a condition for success. So we 'covered' our secret track with 
the two public tracks, the one run by Erekat and Singer, and the other between 
Tarifi and Shahor, coordinator oflsraeli activities in the Palestinian territories.302 
The lack of structure, poor performance, and the need to move quickly in order to achieve 
results to offset growing opposition led to poor outcomes and inferior implementation, 
which in turn weakened the leadership, and caused it to perform even more poorly. This 
will be shown in the following description of the content and analysis ofthe signed 
agreement. 
The Interim Agreement was signed in Washington DC on 28 September, 1995, by Yitzhak 
Rabin for Israel and Yasser Arafat for the PLO. Also signing were the presidents ofthe 
United States of America, the Russian Federation, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the 
European Union, and the Kingdom ofNorway. 
300 Interview with Nabeel Kassis, Ramallah, May, 2007 
301 Qurei, p. 348. 
302 Ibid., p. 335. 
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The Interim Agreement superseded all previous agreements signed in the course of the 
Middle East peace process, with the exception ofthe DOP. The preamble of the Interim 
Agreement includes this statement: 
Following the Gaza-Jericho Agreement; the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers 
and Responsibilities signed at Erez in Gaza on 29 August, 1994 (hereinafter "the 
Preparatory Transfer Agreement'); and the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and 
Responsibilities signed at Cairo on 27 August, 1995 (hereinafter 'the Further Transfer 
Protocol'); which three agreements will be superseded by this Agreement".303 
The preamble is clear in putting the Interim Agreement within the framework of the 
Middle East peace process initiated in Madrid in October 1991. It is also clear in its 
intention that the negotiations on final status issues planned to follow the Interim 
Agreement commence as soon as possible, but no later than 4 May, 1996. These final 
status negotiations will lead to implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 
and 338. 
Before delving into the contents ofthe Interim Agreement, it is worth examining what it 
excludes. The Interim Agreement, which defers the major and substantive aspects of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict until the final status talks, did not place any restrictions on 
Israel, the party with more power, that would have prevented it from continuing to create 
facts on the ground pre-emptive of Palestinian objectives in any final status talks. 
In response to criticisms raised about the absence of any such restrictive clauses in the 
DOP, Hassan Asfour said: 
The Interim Agreement, which is about the implementation of the DOP, should have 
included the need for a halt to settlement activities, because the DOP has a paragraph to 
that effect in Article IV. It says, 'the two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a 
single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period,' and 
303 Interim Agreement, Preamble 
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since the Interim Agreement is about the implementation [ofthe DOP], it should have 
stated clearly the need to stop settlement expansion. 304 
As noted earlier in this thesis, one ofthe major factors preventing the success of the 
Washington negotiations was the insistence of the Palestinian delegation (from inside the 
occupied territories) that settlement expansion be halted. The fact that the issue is not even 
mentioned in the Interim Agreement is a serious omission in the agreement from the 
Palestinian perspective. The matter takes on an even greater significance in light of the fact 
that the one-year period between the Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the Interim Agreement 
witnessed active Israeli expansion of settlements, an increase in the number of settlers, and 
additional expropriations of land from the OPT. 
The Interim Agreement not only failed to prevent or to make clear the illegality oflsraeli 
settlement expansion, it legitimises the existing settlements and the application of Israeli 
law to these settlements and settlers in the OPT despite the contradiction of relevant 
international laws and conventions. Point 4.b in Article XVII states: 
To this end, the Israeli military government shall retain the necessary legislative, judicial 
and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with international law. This 
provision shall not derogate from Israel's applicable legislation over Israelis in 
personam. 305 
This is simply an approved extra-territorial judicial jurisdiction which lays the foundation 
for apartheid situations, because it allows the application of two legal systems and two 
judicial systems in one entity-the Palestinian territories. 
In fact, during the implementation of the Interim Agreement and in the few years that 
followed its signing, there was a dramatic rise in Israel's use of policies and practices 
aimed at creating a pre-emptive new status quo, primarily the expansion of settlements and 
304 Interview with Hassan Astour, Ramallah, March, 2000. 
305 Interim Agreement, Article XVII, and Point 4. b 
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settlers. While doing so, Israel argued that its actions were not in violation of either the 
DOP or the Interim Agreement. 
This is all especially important given that Israel's only openly-stated strategy vis-a-vis the 
OPT -and one that was maintained throughout the peace process and implementation 
period-was to carry on with settlement expansion and to ensure its continuation. That was 
the strategy that Palestinians failed to counter effectively. 
An editorial dimension to this problem is that the Interim Agreement postpones the 
discussion on settlements without defining them, their size or their borders. This leaves the 
areas excluded from the Agreement subject to expansion as the settlements grew, and made 
time a crucial factor playing against the Palestinians, at least from this perspective. 
As has already been noted, the DOP represented a compromise of many ofthe basic rights 
and positions of the Palestinians. The Interim Agreement marked a further compromise of 
the DOP-compromising the compromise. Possibly the most peculiar example of this is 
that while the DOP called for the need to preserve the integrity of the Palestinian 
territories, the Interim Agreement disintegrates these territories by dividing them into 
different areas, Zones A, B and C, with different provision and jurisdictions applicable to 
each. 
The third point of Article X including the following: 
a. Area A means the populated areas delineated by the red line and shaded in brown 
on Map No.1; 
b. Area B means the populated areas delineated by the red line and shaded in 
yellow on Map No. 2, and the built-up area of the hamlets listed in Appendix 6 to 
Annex 1 ; and 
c. Area C means areas of the West Bank outside Areas A and 8 .... 306 
A thorough examination of the Map No. I attached to the Interim Agreement reveals the 
following points: 
306 Interim Agreement, Article X 
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I. Area A, from which the Israeli army should redeploy, is only three percent of the 
Palestinian territories. 
2. Area 8 is approximately 23 percent. 
3. There is no geographic continuity between the seven towns that are designated Area A; 
instead they are separated completely by Areas 8 and C. 
4. The populated but rural areas are designated Area 8, but there is again a lack of any 
geographic continuity and they are separated by Area C. 
5. Area A, which is primarily towns, is limited to the built-up areas only and includes no 
space for expansion. 
6. Area C, which includes Israeli settlements, is the only category with geographic 
continuity. 
The significance ofthis lies not only in the negative impact on the integrity of the territory 
as an entity, but also in the fact that the powers and responsibilities transferred to the 
Palestinian Authority vary between Areas A, 8, and C. One example of this is security. 
Point I in Article XIII states that the Palestinian Authority will "assume the powers and 
responsibilities for internal security and public order in Area in that district." Point 2.a 
concerning Area 8 states that the "Council will assume responsibility for public order for 
Palestinians. Israel shall have the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of 
protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism." Similarly, Article XI, which 
deals with land issues, differentiates between the scope of the powers given to the 
Palestinian Authority in Areas A, 8, and C. 
Analysis of the Interim Agreement presents a number of challenges; for this reason, three 
criteria are used here to assess the document. The first is the means by which issues 
disputed in the negotiations were settled; the second is to what extent the Interim 
Agreement facilitated each side in the creation of facts on the ground which would advance 
their progress toward their respective national goals; and the third is to what extent the 
Interim Agreement conforms with international law. 
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The Interim Agreement failed to specifY borders to the settlements, which left Israel able to 
expand them. At the same time, the agreement does specifY the borders of the Palestinian 
residential areas, and particularly the towns, in such a way as to prevent Palestinians from 
expanding their residential areas in order to allow natural growth. The absence of anything 
in the text to the effect of freezing settlement construction or expansion and the absence of 
anything specifYing settlement residential zones has allowed Israel to continue to expand 
its settlements and, consequently, to further consolidate the occupation and make its 
reversal difficult. The most dangerous outcome of these flaws in the agreement is that they 
allow Israel to take advantage of the interim period and further the achievement of its 
objectives in the final status negotiations as far as the land-the essence of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict-is concerned. 
The situation was similar vis-a-vis Jerusalem, the status of which was postponed to the 
final phase of negotiations. The Agreement does not prevent Israel from making legal, 
administrative, demographic and construction changes during the interim period ofthe 
kind that dramatically alter the situation on the ground to serve Israeli needs and objectives 
in the final status negotiations. The design of the Interim Agreement in effect gives Israel 
the advantage in Jerusalem, allowing it to continue the "creation of facts" policies that will 
determine, in practical terms, the future of Jerusalem, instead of leaving this to be decided 
by the two sides through negotiations. 
It was clear from the beginning of the process that the Palestinian objective in final status 
negotiations would be the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the part of 
Palestine that was occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem. Equally as clear, however, 
is that among Israel's objectives in final status negotiations is the prevention ofthe 
establishment of a Palestinian state. Given this contradiction, one question that might help 
to evaluate the Interim Agreement is whether or not it helps the Palestinians along the path 
toward achievement of their objectives. Looked at from this perspective, the absence of 
any practical mechanisms for ensuring the geographic contiguity and integrity of the land 
and the society become serious flaws, since these are essential conditions for any future 
state. 
Despite the fact that the Interim Agreement regards the Palestinian territories as a single 
geographic unit, it effectively divides it into three areas that are geographically, 
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administratively and legally distinct: Areas A, B, and C. In addition, the Interim 
Agreement lacks any mechanism allowing continuity between two parts ofthe territories, 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The end result is the disintegration ofthe Palestinian 
territories in more than one respect-geographic, administrative and economic. The 
subsequent difficulties in the movement of people and goods between the different parts of 
the territories, mainly between the West Bank and Gaza, and to a certain extent between 
the northern and southern West Bank, had an extremely detrimental impact on the integrity 
of the territories, the society and the economy, and was responsible for the economic-and 
to a lesser extent, the political--disintegration which followed the Interim Agreement. 
Public opinion polls conducted after the implementation of the Interim Agreement, as 
Israel began to separate the West Bank and Gaza, showed increasing differences in opinion 
between Gazans and West Bank Palestinians, as well as between Jerusalemites and people 
from the remaining West Bank on most of the issued raised in the questions. Economic 
disintegration, too, was evident in the sharp reduction of the market available to West Bank 
producers, which was limited from both the West Bank and Gaza to only the West Bank, 
and for Gaza producers to Gaza only. The Economic Protocol attached to the Interim 
Agreement did not allow the Palestinian economy access to outside markets and the small, 
closed markets created a virtual bottleneck; clearly, then, this Agreement had primarily 
negative consequences for the economy, a major component in the building of a state. 
The Interim Agreement is unhelpful with regard to the Palestinian need to create facts on 
the ground conducive to achieving their objectives in the final status negotiations, 
particularly regarding issues of land, which lie at the core ofboth the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict and of the peace process. An examination of the way in which the Interim 
Agreement deals with issues such as land management, zoning and planning reveals that it 
does not make it easy for Palestinians to move freely to create the facts on the ground that 
they need. Furthermore, the text on these issues keeps Palestinian will hostage to Israeli 
decision-making power, albeit indirectly. 
Article 22 of Annex 3 of the Interim Agreement states that: 
powers and responsibilities in the sphere of Land Registration in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip will be transferred from the military government and its Civil 
Administration to the Palestinian side. This sphere includes, inter alia, registration 
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in the Land Registry of real estate transactions, first registrations of land, 
registrations of courts' decisions, registrations of parcelations pursuant to the 
Towns, Villages and Building Planning Law, No 79, of 1966, and the 
administration of Land Registry offices and processes.307 
But an examination of the details of this article reveals restrictions and exceptions that 
effectively strip any meaning from the above paragraph, rendering it null and void. For 
example, Area C is excluded from the powers transferred, and Area C is the vast majority 
of the Palestinian territories. The transfer of these powers and responsibilities is made 
gradual and excludes Israelis and Israeli-related matters, while not specifYing the rights of 
the Israelis. "The Palestinian side shalt respect the legal rights oflsraetis [including 
corporations owned by Israelis] related to land located in the areas under the territorial 
jurisdiction ofthe Counci1".308 
Point 4 of Article 22 of Annex 3 enshrines the rights of Israelis and any Israeli entity to 
object to any Palestinian regulation or decision regarding land registration within a certain 
period of time. In the case of such an objection being raised, the two sides must refer such 
complaints to a joint committee which decides whether the Palestinian party can 
implement the decision or not: 
... when an Israeli or a Palestinian considers that his or her rights may be affected by 
any enforcement, confirmation or registration proceedings, he or she may request 
within 30 days from the receipt of the information by the CAC [Civil Affairs 
Committee] in accordance with subparagraph c. below, that the issue be brought 
before a professional joint committee established by the two sides, hereafter 'the 
Joint Committee', prior to the carrying out of such procedure. The Joint Committee 
should convene within fourteen days from the submission of the objection to deal 
with all the relevant aspects pertaining to the issue and decide whether to approve 
the carrying out of the proceedings regarding which the objection has been 
submitted. 
307 Article 22, Annex 3, Interim Agreement 
308 Article 22, Annex 3, Point 3, Interim Agreement 
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Pending the approval by the Joint Committee, no enforcement, confirmation or registration 
regarding which the objection has been put forward may be carried out or registered in the 
Land Registry or in any other relevant registry. 309 
In the same article, subpoint c. of Point 5 obliges the Palestinians to inform the Israelis of 
any judgment in this regard: "The Palestinian side shall, at the earliest opportunity, provide 
the CAC with the information regarding any judgment or any request for enforcement, 
confirmation, or registration [including first registration of land] which may affect the 
rights of Israelis." 
Not all aspects of this agreement are negative vis-a-vis the Palestinians' ability to create 
useful facts. The Agreement permits the Palestinians to establish an elected council of 88 
members, which allows the possibility of establishing three distinct authorities-
legislative, executive and judicial-and the size of the council and its powers and 
responsibilities creates a semblance of legitimacy and a political system that demonstrates 
efficiency and accountability despite some problems in the election arrangements as 
expressed in the agreement. The fact that all the Palestinian people in the territories were 
able to elect a single unified parliament allows the Palestinians to take a step towards self-
determination and the creation of a democratic regime. 
The second criteria used in this analysis is the extent to which the Interim Agreement is in 
harmony with the DOP and serves as a straightforward mechanism for implementation of 
the DOP. However, it seems clear that in this regard, the Interim Agreement represents a 
compromise, in many ways, of the DOP rather than its honest implementation. 
One example is the fact that in the Interim Agreement, certain issues that the DOP included 
within the interim period obligations are postponed to final status negotiations. Point 3 of 
Article 13 ofthe DOP states: "Further redeployments to specified locations will be 
gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public 
309 Point 4, Article 22, Annex 3, Interim Agreement 
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order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII 
above. "310 
The Interim Agreement describes the issue very differently: the redeployment is to take 
place gradually in three phases, with six months between each phase; and it will not 
necessarily include all the Palestinian territories except final status issues, determined in 
the DOP, but rather will be carried out to locations that are to be determined in the final 
status negotiations. Point I 0 of Article I, Annex I states: 
The specified military locations referred to in Article X, paragraph 2 of this 
Agreement will be determined in the further redeployment phases within the 
specified time-frame ending not later than 18 months from the date of the 
inauguration ofthe Council, and will be negotiated in the permanent status 
negotiations.311 
There are numerous other examples, all of which cannot be listed here. However, the DOP 
allows redeployment from Palestinian populated areas; it does not talk about gradualism or 
partiality, while the Interim Agreement chooses certain population areas from which Israel 
should gradually redeploy its army. The phases ofthe further redeployment are specified 
in Appendix 1 of the Interim Agreement as follows: 
Pursuant to Article 1.8 of this Annex, the further redeployment oflsraeli military 
forces to specified military locations will take places in phases as follows: 
Phase 1: six months after the inauguration of the Council 
Phase 2: twelve months after the inauguration of the Council 
Phase 3: eighteen months after the inauguration of the Counci1312 
Israeli negotiators strongly insisted on phasing the implementation ofthe agreements, and 
then phasing these phases to the furthest extent possible. This phasing strategy has a 
rationale stemming from the Israeli concept of the peace process, which is that any future 
305 Point 3, Article 13, DOP 
311 Point 10, Article I, Annex I, Interim Agreement 
312 Appendix I, Interim Agreement 
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steps or phases are dependent on the level of success-from the Israeli point ofview-of 
the phases already implemented. 
The Israeli approach, which is based on a reward system for 'good behaviour', neglects the 
concept of the peace process having fixed terms of reference in the form of specific legal 
rights based on international legality and Security Council resolutions. In effect, this 
approach makes the process reversible, dependent on Israeli judgment of success to date. 
This contradicts the Palestinian view: that the process is irreversible and has specific 
objectives which were determined in the agreed-upon terms of reference. For this reason, 
the more phases the implementation process includes, the closer the agreement becomes to 
the Israeli concept. 
Raja Shehadeh points out in his analysis of the Interim Agreement that: Sub Article 1 of 
Article XVII ofthe Interim Agreement (quoted below) concerning the jurisdiction ofthe 
council is more remarkable for what it excluded from the jurisdiction of the council than 
for what it included. Comparing it with the Article in the DOP dealing with jurisdiction, it 
is clear that it has diverged substantially from it. 
The following paragraph specifies the exceptions to the jurisdictions granted to the 
Palestinian Authority under the DOP: "Jurisdiction ofthe council will cover West Bank 
and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status 
. . ,313 
negotmt10ns . 
These exceptions to the Palestinians' authority exceeded the exceptions laid down in the 
DOP. Article XVII, entitled "Jurisdiction," included the following: 
In accordance with the DOP, the jurisdiction of the council will cover West Bank 
and Gaza Strip territory as a single territorial unit, except for: 
a. Issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: refugees, 
borders, foreign relations, and Israelis, and 
b. Powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council. 
313 DOP, Article IV 
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It should be noted also that while the DOP determined that redeployment would be carried 
out, although with exceptions, the Interim Agreement added in the concept of gradualism, 
as explained earlier. This marks another significant difference between the DOP and the 
Interim Agreement on the DOP's implementation, and another compromise by the 
Palestinian leadership on a previous compromise, the DOP. Subpoint a., Point 2 of Article 
17 states the following: "The territorial jurisdiction of the council shall encompass Gaza 
Strip and West Bank territory, except for Area C which, except for issues that will be 
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian 
jurisdiction in three phases."314 
It has been argued earlier in this chapter that one of Israel's strategic objectives vis-a-vis 
the OPT was the establishment and expansion of settlements, and Israel's negotiating 
strategy attempted to ensure harmony between its settlement policies and the agreements 
with the Palestinians. The Interim Agreement included several examples that demonstrate 
that the agreement permits and even legitimises Israeli settlement. This is not only in direct 
contradiction to Palestinian needs and strategies, but blatantly contravenes international 
law, as will be shown below. 
Under Article 17, Chapter 3, entitled "Legal Affairs," Point 4.b reads as follows: 
To this end, the Israeli military government shall retain the necessary legislative, 
judicial and executive powers and responsibilities in accordance with international 
law. This provision shall not derogate from Israel's applicable legislation over 
Israelis in personam.315 
This paragraph gives the impression that Israel will apply Israeli law to settlers living in 
the OPT, which leaves two different legal systems and two different judiciaries applicable 
to two different peoples living in the one territorial unit-a typical apartheid system, a 
contradiction of international law, and contradictory to the interests and strategic objectives 
ofthe Palestinians within the negotiations process. 
309 Interim Agreement, Article 17, Point 2.a 
315 Article 17, Chapter 3, entitled "Legal Affairs," Point 4. b 
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Another illustration of this point regarding Israeli settlements and settlers can be found in 
Point 3, Article 16 of Appendix I, which states: "The Palestinian side shall respect the 
legal rights oflsraelis (including corporations owned by Israelis) related to Government 
and Absentee land located in the areas under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council."316 
This Palestinian admission that the Israelis have legal rights in the OPT is an acceptance 
and legitimisation of the illegal acquisition of Palestinian land and other results of the 
Israeli occupation. 
Looking at the difficult issues that delayed an agreement and caused tension between the 
two sides is useful in highlighting 'the compromise of the compromise' that was imposed 
by the Israelis in the negotiations in implementing the DOP. Because of the intense 
negotiations on these issues in the final weeks ofthe Taba talks, both Palestinians and 
Israelis issued several public statements stating their fixed positions on these issues. There 
are at least three examples of issues that were settled after long and public disputes: 
Hebron, prisoners, and the redeployment map. 
The publicly-declared Palestinian position on Hebron was that Hebron should be treated in 
a similar fashion to other Palestinian towns in the West Bank-including the scope of 
further Israeli redeployment, which would require the evacuation of the handful of settlers 
living there.317 If this proved difficult, the next step should then be an agreed timetable 
which would ultimately end with an Israeli redeployment from the entire city. 
In fact, the agreement reached on redeployment in Hebron differed greatly from that in 
other Palestinian towns, and represented a compromise on the original Palestinian position. 
The Hebron Protocol transferred civilian powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian 
Authority-and divided the city in two. One section, H-1, was to be under Palestinian 
control, while the second, H-2--one third of the entire city-was to be under Israeli 
control. H-2 includes most of the city centre. 
316 Point 3, Article 16 of Appendix I 
317 Israel wanted special treatment for Hebron in the agreement because of the presence of some 400 Jewish 
settlers in the city centre, and the presence of a site considered holy to Jews and Muslims as well. 
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In addition, the Interim Agreement also included the redeployment from two-thirds of 
Hebron to be completed six months after the redeployment from the other West Bank 
towns and cities. Article VII of Annex I states: "There will be redeployment oflsraeli 
military forces in the city of Hebron except for places and roads where arrangements are 
necessary for the security and protection of Israelis and their movement. The areas of such 
redeployment are delineated by red ... (hereinafter 'Area H-1 ')".318 
The second example of a major dispute was the tension that emerged in the Interim 
Agreement talks in Taba over the eleventh-hour redeployment map presented by Israel. 
This map was publicly rejected by the Palestinian negotiators, who described it as 'the map 
ofcantonisation' or the 'leopard's skin map', because the Areas A were separated by Areas 
B and C, and Areas B were separated by Areas C. The way the map had been drawn meant 
that there was no geographic continuity between the two categories of land over which the 
Palestinians were being given control, named Areas A and B. 
The reason behind this fragmentation is clear-to prevent the development of these 
territories into a state, which is exactly why the Palestinians in the negotiations rejected it. 
Arafat stated repeatedly that the Palestinians could not accept that map; it transformed their 
land cantons, and contradicted with the principle of geographic integrity that was clear in 
the DOP. Nevertheless, this map became part of the Interim Agreement. 
The final example of a major contradiction between the DOP and the Interim Agreement is 
the issue of prisoners, an issue given top priority in the agenda and public statements ofthe 
Palestinian negotiators. Palestinian public opinion was that any agreement should include 
the release of all Palestinian prisoners-gradually, but within an agreed timetable. Hisham 
Abdulraziq, a Palestinian activist and member of the Palestinian delegation in charge of the 
prisoners portfolio who was later to become Palestinian Authority minister for prisoner 
affairs, made a number of public statements in which he insisted that "the Palestinians will 
not sign any agreement that does not include the release of all Palestinian prisoners".319 
318 see Article VII, Annex I: "Guidelines for Hebron''. 
319 Statement made in al-Quds newspaper. 
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In the end, however, the Interim Agreement did not guarantee the release of all prisoners 
but only the release of some prisoners in three instalments-no specific number of 
prisoners or release dates were mentioned. The Interim Agreement includes an annex, 
Annex VII, entitled "Release of Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees." This annex includes 
wording as to the intent that "the release of detainees and prisoners, as agreed upon in 
Article XVI of this Agreement will be carried out in three stages".320 The annex also 
includes the categories of prisoners to be included in each phase of releases. 
The examples discussed above illustrate Palestinian weakness in the negotiations with 
Israel over implementation of the DOP. The weakness was a direct result of relying on 
negotiators who demonstrated political loyalty rather than relevant expertise, which led to 
an emphasis on generalities rather than detail. The weakness also resulted from public 
pressure, which was disappointed with the developing situation and demanded progress, 
and from Israel, which was not honest in its implementation and continued to behave as an 
occupier. 
Many issues were handled in exactly the same manner in both the Interim Agreement and 
the Gaza-Jericho Agreement: legislation; security concepts; arrangements at the border 
crossing points; and many others. Above all, the Economic Protocol that was signed in 
Paris by Israeli finance minister Avraham Shohat and Palestinian negotiator Ahmed Qurei 
(which was included in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement) was adopted and included as the 
Economic Protocol ofthe Interim Agreement. 
In sum, the Interim Agreement reflected yet again the weakness ofthe Palestinian 
leadership. The composition and approach of the Palestinian negotiators, which were 
selected on the basis of factional and personal loyalties rather than proficiency and the 
teams' fragmentation, all lead to a shift in Israel's favour. In addition, the Palestinian side 
was weakened by Israel's behaviour, which allowed Israeli interests, as embodied in its 
negotiation strategies, to dominate and take precedence over the objectives and interests of 
the Palestinian people. 
320 Interim Agreement Point I, Annex VII 
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The flaws of the Interim Agreement were not, however, immediately fully evident. Arafat 
and his Fatah leaders were able to 'sell' the agreement to the Palestinian population by 
emphasising symbolic gains. A week after the signing of the Interim Agreement, which 
was then called the 'Taba agreement' or 'Oslo II', the Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Centre (JMCC) conducted a public opinion poll on Palestinian attitudes 
towards the agreement and the effect ofthe agreement on the standing of both the 
Palestinian Authority and the opposition. 
In the poll, a random sample of I ,273 Palestinians over 18 years of age were interviewed, 
972 were in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and 346 in Gaza. The interviews 
were done in homes, conducted face-to- face on Friday and Saturday, 6-7 October, 1995. 
The poll showed overwhelming Palestinian support for the agreement and the peace 
process in general. In addition, support for the opposition had declined, and majority of the 
public felt that the opposition was generally either impractical or vague. Nearly 66 percent 
of respondents said they either strongly or cautiously supported the agreement, and only 
16.4 percent opposed it. Just over 19 percent believe that the agreement reinforced the 
Israeli occupation, while 69.3 percent believed that the agreement was a step towards the 
full or partial realization of Palestinian aspirations of an independent Palestinian state with 
Jerusalem as its capital. 
Support for Hamas, the largest opposition group, declined after the agreement from 18 
percent in a JMCC poll conducted on 21 June 1995 to I 0. 7 percent in this later poll. Of 
those who opposed the peace process, 49.8 percent were critical of the opposition for being 
"impractical" or vague, compared to the 33.9 percent who said the opposition was 
practical. In the same direction, support for imprisoned Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh 
Ahmad Yassin declined from I 0.9 percent in a poll conducted by JMCC on 21 June 1995, 
to 5.5 percent in the later poll. A leftist leader who was critical ofthe agreement, Haidar 
Abdul Shafi, saw a decline in support from 7 .I percent on June 21 to 4.6 percent. 
This poll also reflected an increase in the feeling that things were going to improve after 
the planned extension (according to the agreement) of the areas under Palestinian control 
from Gaza and Jericho to the rest of the Palestinian territories. Over 62 percent said that 
their feeling of security would improve when the Palestinian Authority took take over in 
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those areas, compared to only 11.2 percent who said the opposite (21.2% said that their 
feeling of security would not change). 
According to the same poll, the agreement increased even the size of the minority that 
believed Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was sincere about implementing the peace 
agreement with Palestinians. On 21 June, the JMCC poll found that only 9.9 percent 
thought Rabin was sincere, while a week after the agreement's signing, 27.2 percent 
thought he was sincere. It is worth noticing that this slight change does not indicate a 
strategic change in the position of the Palestinian public, as the same poll found that 65.2 
percent still believe Israel has no right to exist, while only 26.4 percent believe it does. 
Implementation and the Deterioration into Violence 
Implementation ofthe Israeli Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip started on 16 January, 1995 when the Israeli Knesset ratified it. A day later the 
military redeployed from Abu Dis village near Jerusalem. This redeployment oflsraeli 
forces and the Palestinian Authority's takeover of major Palestinian cities and towns was 
followed on 20 January by the first Palestinian elections. On 12 February, Arafat was 
sworn in as the first elected president of Palestine. The elected Palestinian Legislative 
Council held its inaugural session in Gaza City on 7 March. 
After this promising start, however, things rapidly began to deteriorate. Dates were not 
respected by Israel during the implementation, tension and a lack of confidence 
characterized the relations between the two sides, and accusations of responsibility for the 
delay were exchanged between the two sides. Palestinians accused Israel of not respecting 
the agreement, especially the dates of implementation, in addition to continuing oppressive 
policies against Palestinians, including settlement expansion and confiscation of land. 
Israelis accused Palestinians of not investing effort in stopping the Palestinian opposition 
from carrying out violent attacks against Israelis. 
In general, Israel implemented the parts of the agreement dealing with the transfer of 
administrative authorities, in addition to the first phase of the three phases of the farther 
redeployment of its forces in the OPT, as stipulated by the Interim Agreement. Through 
this process, the total area under control of the Palestinian Authority was 2-3% Area A 
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(under total civilian and security Palestinian control) and 23% Area B (under Palestinian 
civilian control and Israeli security control). 
On 10 October, 1995, Israel released 600 Palestinian political prisoners. The next day, 
three towns in the West Bank were evacuated by the Israel army. On 13 November, the 
Palestinian Authority took over Jenin in the West Bank. Transfer of several other 
authorities to the Palestinian Authority took place on 18 November, including transport, 
licensing, weather, population registry, employment and land registration. One day later 
the Palestinian Authority took over Tulkarem, proceeding to the town ofNablus on 11 
December, Bethlehem on 21 December and Ramallah on 27 December. 
However, the areas under Palestinian control had no geographic continuity and were 
separated by Israeli-controlled areas, as illustrated in the Map attached to the Agreement. 
This situation left the Palestinian Authority and leadership hostage to the Israeli 
government whereby Israel controlled many vital interests of the Palestinian Authority, 
including movement in and out of the territories and movement between the various parts 
of these territories. This leverage was exercised repeatedly by the Israeli government 
frequently through its 'closure' policy. 
In addition, in the course of the implementation as a means of appeasing the settlers, the 
Israeli government invested $300 million in a massive construction of bypass roads, or 
highways connecting settlements to allow settlers to avoid Palestinian population centres. 
This involved further confiscation of Palestinian land and the added disintegration of major 
land blocs. 
On 12 February 1996, the same day that President Arafat was sworn in to office, Israel 
imposed a total security closure across the OPT until the end ofthe main Muslim feast. On 
I2 June, 1996, the second deadline for the agreed-on Israeli redeployment from the 
Palestinian town of Hebron in the West Bank passed and was postponed indeterminably. 
On 4 November 1995, and before caring out the redeployment from Hebron or 
commencing implementation of the second and third phases ofthe reemployment, Prime 
Minister oflsrael Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish fanatic. This development 
led to early elections in which the right-wing Likud bloc took over in the 141h elections of 
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the Knesset on 29 May 1996 Benjamin Netanyahu, who publicly opposed the Oslo 
Agreements, became the new Israeli prime minister. This change left the implementation 
of the rest of the agreements on hold indefinitely and introduced a deep stagnation to the 
peace process. 
The period also witnessed an increase in oppressive measures by the Palestinian Authority; 
one example was the security raid of AI-Najah University. The increase in public lack of 
satisfaction with the Palestinian Authority's performance and its official repression led to 
an active campaign by Palestinian human rights organization. As a result, on 18 May, 
Palestinian security forces arrested the head of the Independent Commission for Citizens 
Rights, Dr. Eyad Sarraj. Advocate Raji Sorani, another leading human rights organization 
director, was also arrested in the same period. On I August, 1996, Palestinian police shot 
dead a man in Tulkarm while firing on a group of demonstrators protesting outside the 
Tulkarm prison. 
At this point, the Palestinian Authority was in one of its weakest periods. Uncontrollable 
violence and attacks against Israelis by Hamas and Islamic Jihad embarrassed the PA, and 
transformed it into a repressive authority. This, in turn, led to tension with the public. Israel 
was not implementing most ofthe articles of the signed agreement and the Israeli closure 
was contributing to economic crisis. This weakness gave Israel leverage in further avoiding 
implementation of parts ofthe agreement, which created a vicious circle stemming from 
the by now obvious weaknesses ofthe agreements for Palestinians. 
In light of the poor implementation of the interim agreement, further trends of decline in 
public opinion towards the agreement and leadership were evident. Public opinion polls 
conducted regularly to examine the attitudes of the Palestinian people towards the peace 
process showed that, while support for the peace process among Palestinians was still 
strong, support for the Interim Agreement and the Oslo process was declining. 
In an analysis published by Arab Thought Forum and Jerusalem Media and 
Communication Centre written by Jamil Rabah, a clear trend showed that "less 
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Palestinians are supporting the Oslo agreements, and more are opposed to it as the 
mechanism of peace, while in the same time there is steadily growing support for the peace 
process in general."321 This study went deeper in showing that "this opposition is even 
higher among the educated who are presumed to be more politically active and thus more 
effective. After analyzing JMCC Poll number 21, conducted in July 1997, there was a 
statistical significance between the level of education of respondents and attitude towards 
the Oslo track". 322 
JMCC's polls showed that those who supported the agreement strongly declined 
systematically from 23.7 percent in October 1995 to 1 0. 5 percent in August 97. Those who 
opposed the agreement, on the other hand, increased from I 6.4 percent in October 1995 to 
19.1 percent in October 1996 and finally 28.4 percent in August I 997. 
As stated earlier, decline in support for the Interim Agreement did not correspond to the 
fairly consistent support for the peace process in general which, according to JMCC polls 
fluctuated only between 72.7 percent in October I 995 to 66 percent in July I 998. 
The relatively stable public support for the peace process can be explained by the public's 
belief in peace and high expectations for it, in addition to the lack of another alternative. 
Likewise, the deteriorating economic situation and Israel's continuing confiscation of land 
in the face ofthe Palestinian Authority, which was failing to deliver strong institutions and 
a better quality of life all contributed to the public's attitude. 
Adel Zagha, head of the economics department at Birzeit University, explained the 
economic deterioration after the Oslo agreement by saying: "The standard of living for the 
population as a whole has fallen by 40 percent since the beginning of the Oslo process."323 
321 Jamil Rabah, Palestinian Public Opinion Since the Peace Process (Jerusalem: Arab Thought Forum and 
Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, 1998). 
322 Jamil Rabah, Palestinian Public Opinion Since the Peace Process (Jerusalem: Arab Thought Forum and 
Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, 1998). 
323 Adel Zagha, Mortgaging Self-Reliance: Foreign Aid and Development in Palestine (JMCC, November 
1997) p. 8. 
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This economic deterioration seemed to have a major effect on the deterioration of 
Palestinian public support for the agreements. In a poll conducted by JMCC in 1997, 68.3 
percent ofthe respondents said that the peace process had resulted in either negative or 
very negative effects on the Palestinian economy. The impact of the economic 
deterioration on public support for the Oslo agreement is clearer when we add that an 
unpublished JMCC poll conducted in March 1997 showed that the economic situation was 
the Palestinian public's main concern. 
Conclusion 
The majority of Palestinians on the official, public, and factional levels reacted positively 
to the Declaration of Principles agreement reached between the PLO and Israel. 
Nevertheless, a significant minority among these three groups opposed that agreement. The 
Israeli recognition of the PLO and its right to return, the willingness to withdraw from 
OPT, and the commitments to negotiate substantial political issues including Jerusalem, 
refugees, and Jewish settlements, were among the reasons why supporters advocated for 
the agreement. 
Signing on the dotted line and then implementing the agreement, especially the return of 
the PLO leadership to the OPT, increased the popularity ofthe PLO top ranks-a popularity 
that was already high. The PLO leaders and fighters were received as heroes. This 
sentiment was accompanied by unrealistically high expectations resulting from an 
exaggeration of the benefits of the agreement in the process of the PLO's selling it to the 
public. That popularity culminated in the first election for the legislative council, when 
PLO returnee leaders were given the highest number of votes. 
The implementation of the first phase of the DOP, the Gaza-Jericho agreement, was carried 
out in parallel with negotiations over the implementation of the rest of the interim 
agreement, and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. That period witnessed a 
change in the composition and structure of the Palestinian negotiating delegation, in 
addition to a deterioration in the Palestinian negotiations performance. The inside 
leadership was marginalized and the talks were carried out in an absence of structure and 
strategy, resulting in weak and problematic agreements and implementation, which in turn 
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started to weaken the PLO leadership's public support and strength to withstand Israeli 
pressure. 
The weakening of the Palestinian leadership enabled Israel to extract further compromises 
from the Palestinian side, which became desperate for achievements to hold up to the 
growing political opposition and decline its own public support. The Israeli government, 
also under pressure from growing opposition, began to hesitate in implementing the 
agreements. In addition, it continued its illegal occupation activities and oppressive 
policies, including newly restricting movement, expanding settlements, and arresting and 
killing Palestinians. These policies led to economic deterioration, humiliation and 
frustration, and ultimately discredited the peace process, and the leadership. 
The PLO, which by then had also become the Palestinian Authority, was caught between 
the negative effects of its poor agreements, implementation, and governance on one hand, 
and the pressure of the Israelis in negotiations and implementation, on the other hand. The 
net outcome of that cycle was a further decline in its public support, the strengthening of 
the opposition, and stagnation in the peace process. That opened the door for a wave of 
violence and counter violence that widened and deepened the vicious circle. 
One way to understand the weak behaviour exhibited by the Palestinians and illustrated in 
the agreements-besides the inherent nature of the PLO leadership-is that the PLO had 
already surrendered all its cards in return for being recognized as Israel's official partner in 
the peace process. Thus, it was left with little leverage to use in the talks which followed. 
Ahmad Qurei (Abu Ala') listed what he considered the four negotiating cards in his hands 
in the beginning ofthe Oslo negotiations. He included the unbreakable steadfastness ofthe 
Palestinian people, the ability to prevent any agreement that bypasses the PLO, the 
possibility of giving or withholding the security Israel needs and demands, and assistance 
in ending the Arab boycott and Israeli isolation in the region. m A thorough look at the 
details of the letters of mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO shows that all these 
cards were already played from the start- even before talks on implementation and the 
final status talks that were ostensibly to come. 
324 Ahmad Qurei, Ar-Riwaha a/-Filistiniyya, pp. 78, 79. 
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Finally, it should be pointed out that the cycle of deteriorating leadership and 
implementations was in no way interrupted or ameliorated by the powers that might have 
intervened. Since the post DOP negotiations were between Israel and the Palestinians, 
there was no third party technically involved who might pressure Israel to reduce its 
damaging occupation policies or assist the Palestinian leadership more constructively. The 
United States chose not to advance such pressure on Israel, while the international donor 
community chose to ameliorate the symptoms with poverty relief policies while not 
pressuring Israel to alter its economically harmful policies and while simultaneously 
adding new pressures for financial accountability and good governance on an already 
beleaguered Palestinian Authority. Thus the environment did nothing to help the 
Palestinian Authority but served instead to compound the problems which created the 
spiral ofviolence. 
199 
CHAPTER SIX: Palestinian Leadership and Palestinian 
Authority 
Introduction 
The return of the PLO leadership to the OPT in accordance with the DOP marked a new 
era for the leadership and the public. The inside-outside dichotomy disappeared, the 
Palestinian leadership was transformed, and official institutions, which operated in a 
patrimonial manner, were dominated and controlled by Arafat and his Fatah 'kitchen'. 
These institutions, which the agreement made structurally dependent on Israel, were 
further constrained by Israeli restrictions. As result, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was 
unable to fulfil its obligations to its public; it was able neither to effectively confront the 
deteriorating economic situation, nor to alter Israel's unwillingness to implement the 
agreement. 
This chapter will argue that the inherent weaknesses in the Palestinian-Israeli agreements 
resulted in structural constraints and problems within the Authority. These weaknesses 
were at once political, economic and administrative. In many instances, these weaknesses 
left the PA in some respects hostage to the Israeli government. This had a detrimental 
effect, in turn, on the negotiating stance of the PLO, and consequently led to additional 
flawed agreements. 
We will first describe the two stages ofthe establishment ofthe PA, the first of which 
embodies the creation ofthe provisional government formed by the PLO leadership after 
the DOP and before the election of the Legislative Council, and the second stage following 
elections and incorporating many ofthe elected parliamentarians in addition to the 
appointed ones. During these stages, the returning leadership took advantage of its strong 
public support in order to dominate the executive branch and the security apparatuses. In 
addition, monopolistic companies were created to provide the leadership with the financial 
resources needed for its political activities. 
This chapter will also show to what extent the implementation of agreements, particularly 
the Economic Protocol of the Interim Agreement, resulted in poor economic performance 
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and complete dependency on the Israeli economy. Israeli practices and weak agreements 
brought about a decline in the economic conditions of the Palestinian people, which in turn 
increased public opposition to the leadership. The leadership responded by tightening the 
screws on the opposition, which further isolated and weakened it. This deteriorating 
political and economic performance created a rift between the government and the elected 
council which, despite its Fatah majority, was obliged to respond to the public's growing 
anger. 
Finally, this chapter will examine the experience of the first Palestinian Legislative 
Council, its election, composition, and relationship with the executive branch, emphasizing 
the interaction between the two as the council increasingly reflected the opinions of its 
electorate. 
Throughout the chapter, there will be also a follow-up on the structure and behaviour of the 
leadership, both in governance and negotiations, in addition to the effect of that on the 
negotiations and their outcome. 
The Establishment of the Palestinian Authority 
This section will deal with the first phase ofthe PA's establishment. In particular, it will 
explore the provisional government established before parliamentary elections, in 
accordance with the Gaza-Jericho agreement. It will show how the returning PLO 
leadership, and particularly Fatah, dominated a government that was compromised by, 
subordinated to, and dependent on Israel. 
The establishment of the PA was carried out in two phases, which were stipulated in two 
separate agreements. The first was the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area 
signed in Cairo on 4 May, 1994. The second was the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement 
on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip signed in Washington, DC on 28 September, 1995. 
In the first phase, the PA was established without first holding elections. According to 
Article 4 of the agreement: "The PLO shall inform the government oflsrael of the names 
ofthe members ofthe Palestinian Authority and any change of members. Changes in the 
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membership of the Palestinian Authority will take effect upon an exchange of letters 
between the PLO and the Government oflsrael."325 
The structure and composition of the authority was also stipulated in detail in the same 
agreement as follows: "The Palestinian Authority will consist of one body of 24 members 
which shall carry out and be responsible for all the legislative and the executive powers 
and responsibilities transferred to it under this agreement". 326 
The membership ofthe authority was restricted to those Palestinians who supported the 
Agreement. Article 4 also states: "Each member of the Palestinian Authority shall enter 
into office upon undertaking to act in accordance with this agreement".327 In accordance 
with this, PLO Chairman Vasser Arafat announced the political program of the PA on 28 
May, 1994, returned to the homeland on 1 July, 1994, and four days later presided over the 
swearing-in ofthe new PA ministers in Jericho. 
The PA was established by a decision ofthe PLO, which was considered the sole 
legitimate representative ofthe Palestinian people and the Palestinian party to the peace 
negotiations and agreements with Israel. Accordingly, the authority gained its legitimacy 
from both the agreements and the PLO. 
This Authority was supposed to serve temporarily until the general election, exercising 
executive and legislative powers. Their agenda included the general objective of 
"implementation and execution of authority in the Palestinian lands, starting with Gaza and 
Jericho, through its endorsed responsibilities and mandate and through a Palestinian 
definition of its legitimacy and obligations". 328 
The political program of the government also included: "preparing for legislative and 
municipal elections and insuring their free nature and legitimacy". There was the clear 
stipulation that the authority would: 
325 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, Cairo, May 1994. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Ibid. 
328 Political Program of the Palestinian National Authority, 28 May, 1994. 
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draft laws and decrees specifically for national authority institutions. These will 
regulate various aspects of life, which will enhance the concept and principles of 
democracy and elections. They will safeguard citizens' rights, general freedoms, 
the independence of the judiciary system, separation of powers, achievement of 
male/female equality, and equality of opportunity and merit, which will strengthen 
the foundation for a free market economy. It will also guarantee the private sector a 
. I 329 pnmary roe. 
The first Palestinian government was dominated by its largest faction, Fatah, the faction 
that had determined the political performance of the PLO. This allowed Fatah to shape the 
PA according to its own vision and interests. Prior to the election, for example, most of the 
important positions in the authority were given to Fatah cadres. The following survey 
illustrates this: 
Before the general election of 1996, the Palestinian Authority was formed as follows: 
Fatah held at least two of the top three positions in each Ministry. Thirty-three of the 40 
deputy ministers in the 20 ministries were from Fatah. Six were independent but pro-Fatah. 
Only one-who later resigned-was from another faction. This meant that Fatah totally 
dominated the non-political positions. 330 
As detailed in Chapter Five of this thesis, the first cabinet was dominated by Fatah and 
close aides of Arafat. All other vital institutions that were either established by the PA or 
existed before were also controlled in the same way. Jamil Hila! noted that: "Fatah controls 
all the institutions ofthe PA such as the Radio and Television Broadcasting, the Central 
Bureau of Statistics, the Monetary Authority, and the Controller's Office".331 Even more 
significant was Fatah's complete control and monopoly over all of the security apparatuses, 
its loyalists filling the positions of all high-ranking officers as well as the vast majority of 
personnel. 
Further, the Fatah political 'kitchen' continued to dominate and control the ongoing 
negotiations with Israel (these individuals included Arafat himself, Mahmoud Abbas, 
329 Ibid. 
330 Jamil Hila!, The Palestinian Political System after Oslo: An Analytical Study (Ramallah: Muwatin, 1998) 
p. 198. 
331 Hila!, p. 200. 
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Ahmad Qurei and Saeb Erekat, and Vasser Abed Rabbo, who was not Fatah but very close 
to Arafat.) 
Key Fatah personalities established companies that monopolized the importation 
(particularly from Israel) of essential commodities. Israel allowed that as part of its carrot-
and-stick policy. This added to Fatah's already comparably significant economic power 
base. 
Thus, the major characteristic of the newly established PA was that it was dominated by 
one party, Fatah. It was a one-party regime. Nabil Amr, prominent Fatah leader, elected 
member ofthe Legislative Council and later a minister in the PA said: "The relationship 
between Fatah and the PA can be described as a merger. The PA is Fatah and Fatah is the 
Palestinian Authority, and the others are there only as decoration." 332 
The transformation of Fatah into an organization controlling the major sources of power of 
the PA raised sensitive questions-even more so when significant players in Fatah were 
made government employees and members of the security services. As Legislative Council 
Speaker Ahmad Qurei stated in an interview in al-Quds newspaper on 7 May 1997, "The 
number of employees in the various institutions ofthe Palestinian Authority in May 1997 
is 79,000, most of whom are members of Fatah." 
Some analysts argued that Fatah domination of the PA was required for it to fulfil the 
special security role it was supposed to play according to the Oslo agreement. Jamil Hila! 
says in this regard: 
The fact that the majority of the Palestinian security forces are members of Fatah is 
an indicator of its role, particularly in light of growing Israeli (and American) 
pressure on the Palestinian Authority to oppress the opposition under the pretext of 
fightin& terror. This reflects an attempt to transform the authority into an agent for 
lsrael.3 3 
332 Nabil A mer, Journal of Palestine Studies 21, Winter 1995. 
333 Hila!, p. 20 I. 
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These arrangements helped to enhance the public position of the returning Palestinian 
leadership of Fatah in general, and Arafat in particular, and managed to create a regime 
that was similar to many of the Arab regimes. It was mixture of a one-party regime and a 
patrimonial legacy. As Jamil Hila! put it: "The Oslo agreement has hastened, or has been 
manipulated to hasten, developments in the Palestinian political system toward what 
appears to be a one-party system generating a neo-patrimonial bureaucratic regime under 
the supreme authority of one leader".334 
All this appears to have been endorsed by Israel. The V.I.P.-Very Important Person-that 
was initially mentioned in the Interim Agreement as being afforded certain special rights, 
on one hand reflected Israeli approval ofthe new Palestinian leadership, and on the other 
hand aimed at creating further dependency of the authority on Israel. This is particularly 
significant because this same leadership and Authority was in talks with Israel for 
implementation ofthe DOP. 
The Election of the Raa'es and the Palestinian Legislative Council 
The second phase of the establishment of the PA differed in its incorporation of elected 
representatives into the structures ofthe PA, commencing with the first ever Palestinian 
general elections. The idea of elections was conceptualized in the first agreement, the 
DOP, signed in Washington on 13 September 1993. This agreement stated: "In order that 
the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according 
to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the 
council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian 
police will ensure public order. "335 
The DOP was also clear that, although these elections were to be "free and democratic", 
the exact details and dates of the vote were subject to approval by Israel. "An agreement 
334 1-Iilal, "The Effect of the Oslo Agreement on the Palestinian Political System", After Oslo: New Realities, 
Old Problems, edited by George Giacaman and Dag Jorund Lanning (Lansing: University of Michigan Press, 
1998) p. 77. 
335 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Washington DC, 13 September 
1993. 
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will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with 
protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine 
months after the entry into force ofthis Declaration ofPrinciples".336 
The details of the establishment of the PA were further developed in the 1995 Israeli-
Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The description of 
the structure ofthat Authority in the agreement included that "the Palestinian Council and 
the Ra 'ees ['president', but also 'head' in Arabic] of the Executive Authority of the council 
constitute the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, which will be elected by the 
Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza Strip for a transitional period".337 
The PA that was appointed by the PLO functioned from 5 July, 1994 to January 1996. 
President Arafat called for the first Palestinian elections through Presidential Decree 
Number 1 for the year 1995. Arafat signed this decree in his capacity as Chairman of the 
Executive Authority ofthe Palestinian Liberation Organization and as the President ofthe 
Palestinian National Authority a post he assumed as leader of the PLO. Article 1 of that 
decree stated that "[t]he Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Jerusalem 
are called to take part in general, free and direct elections. They will elect the President of 
the Palestinian National Authority and the Members of the Palestinian Council on Saturday 
20 January 1996. "338 
On 14 December, I 995, President Arafat issued a second decree in which he divided the 
OPT into 16 constituencies and specified the number of seats in each one. In addition, the 
decree allocated five seats for Christians in various areas. Seven days later, in decree 
number three, Arafat appointed a Central Election Commission that included nine public 
figures and was headed by Mahmoud Abbas, the number two man in the PLO and Fatah. 
Decree number four established a Central Election Appeals Court that included five 
judges. 
336 Ibid. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, The Palestinian Council (Jerusalem: JMCC, 1998) p. 15. 
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While the elections went according to these presidential decrees, the resolutions of the 
Central Election Commission and the bylaws established by the PLO, at the same time, 
everything was done in accordance with the stipulations of the agreements signed with 
Israel. Annex two ofthe Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, signed in Washington on 28 September 1996 and entitled "Protocol 
Concerning Elections", addresses all issues concerning the elections. Included in this 
annex were the scope of responsibilities of the Central Election Commission, the right to 
vote, registration arrangements, qualification and nomination of candidates, election 
campaigns, format for canvassing information, international observation of the elections, 
and arrangements concerning the elections in Jerusalem. Annex Two was clear that: 
I) Pursuant to Article III of the Declaration of Principles and in accordance with 
the provisions of this Annex, direct, free and general elections will be held for the 
council and simultaneously for the Ra 'ees of the Executive Authority. 2) The 
holding of elections for the position of the Ra 'ees and for the Palestinian Council 
shall be governed by this Annex and the Law on the Election of the Ra 'ees and the 
Palestinian Council and the regulations made under this law. The Election Law and 
the election regulations shall be consistent with the provisions of this agreement.339 
The agreement also specified the structure of the council. It stipulated that the Palestinian 
Council, with the Ra 'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council, would constitute the 
Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority. It also stated that the Palestinian people in 
the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip would elect the council for a transitional 
period not exceeding five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on 4 May, 
1994. 
According to the agreement, territorial jurisdiction of the council encompassed the Gaza 
Strip except for Area C, which was to be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in 
three phases. Each phase was to take place after an interval of six months, with the transfer 
to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of the Council. At this time, the council 
was to cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that were to be 
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. Territorial jurisdiction of the council 
339 Israeli Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Article I, Annex II, p. I 09. 
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included land, subsoil and territorial waters, in accordance with the provisions ofthe 
agreement. 
The council was also to have legislative powers. The Interim Agreement defined 
legislation as "any primary and secondary legislation, including basic laws, laws, 
regulations and other legislative acts". 340 The primary legislative power was to lie in the 
council as a whole, but the Ra 'ees of the Executive Authority of the council would have 
specific legislative powers including the power to initiate legislation or present proposed 
legislation to the council. In addition, he also would have the power to promulgate 
legislation adopted by the council. TheRa 'ees would also be able to issue secondary 
legislation, including regulations, relating to any matter specified and lying within the 
scope established in the legislation adopted by the council. 
The legislative powers ofthe council remained limited to what Israel had acceded to in this 
agreement. Israel also ensured that the accumulated body of laws and military orders it 
created though the 30 years of occupation, in order to consolidate that occupation, should 
remain intact. Point 4a of Article XVIII in the Chapter entitled "Legislative Affairs" states: 
Legislation, including legislation which amends or abrogates existing laws or 
military orders, which exceeds the jurisdiction of the council or which is otherwise 
inconsistent with the provisions ofthe DOP, this agreement, or of any other 
agreement that may be reached between the two sides during the interim period, 
shall have no effect and shall be void ab initio.341 
The agreement also specified in detail the structure and composition of the Executive 
Authority of the Council. The agreement determined that the Ra 'ees of the council should 
be an officio member of the Executive Authority. The Executive Authority would be 
structured in the following way: 
340 Ibid. 
All ofthe other members ofthe Executive Authority, except as provided in 
subparagraph (c) below, shall be members of the Council, chosen and proposed to 
the council by the Ra 'ees of the Executive Authority and approved by the Council. 
341 Ibid., p. 21. 
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TheRa 'ees of the Executive Authority shall have the right to appoint some persons, 
in number not exceeding 20% of the total membership ofthe Executive Authority, 
who are not members ofthe Council, to exercise executive authority and participate 
in government tasks. Such appointed members may not vote on meetings of the 
Council. 
Non~elected members ofthe Executive Authority must have a valid address in an 
area under the jurisdiction of the Council.342 
The Agreement ensured special relations between Israel and the council: 
Israel and the council should seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and 
shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda against 
each other. Israel and the council will insure that their respective education system 
contribute to peace between the Israeli and the Palestinian people and peace in the 
entire region, and will refrain from the introduction of any action that could 
adversely affect the process of reconciliation.343 
The First Palestinian Elections 
Elections took place on 20 February I 996 with a heavy international media and monitoring 
presence. International observers, headed by former American president Jimmy Carter, 
reported that the elections were generally free and fair. The elections were boycotted by 
the opposition. Hamas, the strongest opposition movement and the organization 
representing Islamic fundamentalists, declared a boycott and were joined by the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP). The boycott was based on the opposition of these groups to the Oslo 
agreements that had brought about the elections. 
In the presidential elections, which took place in the same day, Chairman Arafat was the 
main candidate, in addition to an elderly women activist named Almeha Khalil. She made 
it clear that she sought simply to make the presidential election more meaningful by not 
leaving only one candidate in the race. Arafat won with comfortable majority, which 
farther consolidated his already established power and authority by giving him presidential 
statues. 
342 Ibid., p. II. 
343 Ibid. p. 12 
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Public opinion polls showed later that the position taken by opposition groups was not 
popular. In one poll, conducted after the conclusion of the elections, in answer to the 
question "Did the election results meet your expectations?", only 21% said "no"; 39.8% 
said results had matched their expectations; and 32.4% felt results had "somewhat met" 
their expectation. Only 6.9% of respondents had no opinion. 
In the same poll, only 20.4% felt that the elections had not been fair and only 21.5% were 
pessimistic about the future performance of the elected councii.344 
The timing of the election was politically significant, coming immediately after Israeli 
redeployment from the major cities and towns of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The 
Israeli army pulled out of the West Bank town of Jenin on 19 November 1995. Arafat 
immediately paid a historical visit to Jenin and delivered a 'liberation speech' that was 
received with great public enthusiasm. The same thing happened in the town ofNablus 
when Arafat declared it liberated on 15 December, 1995, in Bethlehem on 21 December, in 
Ramallah on 30 December and in Tulkarm on 31 December. 
Voter turnout in the Legislative Council elections proved to be high-70.13% in the West 
Bank and 87.18% in the Gaza Strip-making the average 75.86%. The same high levels of 
participation were witnessed in the presidential election, where the turnout was 71.6%. 
The election results represented a huge victory for Fatah, which is unsurprising. This was 
due to the following: 
I. The timing ofthe elections, coming just shortly after the Israeli withdrawals 
from all major Palestinian cities and towns, affecting a large percentage ofthe 
Palestinian population in the OPT. The withdrawals created a sense of optimism 
about the peace process and the Palestinian Authority. 
2. The elections boycott of the opposition parties. Hamas (the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement) and the two leftist opposition factions, DFLP and PFLP, 
340 JMCC, poll, n. 13, 1-2 February, 1996 
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declared a boycott of the elections on the basis of their opposition to the Israeli-
Palestinian Interim Agreement which had stipulated these elections in the first 
place. 
3. The fact that Fatah had a stranglehold on the PA structure including security, 
civilian and media positions in the period between the establishment of the 
provisional Palestinian government and the elections gave Fatah a huge advantage 
in the elections. 
4. The heavy political weight of Chairman Arafat who, as head ofFatah and a 
historical leader, had special credibility among Palestinian public, especially in the 
OPT. 
These factors are in addition to the fact that Fatah was the largest, strongest and richest 
political group in the PLO before the establishment of the PA, and was also seen as the 
leading political group in the history of the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli 
occupation. 
According to a study published by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, Fatah 
candidates won 68 of the 88 council seats, giving them a majority of 73%. The rest of the 
seats were distributed as follows: independent candidates (18%) won 16 seats. Four seats 
went to pro-Hamas independent candidates (a handful ofHamas members ran in the 
election despite their organization's decision to boycott the elections). One seat was won by 
a candidate from a small pro-Fatah party called Fida'. Finally, a PFLP candidate who also 
ran despite his faction's boycott took one seat. 
The same study revealed other significant features about the composition of the elected 
Council. A majority (64) of the elected members were either PLO officials or close to the 
PLO. On the other hand, 78 of the elected members had been extremely active in the 
resistance against the Israeli occupation: 37 had been imprisoned and deported; seven had 
been deported, 8 had served long terms of imprisonment, 12 had been administratively 
detained, and 14 had a militant past. Data provided shows that: "Council members' 
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political history was a significant factor in winning the election, unlike in Jordan, for 
example, where many ofthe parliament members were elected on a tribal basis".345 
Another significant feature was the disproportionately high number of returnees, with the 
PLO in the majority. Seven ofthe members were returning deportees, 29 PLO returnees, 
and 52 residents. What is even more significant in this regard is the fact that in 14 out of 16 
constituencies, the candidates who received the highest number of votes were returnees 
who had served as high-ranking PLO officials outside. 
A 'New' Political Elite 
A 'new' political elite was in the making. It was composed of the returning PLO/Fatah 
political 'kitchen', the monopoly elite, and the high ranking officials in the military and 
civilian structures. This elite was characterised by its political and economic dependency 
on Israel, and therefore, it was a soft negotiator with Israel. 
As noted above, the Palestinian leadership established the PA after the signing of the first 
agreement, and in parallel, started the negotiations that led to the Interim Agreement. In 
these negotiations and those that followed, Palestinians were increasingly in a 
disadvantageous position. This was first due to the fact that the agreement, as has been 
shown, further shifted the balance of power against the Palestinians, who become hostage 
to Israeli demands. Second, and also as result of the agreement, a new elite was created 
amongst the Palestinian leadership and bureaucracy, an elite with vested interests in 
specific relations with Israel that were not always in harmony with the national interests of 
the Palestinian people. 
When Israeli officials evaluate the DOP, they take these features into consideration, 
particularly the fact that the terms of the agreement kept the Palestinian side dependant on 
Israel, and created an even more dependant elite. It is interesting to note the way in which 
an Israeli government official described the DOP to the Israeli opposition: 
345 Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, The Palestinian Council, Figure 5. 
212 
We control electrical power, water resources, and telecommunications and so on. 
We control everything. There are a number of natives who serve as middlemen. 
What could suit our purposes better? If you read it, [asking the opposition to read 
Oslo agreement] you not only will accept it, you will become its enthusiastic 
supporters. The power imbalance between the Palestinians and us never served our 
interests better in the past, even before the Intifada.346 
The Palestinian delegation that was charged with the task of negotiating the Interim 
Agreement and subsequent talks was effected by the new reality wrought by the earlier 
negotiations and agreements. Specifically, four aspects of the new reality had negative 
effects for the later negotiations: I) the new Palestinian elite and its links with Israel; 2) 
dependency on Israel; 3) arrangements that left Palestinian-controlled towns and cities-
the populated areas-separated by Israeli-controlled blocs; and 4) absolute Israeli control 
over borders. 
The first point was the least visible but most effective. The agreement, together with the 
style of governance adopted by the PA, Jed to the creation of a group of individuals who 
had narrow interests that did not necessary conform to those of the nation and the public. 
Better relations with Israel better served these narrow interests, and Israel used this 
leverage on order to extract concessions from this group. Azmi Bishara was one of the first 
to tackle this sensitive issue. He wrote: 
This group of co-opted individuals-which includes also some former militants and 
prisoners-has become in a way, a clientele network, and for them the main issue is 
how to keep the peace process alive under all circumstances. In the process itself, 
privileges can become a source of pressure on them; for example after any 
'terrorist' action or during Israeli holidays a hermetic closure in the Occupied 
Territories is imposed by Israel. During this closure all permits to pass the 
checkpoints are cancelled, including those granted to the so-called YIPs. Only 
members of the exclusive status (VIP I )-new categories invented by Israel-are 
allowed to keep the permits.347 
VIP status and its related procedures and categories was first introduced in the Interim 
Agreement, detailed in Section F, Appendix 5, Article XIII from Annex I. It is a special 
status granted to "holders of most senior positions within the council and officers of the 
346 Legal Adviser to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, quoted from Ha 'aretz by Azmi Bishara in "Reflections on 
the Realities of the Oslo Process," published in After Oslo, p. 221. 
347 Ibid., pp. 220-221. 
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Palestinian police of the rank of Major General (hereinafter----category I)". There are also 
categories 2 and 3. 
The granting of VIP status is carried out through the provision of a special identity card. 
The PA must apply for these cards from the Israelis and "Upon approving VIP status, the 
CAC will issue to the person concerned a certificate confirming such status".348 
The VIP cards allow the holders special treatment both at the crossing points and in 
passing Israeli military checkpoints in the West Bank and Gaza strip. YIPs are allowed to 
enter Israel and Jerusalem, as Jerusalem is considered by Israel as annexed to Israel. The 
VIP cards are even more important because of the division (by Israeli-drawn borders 
around Jerusalem) of the West Bank into isolated northern and southern regions, which 
means that few people can travel freely throughout the area. 
Other respected Palestinian intellectuals noticed the influence of material advantages on 
the political behaviour of some PA officials. Professor Edward W. Said posed the 
following question: 
Many of Arafat's advisers are intelligent men and women. Why are they so silent? 
And why do the most gifted so willingly accept a few material advantages (a car, an 
office, a position, a VIP designation) in return for continuing to work with a man 
whose tactics they loathe and whose mistakes over the past few years they know, 
and have said openly, have brought us as Palestinians and as Arabs to one ofthe 
lowest point in our history?349 
Following the establishment ofthe PA, Israel has been in a position to exert extremely 
effective pressure on the Palestinians at almost no cost. By invalidating the VIP pass, Israel 
can prevent the meeting, and consequently the functioning, of the most vital government, 
security and non-government bodies. Members ofthe Legislative Council, of the Cabinet 
and of the higher Security Council and other security commanding committees, all whom 
are from the different Palestinian towns, villages and refugees camps, would subsequently 
not be able to travel from one controlled Palestinian area to the other in order to convene 
meetings. 
348 Interim Agreement, Section 5, Article 8, annex I. 
349 Edward W. Said, The End of the Peace Process (New York: Pantheon Books, 2000) p. 136. 
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The PA itself was also weakened politically and made dependent to a large extent-
including economically--on Israel. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip seriously weakened the Palestinian political position. It removed a 
number of conditions that previously had been sources of leverage for the Palestinian side, 
and added to the leverage ofthe Israelis. 
Prior to the agreement, political conditions were dominated by the struggle between the 
two sides. The Israelis were occupying the OPT, controlling the Palestinians in the OPT 
and exploiting the economy there. The Palestinians in tum were suffering but resisting and 
struggling in various ways. Direct resistance through armed struggle was a heavy security 
burden on Israel. Intifada-style resistance was a huge moral and security problem for the 
Israelis, and damaged Israel's international public image. 
Furthermore, being in conflict with Palestinians denied Israel any acceptance in the region, 
keeping it entirely isolated. The Arab boycott oflsrael was reason enough for many 
countries to refuse to recognise or establish political relations with Israel. 
Legally, international law and legitimacy required Israel to adhere to all the relevant 
resolutions of the United Nations. That would have included withdrawal from all ofthe 
OPT, including East Jerusalem, in addition to dismantling the settlements. Relevant UN 
resolutions also required Israel to guarantee the Palestinian refugees the right of return or 
compensation. 
After the agreement, and because of it, many aspects of this political reality changed. The 
PA was required by the agreement to play a security role, which resulting in the crushing 
of all forms of armed resistance. In addition, the agreement created a situation whereby 
there was no interaction between the Palestinian public and Israelis, whether they were 
civilians, settlers or military (the PA was the go-between). The political implication of 
such arrangements was that an Intifada-type resistance became virtually impossible. This 
was a direct result of the Israeli evacuation of Palestinian populated areas and the placing 
of those areas under Palestinian security control. 
The PLO formally recognized Israel and committed itself in the agreement to cooperation 
with Israel and to a role in facilitating regional cooperation. This opened the door for Israel 
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to end its isolation in the region. Another result was that the international image of Israel 
was transformed from an aggressive and oppressive state to a partner in a peace process. 
These examples illustrate the level of dependency on Israel created by the agreements, and 
the extent to which the PA was virtually hostage to Israeli will. These striking political, 
economic, legal and administrative realities have clearly influenced the way the PA and the 
delegations to the peace talks have negotiated with Israel in follow-up negotiations. 
One way to measure the impact is to look at some relevant aspects of the outcome of these 
negotiations. As shown below, the later agreements marked further consolidation of the 
PA 's dependency on Israel. The Interim Agreement left Israel with the upper hand in 
administrating the powers and responsibilities given to the PA. In many cases, the 
Palestinian side required Israeli approval, or Israel was otherwise in a position to object or 
veto procedures, decisions or legislation. An example of this was the arrangements for 
crossing points to Egypt and Jordan explained in detail earlier here. 
Another example from the same annex relates the responsibilities ofthe manager of the 
Palestinian wing of the crossing, who has the responsibility of hiring but only after Israeli 
approval. Section 2 point A ofthe annex says: "The assignments of the Manager ofthe 
Palestinian wing shall be the following: a. employment of Palestinian staff in the 
Palestinian wing. The list of Palestinian candidates for employment for the Palestinian 
wing shall be passed by the manager ofthe Palestinian wing director general for security 
clearance. "350 
The PA inherited a legal and administrative system and structure from the occupation. It 
also committed itself to legal and administrative constraints that were not mentioned in the 
agreement itself. The agreement created numerous joint committees to handle procedural 
and administrative aspects of Palestinian life. In addition, committees dealing with legal 
matters and disputes were also established on several levels. 
350 Ibid. 
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A typical way of restricting the responsibilities of the Palestinian side was through joint 
committees that reach decisions by consensus. Article 16, Annex Ill deals with the 
sensitive issue of government and absentee land and immovable: "Powers and 
responsibilities ofthe Custodian of Government and the Absentees Property in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip with regard to Government and Absentees Land and immovable, 
shall be transferred from the military government and its Civil Administration to the 
Palestinian side."351 The next point goes on to say: "The Palestinian side shall respect the 
legal rights of the Israelis (including corporations owned by Israelis) related to government 
and Absentee land located in the areas under in the areas under the territorial jurisdiction of 
the Council."352 
The next two points in the same article set restrictions that neutralize the previously-
transferred responsibility. 
a. The Palestinian court shall be empowered to deal with disputes regarding rights 
related to land. 
b. Notwithstanding the above, when Israeli or Palestinian consider that his or her 
rights may be affected by any enforcement, confirmation or registration 
proceedings, he or she may request, within 30 days from the receipt of information 
by the CAC in accordance with subparagraph 
c. below, that the issue be brought before a Professional Joint Committee 
established by the two side.353 
Other examples of this same problem are noted in Article 22 on land registration. The 
powers and responsibilities on land registration were transferred by the agreement to the 
PA, however, if a Palestinian or Israeli person or entity felt that his or her rights were 
affected, they could complain to the Israeli-Palestinian joint committee. The article 
confirmed that: "Pending the approval by the joint Committee, no enforcement, 
351 Ibid., p. 148. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Ibid. 
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confirmation or registration, regarding which the objection has put forward, may be carried 
out or registered in the Land Registry or in any other relevant registry". 354 
The Interim Agreement suffers from the same problem at the legislative level. The 
Palestinian Authority has legislative powers; its legislation should not contradict with the 
other articles of the agreement. Any dispute that arises over whether or not a piece of 
legislation is in contravention of the agreement will be referred to a joint legal committee 
and the disputed legislation will take effect only when this committee has reached a 
consensus decision. 
Point two of Article XVIII, Chapter 3, in the main body of the agreement states that "[t]he 
Council has the power, within its jurisdiction as defined in article XVII of this agreement, 
to adopt legislation." This power, however, is restricted in point 4.a. of the same article, 
which states the following: 
Legislation, including legislation which amends or abrogates existing laws or 
military orders, which exceeds the jurisdiction of the council or which is otherwise 
inconsistent with the provisions ofthe DOP, this agreement or of any other 
agreement that may be reached between the two sides during the interim period, 
shall have no effect and shall be void and initio.355 
Point 5 ofthe same chapter commits the PA to communicate any new legislation to Israel: 
"All legislation shall be communicated to the Israeli side ofthe Legal committee".356 In 
addition, to ensure that the PA can legislate only what Israel does not object to, the 
agreement gave Israel the possibility to review such legislation. Point 6 ofthe same chapter 
says: 
Without derogating from the provisions of paragraph 4 above, the Israeli side of the 
legal committee may refer for the attention of the committee any legislation 
regarding which Israel considers the provisions of paragraph 4 apply, in order to 
discuss issues arising from such legislation. The le~al committee will consider the 
legislation referred to it at the earliest opportunity. 57 
354 Ibid., p. 154. 
355 Ibid. 
356 1bid. 
357 Ibid., p. 20. 
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The Economic Status of the Palestinian National Authority 
Economic relations between Israel and the Palestinian side were regulated in the Protocol 
on Economic Relations. This protocol was negotiated between Israel and PLO 
representatives in France and signed in Paris on 29 April, 1994. Later this protocol became 
Annex 5 in the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
The economic protocol was perceived to be an important component of the agreement; its 
preamble stated that "[t]he two parties view the economic domain as the cornerstone in 
their mutual relations with a view to enhance their interest in the achievement of a just, 
lasting and comprehensive peace".358 
The economic agreement maintained complete Palestinian dependency on the Israeli 
economy, and did not mark any move towards economic independence. A prominent 
indicator to this would be the indirect taxes. Point 7 in article Ill stated the following: "The 
Palestinian Authority will levy Value Added Taxes at one rate on both locally produced 
goods and services and on imports by Palestinians. (Whether covered by the three lists 
mentioned above or not, it may fix it at the level of 15% to 16 %.)"359 
One ofthe most prominent critics of the Economic Protocol came from a specialized 
professional study group that was assembled by the private sector company, Management 
Consulting Services. The study was commissioned by and in cooperation with the 
President's Office. The task of the study group was to review the difficulties raises by the 
Economic Protocol two years after the start of implementation. 
The report presented to the President noted that: 
This agreement does not create a customs union between two symmetrical parties, 
because the Israeli customs policy forms the basis of the Palestinian economy. 
Israel can alter customs scales and prices unilaterally without Palestinian approval, 
and without any consideration for Palestinian interests. 
358 Interim Agreement, Annex V, p. 214. 
359 Interim Agreement, Economic Protocol, p. 218. 
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It [the agreement] is a custom union with the strong entity controlling the weak one 
and, with some exceptions, the previously-determined commodities list. The 
customs policy based on the agreement and imposed on the Palestinians and which 
were formulated according to Israeli economic priorities, are not based on 
Palestinian development needs. These needs demand special custom policy, not 
necessarily protective, but different from the Israeli priorities.360 
Another important point raised by the report referred to the gap between the agreement 
and its implementation; in addition, it noted the negative impact of Israeli measures. 
The first article reaffirmed the geographical unity ofthe Palestinian territory. The 
actual implementation of the agreement showed a clear contradiction between what 
was stated in the preamble and the first article, which created the basis of the 
agreement, and what is actually happening on the ground because of ongoing 
Israeli measures taken against the Palestinian economy. The last of these measures 
was the closure imposed in February 1996, which has lasted for more than a month, 
and the prolonged internal closure ofthe Palestinian territories between isolated 
cantons, all of which has caused the Palestinian economy losses totalling hundreds 
of millions of dollars.361 
The situation achieved by the agreement conformed with well-known Israel objectives. 
Emma C. Murphy concluded that: "In the end, the Israeli wishes prevailed. A custom 
union was established between Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. With the Israeli 
import tariff, other trade taxes, import licensing and standards have all been accepted by 
the Palestinians. "362 
The DOP served another objective Israel had always sought: the use of its new relations 
with Palestinians as a bridge to regional markets. Emma C. Murphy concluded that: 
The Declaration [DOP] further sought to link projected Palestinian economic 
development to a regional economic development program that would integrate 
Israel into network of regional trade and economic cooperation and trump the Arab 
boycott. In return for passing responsibility for welfare of the territories (which it 
360The Palestinian-Israeli Economic Agreement: A Study of Problems and Shortcomings (Ram allah: 
Management Consultancies Service, April 1996) p. 3. 
361 Ibid., p. 4. 
362 Emma C. Murphy, Israel and the Palestinians: The Economic Rewards of Peace? (Durham: University of 
Durham, March 1995) p. 14. 
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continued to occupy) to the PLO, the international donor community and the 
private sector, Israel would gain access to markets and investments long denied. 363 
The economic reality created by the agreement left the Palestinian side weaker and even 
more dependent, while delivering direct and indirect benefits to Israel. The agreement with 
the Palestinians succeeded in beginning the process of ending the Arab boycott of Israel. 
Murphy quoted an Israeli journalist as saying: 
[S]ince its the inception, [the Arab boycott against Israel] has been a relatively 
effective weapon. Official estimates put the damage caused by the boycott, mainly 
in its secondary and tertiary aspects, at some $40 billion. Even if this figure is 
inflated, the boycott was clearly effective in blocking the formation of working 
relations between Israeli and multinationals, from Europe and Asia in particular."364 
That was important to Israel and has always been an Israeli and American demand of the 
Arab states. The annual report ofthe American Trade Bureau of March 2000 reported 
American success in dismantling the Arab boycott of Israel: 
Jordan's ending of the boycott has been in effect since 16 August 2000, with the 
implementation of legislation that implemented the Jordanian-Israel peace treaty. 
Egypt ended all aspects of boycott after 1980 as result of the implementation ofthe 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. The Palestinian Authority agreed in a letter to the 
American Commerce attache in 1998, not to implement the Arab boycott. Members 
ofthe Arab GulfCooperation Council announced in September 1994, that it is no 
longer abiding by the boycott in the second degree. In 1996, both Oman and Qatar 
ended their boycott and established commercial arrangements with Israel. The list 
of the Arab countries that stopped implementing the Arab boycott includes 
Mauritania, Morocco, Tunis, which recognized Israel and established limited 
diplomatic relations. In addition, Yemen gave up practical implementation ofthe 
Arab boycott, and Algeria is only committed to the boycott in principle but not in 
practice.365 
Even when we look at the peace process in conjunction with the 'new world order' and the 
process of globalization, the Palestinian side is still the loser, particularly on the economic 
level. In one of the first studies of the political economy of the Middle East peace process, 
Murphy wrote that: 
363 Emma C Murphy, "Stacking the Deck The Economics of the lsraeli-PLO Accords", Middle East Report 
(May-June/July-August 1995) p. 36. 
364 Ibid., p. 18. 
365 AI-Ayyam newspaper, Ramallah, no 1587 vol 5 (2000). 
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There still will be winners and losers. The Palestinians still are being excluded from 
the economic development process. International aid and infrastructure building 
may repair some of the damage done by Is rae I in the nearly 30 years of occupation, 
but they do not equate with sustainable development. The current terms of the 
Israeli PA agreement still impose restrictions on such development.366 
Mohammed Shtayyeh, director-general ofthe Palestinian Economic Council for 
Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), summarized the impact oflsraeli policies 
and practices vis-a-vis the Palestinian economy following the Interim Agreement and the 
Economic Protocol. He noted: 
The Palestinian GOP declined in 1997 by 24% compared with 1993, and annual per 
capita income declined from $1800 to II 00 in West Bank and from $1400 to $7 50 
in Gaza Strip. As result Palestinian' purchasing power declined as well and many 
fell below the poverty line-some 500,000 people, 30% of the population, were 
living on less than two dollars a day. In addition, the unemployment rate increased 
to 41% in Gaza Strip, and 29% in West Bank. One of the most devastating effects 
ofthe Israeli closure policy is that it lessens investor confidence in Palestine.367 
The conclusion can clearly be drawn that the Palestinian economy, already devastated as 
result of 30 years of occupation, was not in much better position after the agreement. 
Israeli measures, the closure policy in particular, combined with the stipulations ofthe 
Economic Protocol, further weakened the Palestinian economy to a point where even 
planning for development or rehabilitation was impossible. This weakness was also 
reflected in the Palestinian economy's structural and infrastructure dependence on the 
Israeli economy, with water, electricity and telecommunications for the OPT being 
supplied by Israel. 
On the level of infrastructure, the combination of30 years of Israeli military occupation 
and the Interim Agreement left Palestinian infrastructure totally dependent on Israel. The 
agreement gave the PA powers and responsibilities related to the water supply, while 
leaving the water supply and decision of whether to dig wells reliant on Israeli approval. 
366 Emma C. Murphy, "The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Responding to the Economics of Globalization", 
Critique (Fall 1996) p. II. 
367 Mohammed Shtayyeh, The Palestinian Economy in the Transitional Period (Jerusalem: PECDAR, 1999) 
p. 18. 
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Point G, Article 40, Annex III, states: "Existing water and sewage systems shall be 
operated in coordinated manner, as set out in this Article". 
The same annex establishes a Joint Water Committee. With regard to the JWC's decision-
making and the structure, the Point 13 states: "The JWC shall be comprised of an equal 
number of representatives from each side". Point 14 of the same article states: "All 
decisions of the JWC shall be reached by consensus, including the agenda, its procedures 
and other matters". Schedule 8 ofthe same annex specifies the responsibilities and 
obligations ofthe (JWC). According to Point A of that schedule: "All licensing and drilling 
of new wells and the increase of extrication from any water sources by either side shall 
require the prior approval ofthe JWC".368 
Palestinian telecommunications are equally dependent on Israel. While the PA operates the 
local telecommunication network, connections with the outside world can only go through 
the Israeli system. An official from the Palestinian Telecommunications Company, Paltel, 
said: 
All the international calls from the Palestinian territories [made] through the 
Palestinian telecommunication system can only be transmitted through two switch-
boards, one in Ramallah and one in Gaza, and from there it goes through the Israeli 
telecommunication system. At the moment, and as result of privatizing 
telecommunication in Israel, Paltel can choose with which Israeli international 
telecommunication company to go.369 
The most severe Palestinian infrastructure dependency is in the field of electricity and 
power supply. At the start of the Israeli occupation, electricity was generated by two 
bodies, the Jerusalem Electricity Company, and some municipalities such as Nablus and 
Gaza. During the period of the occupation, however, these sources were gradually 
weakened and eventually stopped any production. The president of the Jerusalem 
Electricity Company, Mr. Husseini said in this regard: 
Both municipalities and the Jerusalem Electricity Company, which is owned by 
municipalities and Jordanian Government, used to produce I 00% of the electricity 
supply needed in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and Gaza strip. Israeli 
368 Interim Agreement, Annex Ill, Point G, Article 40. 
369 Interview with Mr. W. N, member of the board of executives of Paltel, Ram allah, March 2000. 
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policies were responsible for a gradual decline until production fell to zero. At the 
moment, 100% ofthe electricity we supply is purchased from Israel.370 
After the signing of the DOP, the international community decided to establish a financial 
mechanism that would provide the necessary support for the Palestinian people. From the 
very beginning, its aim was to provide an incentive to Palestinians 'to buy in' to the peace 
process. Its immediate objective was to help in both the reconstruction process and the 
process of building the institutions of the future state. However, with the deteriorating 
economic situation ofthe authority, the international aid began to evolve to serve other 
functions. 
This evolution was first visible as the aid began to form 'compensation' to Palestinians for 
losses resulting from Israel's reluctance to implement the agreements, and economic 
damage done by the Israeli closure policy and restrictions on the movement of persons and 
cargo. The second change was that the funding sought to 'encourage' the Palestinian 
leadership to be more forthcoming in its negotiations with Israel, and in cracking down on 
radical opposition elements. 
The United States was instrumental in this aspect. A research project on foreign aid and 
development in the OPT published in Jerusalem described how the international 
community met in Washington on I October, 1993 at a US-hosted conference to support 
the Middle East peace process. This conference concluded with the donor community 
pledging US $2,996,32 million to the Palestinians to be disbursed between 1994 and 1998. 
At the donor conference in Washington DC on 30 November, 1998, donors pledged a 
further 3.8 billion for the next five years; the US alone pledged to increase donations from 
US$500 million to US$900 million. 371 (For further details on this subject, see Rex 
Brynen's book.i72 
370 Interview with Mr. Ali Husseini, president of Jerusalem Electricity Company, Jerusalem, March 2000. 
371 The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre, Foreign Aid and Development in Palestine, 
(Jerusalem: JMCC, 1999), p. 3. 
372 Rex Brynen, A Very Political Economy: Peace Building and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
(July, 2000) 
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Increasing economic decline and growing political opposition made the PA desperate for 
donors' financial and economic aid. The United States, being the leading and most 
influential donor country and close ally oflsrael, manipulated the international aid to 
increase the dependency of, and extract more negotiation concessions from, the PA. In the 
beginning, donors insisted on proper financial audits, accountability and transparency. 
Later, however, there began to be a trade-off: these conditions were relaxed apropos to the 
delivery of more flexible negotiating positions. It is interesting to observe that international 
donor conferences were usually timed to convene after major negotiations breakthroughs. 
These developments weakened the PA position vis-a-vis Israel while at the same time 
strengthened and consolidated Arafat's patrimonial rule. 
The Council Responds 
Three main factors were responsible for the poor performance of the new co-opted, 
compromised, largely pro-Arafat Fatah leadership and its subsequently tense relationship 
with the public and the elected council. One was economic decline resulting from both 
weak agreements and harmful Israeli practices. Second was mismanagement and 
corruption, and third was Israeli unwillingness to stop consolidating the occupation even as 
it proceeded with agreements meant to implement a Palestinian statehood. 
The Fatah majority of the council meant that Arafat still wielded considerable authority 
over the council. But these elected representatives also felt accountable to their 
constituencies, a public that was likely to vote again in another election. As will be shown, 
the behaviour of the council towards the executive branch was a reflection of public 
opinion towards the executive. 
The 400-page Interim Agreement written in legalese was not easy to read and decipher. At 
the same time, the leadership (also in control ofthe media) was exaggerating its positive 
aspects. The agreement's signing was accompanied by symbolic and sometimes 
substantive achievements that created a public euphoria glossing over the agreement's 
details. 
It was only when the agreement was implemented that the public started to understand it. 
The public observed that the agreement had no clauses to stop Israel's land confiscation, 
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settlement expansion and other occupation practices. In addition, it was clear that no matter 
how 'good' the agreement was, Israel seemed not very serious about its implementation. 
Economic deterioration dragged on the public's spirits and shone a light on the new 
authority's incompetence. 
Israeli settlement policies, which are illegal and considered by Palestinians as incompatible 
with the peace process, were also observed and documented by the UN. The report ofthe 
United Nations Economic and Social Council dated 22 July 1997 concluded that: 
The building of settlements in and around Jerusalem and near the green line did not 
stop during the Governments led by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon 
Peres, despite continuous assurances that settlement activities would be frozen. 
Following his election as a prime minister in May 1996, and his establishment of a 
new government, Benjamin Netanyahu initiated a policy of building in areas where 
settlement building has been frozen, negatively affecting the peace process.373 
More precisely, Sara Roy noticed that: 
[I]n the years between the Oslo inception and its unofficial end in September 
2000 ... influx of I 00,000 new Israeli settlers into the West Bank and Gaza-which 
doubled the settler population-and the addition of at least 30 new Israeli 
settlements, and settlement related infrastructure since 1993. During that time, the 
Government oflsrael confiscated over 40,000 acres of Palestinian land-much of it 
viable agricultural land worth more than $1 billion.374 
All that led to gradual but growing doubts from the public concerning the implementation 
of the agreement, and led critics to raise their voices against the agreement and the 
authority. This took some time, however, and the lag was reflected in the Legislative 
Council, which also came rather late to raise these issues before the executive. 
The debate and the tensions between the Palestinian Legislative Council and the PA, 
particularly the executive, mirror the debate and tensions that have emerged between the 
authority and the general public. While a certain amount of debate between executive and 
legislative branches of any governing authority is healthy and even desirable, in the 
373 General Assembly, Fifty-second session, Item 12, Report ofthe Economic and Social Council 1997, 
Geneva. (Full account oflsraeli settlements expansion can be found in that report. ) 
374 Roy, Failing Peace, p. 234 
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Palestinian case the lack of political legitimate opposition form, Fatah's domination, and 
the lack of independence all help to limit the constructive nature of any debate. 
In the beginning, the council's operations were marked by relatively smooth relations with 
the Authority, largely because the council was concentrating on political issues 
surrounding relations with Israel, which were tense anyway. The council generally avoided 
controversial (domestic) issues and was supportive of the fledgling Authority. 
A typical example of the discourse ofthis period can be found amongst the early 
resolutions of the council, e.g. Resolution number (5/2/2) of the Palestinian Legislative 
Council, passed during the second session of the first term held in Ramallah 3-3 April 
1996. This resolution called on the council to: 
First: To encourage and deepen democratic dialogue between all Palestinian forces, 
of all political and ideological positions, in order to strengthen Palestinian national 
unity and to support the Palestinian Authority, the existence of which is a national 
achievement on the road to establishing a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its 
capital. Second: to call upon the Palestinian National Authority to request from the 
Israeli government that it respect the letter and the spirit of the agreement signed 
with the PL0.375 
Thus, the nature ofthe council's activities and the resolutions passed reflected the situation 
at the time. The main concerns of the general public at that time were the fact that Israel 
was not implementing the agreement, and was taking repressive measures damaging to the 
Palestinian population. The same resolution continues: 
Israel should immediately end the arrest campaigns and house raids targeted at our 
people and the deportation ofGazan students from the West Bank, given that the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank are one geopolitical unit. In addition, the PNA 
should demand Israel's commitment to establish a safe passageway between the two 
areas and end the siege and closure imfosed on the Palestinian National Authority 
territories, which separates families.37 
At a later stage, however, and as result of both the changing political reality and the 
dynamics of the democratic process and representation, relations between the council and 
375 Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, The Palestinian Council, p. 82. 
376 Ibid. 
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the authority began to change. Tense debate started to replace previously smooth relations. 
This could be explained by differences in interests, which also began to emerge along with 
the changing reality. Two main areas of tension marked the new relationship: the political 
arena and the area of governance (or the non-political performance) of the PA. 
There are several cases (e.g. the row over political prisoners) that exemplifY these two 
dimensions. The PA, after political pressure from Israel and the US government, launched 
a widespread campaign of arrests targeting alleged Islamic fundamentalists, which gave 
rise to numerous violations of human rights. This sparked strong public protests, and calls 
for the public's elected representative to act to protect human and civil rights. The result 
was heated debates in the council sessions between PLC members and members of Arafat's 
cabinet, which frequently ended in the issuance of resolutions critical of the authority. 
Council resolution 48/7 /I is a good example: 
To request that the Executive immediately release [detained] students of 
universities, colleges and secondary schools so they can sit exams which will start 
on Saturday 8 June 1996, and to similarly release all teachers and professors. 
To request from the Executive authority to release all detainees who have not been 
proven guilty. 
To request that the Executive authority bring to court those who have been found 
guilty. 
To request that the Executive authority adhere to the procedures detailed in the 
Trial Law [for arrest, investigation, and search] No.4 of 1924.377 
On the political level, Israel's measures against Palestinians, its lack of respect for the 
signed agreements, and especially its settlement expansion policy and the Palestinian 
public's protests against them all influenced positions taken by the council, which 
conflicted with policies ofthe executive. Thus, on the political level, there was increasing 
tension resulting from the clash of conflicting interests. The PA, while concerned about 
Israeli settlement expansion, was unable to take any practical measures to halt it, since this 
could have damaged the authority's relations with the US government and with Israel and 
might have interfered with the flow of funds to the PA from donor countries. 
377 Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, The Palestinian Council, p. I 0 I. 
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The difference in interests and its impact on Authority actions led the council to call for 
drastic action. In session no 58/9/1, in Ramallah, the council issued a resolution which 
included the following: "To request the Executive Authority study a proposal calling for 
freezing multilateral negotiations and linking them with the extension ofthe Israeli 
government's commitment to halting land confiscation, settlement expansion and 
construction of bypass roads".378 
Another point of tension between the authority and the council was the idea of having a 
Basic Law-equivalent to a constitution in independent countries-that would govern 
relations between the different branches of the authority (legislative, executive and 
judiciary) as well as relations between the public and the authority. Article I ofthe third 
draft of this basic law states that: "The Palestinian people are the source of all authorities 
which shall be exercised, during the transitional period, through the legislative and judicial 
authorities in the manner provided for in this Basic Law" .379 
The president ofthe PA kept stalling and making objections to specific points of the draft 
Basic Law until it was assumed that his ratification would never occur. One prominent 
Fatah Council member recalled: 
We kept arguing with Abu Ammar [Arafat] about the Basic Law until we realized 
that no matter how much time and effort we put in, the Old Man was not going to 
sign it. There are two possible explanations for this. One is that the Basic Law 
includes articles that would annoy the Israelis, who would claim that it was in 
violation ofthe Interim Agreement. The other is that this document restricts the 
President's power and would force on him a style of governance that he is not 
accustomed to.380 
One example of what could be considered a violation ofthe agreement can be found in 
Article 5 ofthe draft Basic Law, which says: 
Jerusalem shall be the capital of Palestine. During the transitional period, the PA 
may set up the government headquarters in any other place in Palestine". Another 
example is in Article 6, which says: "Sovereignty over the national resources in 
378 Ibid., p. 107. 
379 Draft Basic Law, Occasional Document Series (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, 
June I 994) p. 3. 
380 Interview with Legislative Council member Marwan Barghouti, March 2000. 
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Palestine is vested in the Palestinian people, and shall be exploited and disposed of 
in the interests ofthe Palestinian people according to Iaw.38 
The PLC became more and more critical ofthe authority, and this coincided with an 
increase in the public's criticism ofthe authority. The PLC's public standing began to slide 
because it was unable to deliver to the public. The arrest ofthe prominent journalist Daoud 
Kuttab was an illustration of the situation. Kuttab was the director of an independent 
television program responsible for the live broadcasts of PLC sessions, including heated 
debates between council members or between the council and cabinet members. Exposing 
these sessions to the public proved embarrassing to the executive and Kuttab was arrested 
by PA security forces. The PLC intervened on his behalf but failed to get him released, 
which was a public humiliation for the elected body. The council then adopted a strongly-
worded resolution in its 11th session: 
Denouncing the arrest by the one ofthe security organs of Brother Daoud Kuttab 
and affirming that he broadcasted Council sessions only after signing an official 
contract with the Council. 
To continue transmitting the sessions ofthe Council, and to form an information 
. . I h' 382 commtttee to tmp ement t ts. 
The debate over the issue of corruption and mismanagement within the PA marked the 
climax ofthe tension between the council and the Authority. The Council, after a rise in 
public anti-corruption protests, established a committee to investigate the issue and 
formulate policy recommendations. The results of opinion polls taken during this period 
reflect the level of public concern over the issue of corruption, with a vast majority of the 
public believing that there was corruption in PA. 
The committee emphasised to the Legislative Council: 
[T]he necessity of correcting the legal framework of companies which were 
established with public funds and with which Palestinian Authority officials and 
employees have been involved. The committee recommends one of the following 
methods: 1) turning them into public corporations in which both the public and 
381 The Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority 
382 Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, The Legislative Council, p. 187. 
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private sectors have a vested interest; 2) turning them from private corporations to 
legally established public sector institutions.383 
The nature and consequences of these monopolies will be thoroughly examined in the next 
chapter. 
The public started to complain against lack of accountability and transparency, in addition 
to human rights abuses, but monopolies were the mostly criticised by the public which was 
reflected in research and reports such as the following example: 
The PA has also introduced monopolies where the encouragement of competition 
would have served the public interests better. These unregulated and unaccountable 
monopolies, in the hands of few powerful figures, control major sectors of the 
economy ... there is a clear link between lack of accountability and Jack of 
development.384 
In a public opinion poll conducted by JMCC on 3-4 Aprill997, 78.8% ofPalestinians 
questioned felt there was either some corruption or large-scale corruption in the PA. That 
same poll showed that the public had a poor opinion of the performance of the Legislative 
Council. When asked to evaluate the PLC's general performance 6.9% felt it was very 
good, 46.9% good, 24.6% bad, and 7.3 very bad. In addition, 14.3% gave no answer. 
This low rating was not the result of the political role played by the PLC; the public 
seemed satisfied with the political and representative level ofthe council's performance. 
The same poll showed 73.9% of respondents feeling that the council did represent the 
political aspirations of the Palestinian people. Therefore, it is likely that the public was 
critical of the weakness in the accountability role of the council. The growing public 
criticism ofthe authority encouraged the council to take more active role, particularly 
regarding the governance role of the authority, however, that was limited by the fact of the 
Fatah majority ofthe council. 
Pursuant to Legislative Council resolution number (2-11-169), issued 27 May 1997, a 
special committee was formed of members from both the Budget & Financial Affairs 
383 Legislative Council Resolution No 1/9/57. 
384 Christian Aid, Losing ground, Israel, poverty and Palestinians, p. 49. 
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Committee and the Public Monitoring Committee. This committee was given a mandate to 
investigate the issue of corruption within the PA and submit its findings and 
recommendations to the council within three weeks. 
The committee carried out their investigation in the majority of departments of the 
authority and presented their recommendations to the PLC, highlighting illegalities and 
corruption in most departments and ministries. The committee's report also referred some 
of the cases uncovered to the general prosecutor: 
In conclusion and as a result of what has been previously stated, the committee 
recommends that the honoured Council demand: that the head of the dissolve the cabinet 
and form a new, professionally qualified cabinet; further, to prohibit the return of any 
ministers convicted of wrong-doing or who have not performed their duties well; 
moreover, to fully authorize the new cabinet to conduct immediately administrative and 
structural reforms and follow up the implementation of this report's recommendations.385 
The cabinet responded by "putting their resignations at the disposal of the President", who 
ignored the report and took no action. One year later, the PA president had a cabinet 
reshuffle in which he removed no one, but added several new members, including three 
council members who had helped draft the corruption investigatory report. 
It can be argued that the issues raised by the council are largely representative of the 
public's concerns. But the extent to which the council was able to exert pressure in its 
relations and debate with the authority did not meet public expectations. This explains the 
systematic decline in the council's public rating in public opinion polls. 
Conclusion 
The implementation of agreements with Israel allowed the PLO leadership to return to the 
OPT and to establish the first Palestinian authority on Palestinian land. These 
385 Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, The Legislative Council, p. 170. 
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developments were perceived as important achievements, however, it can be concluded 
from this chapter, that this achievement came at a heavy price. 
Poor Palestinian negotiating performance, as discussed in previous chapters, led to flawed 
agreements and problematic implementation. The interim agreement produced an authority 
that was structurally dependent on Israel. When the Authority's patrimonial style of 
governance was combined with Israeli measures, the Palestinian people under the new PA 
found themselves in deteriorating political and economic conditions. That led to the 
opening of heated debates between the public and the authority, which further weakened it, 
not only vis-a-vis its public, but in facing Israel as well. An indicative example is the 
monopolies that provided Arafat with further means of implementing patrimonial rule, but 
at the same time sparked criticism that led the elected Council to appoint a special 
committee to investigate the issue of monopolies and companies enjoying special 
privileges 
As result of its inability to face deteriorating economic conditions, the P A pursued aid 
from the international donor community, which was in turn used to blackmail and further 
weaken it in negotiations. The PA's desperation, combined with a leadership style learned 
in exile in the Arab world, led to poor governance. Corruption became evident and led to 
serious rifts between the elected council and the executive authority; nevertheless, the 
Fatah majority in the council limited the corrective role the council attempted to play. 
This chapter has demonstrated that the flaws and weaknesses ofthe PA were detrimental to 
Palestinians' subsequent negotiating performance, aggravating the imbalance of power 
between the two sides. These flaws, however, resulted at least in part from the nature of the 
agreement, which itself was the product of weak and ineffective negotiating positions. 
A vicious circle developed on the Palestinian side of the negotiating table. Poor 
performance in talks with Israel helped to produce flawed agreements that further 
weakened the Palestinian side in all respects, including their ability to negotiate with Israel. 
More flawed agreements resulted, and so the cycle continued. 
In closure, the Palestinian leadership was ultimately transformed as a result of that circle of 
failure. It became compromised, dependant on Israel, incapable of facing political and 
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economic challenges, and most important, oppressive in its response to public criticism. Its 
sty Ie in both negotiating and governing led it to lose its original reservoir of power-public 
confidence and support garnered through the years of exile and uprising-leaving it 
helpless before Israel's whims and dictates. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis sought to answer the following question: 
"To what extent did the composition and behaviour of the Palestinian leadership have an 
impact on the process and outcomes of negotiations with Israel from the Madrid 
conference to the Oslo interim agreements? 
The thesis answered this question by concluding that the change in the leadership 
composition of negotiating teams, specifically marginalization by the external leadership 
of the internal leadership (replacing previously complementary relations), led to poor 
negotiating performance and ultimately flawed agreements. These, in turn, (and bearing in 
mind a continuously hostile negotiating environment) led to still poorer performance in the 
on-going negotiations. A vicious cycle of weak performances and flawed agreements was 
established which can therefore, in part at least, be attributed to the composition and 
behaviour of the Palestinian leadership as it was represented in the negotiating teams. 
The invitation to the peace process arrived when the Palestinian leadership in exile outside 
was at its weakest, and sought to further weaken it by restricting participation in the peace 
talks to Palestinians from the OPT except East Jerusalem. The outside leadership, 
comprised of Arafat's inner circle in Tunis, had its own legitimacy, institutional and 
financial power but decided to fall back on the strong political support and loyalty of the 
leadership in the OPT by appointing a delegation from inside in order to avoid the political 
danger of exclusion and marginalization. The Palestinian delegation from inside was 
selected from individuals with popular credibility and the credentials of struggle, which 
meant that they were loyal to the inside's main source of power, the Palestinian public in 
the OPT. Thus, the relationship between the inside and outside leaderships was 
complementary: the inside needed the legitimacy and political access of the outside, and 
the outside needed the unity and representation ofthe inside. This mutual opportunism 
exposed, however, each leadership's differences in structure and priorities, which stemmed 
from their different contexts. Because its priorities and approach prevailed, the outside 
manipulated the inside delegation to encourage secret but direct talks between the PLO and 
Israel in Oslo, in parallel with the talks in Washington. The Oslo talks' lack of structure 
and terms ofreference, the absence of a third party, as well as the missing expertise ofthe 
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negotiators from the OPT (who had personal knowledge of both the Israelis and the 
terrain), led to a weak Palestinian performance. The imbalance of powers between Israel 
and the Palestinians prevailed, and resulted in an agreement that was flawed. This, 
combined with an unfavourable environment created by Israel's expansion of illegal 
settlements, the asymmetry ofpower, and the biased position ofthe US mediator, led to 
flawed implementation of the agreement. Among the unfortunate outcomes of the DOP 
was the creation of a Palestinian Authority that was structurally dependent on and 
compromised by Israel, which thereafter affected the Palestinian leadership's 
implementation of subsequent agreements. Thus, a vicious cycle was created where 
problematic structure, delegation composition, and the leadership and delegation's 
behaviour led to poor process, which in tum brought about flawed agreements, which 
influenced the Palestinian performance- and so on. 
This thesis began by surveying the extensive literature available on the Washington and 
Oslo negotiations processes. The survey reveals areas of misunderstanding and gaps in 
knowledge. This thesis sought to fi II some of these gaps and correct some wrong 
conclusions. 
The literature survey discloses scholars' serious misunderstandings about the Palestinian 
leadership, particularly the relations between its two components, inside and outside. The 
literature perceived the leadership as a bureaucratic structure existing in exile, where the 
inside was more moderate than outside, and that the relationship between these two 
components ofthe leadership was static and competitive. In contrast, however, this thesis 
concluded that the Palestinian leadership was perceived by Palestinians as a framework for 
political unity, taking the lead in their struggle and embodying their national aspirations for 
self-determination and return. The PLO incorporated the leadership inside and outside, 
whose relations were dynamic and changing but more complementary than competitive. 
The evolution of their shared political position did not result from one moderate force 
influencing another group, but rather through natural, healthy debates both inside and 
outside that produced a position advocating the two-state solution based on international 
legality. 
As Chapter One concludes, much of the literature approached the peace process 
analytically by focusing on its outcomes and blaming the actors, especially Palestinians. To 
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judge the process by its outcomes was premature and led to incorrect analyses. In addition, 
the overwhelming tendency of scholars to explain the process' outcomes, particularly 
negative results, by blaming the leaders was insufficient. Instead, this thesis showed that 
focusing on the structure of the leadership and negotiations delegation, in addition to the 
structure of the process, more sufficiently explains the outcome. The best example of this 
was the Palestinian inner circle's decision to turn to the secret Oslo channel, which had a 
structure that stripped the Palestinian side of its strengths and safeguards-namely, terms 
of reference, a third party and Palestinian public opinion-and left Palestinians to the 
mercy ofthe balance ofpower. 
To better understand the nature, structure, behaviour and internal relations of the 
Palestinian leadership during the talks, this thesis showed the evolution ofthe leadership 
through the lessons of history, including the environment in which both the inside and 
outside leaderships emerged. 
Our foremost conclusion in this regard was that at the outset of the peace process the inside 
and outside were interdependent in the sense that the inside leadership, which was subject 
to the rigors of the Israeli occupation, needed the guidance and support ofthe outside in 
order to develop and mature. In the same way, the outside needed the loyalty and 
legitimacy it received from the inside. Both sought political and organizational unity for 
strength and recognition. The leadership in the OPT and the leadership outside had a 
complementary relationship, therefore, that enabled both of them to survive the challenges 
of Palestinian participation in the peace process, and the danger of exclusion, in the eve of 
the process and its beginnings. 
The common existential challenges facing the Palestinian people everywhere unified them 
politically in demanding an end to the occupation, the establishment of an independent 
state and the return of the refugees. The challenge posed by attaining legitimacy and 
recognition, both vital for survival and success, brought together the inside and outside 
under one umbrella organization, the PLO. 
This thesis proved that the contrasting realities out of which these two leaderships were 
born, however, led them to subsequently employ different approaches and priorities. The 
inside leadership was faced with the immediate dangers ofthe Israeli occupation-
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settlement expansion in particular-and the harassment experienced by Palestinians in the 
OPT. Similarly, living in Palestinian society protected the political positions ofthe inside 
leadership, ensuring adherence to the public interest. Elections held in various institutions 
in the OPT provided accountability. The outside leadership, on the other hand, was more 
concerned with its immediate role and the challenges of achieving legitimacy and 
recognition (and later on, maintaining it), ensuring a place and status in the Arab world, as 
well as the required financial resources. These differing circumstances led to a dichotomy 
in interests, even as the inside and outside Jeaderships had the same political position and 
relied upon each other for survival. 
This dichotomy enabled the PLO to overcome the Israeli-imposed and American-enforced 
conditions for Palestinian participation in peace talks, while hoping to improve on those 
conditions during the course of the negotiations. Their complementary relationship, the 
inside's loyalty to the outside, and the outside's confidence in the inside, enabled 
Palestinians to participate in the historically-significant Madrid conference through a FLO-
appointed delegation representing the agreed-on position of the PLO. This led to growing 
Palestinian and international support for the cause. 
One of the main findings of the thesis was that during the talks, and despite political and 
organizational harmony, differences in priorities between the two components ofthe 
leadership began to emerge. Mindful ofthe need to achieve recognition of the PLO as the 
legitimate representative ofthe Palestinian people, the delegation was more concerned with 
achieving the gradual end ofthe occupation, beginning with an acknowledgment of its 
legal status and by achieving a halt to the occupation's further consolidation. The outside 
leadership, on the other hand, was primarily concerned with achieving recognition and 
financial security for itself and playing a direct role in the negotiations, alongside the other 
objectives of ending the occupation. 
More importantly, this thesis concludes that the structure of the process, and its effect on 
the behaviour of the leadership, was one of the main causes of its failure. The open-ended 
nature ofthe process, the vagueness ofthe terms of reference, restrictions on Palestinian 
representation, and the partial role of the sponsor all contributed to the weakness of the 
Palestinian leadership, and its negotiations performance. An illustration ofthis was when 
the PLO leadership, seeking to participate in the negotiations, manipulated the Washington 
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delegation to encourage Israel to bypass them and turn to secret but direct talks, thus 
paying the price of abandoning all terms of reference. 
One of the most interesting analyses ofthese structural problems was offered by Professor 
Herbert Kelman: 
The major structural limitation of the Oslo agreement, which put the new 
relationship to severe test, was the lack of explicit commitment to the two-state 
solution as the endpoint of negotiation, [because of this] both Arafat and Rabin did 
maintain reserve options as fall-back positions in the event the arrangements and 
the negotiations stipulated for the interim period did not work out as they had 
hoped. On the Israeli side, the reserve option was to resume control over 
Palestinian territories; on the Palestinian side, it was to resume armed struggle.386 
The individualistic style of leadership and the marginalizing of PLO institutions, together 
with a decline in coordination between the leadership and the delegation of the inside, 
allowed poor negotiations performance on the part of Palestinians at the new secret 
channel in Oslo. Desperate for recognition and a direct role in the talks, the PLO leadership 
(in fact, only Chairman Arafat and another four leaders) bypassed the inside leadership, 
PLO institutions and the Palestinian public. That led to negotiations that had no terms of 
reference or moderating third party, and excluded the expertise gained by the delegation to 
the Washington talks and their extensive knowledge of the OPT and Israel. 
As this thesis concludes, the immediate impact ofthis new structure was a trade-off: Arafat 
committed Palestinians to ending the Intifada (even as Israel escaped earlier Palestinian 
demands that it stop consolidating the occupation), in exchange for Israel's recognition of 
the PLO as the representative ofthe Palestinian people and the party in charge of 
implementing agreements, alongside promises that Israel would later negotiate the 
substantial issues of Jerusalem, refugees and settlements. 
This negotiating structure and behaviour led to an unprecedented decline in cooperation 
and coordination between the inside and outside leaderships and, to the beginning of the 
marginalization ofthe inside by the outside. This, in turn, negatively affected the 
386 Herbert Kelman, "The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Its Vicissitudes", American Psychologist, 
Vol. 62, No.4, 287-303 (2007) p. 292. 
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complementary relationship that was an important source of strength for both parts of the 
leadership and the Palestinian cause. Moreover, this change led the Oslo talks to focus on 
generalities and symbolic issues at the expense of the practical and substantial issues that 
were raised by the inside leadership in Washington. This, in tum, led to the end of the 
deadlock and a flawed agreement. 
This thesis also concludes that the sudden announcement of the DOP agreement, its 
positive reception by PLO institutions and the Palestinian public, and the recognition ofthe 
PLO by Israel and its return to the OPT led to an increase in the popularity of the PLO 
leadership outside and strengthened its political standing. These developments in tum 
deepened the outside leadership's structural and performance deficiencies, and enabled it 
to co-opt and marginalize the inside leadership, thereby leading to even worse 
performance. 
The return of the outside PLO leadership to the OPT in accordance with the agreement 
naturally ended the inside-outside dichotomy, which had previously played a positive role 
in Palestinian politics, including the negotiations. At the same time, this opened the door 
for the establishment of the Palestinian Authority and the creation of new elite. The 
authority and its elite were shaped largely by the restrictions of the agreement and the 
individualistic and patrimonial nature ofthe returning leadership. 
The thesis showed how the agreement encouraged structural dependency of the Palestinian 
Authority on Israel. In addition, Israel allowed PLO-initiated companies to monopolize the 
import of vital commodities from and through Israel. These monopolies, together with the 
new security elite, civilian bureaucratic elite and the top PLO returning leadership, formed 
the new leadership structure in the OPT. With this new composition, the Palestinian 
leadership/Authority was also charged with continuing the negotiations for the 
implementation of the rest of the agreement. 
The Palestinian public first came face-to-face with this historic leadership, not as a symbol 
of unity and leader of struggle, but rather as a government under severe restrictions and 
characterized by specific interests, as Chapter Two of this thesis explained, can be 
accounted for by class and other interests shared with Arab regimes. 
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The flimsy agreements and their implementation, the dependent PA and the vested 
interests of the new elite, together with the resumption oflsraeli occupation measures that 
exposed the real nature of the agreements encouraged opposition to the agreements and led 
to a gradual decline in the public position of the leadership. 
As Chapter Five illustrated, in the negotiations that followed, Israel took advantage of the 
growing weakness of the leadership, which was now more dependent on Israel and 
desperate for progress in the talks and for foreign financial aid, which was also 
manipulated to pressurize the Palestinian leadership. That enabled Israel to extract more 
concessions, and consequently produced poorer agreements. 
This thesis concluded that a cycle was thus established: poor negotiations performance led 
to flawed agreements that negatively affected the structure and performance of the 
leadership which led to an increase in violence and strengthened the opposition, reducing 
the leadership's popularity and allowing it to be further exploited in negotiations. 
Chapter Six concluded that an outcome of that cycle was that the Palestinian leadership 
became compromised, corrupt, dependent on Israel, incapable of facing challenges, and 
most important, oppressive in its response to public criticism. Its style of negotiating and 
leadership led it to lose its original reservoir of power-public confidence and support 
garnered through the years of exile and uprising-leaving it helpless before Israel's whims 
and dictates. 
As pointed out in several places in the thesis, the composition and behaviour of the 
leadership were not the only factors that impacted the outcome of the process; this thesis 
alludes to other factors whenever relevant. As showed earlier, the imbalance of power, 
Israeli practices on the ground in the OPT and the American bias towards Israel all played 
a role in determining the outcome. However, these other factors of the negotiations 
environment are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
This conclusion invites further research on these objective factors that also had impacts on 
the outcome of the process. That will complement our research and make it possible to 
assess the different weights of the different factors affecting the outcome of the peace 
process. 
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The agreement allowed the PLO leadership to reproduce in the OPT the structure of 
governance that had dominated outside. The PA was largely patrimonial in nature, 
dominated by Arafat and a handful number of Fatah leaders who controlled the economy, 
security, PA bureaucracy, and above all, negotiations with Israel. 
Now, however, as the thesis noticed above, these practices existed in a very different 
environment. After the experience of free and democratic elections, the Palestinian public 
and their elected council took positions against bad governance, corruption, and weakness 
in the face of Israeli violations of Palestinian rights. The Palestinian opposition gained in 
power, and tension grew between the public and the PA, which was thereby stripped of an 
important source of power-the public support of a people who had stood together for 
decades of steadfastness and struggle against occupation. 
Where did this take us? Israel understood the Palestinian situation and reality, and 
manipulated its weaknesses. The first Palestinian Intifada was responsible for a 
transformation in the Israeli attitude: the use of force was no longer sufficient, and political 
compromise became inevitable. But while Israel may have prepared itself for an exchange 
of land for peace, in the course of negotiations, its leaders must have realized that they 
might be able to have their cake and eat it, too-in other words, achieve peace and its 
dividends without ending the occupation. 
In parallel with the gradual Israeli co-option and neutralization ofthe Palestinian 
leadership, the Palestinian people were growing distant from their leadership, and the 
opposition was gaining ground. The ultimate outcome was that when the leadership was 
transformed, the public was not. Gradually, new expressions of its will started to emerge. 
As much as Israel might consider itself clever and victorious in the aftermath of the peace 
process, it should recognize that the strategy oftaking advantage of the weaknesses ofthe 
Palestinian leadership at the expense of the Palestinian legitimate rights has been 
responsible for the emergence ofHamas as a rising leadership. 
This has proved to be a short-sighted policy on the part oflsrael. The Palestinian people in 
the OPT have been determined in rejecting the occupation and fighting for its end. After 40 
years of occupation, this rejection appears to be as fresh as it was in 1967. The failure of 
the peace process to end the occupation, the deterioration of social and economic 
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conditions, and the poor governance ofthe PA, led to new trends in Palestinian public 
opinion. Gradually, public opinion shifted from supporting the Fatah leadership and the 
agreements it signed with Israel, to opposing it and supporting its opposition. 
The collapse of Camp David final status negotiations opened the door for a return of Israeli 
direct occupation and renewed Palestinian resistance in the form of the 'second' Intifada. 
The leadership that was attached to the failure peace process became irrelevant, and the 
opposition Hamas movement, which was achieving the public's demand for revenge 
against the atrocities of the occupation, became growingly popular and ultimately won the 
parliamentary elections of 2006. 
This conclusion invites further research into the effects of the Israeli approach to the peace 
process on the change in the attitudes of the Palestinian public, the fall of the historic 
leadership, and the rise of a new one: Hamas. 
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APPENDICES 
United Nation Security Council Resolution 242 
(1967) of22 November 1967 
The Security Council, 
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, 
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a 
just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, 
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations 
have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, 
I. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment ofajust and 
lasting peace in the Middle East which 
should include the application of both the following principles: 
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict; 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace 
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 
2. Affirms further the necessity 
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the 
area; 
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every 
State in the area, through measures including 
the establishment of demilitarized zones; 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the 
Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to 
promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in 
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the 
efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible. Adopted unanimously at the 
1382nd meeting. 
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 
(1973) 22 October 1973 
The Security Council 
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military 
activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this 
decision, in the positions they now occupy; 
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the 
implementation ofSecurity Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; 
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start 
between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and 
durable peace in the Middle East. 
Adopted at the 1747th meeting by 14 votes to none. 
1/ One member (China) did not participate in the voting. 
US Letters of Assurances on the Terms of the Peace 
Washington, October 1991 
Letters of Assurances (LOSs) were issued to each party to the Conference by the United Sates in 
mid-October 1991. 
The following are several of the main points of the US Letter of Assurance to the Palestinian Side: 
Palestinian and Israelis must respect each other's security, identity and political rights. 
We believe that the Palestinians should gain control over political, economic and other decisions 
that affect them and their fate 
The US will seek to avoid any prolongation and stalling by any party. All negotiations should 
proceed as quickly as possible toward agreement. 
The U.S. is opposed to Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and extension of Israeli law on it and 
the extension of Jerusalem's municipal boundaries. We encourage all sides to avoid unilateral acts 
that would exasperate local tensions or make negotiations more difficult or preempt their final 
outcome. 
The US supports the right of Palestinians to bring any issue including East Jerusalem to the table. 
The purpose of negotiations transitional issues is to effect the peaceful and orderly transfer of 
authority from Israel to Palestinians. Palestinians need to achieve rapid control over political, 
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economic, and other decisions that affects their lives and to adjust to a new situation in which 
Palestinians exercise authority in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Once agreed the interim self-governing arrangements will last for a period of five years. Beginning 
the third year of the period of self-governing arrangements, negotiations will take place on 
permanent status. It is the aim of the U.S. government that permanent status negotiations will be 
concluded by the end of the transitional period. 
The US believes that no party should take unilateral actions that seek to predetermine issues that 
can only be reached through negotiations. In this regard the U.S. has opposed and will continue to 
oppose settlement activity in the territories occupied in 1967 which remain an obstacle to peace. 
US-Soviet Letter of Invitation to the Peace Talks in Madrid 
The following is the full text of the invitation to the Madrid peace conference jointly issued by US 
Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pan kin to Israel, Syria, Jordan, 
Lebanon and the Palestinians. 
19 October 1991 
Your Excellency, 
On behalf of President Gorbachev and President Bush, we are very pleased to convey the attached 
invitation. After extensive consultations with Israel, Arab states, and the Palestinians, we have 
concluded that an historic opportunity exists to advance the prospects for genuine peace throughout 
the region. The United States and the Soviet Union are deeply committed to helping the parties 
realize this opportunity. 
We look forward to working with you closely in this historic endeavor, and count on your 
continuing support and active participation. 
To facilitate preparations for the conference, and ensuring negotiations, we urgently request your 
positive response as soon as possible, but no later than 6:00p.m. Washington time, 23 October. 
Sincerely, 
James A. Baker, III 
Boris Dmitriyevich Pankin 
Invitation 
After extensive consultations with Arab states, Israel, and the Palestinians, the United Nations and 
the Soviet Union believe that an historic opportunity exists to advance the prospects for genuine 
peace throughout the region. The United States and the Soviet Union are prepared to assist the 
parties to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement, through direct negotiations 
along two tracks, between Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based 
on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of this process is real 
peace. 
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Towards that end, the president of the U.S. and the president of the USSR invite you to a peace 
conference, which their countries will co-sponsor, followed immediately by direct negotiations. 
The conference will be convened in Madrid on 30 October 1991 . 
. President Bush and President Gorbachev request your acceptance of this invitation no later than 6 
P.M. Washington time, 23 October 1991, in order to ensure proper organization and preparations of 
the conference. 
Direct bilateral negotiations will begin four days after the opening of the conference. Those parties 
who wish to attend the multilateral negotiations will convene two weeks after opening of the 
conference to organize those negotiations. The co-sponsors believe that those negotiations should 
focus on region-wide issues such as arms control and regional security, water, refugee issues, 
environment, economic development, and other subjects of mutual interest. 
The co-sponsors will chair the conference which will be held at ministerial level. Governments to 
be invited include Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Palestinians will be invited and attend as part 
of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Egypt will be invited to the conference as a participant. 
The European Community will be a participant in the conference, alongside the United States and 
the Soviet Union and will be represented by its presidency. The Gulf Cooperation Council will be 
invited to send its secretary-general to the conference as an observer, and GCC member states will 
be invited to participate in organizing the negotiations on multilateral issues. The United Nations 
will be invited to send an observer, representing the secretary-general. 
The conference will have no power to impose solutions on the parties or veto agreements reached 
by them. It will have no authority to make decisions for the parties and no ability to vote on issues 
or results. The conference can reconvene only with the consent of all the parties. 
With respect to the negotiations between Israel and Palestinians who are part of the joint Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation, negotiations will be conducted in phases, beginning with talks on interim 
self-government arrangements. These talks will be conducted with the objective of reaching 
agreement within one year. Once agreed the interim self-government arrangements will last for a 
period of five years. Beginning the third year of the period of interim self-government 
arrangements, negotiations will take place on permanent status. These permanent status 
negotiations, and the negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, will take place on the basis of 
resolutions 242 and 338. 
It is understood that the co-sponsors are committed to making this process succeed. It is their 
intention to convene the conference and negotiations with those parties who agree to attend. 
The co-sponsors believe that this process offers the promise of ending decades of confrontation 
and conflict and the hope of lasting peace. Thus, the co-sponsors hope that the parties will approach 
these negotiations in the spirit of good will and mutual respect. In this way, the peace process can 
begin to break down the mutual suspicions and mistrust that perpetuate the conflict and allow the 
parties to begin to resolve their differences. Indeed, only through such a process can real peace and 
reconciliation among the Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians be achieved. And only through this 
process can the peoples of the Middle East attain the peace and security they richly deserve. 
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Declaration of Principles 
The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordan ian-Palestinian delegation 
to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian 
people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their 
mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity 
and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic 
reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the 
following principles: 
Article I 
AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, 
among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected 
Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a 
transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 
It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and 
that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338. 
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Article II 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD 
The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles. 
Article III 
ELECTIONS 
I. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves 
according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the 
Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will 
ensure public order. 
2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance 
with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine 
months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles. 
3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. 
Article IV 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that 
will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period. 
Article V 
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS 
I. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho 
area. 
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the 
beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the 
Palestinian people representatives. 
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, 
refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other 
neighbors, and other issues of common interest. 
4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be 
prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period. 
Article VI 
PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
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I. Upon the entry into force ofthis Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza 
Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil 
Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This 
transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council. 
2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from 
the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: 
education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will 
commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the 
Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as 
agreed upon. 
Article VII 
INTERIM AGREEMENT 
1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the 
"Interim Agreement"). 
2. The Interim Agreement shall specifY, among other things, the structure of the Council, the 
number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military 
government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specifY 
the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the 
independent Palestinian judicial organs. 
3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of 
the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred 
previously in accordance with Article VI above. 
4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council 
will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a 
Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental 
Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any 
other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specifY their 
powers and responsibilities. 
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli 
military government will be withdrawn. 
Article VIII 
PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY 
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry 
the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall 
security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order. 
Article IX 
LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS 
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I. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within 
all authorities transferred to it. 
2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres. 
Article X 
JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE 
In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any 
subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this 
Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order 
to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes. 
Article XI 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS 
Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the 
Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force ofthis Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-
Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and 
implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex lli 
and Annex IV. 
Article XII 
LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT 
The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing 
further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian 
representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to 
promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a 
Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons 
displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in I967, together with necessary measures to prevent 
disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee. 
Article XIII 
REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES 
I. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections 
for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will 
take place, in addition to withdrawal oflsraeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV. 
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces 
should be redeployed outside populated areas. 
3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with 
the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police 
force pursuant to Article VIII above. 
Article XIV 
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ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA 
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as 
Annex II. 
Article XV 
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES 
I. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any 
subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through 
the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above. 
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of 
conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties. 
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which 
cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties 
will establish an Arbitration Committee. 
Article XVI 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL PROGRAMS 
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a 
"Marshall Plan," the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV. 
Article XVII 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
I. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing. 
2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto 
shall be regarded as an integral part hereof. 
DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993. 
For the Government of Israel: (SHIMON PERES) 
For the P.L.O.: (MAHMOUD ABBAS) 
Witnessed By: The United States of America: (WARREN CHRISTOPHER) 
The Russian Federation: (ANDREI KOZYREV) 
ANNEX/ 
PROTOCOL ON THE MODE AND CONDITIONS OF ELECTIONS 
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1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, 
according to an agreement between the two sides. 
2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues: 
a. the system of elections; 
b. the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal 
composition; and 
c. rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the 
organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station. 
3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be 
prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons. 
ANNEX I/ 
PROTOCOL ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND 
JERICHO AREA 
I. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this 
Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza 
Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the 
Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal. 
2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the 
Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza 
Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the 
signing of this agreement. 
3. The above agreement will include, among other things: 
a. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military 
government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives. 
b. Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except: 
external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters. 
c. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian 
police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding 
Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will 
participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police 
and police officers. 
d. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon. 
e. Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for 
mutual security purposes. 
f. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an 
Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. 
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Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and 
international parties to support these aims. 
g. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip 
and Jericho area. 
4. The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding 
passages: 
a. Gaza-Egypt; and 
b. Jericho-jordan. 
5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian 
authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the 
Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council. 
6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue 
to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim 
period. 
ANNEX I// 
PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic 
Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following: 
I. Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by experts 
from both sides, which will also specifY the mode of cooperation in the management of water 
resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on 
water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for 
implementation in and beyond the interim period. 
2. Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will 
also specifY the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of 
electricity resources. 
3. Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which will 
provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and 
in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This Program 
may also provide for the construction of a Petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and 
the construction of oil and gas pipelines. 
4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for 
the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, 
as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank. 
5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Program, which will 
define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for the 
establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
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to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Program will provide for carrying out the necessary 
construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc. 
6. Cooperation in the field oftrade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, which will 
encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free 
trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other 
areas related to trade and commerce. 
7. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will 
provide for the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian Industrial Research and Development 
Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in 
the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries. 
8. A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare 
issues. 
9. A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian 
workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research 
institutes and data banks. 
I 0. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this 
sphere. 
II. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and 
media. 
12. Any other programs of mutual interest. 
ANNEX IV 
PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 
I. The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a 
Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated 
by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other 
interested states, such as members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as we]] as members of the private sector. 
2. The Development Program will consist of two elements: 
a. an Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
b. a Regional Economic Development Program. 
A. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
will consist of the following elements: 
(I) A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and 
Construction Program. 
(2) A Small and Medium Business Development Plan. 
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{3) An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, 
transportation and communications, etc.). 
(4) A Human Resources Plan. 
(5) Other programs. 
B. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following 
elements: 
{I) The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, 
and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step. 
{2) The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for 
coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area. 
(3) The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza)Dead Sea Canal. 
(4) Regional Desalinization and other water development projects. 
(5) A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated 
regional effort for the prevention of desertification. 
( 6) Interconnection of electricity grids. 
(7) Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial 
exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources. 
{8) A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications 
Development Plan. 
(9) Regional cooperation in other spheres. 
3. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate towards their 
success. The two parties will encourage intersessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and 
feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups. 
AGREED MINUTES TO THE DEC LARA T/ON OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-
GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS 
A. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS 
Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of 
Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining 
to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below. 
B. SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS 
Article IV 
It is understood that: 
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I. Jurisdiction ofthe Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that 
will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, 
and Israelis. 
2. The Councils jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres 
and authorities transferred to it. 
Article VI(2) 
It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows: 
I. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorised Palestinians who 
will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians 
according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, 
social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon. 
2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected. 
3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in 
accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide 
for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct 
taxation office. 
4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will 
immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above 
offices in accordance with the above understandings. 
Article VII(2) 
The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation. 
Article Vll(5) 
The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and 
responsibilities not transferred to the Council. 
Article VIII 
It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and 
coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and 
responsibilities to the 
Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement. 
Article X 
It is agreed that, upon the entry into force ofthe Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and 
Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members 
of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee. It is further agreed that each side will have an 
equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by 
agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint 
Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings. 
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ANNEX II 
It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for 
external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli 
military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho 
area. 
DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993. 
For the Government of Israel: (SHIMON PERES) 
For the P.L.O.: (MAHMOUD ABBAS) 
Witnessed By: The United States of America: (WARREN CHRISTOPHER) 
The Russian Federation: (ANDREI KOZYREY) 
Exchanged letters 
September 9, 1993 
Mr. Prime Minister, 
The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East. In 
firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the following PLO commitments: 
The PLO recognizes the right of the State oflsrael to exist in peace and security. 
The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 
The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues reiating to permanent status 
will be resolved through negotiations. 
The PLO considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic event, 
inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, tree from violence and all other acts which 
endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts 
of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure 
their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators. 
In view ofthe promise of a new era and the signing ofthe Declaration of Principles and based on 
Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the PLO affirms that those 
articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the 
Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no 
longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for 
formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant. 
Sincerely, 
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Yasser Arafat 
Chairman 
The Palestine Liberation Organization 
Yitzhak Rabin 
Prime Minister of Israel 
Mr. Chairman, 
September 9, 1993 
In response to your letter of September 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that, in light ofthe PLO 
commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as 
the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the 
Middle East peace process. 
Sincerely, 
Yitzhak Rabin 
Prime Minister of Israel 
September I 0, 1993 
Yasser Arafat 
Chairman 
The Palestine Liberation Organization 
September 9, 1993 
Dear Minister Holst, 
I would like to confirm to you that, upon the signing of the Declaration of Principles, I will include 
the following positions in my public statements: 
In light of the new era marked by the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the PLO encourages 
and calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in the steps 
leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and 
stability and participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and 
cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
Yasser Arafat 
Chairman 
The Palestine Liberation Organization 
His Excellency 
Johan Jorgen Holst 
Foreign Minister of Norway 
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Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area 
May 4, 1994 
The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter "the 
PLO"), the representative of the Palestinian people; 
PREAMBLE 
WITHIN the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated at Madrid in October 1991; 
REAFFIRMING their determination to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security, 
while recognizing their mutual legitimate and political rights; 
REAFFIRMING their desire to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement through 
the agreed political process; 
REAFFIRMING their adherence to the mutual recognition and commitments expressed in the 
letters dated September 9, 1993 , signed by and exchanged between the Prime Minister oflsrael 
and the Chairman of the PLO; 
REAFFIRMING their understanding that the interim self-government arrangements, including the 
arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area contained in this Agreement, are an 
integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead 
to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; 
DESIROUS of putting into effect the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements signed at Washington, D.C. on September 13, 1993, and the Agreed Minutes thereto 
(hereinafter "the Declaration of Principles"), and in particular the Protocol on withdrawal oflsraeli 
forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area; 
HEREBY AGREE to the following arrangements regarding the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area: 
ARTICLE I 
DEFINITIONS 
For the purpose of this Agreement: 
a. the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area are delineated on map No. I and Article IX below 
(hereinafter "the Palestinian Police"). 
b. In order to cany out Israel's responsibility for external security and for internal security and 
public order of Settlements and Israelis, Israel shall, concurrently with the withdrawal, 
redeploy its remaining military forces to the Settlements and the Military Installation Area, 
in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Subject to the provisions of this 
Agreement, this redeployment shall constitute full implementation of Article XIII of the 
Declaration of Principles with regard to the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area only. 
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c. For the purposes of this Agreement, "Israeli military forces" may include Israel police and 
other Israeli security forces. 
d. Israelis, including Israeli military forces, may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza 
Strip and the Jericho Area. Palestinians may use public roads crossing the Settlements 
freely, as provided for in Annex I. 
e. The Palestinian Police shall be deployed and shall assume responsibility for public order 
and internal security of Palestinians in accordance with this Agreement and Annex I. 
ARTICLE lli 
TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY 
1. Israel shall transfer authority as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli military 
government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian Authority, hereby established, 
in accordance with Article V of this Agreement, except for the authority that Israel shall 
continue to exercise as specified in this Agreement. 
2. As regards the transfer and assumption of authority in civil spheres, powers and 
responsibilities shall be transferred and assumed as set out in the Protocol Concerning Civil 
Affairs attached as Annex II. 
3. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of the agreed powers and responsibilities 
are set out in Annex II. 
4. Upon the completion of the Israeli withdrawal and the transfer of powers and 
responsibilities as detailed in paragraphs I and 2 above and in Annex II, the Civil 
Administration in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area will be dissolved and the Israeli 
military government will be withdrawn. The withdrawal of the military government shall 
not prevent it from continuing to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified in this 
Agreement. 
5. A Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee (hereinafter "the CAC") 
and two Joint Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees for the Gaza Strip and the Jericho 
Area respectively shall be established in order to provide for coordination and cooperation 
in civil affairs between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, as detailed in Annex II. 
6. The offices of the Palestinian Authority shall be located in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho 
Area pending the inauguration of the Council to be elected pursuant to the Declaration of 
Principles. 
ARTICLE IV 
STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY 
1. The Palestinian Authority will consist of one body of24 members which shall carry out 
and be responsible for all the legislative and executive powers and responsibilities 
transferred to it under this Agreement, in accordance with this Article, and shall be 
responsible for the exercise of judicial functions in accordance with Article VI, 
subparagraph I.b. ofthis Agreement. 
2. The Palestinian Authority shall administer the departments transferred to it and may 
establish, within its jurisdiction, other departments and subordinate administrative units as 
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necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities. It shall determine its own internal 
procedures. 
3. The PLO shall inform the Government of Israel of the names of the members of the 
Palestinian Authority and any change of members. Changes in the membership ofthe 
Palestinian Authority will take effect upon an exchange of letters between the PLO and the 
Government of Israel. 
4. Each member of the Palestinian Authority shall enter into office upon undertaking to act in 
accordance with this Agreement. 
ARTICLE V 
JURISDICTION 
l. The authority of the Palestinian Authority encompasses all matters that fall within its 
territorial, functional and personal jurisdiction, as follows: 
a. The territorial jurisdiction covers the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area territory, as 
defined in Article I, except for Settlements and the Military Installation Area. 
Territorial jurisdiction shall include land, subsoil and territorial waters, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
b. The functional jurisdiction encompasses all powers and responsibilities as 
specified in this Agreement. This jurisdiction does not include foreign relations, 
internal security and public order of Settlements and the Military Installation Area 
and Israelis, and external security. 
c. The personal jurisdiction extends to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction 
referred to above, except for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement. 
2. The Palestinian Authority has, within its authority, legislative, executive and judicial 
powers and responsibilities, as provided for in this Agreement. 
3. 
a. Israel has authority over the Settlements, the Military Installation Area, Israelis, 
external security, internal security and public order of Settlements, the Military 
Installation Area and Israelis, and those agreed powers and responsibilities 
specified in this Agreement. 
b. Israel shall exercise its authority through its military government, which, for that 
end, shall continue to have the necessary legislative, judicial and executive powers 
and responsibilities, in accordance with international law. This provision shall not 
derogate from Israel's applicable legislation over Israelis in personam. 
4. The exercise of authority with regard to the electromagnetic sphere and airspace shall be in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. 
5. The provisions of this Article are subject to the specific legal arrangements detailed in the 
Protocol Concerning Legal Matters attached as Annex III . Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority may negotiate further legal arrangements. 
6. Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall cooperate on matters of legal assistance in 
criminal and civil matters through the legal subcommittee of the CAC. 
ARTICLE VI 
POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY 
278 
I. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Palestinian Authority, within its 
jurisdiction: 
2. 
a. has legislative powers as set out in Article VII of this Agreement, as well as 
executive powers; 
b. will administer justice through an independent judiciary; 
c. will have, inter alia, power to formulate policies, supervise their implementation, 
employ staff, establish departments, authorities and institutions, sue and be sued 
and conclude contracts; and 
d. will have, inter alia, the power to keep and administer registers and records of the 
population, and issue certificates, licenses and documents. 
a. In accordance with the Declaration of Principles, the Palestinian Authority will not 
have powers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign relations, which sphere 
includes the establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other types of 
foreign missions and posts or permitting their establishment in the Gaza Strip or 
the Jericho Area, the appointment of or admission of diplomatic and consular staff, 
and the exercise of diplomatic functions. 
b. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, the PLO may conduct 
negotiations and sign agreements with states or international organizations for the 
benefit of the Palestinian Authority in the following cases only: 
1. economic agreements, as specifically provided in Annex IV of this 
Agreement; 
2. agreements with donor countries for the purpose of implementing 
arrangements for the provision of assistance to the Palestinian Authority; 
3. agreements for the purpose of implementing the regional development 
plans detailed in Annex IV of the Declaration of Principles or in 
agreements entered into in the framework of the multilateral negotiations; 
and 
4. cultural, scientific and educational agreements. 
c. Dealings between the Palestinian Authority and representatives of foreign states 
and international organizations, as well as the establishment in the Gaza Strip and 
the Jericho Area of representative offices other than those described in 
subparagraph 2.a. above, for the purpose of implementing the agreements referred 
to in subparagraph 2.b. above, shall not be considered foreign relations. 
ARTICLE VII 
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY 
I. The Palestinian Authority will have the power, within its jurisdiction, to promulgate 
legislation, including basic laws, laws, regulations and other legislative acts. 
2. Legislation promulgated by the Palestinian Authority shall be consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
3. Legislation promulgated by the Palestinian Authority shall be communicated to a 
legislation subcommittee to be established by the CAC (hereinafter "the Legislation 
Subcommittee"). During a period of30 days from the communication ofthe legislation, 
Israel may request that the Legislation Subcommittee decide whether such legislation 
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exceeds the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority or is otherwise inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
4. Upon receipt of the Israeli request, the Legislation Subcommittee shall decide, as an initial 
matter, on the entry into force of the legislation pending its decision on the merits of the 
matter. 
5. If the Legislation Subcommittee is unable to reach a decision with regard to the entry into 
force ofthe legislation within 15 days, this issue will be referred to a board of review. This 
board of review shall be comprised of two judges, retired judges or senior jurists 
(hereinafter "Judges"), one from each side, to be appointed from a compiled list of three 
Judges proposed by each. 
In order to expedite the proceedings before this board of review, the two most senior Judges, one 
from each side, shall develop written informal rules of procedure. 
6. Legislation referred to the board of review shall enter into force only if the board of review 
decides that it does not deal with a security issue which falls under Israel's responsibility, 
that it does not seriously threaten other significant Israeli interests protected by this 
Agreement and that the entry into force of the legislation could not cause irreparable 
damage or harm. 
7. The Legislation Subcommittee shall attempt to reach a decision on the merits of the matter 
within 30 days from the date of the Israeli request. If this Subcommittee is unable to reach 
such a decision within this period of 30 days, the matter shall be referred to the Joint 
Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee referred to in Article XV below (hereinafter "the 
Liaison Committee"). This Liaison Committee will deal with the matter immediately and 
will attempt to settle it within 30 days. 
8. Where the legislation has not entered into force pursuant to paragraphs 5 or 7 above, this 
situation shall be maintained pending the decision of the Liaison Committee on the merits 
of the matter, unless it has decided otherwise. 
9. Laws and military orders in effect in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area prior to the signing 
of this Agreement shall remain in force, unless amended or abrogated in accordance with 
this Agreement. 
ARTICLE VIII 
ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER 
I. In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the Gaza 
Strip and the Jericho Area, the Palestinian Authority shall establish a strong police force, as 
set out in Article IX below. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for defense 
against external threats, including the responsibility for protecting the Egyptian border and 
the Jordanian line, and for defense against external threats from the sea and from the air, as 
well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis and Settlements, for the purpose of 
safeguarding their internal security and public order, and will have all the powers to take 
the steps necessary to meet this responsibility. 
2. Agreed security arrangements and coordination mechanisms are specified in Annex I . 
3. A joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes (hereinafter 
"the JSC"), as well as three joint District Coordination and Cooperation Offices for the 
280 
Gaza district, the Khan Yunis district and the Jericho district respectively (hereinafter "the 
DCOs") are hereby established as provided for in Annex I. 
4. The security arrangements provided for in this Agreement and in Annex I may be reviewed 
at the request of either Party and may be amended by mutual agreement of the Parties. 
Specific review arrangements are included in Annex I. 
ARTICLE IX 
THE PALESTINIAN DIRECTORATE OF POLICE FORCE 
I. The Palestinian Authority shall establish a strong police force, the Palestinian Directorate 
of Police Force (hereinafter "the Palestinian Police"). The duties, functions, structure, 
deployment and composition of the Palestinian Police, together with provisions regarding 
its equipment and operation, are set out in Annex I, Article III. Rules of conduct governing 
the activities of the Palestinian Police are set out in Annex I, Article VIII. 
2. Except for the Palestinian Police referred to in this Article and the Israeli military forces, 
no other armed forces shall be established or operate in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area. 
3. Except for the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Palestinian Police described in 
Annex I, Article III, and those of the Israeli military forces, no organization or individual in 
the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area shall manufacture, sell, acquire, possess, import or 
otherwise introduce into the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area any firearms, ammunition, 
weapons, explosives, gunpowder or any related equipment, unless otherwise provided for 
in Annex I. 
ARTICLE X 
PASSAGES 
Arrangements for coordination between Israel and the Palestinian Authority regarding the Gaza-
Egypt and Jericho-Jordan passages, as well as any other agreed international crossings, are set out 
in Annex I, Article X. 
ARTICLE XI 
SAFE PASSAGE BETWEEN THE GAZA STRIP AND THE JERICHO AREA 
Arrangements for safe passage of persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and the 
Jericho Area are set out in Annex I, Article IX. 
ARTICLE XII 
RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY 
I. Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance 
and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each 
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other and, without derogating from the principle of freedom of expression, shall take legal 
measures to prevent such incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within 
their jurisdiction. 
2. Without derogating from the other provisions of this Agreement, Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority shall cooperate in combatting criminal activity which may affect both sides, 
including offenses related to trafficking in illegal drugs and psychotropic substances, 
smuggling, and offenses against property, including offenses related to vehicles. 
ARTICLE XIII 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
The economic relations between the two sides are set out in the Protocol on Economic Relations 
signed in Paris on April 29, 1994 and the Appendices thereto, certified copies of which are attached 
as Annex IV, and will be governed by the relevant provisions of this Agreement and its Annexes. 
ARTICLE XIV 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this 
Agreement with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and 
the rule of law. 
ARTICLE XV 
THE JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE 
I. The Liaison Committee established pursuant to Article X of the Declaration of Principles 
shall ensure the smooth implementation of this Agreement. It shall deal with issues 
requiring coordination, other issues of common interest and disputes. 
2. The Liaison Committee shall be composed of an equal number of members from each 
Party. It may add other technicians and experts as necessary. 
3. The Liaison Committee shall adopt its rules of procedure, including the frequency and 
place or places of its meetings. 
4. The Liaison Committee shall reach its decisions by Agreement. 
ARTICLE XVI 
LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT 
I. Pursuant to Article XII of the Declaration of Principles, the two Parties shall invite the 
Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and 
cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian 
representatives on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other 
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hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements shall include the 
constitution of a Continuing Committee. 
2. The Continuing Committee shall decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of 
persons displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary 
measures to prevent disruption and disorder. 
3. The Continuing Committee shall deal with other matters of common concern. 
ARTICLE XVII 
SETTLEMENT OF DIFFERENCES AND DISPUTES 
Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred to the appropriate 
coordination and cooperation mechanism established under this Agreement. The provisions of 
Article XV of the Declaration of Principles shall apply to any such difference which is not settled 
through the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism, namely: 
I. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Agreement or any 
subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period shall be settled by negotiations 
through the Liaison Committee. 
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be settled by a mechanism of 
conciliation to be agreed between the Parties. 
3. The Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which 
cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both Parties, the 
Parties will establish an Arbitration Committee. 
ARTICLE XVHI 
PREVENTION OF HOSTILE ACTS 
Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and 
hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other's authority and 
against their property, and shall take legal measures against offenders. In addition, the Palestinian 
side shall take all measures necessary to prevent such hostile acts directed against the Settlements, 
the infrastructure serving them and the Military Installation Area, and the Israeli side shall take all 
measures necessary to prevent such hostile acts emanating from the Settlements and directed 
against Palestinians. 
ARTICLE XIX 
MISSING PERSONS 
The Palestinian Authority shall cooperate with Israel by providing all necessary assistance in the 
conduct of searches by Israel within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area for missing Israelis, as 
well as by providing information about missing Israelis. Israel shall cooperate with the Palestinian 
Authority in searching for, and providing necessary information about, missing Palestinians. 
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ARTICLE XX 
CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES 
With a view to creating a positive and supportive public atmosphere to accompany the 
implementation of this Agreement, and to establish a solid basis of mutual trust and good faith, 
both Parties agree to carry out confidence building measures as detailed herewith: 
I. Upon the signing of this Agreement, Israel will release, or tum over, to the Palestinian 
Authority within a period of 5 weeks, about 5,000 Palestinian detainees and prisoners, 
residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Those released will be free to return to their 
homes anywhere in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. Prisoners turned over to the 
Palestinian Authority shall be obliged to remain in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area for 
the remainder of their sentence. 
2. After the signing of this Agreement, the two Parties shall continue to negotiate the release 
of additional Palestinian prisoners and detainees, building on agreed principles. 
3. The implementation of the above measures will be subject to the fulfillment of the 
procedures determined by Israeli law for the release and transfer of detainees and prisoners. 
4. With the assumption of Palestinian authority, the Palestinian side commits itself to solving 
the problem of those Palestinians who were in contact with the Israeli authorities. Until an 
agreed solution is found, the Palestinian side undertakes not to prosecute these Palestinians 
or to harm them in any way. 
5. Palestinians from abroad whose entry into the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area is approved 
pursuant to this Agreement, and to whom the provisions of this Article are applicable, will 
not be prosecuted for offenses committed prior to September 13, 1993. 
ARTICLE XXI 
TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE 
I. The Parties agree to a temporary international or foreign presence in the Gaza Strip and the 
Jericho Area (hereinafter "the TIP"), in accordance with the provisions of this Article. 
2. The TIP shall consist of 400 qualified personnel, including observers, instructors and other 
experts, from 5 or 6 of the donor countries. 
3. The two Parties shall request the donor countries to establish a special fund to provide 
finance for the TIP. 
4. The TIP will function for a period of 6 months. The TIP may extend this period, or change 
the scope of its operation, with the agreement of the two Parties. 
5. The TIP shall be stationed and operate within the following cities and villages: Gaza, Khan 
Yunis, Rafah, Deir El Ballah, Jabaliya, Absan, Beit Hanun and Jericho. 
6. Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall agree on a special Protocol to implement this 
Article, with the goal of concluding negotiations with the donor countries contributing 
personnel within two months. 
ARTICLE XXII 
RIGHTS, LIABILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS 
I. 
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a. The transfer of all powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority, as 
detailed in Annex II, includes all related rights, liabilities and obligations arising 
with regard to acts or omissions which occurred prior to the transfer. Israel will 
cease to bear any financial responsibility regarding such acts or omissions and the 
Palestinian Authority will bear all financial responsibility for these and for its own 
functioning. 
b. Any financial claim made in this regard against Israel will be referred to the 
Palestinian Authority. 
c. Israel shall provide the Palestinian Authority with the information it has regarding 
pending and anticipated claims brought before any court or tribunal against Israel 
in this regard. 
d. Where legal proceedings are brought in respect of such a claim, Israel will notify 
the Palestinian Authority and enable it to participate in defending the claim and 
raise any arguments on its behalf. 
e. In the event that an award is made against Israel by any court or tribunal in respect 
of such a claim, the Palestinian Authority shall reimburse Israel the full amount of 
the award. 
f. Without prejudice to the above, where a court or tribunal hearing such a claim 
finds that liability rests solely with an employee or agent who acted beyond the 
scope of the powers assigned to him or her, unlawfully or with willful 
malfeasance, the Palestinian Authority shall not bear financial responsibility. 
2. The transfer of authority in itself shall not affect rights, liabilities and obligations of any 
person or legal entity, in existence at the date of signing of this Agreement. 
ARTICLE XXIII 
FINAL CLAUSES 
I. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signing. 
2. The arrangements established by this Agreement shall remain in force until and to the 
extent superseded by the Interim Agreement referred to in the Declaration of Principles or 
any other agreement between the Parties. 
3. The five-year interim period referred to in the Declaration of Principles commences on the 
date of the signing of this Agreement. 
4. The Parties agree that, as long as this Agreement is in force, the security fence erected by 
Israel around the Gaza Strip shall remain in place and that the line demarcated by the 
fence, as shown on attached map No. I, shall be authoritative only for the purpose of this 
Agreement. 
5. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or preempt the outcome of the negotiations on 
the interim agreement or on the permanent status to be conducted pursuant to the 
Declaration of Principles. Neither Party shall be deemed, by virtue of having entered into 
this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, claims or positions. 
6. The two Parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the 
integrity of which will be preserved during the interim period. 
7. The Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area shall continue to be an integral part of the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip, and their status shall not be changed for the period of this Agreement. 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be considered to change this status. 
8. The Preamble to this Agreement, and all Annexes, Appendices and maps attached hereto, 
shall constitute an integral part hereof. 
285 
Done in Cairo this fourth day of May, 1994. 
For the Government of the 
State of Israel 
For the PLO 
Witnessed By: 
The United States of America 
The Russian Federation 
The Arab Republic of Egypt 
Protocol on Economic Relations 
ANNEX IV 
Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government ofthe State of Israel and the 
P.L.O., representing the Palestinian people 
Paris, April 29, 1994 
PREAMBLE 
The two parties view the economic domain as one of the cornerstone in their mutual 
relations with a view to enhance their interest in the achievement of a just, lasting and 
comprehensive peace. Both parties shall cooperate in this field in order to establish a sound 
economic base for these relations, which will be governed in various economic spheres by 
the principles of mutual respect of each other's economic interests, reciprocity, equity and 
fairness. 
This protocol lays the groundwork for strengthening the economic base of the Palestinian 
side and for exercising its right of economic decision making in accordance with its own 
development plan and priorities. The two parties recognise each other's economic ties with 
other markets and the need to create a better economic environment for their peoples and 
individuals. 
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Article I 
FRAMEWORK AND SCOPE OF THIS PROTOCOL 
1. This protocol establishes the contractual agreement that will govern the economic 
relations between the two sides and will cover the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
during the interim period. The implementation will be according to the stages 
envisaged in the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self Government 
Arrangements signed in Washington D.C. on September 13, 1993 and the Agreed 
Minutes thereto. It will therefore begin in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area and 
at a later stage will also apply to the rest of the West Bank, according to the 
provisions of the Interim Agreement and to any other agreed arrangements between 
the two sides. 
2. This Protocol, including its Appendixes, will be incorporated into the Agreement 
on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (in this Protocol -the Agreement), will be 
an integral part thereof and interpreted accordingly. This paragraph refers solely to 
the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. 
3. This Protocol will come into force upon the signing of the Agreement. 
4. For the purpose of this Protocol, the term "Areas" means the areas under the 
jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority, according to the provisions ofthe 
Agreement regarding territorial jurisdiction. The Palestinian Jurisdiction in the 
subsequent agreements could cover areas, spheres or functions according to the 
Interim Agreement. Therefore, for the purpose of this Protocol, whenever applied, 
the term "Areas" shall be interpreted to mean functions and spheres also, as the case 
may be, with the necessary adjustments. 
Article II 
THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE 
I. Both parties will establish a Palestinian-Israeli Joint Economic Committee 
(hereinafter- the JEC) to follow up the implementation of this Protocol and to 
decide on problems related to it that may arise from time to time. Each side may 
request the review of any issue related to this Agreement by the JEC. 
2. The JEC will serve as the continuing committee for economic cooperation 
envisaged in Annex III of the Declaration of Principles. 
3. The JEC will consist of an equal number of members from each side and may 
establish sub-committees specified in this Protocol. 
A sub-committee may include experts as necessary. 
4. The JEC and its sub-committees shall reach their decisions by agreement and shall 
determine their rules of procedure and operation, including the frequency and place 
or places of their meetings. 
Article III 
IMPORT TAXES AND IMPORT POLICY 
I. The import and customs policies of both sides will be according to the principles 
and arrangements detailed in this Article. 
2. 
a. The Palestinian Authority will have all powers and responsibilities in the 
sphere of import and customs policy and procedures with regard to the 
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following: 
I. Goods on List AI, attached hereto as Appendix I locally-produced 
in Jordan and in Egypt particularly and in the other Arab countries, 
which the Palestinians will be able to import in quantities agreed 
upon by the two sides up to the Palestinian market needs as 
estimated according to para 3 below. 
2. Goods on List A2, attached hereto as Appendix II, from the Arab, 
Islamic and other countries, which the Palestinians will be able to 
import in quantities agreed upon by the two sides up to the 
Palestinian market needs as estimated according to para 3 below. 
b. The import policy of the Palestinian Authority for Lists AI and A2 will 
include independently determining and changing from time to time the 
rates of customs, purchase tax, levies, excises and other charges, the 
regulation of licensing requirements and procedures and of standard 
requirements. The valuation for custom purposes will be based upon the 
GATT 1994 agreement as ofthe date it will be introduced in Israel, and 
until then- on the Brussels Definition of Valuation (BOY) system. The 
classification of goods will be based on the principles of "the Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System". Concerning imports referred 
to in Article VII of this Protocol (Agriculture), the provisions of that 
Article will apply. 
3. For the purposes of para 2(a) above, the Palestinian market needs for 1994 will be 
estimated by a sub-committee of experts. These estimates will be based on the best 
available data regarding past consumption, production, investment and external 
trade of the Areas. The sub-committee will submit its estimate within three months 
from the signing of the Agreement. These estimates will be reviewed and updated 
every six months by the sub-committee, on the basis of the best data available 
regarding the latest period for which relevant data are available, taking into 
consideration all relevant economic and social indicators. Pending an agreement on 
the Palestinian market needs, the previous period's estimates adjusted for 
population growth and rise in per-capita GNP in the previous period, will serve as 
provisional estimate. 
4. The Palestinian Authority will have all powers and responsibilities to independently 
determine and change from time to time the rates of customs, purchase taxes; 
levies, excises and other charges on the goods on List B, attached hereto as 
Appendix III, of basic food items and other goods for the Palestinian economic 
development program, imported by the Palestinians to the Areas. 
5. 
a. With respect to all goods not specified in Lists AI, A2 and B, and with 
respect to quantities exceeding those determined in accordance with paras 
2(a) & 3 above (hereinafter- the Quantities), the Israeli rates of customs, 
purchase tax, levies, excises and other charges, prevailing at the date of 
signing of the Agreement, as changed from time to time, shall serve as the 
minimum basis for the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority 
may decide on any upward changes in the rates on these goods and 
exceeding quantities when imported by the Palestinians to the Areas. 
b. With respect to all goods not specified in Lists A I and A2, and with respect 
to quantities exceeding the Quantities, Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
will employ for all imports the same system of importation, as stipulated in 
para 10 below, including inter alia standards, licensing, country of origin, 
valuation for customs purposes etc. 
6. Each side will notifY the other side immediately of changes made in rates and in 
other matters of import policy, regulations and procedures, determined by it within 
its respective powers and responsibilities as detailed in this Article. With regard to 
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changes which do not require immediate application upon decision, there will be a 
process of advance notifications and mutual consultations which will take into 
consideration all aspects and economic implications. 
7. The Palestinian Authority will levy VAT at one rate on both locally produced 
goods and services and on imports by the Palestinians (whether covered by the 
three Lists mentioned above or not), and may fix it at the level of 15% to 16%. 
8. Goods imported from Jordan, Egypt and other Arab countries according to para 
2(a)(l) above (List AI) will comply with rules of origin agreed upon by a joint sub-
committee within three months of the date of the signing of the Agreement. 
Pending an agreement, goods will be considered to have been "locally produced" in 
any of those countries if they conform with all the following: 
a. They have been wholly grown, produced, or manufactured in that country, 
or have been substantially transformed there into new or different goods, 
having a new name, character, or use, distinct from the goods or materials 
from which they were so transformed; 
b. They have been imported directly from the said country; 
c. The value or the costs of the materials produced in that country, plus the 
direct processing costs in it, do not fall short of30 percent of the export 
value of the goods. This rate may be reviewed by the joint committee 
mentioned in para 16 a year after the signing of the Agreement. 
d. The goods are accompanied by an internationally recognized certificate of 
origin; 
e. No goods will be deemed as substantially new or different goods, and no 
material will be eligible for inclusion as domestic content, by virtue of 
having merely undergone simple combining or packaging, or dilution with 
water or other substances, which do not materially alter the characteristics 
of the said goods. 
9. Each side will issue import licences to its own importers, subject to the principles 
of this Article and will be responsible for the implementation of the licensing 
requirements and procedures prevailing at the time of the issuance of the licenses. 
Mutual arrangements will be made for the exchange of information relevant to 
licensing matters. 
I 0. Except for the goods on Lists AI and A2 and their Quantities- in which the 
Palestinian Authority has all powers and responsibilities, both sides will maintain 
the same import policy (except for rates of import taxes and other charges for goods 
in List B) and regulations including classification, valuation and other customs 
procedures, which are based on the principles governing international codes, and 
the same policies of import licensing and of standards for imported goods, all as 
applied by Israel with respect to its importation. Israel may from time to time 
introduce changes in any of the above, provided that changes in standard 
requirements will not constitute a non-tariff-barrier and will be based on 
considerations of health, safety and the protection of the environment in conformity 
with Article 2.2. of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to trade of the Final Act 
of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations. Israel will give the Palestinian 
Authority prior notice of any such changes, and the provisions of para 6 above will 
apply. 
II. 
a. The Palestinian Authority will determine its own rates of customs and 
purchase tax on motor vehicles imported as such, to be registered with the 
Palestinian Authority. The vehicle standards will be those applied at the 
date of the signing of the Agreement as changed according to para 10 
above. However, the Palestinian Authority may request, through the sub-
committee on transportation, that in special cases different standards will 
apply. Used motor vehicles will be imported only if they are passenger cars 
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12. 
or dual-purpose passenger cars of a model of no more than three years prior 
to the importation year. The sub-committee on transportation will 
determine the procedures for testing and confirming that such used cars 
comply with the standards' requirements for that model year. The issue of 
importing commercial vehicles of a model prior to the importation year 
will be discussed in the joint sub-committee mentioned in para 16 below. 
b. Each side may determine the terms and conditions for the transfer of motor 
vehicles registered in the other side to the ownership or use of a resident of 
its own side, including the payment of the difference of import taxes, if 
any, and the vehicle having been tested and found compatible with the 
standards required at that time by its own registration administration, and 
may prohibit transfer of vehicles. 
a. Jordanian standards, as specified in the attached Appendix I, will be 
acceptable in importing petroleum products into the Areas, once they meet 
the average of the standards existing in the European Union countries, or 
the USA standards, which parameters have been set at the values 
prescribed for the geographical conditions of Israel, the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank. Cases of petroleum products which do not meet these 
specifications will be referred to a joint experts' committee for a suitable 
solution. The committee may mutually decide to accept different standards 
for the importation of gasoline which meet the Jordanian standards even 
though, in some of their parameters, they do not meet the European 
Community or USA standards. The committee will give its decision within 
six months. Pending the committee's decision, and for not longer than six 
months of the signing of the Agreement, the Palestinian Authority may 
import to the Areas, gasoline for the Palestinian market in the Areas, 
according to the needs of this market, provided that: 
I. this gasoline is marked in a distinctive colour to 
differentiate it from the gasoline marketed in Israel; and 
2. the Palestinian Authority will take all the necessary steps 
to ensure that this gasoline is not marketed in Israel. 
b. The difference in the final price of gasoline to consumers in Israel and to 
consumers in the Areas, will not exceed 15% of the official final consumer 
price in Israel. The Palestinian Authority has the right to determine the 
prices of petroleum products, other than gasoline, for consumption in the 
Areas. 
c. If Egyptian gasoline standards will comply with the conditions of sub-para 
(a) above, the importation of Egyptian gasoline will also be allowed. 
13. In addition to the points of exit and entry designated according to the Article 
regarding Passages in Annex I of the Agreement for the purpose of export and 
import of goods, the Palestinian side has the right to use all points of exit and entry 
in Israel designated for that purpose. The import and export of the Palestinians 
through the points of exit and entry in Israel will be given equal trade and economic 
treatment. 
14. In the entry points of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip: 
a. Freight shipment 
The Palestinian Authority will have full responsibility and powers in the 
Palestinian customs points (freight-area) for the implementation of the 
agreed upon customs and importation policy as specified in this protocol, 
including the inspection and the collection of taxes and other charges, when 
due. 
Israeli customs officials will be present and will receive from the 
Palestinian customs officials a copy of the necessary relevant documents 
290 
related to the specific shipment and will be entitled to ask for inspection in 
their presence of both goods and tax collection. 
The Palestinian customs officials will be responsible for the handling of the 
customs procedure including the inspection and collection of due taxes. 
In case of disagreement on the clearance of any shipment according to this 
Article, the shipment will be delayed for inspection for a maximum period 
of 48 hours during which a joint sub-committee will resolve the issue on 
the basis of the relevant provisions ofthis Article. The shipment will be 
released only upon the sub-committee's decision. 
b. Passengers customs lane 
Each side will administer its own passengers customs procedures, including inspection and 
tax collection. The inspection and collection of taxes due in the Palestinian customs lane 
will be conducted by customs officials of the Palestinian Authority. 
Israeli customs officials will be invisibly present in the Palestinian customs lane and 
entitled to request inspection of goods and collection of taxes when due. In the case of 
suspicion, the inspection will be carried out by the Palestinian official in a separate room in 
the presence of the Israeli customs official. 
15. The clearance ofrevenues from all import taxes and levies, between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority, will be based on the principle of the place of final 
destination. In addition, these tax revenues will be allocated to the Palestinian 
Authority even if the importation was carried out by Israeli importers when the 
final destination explicitly stated in the import documentation is a corporation 
registered by the Palestinian Authority and conducting business activity in the 
Areas. This revenue clearance will be effected within six working days from the 
day of collection of the said taxes and levies. 
16. The Joint Economic Committee or a sub-committee established by it for the 
purposes of this Article will deal inter alia with the following: 
1. Palestinian proposals for addition of items to Lists AI, A2 and 8. Proposals for 
changes in rates and in import procedures, classification, standards and licensing 
requirements for all other imports; 
2. Estimate the Palestinian market needs, as mentioned in para 3 above; 
3. Receive notifications of changes and conduct consultations, as mentioned in para 6 
above; 
4. Agree upon the rules of origin as mentioned in para 8 above, and review their 
implementation; 
5. Coordinate the exchange of information relevant to licensing matters as mentioned 
in para 9 above; 
6. Discuss and review any other matters concerning the implementation of this Article 
and resolve problems arising therefrom. 
17. The Palestinian Authority will have the right to exempt the Palestinian returnees 
who will be granted permanent residency in the Areas from import taxes on 
personal belongings including house appliances and passenger cars as long as they 
are for personal use. 
18. The Palestinian Authority will develop its system for temporary entry of needed 
machines and vehicles used for the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian 
economic development plan. 
Concerning other machines and equipment, not included in Lists AI, A2 and 8, the 
temporary entry will be part of the import policy as agreed in para 10 above, until 
the joint sub-committee mentioned in para 16 decides upon a new system proposed 
by the Palestinian Authority. The temporary entry will be coordinated through the 
joint sub-committee. 
19. Donations in kind to the Palestinian Authority will be exempted from customs and 
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other import taxes if destined and used for defined development projects or non-
commercial humanitarian purposes. The Palestinian Authority will be responsible 
exclusively for planning and management of the donors' assistance to the 
Palestinian people. The Joint Economic Committee will discuss issues pertaining to 
the relations between the provisions in this Article and the implementation of the 
principles in the above paragraph. 
Article IV 
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL ISSUES 
I. The Palestinian Authority will establish a Monetary Authority (PMA) in the Areas. 
The PMA will have the powers and responsibilities for the regulation and 
implementation of the monetary policies within the functions described in this 
Article. 
2. The PMA will act as the Palestinian Authority's official economic and financial 
advisor. 
3. The PMA will act as the Palestinian Authority's and the public sector entities' sole 
financial agent, locally and internationally. 
4. The foreign currency reserves (including gold) of the Palestinian Authority and all 
Palestinian public sector entities will be deposited solely with the PMA and 
managed by it. 
5. The PMA will act as the lender of last resort for the banking system in the Areas. 
6. The PMA will authorize foreign exchange dealers in the Areas and will exercise 
control (regulation and supervision) over foreign exchange transactions within the 
Areas and with the rest of the world. 
7. 
a. The PMA will have a banking supervision department that will be 
responsible for the proper functioning, stability, solvency and liquidity of 
the banks operating in the Areas. 
b. The banking supervision department will predicate its supervision on the 
international principles and standards reflected in international conventions 
and especially on the principles of the "Basle Committee". 
c. The supervision department will be charged with the general supervision of 
every such bank, including: 
• The regulation of all kinds of banking activities, including their 
foreign activities; 
• The licensing ofbanks formed locally and of branches, 
subsidiaries, joint ventures and representative offices of foreign 
banks and the approval of controlling shareholders; 
• The supervision and inspection of banks. 
8. The PMA will relicense each ofthe five branches of the Israeli banks operating at 
present in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as soon as its location or the 
authorities regarding it come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. 
These branches will be required to comply with the general rules and regulations of 
the PMA concerning foreign banks, based on the "Basle Concordat". Para 10 d, e, 
and f below will apply to these branches. 
a. Any other Israeli bank wishing to open a branch or a subsidiary in the Areas 
will apply for a license to the PMA and will be treated equally to other foreign 
banks, provided that the same will apply to the Palestinian banks wishing to 
open a branch or a subsidiary in Israel. 
b. Granting of a license by both authorities will be subject to the following 
arrangements based on the "Basle Concordat" valid on the date of signing of 
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9. 
10. 
the Agreement and to the host authority's prevailing general rules and 
regulations concerning opening ofbranches and subsidiaries of foreign banks. 
In this para I 0 "host authority" and "home authority" apply only to the Bank of 
Israel (BOI) and the PMA. 
c. A bank wishing to open a branch or establish a subsidiary will apply to the host 
authority, having first obtained the approval of its home authority. The host 
authority will notifY the home authority of the terms of the license, and will 
give its final approval unless the home authority objects. 
d. The home authority will be responsible for the consolidated and comprehensive 
supervision of banks, inclusive of branches and subsidiaries in the area under 
the jurisdiction of the host authority. However, the distribution of supervision 
responsibilities between the home and the host authorities concerning 
subsidiaries will be according to the "Basle Concordat". 
e. The host authority will regularly examine the activities of branches and 
subsidiaries in the area under its jurisdiction. The home authority will have the 
right to conduct on site examinations in the branches and subsidiaries in the 
host area. However, the supervision responsibilities of the home authority 
concerning subsidiaries will be according to the "Basle Concordat". 
Accordingly, each authority will transfer to the other authority copies of its 
examination reports and any information relevant to the solvency, stability and 
soundness of the banks, their branches and subsidiaries. 
f. The BOI and the PMA will establish a mechanism for cooperation and for the 
exchange of information on issues of mutual interest. 
a. The New Israeli Sheqel (NIS) will be one of the circulating currencies in the 
Areas and will legally serve there as means of payment for all purposes 
including official transactions. Any circulating currency, including the NIS, 
will be accepted by the Palestinian Authority and by all its institutions, local 
authorities and banks, when offered as a means of payment for any transaction. 
b. Both sides will continue to discuss, through the JEC, the possibility of 
introducing mutually agreed Palestinian currency or temporary alternative 
currency arrangements for the Palestinian Authority. 
a. The liquidity requirements on all deposits in banks operating in the Areas will be 
determined and announced by the PMA. 
b. Banks in the Areas will accept NIS deposits. The liquidity requirements on the 
various kinds ofNIS deposits (or deposit linked to the NIS) in banks operating in 
the Areas will not be less than 4% to 8%, according to the type of deposits. 
Changes of over 1% in the liquidity requirements on NIS deposits (or deposits 
linked to the NIS) in Israel will call for corresponding changes in the above 
mentioned rates. 
c. The supervision and inspection of the implementation of all liquidity requirements 
will be carried out by the PMA. 
d. The reserves and the liquid assets required according to this paragraph will be 
deposited at the PMA according to rules and regulations determined by it. Penalties 
for non compliance with the liquidity requirements will be determined by the PMA. 
II. The PMA will regulate and administer a discount window system and the supply of 
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temporary finance for banks operating in the Areas. 
a. The PMA will establish or license a clearing house in order to clear money orders 
between the banks operating in the Areas, and with other clearing houses. 
b. The clearing of money orders and transactions between banks operating in the 
Areas and banks operating in Israel will be done between the Israeli and the 
Palestinian clearing houses on same working day basis, according to agreed 
arrangements. 
12. Both sides will allow correspondential relations between each others' banks. 
13. The PMA will have the right to convert at the 801 excess NIS received from banks 
operating in the Areas into foreign currency, in which the 801 trades in the 
domestic inter-bank market, up to the amounts determined per period, according to 
the arrangements detailed in para 16 below. 
a. The excess amount ofNIS, due to balance of payments flows, that the PMA will 
have the right to convert into foreign currency, will be equal to: 
plus 
1. Estimates of all Israeli "imports" of goods and services from the Areas, 
valued at market prices (inclusive of taxes), which were paid for inNIS, 
less: 
i. the taxes collected by the Palestinian Authority on all Israeli 
"imports" from the Areas and rebated to Israel inNIS, and 
ii. the taxes collected by Israel on all Israeli "imports" from the Areas 
and included in their market value, and not rebated to the 
Palestinian Authority,minus 
2. Estimates of all Israeli "exports" of goods and services to the Areas, valued 
at market prices (inclusive of taxes), which were paid for inNIS, less 
1. the taxes collected by Israel on such "exports" and rebated to the 
Palestinian Authority, and 
ii. the taxes collected by the Palestinian Authority on such "exports" 
and included in their market value, and not rebated to Israel; 
3. The accumulated net amounts of foreign currency converted previously 
into NIS by the PMA, as recorded in the 801 Dealing Room. 
b. The said flows and amounts will be calculated as of the date of the signing of the 
Agreement. 
Notes to para 16: 
i. The estimates of the said "exports and imports" of goods and services will include 
inter alia labor services, NJS expenditure of tourists and Israelis in the Areas and 
NIS expenditure of Palestinians ofthe Areas in Israel. 
ii. Taxes and pension contributions on "imports" of labor services, paid to "importing" 
side and rebated to the "exporting" one, will not be included in the estimates of the 
sums to be converted, as the "exports"' earnings of labor services are recorded in 
the statistics inclusive of them, although they do not accrue to the individuals 
supplying them. 
14. The PMA and the 801 will meet annually to discuss and determine the annual 
amount of convertible NIS during the following calendar year and will meet semi-
annually to adjust the said amount. The amounts determined annually and adjusted 
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semi-annually will be based on data and estimates regarding the past and on 
forecasts for the wi following period, according to the formula mentioned in para 
16. The first meeting will be as soon as possible within three months after the date 
ofthe signing of the Agreement. 
a. D The exchange of foreign currency for NIS and vice-versa by the PMA will be 
carried out through the BOI Dealing Room, at the market exchange rates. 
b. The BOI will not be obliged to convert in any single month more than 1/5 of the 
semi-annual amount, as mentioned in para 17. 
c. There will be no ceiling on the annual foreign currency conversions by the PMA 
into NIS. However, in order to avoid undesirable fluctuations in the foreign 
exchange market, monthly ceilings of such conversions will be agreed upon in the 
annual and semi-annual meetings referred to in para 17. 
d. Banks in the Areas will convert NIS into other circulating currencies and vice-
versa. 
e. The Palestinian Authority will have the authorities, powers and responsibilities 
regarding the regulation and supervision of capital activities in the Areas, including 
the licensing of capital market institutions, finance companies and investment 
funds. 
Article V 
DIRECT TAXATION 
I. Israel and the Palestinian Authority will each determine and regulate independently 
its own tax policy in matters of direct taxation, including income tax on individuals 
and corporations, property taxes, municipal taxes and fees. 
2. Each tax administration will have the right to levy the direct taxes generated by 
economic activities within its area. 
3. Each tax administration may impose additional taxes on residents within its area on 
(individuals and corporations) who conduct economic activities in the other side's 
area. 
4. Israel will transfer to the Palestinian Authority a sum equal to: 
a. 75% of the income taxes collected from Palestinians from the Gaza Strip 
and the Jericho Area employed in Israel. 
b. The full amount of income taxes collected from Palestinians from the Gaza 
Strip and Jericho Area employed in the settlements. 
5. The two sides will agree on a set of procedures that will address all issues 
concerning double taxation. 
Article VI 
INDIRECT TAXES ON LOCAL PRODUCTION 
I. The Israel and the Palestinian tax administrations will levy and collect VAT and 
purchase taxes on local production, as well as any other indirect taxes, in their 
respective areas. 
2. The purchase tax rates within the jurisdiction of each tax administration will be 
identical as regards locally produced and imported goods. 
3. The present Israeli VAT rate is 17%. The Palestinian VAT rate will be 15% to 
16%. 
4. The Palestinian Authority will decide on the maximum annual turnover for 
businesses under its jurisdiction to be exempt from VAT, within an upper lim it of 
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12,000 us$. 
5. The VAT on purchases by businesses registered for VAT purposes will accrue to 
the tax administration with which the respective business is registered. 
Businesses will register for VAT purposes with the tax administration of the side of 
their residence, or on the side of their ongoing operation. 
There will be clearance of VAT revenues between the Israeli and Palestinian VAT 
administrations on the following conditions: 
a. The VAT clearance will apply to VAT on transactions between businesses 
registered with the VAT administration of the side in which they reside. 
b. The following procedures will apply to clearance of VAT revenues 
accruing from transactions by businesses registered for VAT purposes: 
I. To be acceptable for clearance purposes, special invoices, clearly 
marked for this purpose, will be used for transactions between 
businesses registered with the different sides. 
2. The invoices will be worded either in both Hebrew and Arabic or 
in English and will be filled out in any of these three languages, 
provided that the figures are written in "Arabic" (not Hindi) 
numerals. 
3. For the purpose of tax rebates, such invoices will be valid for six 
months from their date of issue. 
4. Representatives of the two sides will meet once a month, on the 
20th day of the month, to present each other with a list of invoices 
submitted to them for tax rebate, for VAT clearance. This list will 
include the following details regarding each invoice: 
a. The number of the registered business issuing it; 
b. The name of the registered business issuing it; 
c. The number of the invoice; 
d. The date of issue; 
e. The amount of the invoice; 
f. The name of the recipient of the invoice. 
5. The clearance claims will be settled within 6 days from the 
meeting, through a payment by the side with the net balance of 
claims against it, to the other side. 
6. Each side will provide the other side, upon demand, with invoices 
for verification purposes. Each tax administration will be 
responsible for providing invoices for verification purposes for 6 
months after receiving them. 
7. Each side will take the necessary measure to verity the authenticity 
of the invoices presented to it for clearance by the other side. 
8. Claims for VAT clearance which will not be found valid will be 
deducted from the next clearance payment. 
9. Once an inter-connected computer system for tax rebates to 
businesses and for VAT clearance between the two sides is 
operational, it will replace the clearance procedures specified in 
sub-paras (4)- (8). 
10. The two tax administrations will exchange lists ofthe businesses 
registered with them and will provide each other with the necessary 
documentation, if required, for the verification of transactions. 
II. The two sides will establish a sub-committee which will deal with 
the implementation arrangements regarding the clearance of VAT 
revenues set above. 
6. VAT paid by not-for-profit Palestinian organizations and institutions, registered by 
the Palestinian Authority, on transactions in Israel, will accrue to the Palestinian tax 
administration. The clearance system set out in para 5 will apply to these 
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organizations and institutions. 
Article VII 
LABOR 
I. Both sides will attempt to maintain the normality of movement of labor between 
them, subject to each side's right to determine from time to time the extent and 
conditions of the labor movement into its area. If the normal movement is 
suspended temporarily by either side, it will give the other side immediate 
notification, and the other side may request that the matter be discussed in the Joint 
Economic Committee. 
2. 
3. 
The placement and employment ofworkers from one side in the area of the other 
side will be through the employment service of the other side and in accordance 
with the other sides' legislation. The Palestinian side has the right to regulate the 
employment of Palestinian labor in Israel through the Palestinian employment 
service, and the Israeli Employment Service will cooperate and coordinate in this 
regard. 
a. Palestinians employed in Israel will be insured in the Israeli social 
insurance system according to the National Insurance Law for employment 
injuries that occur in Israel, bankruptcy of employers and maternity leave 
allowance. 
b. The National Insurance fees deducted from the wages for maternity 
insurance will be reduced according to the reduced scope of maternity 
insurance, and the equalization deductions transferred to the Palestinian 
Authority, if levied, will be increased accordingly. 
c. Implementation procedures relating thereto will be agreed upon between 
the Israeli National Insurance Institute and the Palestinian Authority or the 
appropriate Palestinian social insurance institution. 
a. Israel will transfer to the Palestinian Authority, on a monthly basis, the 
equalization deductions as defined by Israeli legislation, if imposed and to 
the extent levied by Israel. The sums so transferred will be used for social 
benefits and health services, decided upon by the Palestinian Authority, for 
Palestinians employed in Israel and for their families. 
The equalization deductions to be so transferred will be those collected 
after the date of the signing of the Agreement from wages of Palestinians 
employed in Israel and from their employers. 
These sums will not include 
I. Payments for health services in places of employment. 
2. 2/3 of the actual administrative costs in handling the matters 
related to the Palestinians employed in Israel by the Payments 
Section of the Israeli Employment Service. 
4. Israel will transfer, on a monthly basis, to a relevant pension insurance institution to 
be established by the Palestinian Authority, pension insurance deductions collected 
after the establishment of the above institution and the completion of the documents 
mentioned in para 6. 
These deductions will be collected from wages of Palestinians employed in Israel 
and their employers, according to the relevant rates set out in the applicable Israeli 
collective agreements. 2/3 of the actual administrative costs in handling these 
deductions by the Israeli Employment Service will be deducted from the sums 
transferred. The sums so transferred will be used for providing pension insurance 
for these workers. Israel will continue to be liable for pension rights of the 
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Palestinian employees in Israel, to the extent accumulated by Israel before the entry 
into force of this para 4. 
5. Upon the receipt of the deductions, the Palestinian Authority and its relevant social 
institutions will assume full responsibility in accordance with the Palestinian 
legislation and arrangements, for pension rights and other social benefits of 
Palestinians employed in Israel, that accrue from the transferred deductions related 
to these rights and benefits. Consequently, Israel and its relevant social institutions 
and the Israeli employers will be released from, and will not be held liable for any 
obligations and responsibilities concerning personal claims, rights and benefits 
arising from these transferred deductions, or from the provisions of paras 2-4 
above. 
6. Prior to the said transfers, the Palestinian Authority or its relevant institutions, as 
the case may be, will provide Israel with the documents required to give legal effect 
to their aforesaid obligations, including mutually agreed implementation 
procedures of the principles agreed upon in paras 3-5 above. 
7. The above arrangements concerning equalization deductions and/or pension 
deductions may be reviewed and changed by Israel if an authorized court in Israel 
will determine that the deductions or any part thereof must be paid to individuals, 
or used for individual social benefits or insurance in Israel, or that it is otherwise 
unlawful. In such a case the liability of the Palestinian side will not exceed the 
actual transferred deductions related to the case. 
8. Israel will respect any agreement reached between the Palestinian Authority, or an 
organization or trade-union representing the Palestinians employed in Israel, and a 
representative organization of employees or employers in Israel, concerning 
contributions to such organization according to any collective agreement. 
9. 
a. The Palestinian Authority may integrate the existing health insurance 
scheme for Palestinians employed in Israel and their families in its health 
insurance services. As long as this scheme continues, whether integrated or 
separately, Israel will deduct from their wages the health insurance fees 
("health stamp") and will transfer them to the Palestinian Authority for this 
purpose. 
b. The Palestinian Authority may integrate the existing health insurance 
scheme for Palestinians who were employed in Israel and are receiving 
pension payments through the Israeli Employment Service, in its health 
insurance services. As long as this scheme continues, whether integrated or 
separately, Israel will deduct the necessary sum of health insurance fees 
("health stamp") from the equalization payments and will transfer them to 
the Palestinian Authority for this purpose. 
I 0. The JEC will meet upon the request of either side and review the implementation of 
this Article and other issues concerning labor, social insurance and social rights. 
II. Other deductions not mentioned above, if any, will be jointly reviewed by the JEC. 
Any agreement between the two sides concerning these deductions will be in 
addition to the above provisions. 
12. Palestinians employed in Israel will have the right to bring disputes arising out of 
employee- employer relationships and other issues before the Israeli Labor Courts, 
within these courts' jurisdiction. 
13. This Article governs the future labor relations between the two sides and will not 
impair any labor rights prior to the date of signing of the Agreement. 
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Article VIII 
AGRICULTURE 
I. There will be free movement of agricultural produce, free of customs and import 
taxes, between the two sides, subject to the following exceptions and arrangements. 
2. The official veterinary and plant protection services of each side will be 
responsible, within the limits of their respective jurisdiction, for controlling animal 
health, animal products and biological products, and plants and parts thereof, as 
well as their importation and exportation. 
3. The relations between the official veterinary and plant protection services of both 
sides will be based on mutuality in accordance with the following principles, which 
will be applied in all the areas under their respective jurisdiction: 
a. Israel and the Palestinian Authority will do their utmost to preserve and 
improve the veterinary standards. 
b. Israel and the Palestinian Authority will take all measures to reach 
equivalent and compatible standards regarding animal disease control, 
including mass vaccination of animals and avians, quarantines, "stamping 
out" measures and residue control standards. 
c. Mutual arrangements will be made to prevent the introduction and spread 
of plant pests and diseases, for their eradication and concerning residue 
control standards in plant products. 
d. The official veterinary and plant protection services of Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority will coordinate and regularly exchange information 
regarding animal diseases, as well as plant pests and diseases, and will 
establish a mechanism for immediate notification of the outbreak of such 
diseases. 
4. Trade between the two sides in animals, animal products and biological products 
will be in keeping with the principles and definitions set out in the current edition 
of the OlE National Animal Health Code as updated from time to time (hereinafter 
- I.A.H.C.). 
5. Transit of livestock, animal products and biological products from one side through 
the area under the jurisdiction of the other side, should be conducted in a manner 
aimed at the prevention of diseases spreading to or from the consignment during its 
movement. For such a transit to be permitted, it is a prerequisite that the veterinary 
conditions agreed upon by both sides will be met in regard to importation of 
animals, their products and biological products from external markets. Therefore 
the parties agree to the following arrangements. 
6. The official veterinary services of each side have the authority to issue veterinary 
import permits for import of animals, animal products and biological products to 
the areas under its jurisdiction. In order to prevent the introduction of animal 
diseases from third parties, the following procedures will be adopted: 
a. The import permits will strictly follow the professional veterinary 
conditions for similar imports to Israel as prevailing at the time of their 
issuance. The permits will specifY the country of origin and the required 
conditions to be included in the official veterinary certificates which should 
be issued by the veterinary authorities in the countries of origin and which 
should accompany each consignment. 
Each side may propose a change in these conditions. The change will come 
into force I 0 days after notice to the other side, unless the other side 
requested that the matter be brought before the Veterinary Sub-Committee 
specified in para 14 (hereinafter - VSC). If it is more stringent than the 
prevailing conditions- it will come into force 20 days after the request, 
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unless both sides decide otherwise through the VSC, and if more lenient- it 
will come into force only if agreed upon by both sides through the VSC. 
However, if the change is urgent and needed for the protection of animal 
and public health, it will come into force immediately after notice by the 
other side and will remain in force unless and until both sides agree 
otherwise through the VSC. 
b. The official veterinary certificates will include the provisions regarding 
OlE Lists A & 8 Diseases as specified in the I.A.H.C. When the I.A. H. C. 
allows alternative requirements regarding the same disease, the most 
stringent one will be adopted unless otherwise agreed upon by the VSC. 
c. When infectious diseases which are not included in Lists A & 8 of the 
I.A.H.C. exist or are suspected, on scientific grounds, to exist in the 
exporting country, the necessary veterinary import conditions that will be 
required and included in the official veterinary certificates, will be 
discussed in the VSC, and in the case of different professional opinions, the 
most stringent ones will be adopted. 
d. The import of live vaccines will be permitted only if so decided by the 
vsc. 
e. Both sides will exchange, through the VSC, information pertaining to 
import licensing, including the evaluation of the disease situation and 
zoosanitary capability of exporting countries, which will be based upon 
official information as well as upon other available data. 
f. Consignments which do not conform with the above mentioned 
requirements will not be permitted to enter the areas under the jurisdiction 
of either side. 
7. Transportation of livestock and poultry and of animal products and biological 
products between areas under the jurisdiction of one side through areas under the 
jurisdiction of the other side, will be subject to the following technical rules: 
a. The transportation will be by vehicles which will be sealed with a seal of 
the official veterinary services of the place of origin and marked with a 
visible sign "Animal Transportation" or "Products of Animal Origin" in 
Arabic and Hebrew, in coloured and clearly visible letters on white 
background; 
b. Each consignment will be accompanied by a veterinary certificate issued 
by the official veterinary services of the place of origin, certifying that the 
animals or their products were examined and are free of infectious diseases 
and originate from a place which is not under quarantine or under animal 
movement restrictions. 
8. Transportation of livestock and poultry, animal products and biological products 
destined for Israel from the Areas and vice versa will be subject to veterinary 
permits issued by the official veterinary services of the recipient side, in keeping 
with the OlE standards used in international traffic in this field. Each such 
consignment will be transported by a suitable and marked vehicle, accompanied by 
a veterinary certificate in the form agreed upon between the official veterinary 
services of both sides. Such certificates will be issued only if permits of the 
recipient side are presented. 
9. In order to prevent the introduction of plant pests and diseases to the region, the 
following procedures will be adopted: 
a. The transportation between the Areas and Israel, of plants and parts thereof 
(including fruits and vegetables), the control of pesticide residues in them 
and the transportation of plant propagation material and of animal feed, 
may be inspected without delay or damage by the plant protection services 
of the recipient side. 
b. The transportation between the Areas through Israel of plants and parts 
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thereof (including fruits and vegetables) as well as of pesticides, may be 
required to pass a phytosanitary inspection without delay or damage. 
c. The official Palestinian plant protection services have the authority to issue 
perm its for the import of plants and parts thereof as well as of pesticides 
from external markets. The permits will be based on the prevailing 
standards and requirements. 
The permits will specifY the required conditions to be included in the 
official Phytosanitary Certificates (hence P.C.) based upon the standards 
and the requirements of the International Plant Protection Convention 
(I.P.P.C.)and those of the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection 
Organization (E.P.P.O.) which should accompany each consignment. The 
P.C.'s will be issued by the plant protection services in the countries of 
origin. Dubious or controversial cases will be brought before the sub-
committee on plant protection. 
10. The agricultural produce ofboth sides will have free and unrestricted access to each 
others' markets, with the temporary exception of sales from one side to the other 
side of the following items only: poultry, eggs, potatoes, cucumbers, tomatoes and 
melons. The temporary restrictions on these items will be gradually removed on an 
increasing scale until they are finally eliminated by 1998, as listed below: 
11. 
Year Poultry Eggs Potatoes Cucumbers Tomatoes Melons 
(tons) (millions) (tons) (tons) (tons) (tons) 
1994 5,000 30 10,000 10,000 13,000 10,000 
1995 6,000 40 13,000 13,000 16,000 13,000 
1996 7,000 50 15,000 15,000 19,000 15,000 
1997 8,000 60 17,000 17,000 22,000 17,000 
1998 unlimited unlimited unlimited unlimited unlimited unlimited 
Note: The above figures refer to the combined quantities marketed from the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip to Israel and vice-versa. The Palestinian Authority will notifY 
Israel the apportioning of these quantities between these areas concerning the 
quantities pertaining to the Palestinian produce. 
12. The Palestinians will have the right to export their agricultural produce to external 
markets without restrictions, on the basis of certificates of origin issued by the 
Palestinian Authority. 
13. Without prejudice to obligations arising out of existing international agreements, 
the two sides will refrain from importing agricultural products from third parties 
which may adversely affect the interests of each other's farmers. 
14. Each side will take the necessary measures in the area under its jurisdiction to 
prevent damage which may be caused by its agriculture to the environment of the 
other side. 
15. The two sides will establish sub-committees of their respective official veterinary 
and plant protection services, which will update the information and review issues, 
policies and procedures in these fields. Any changes in the provisions of this 
Article will be agreed upon by both sides. 
16. The two sides will establish a sub-committee of experts in the dairy sector in order 
to exchange information, discuss and coordinate their production in this sector so as 
to protect the interests ofboth sides. In principle, each side will produce according 
to its domestic consumption. 
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Article IX 
INDUSTRY 
I. There will be free movement of industrial goods free of any restrictions including 
customs and import taxes between the two sides, subject to each side's legislation. 
2. 
a. The Palestinian side has the right to employ various methods in 
encouraging and promoting the development of the Palestinian industry by 
way of providing grants, loans, research and development assistance and 
direct-tax benefits. The Palestinian side has also the right to employ other 
methods of encouraging industry resorted to in Israel. 
b. Both sides will exchange information about the methods employed by them 
in the encouragement of their respective industries. 
c. Indirect tax rebates or benefits and other subsidies to sales shall not be 
allowed in trade between the two sides. 
3. Each side will do its best to avoid damage to the industry of the other side and will 
take into consideration the concerns ofthe other side in its industrial policy. 
4. Both sides will cooperate in the prevention of deceptive practices, trade in goods 
which may endanger health, safety and the environment and in goods of expired 
validity. 
5. Each side will take the necessary measures in the area under its jurisdiction to 
prevent damage which may be caused by its industry to the environment of the 
other side. 
6. The Palestinians will have the right to export their industrial produce to external 
markets without restrictions, on the basis of certificates of origin issued by the 
Palestinian Authority. 
7. The JEC will meet and review issues pertaining to this Article. 
Article X 
TOURISM 
I. The Palestinian Authority will establish a Palestinian Tourism Authority which will 
exercise, inter alia, the following powers in the Areas. 
a. Regulating, licensing, classifYing and supervising tourist services, sites and 
industries. 
b. Promoting foreign and domestic tourism and developing the Palestinian 
tourist resources and sites. 
c. Supervising the marketing, promotion and information activities related to 
foreign and domestic tourism. 
2. Each side shall, under its respective jurisdiction, protect, guard and ensure the 
maintenance and good upkeep of historical, archaeological, cultural and religious 
sites and all other tourist sites, to fit their status as well as their purpose as a 
destination for visitors. 
3. Each side will determine reasonable visiting hours and days for all tourist sites in 
order to facilitate visits at a wide variety of days and hours, taking into 
consideration religious and national holidays. Each side shall publicize such 
opening times. Meaningful changes in the opening times will take into 
consideration tourist programs already committed to. 
4. Tourist buses or any other form of tourist transport authorized by either side, and 
operated by companies registered and licensed by it, will be allowed to enter and 
proceed on their tour within the area under the jurisdiction of the other side, 
provided that such buses or other vehicles conform with the EEC technical 
specifications [1. currently adopted.] All such vehicles will be clearly marked as 
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tourist vehicles. 
5. Each side will protect the environment and the ecology around the tourist sites 
under its jurisdiction. In view of the importance of beaches and maritime activities 
for tourism, each side will do its best efforts to ensure that development and 
construction on the Mediterranean coast, and especially at ports (such as Ashqelon 
or Gaza), will be planned and carried out in a manner that will not adversely affect 
the ecology, environment or the functions of the coastline and beaches of the other 
side. 
6. Tourism companies and agencies licensed by either side shall enjoy equal access to 
tourism - related facilities and amenities in border points of exit and entry 
according to the regulations of the authority operating them. 
7. 
a. Each side will license, according to its own rules and regulations, travel 
agents, tour companies, tour guides and other tourism businesses 
(hereinafter- tourism entities) within its jurisdiction. 
b. Tourism entities authorized by either side, will be allowed to conduct tours 
that include the area under the jurisdiction of the other side, provided that 
their authorization as well as their operation will be in accordance with 
rules, professional requirements and standards agreed upon by both sides in 
the sub-committee mentioned in para 9. 
Pending that agreement, existing tourism entities in the Areas which are 
currently allowed to conduct tours that include Israel, will be allowed to 
continue to do so, and Israeli authorized tourism entities will continue to be 
allowed to conduct tours that include the Areas. 
In addition, any tourism entity of one side that the tourism authorities of the 
other side will certifY as fulfilling all its rules, professional requirements 
and standards, will be allowed to conduct tours that include that other side. 
8. Each side will make its own arrangement for compensation of tourists for bodily 
injury and property damages caused by political violence in the areas under its 
respective jurisdiction. 
9. The JEC or a tourism sub-committee established by it shall meet upon the request 
of either side in order to discuss the implementation of the provisions of this Article 
and resolve problems that may arise. The sub-committee will also discuss and 
consider tourist issues of benefit to both sides, and will promote educational 
programs for tourism entities of both sides in order to further their professional 
standards and their ethics. Complaints of one side against the behaviour of tourism 
entities of the other side will be channelled through the committee. 
Note: It is agreed that the final wording in the last sentence in para 4 will be adopted 
according to the final wording in the relevant provisions of the Agreement. 
Article XI 
INSURANCE ISSUES 
1. The authorities, powers and responsibilities in the insurance sphere in the Areas, 
including inter alia the licensing of insurers, insurance agents and the supervision 
of their activities, will be transferred to the Palestinian Authority. 
2. 
a. The Palestinian Authority will maintain a compulsory absolute liability 
system for road accident victims with a ceiling on the amount of 
compensation based upon the following principles: 
I. Absolute liability for death or bodily injury to road accident 
victims, it being immaterial whether or not there was fault on the 
303 
3. 
4. 
part of the driver and whether or not there was fault or contributory 
fault on the part of others, each driver being responsible for 
persons travelling in his vehicle and for pedestrians hit by his 
vehicle. 
2. Compulsory insurance for all motor vehicles, covering death or 
bodily injury to all road accident victims, including drivers. 
3. No cause of action in tort for death or bodily injury resulting from 
road accidents. 
4. The maintenance of a statutory fund (hereinafter- the Fund) for 
compensation of road accident victims who are unable to claim 
compensation from an insurer for the following reasons: 
i. the driver liable for compensation is unknown; 
ii. the driver is not insured or his insurance does not cover the 
liability involved; or 
111. the insurer is unable to meet his liabilities. 
5. Terms in this Article will have the same meaning as in the 
legislation prevailing at the date of signing of the Agreement 
concerning compulsory motor vehicle insurance and compensation 
of road accident victims. 
6. Any change by either side in the rules and regulations regarding the 
implementation of the above mentioned principles will require 
prior notice to the other side. A change which might substantially 
affect the other side will require prior notice of at least three 
months. 
a. Upon the signing of the Agreement the Palestinian Authority will establish 
a Fund for the Areas (hereinafter - the Palestinian Fund) for the purposes 
detailed in para 2(a){4) above and for the purposes detailed below. The 
Palestinian Fund will assume the responsibilities of the statutory Road 
Accident Victims Compensation Fund in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
(hereinafter- the Existing Fund) regarding the Areas, according to the 
prevailing law at that time. Accordingly, the Existing Fund will cease to be 
responsible for any liability regarding accidents occurring in the Areas 
from the date of signing of the Agreement. 
b. The Existing Fund will transfer to the Palestinian Fund, after the 
assumption of the above mentioned responsibilities by it, the premiums 
paid to the Existing Fund by the insurers for vehicles registered in the 
Areas, pro-rata to the unexpired period of each insurance policy. 
a. Compulsory motor vehicle insurance policies issued by insurers licensed 
by either side will be valid in the territories of both sides. Accordingly, a 
vehicle registered in one side covered by such a policy will not be required 
to have an additional insurance coverage for travel in the areas under the 
other side's jurisdiction. These insurance policies will cover all the 
liabilities according to the legislation of the place of the accident. 
b. In order to cover part of the liabilities which may incur due to road 
accidents in Israel by uninsured vehicles registered in the Palestinian 
Authority, the Palestinian Fund will transfer to the Israeli Fund, on a 
monthly basis, for each insured vehicle, an amount equal to 30% of the 
amount paid to the Israeli Fund by an insurer registered in Israel, for the 
sat-ne type of vehicle, for the same period of insurance (which will not be 
less than 90 days). 
5. In cases where a victim of a road accident wishes to claim compensation from an 
insurer registered by the other side or from the Fund of the other side or in cases 
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where a driver or an owner of a car is sued by a victim, by an insurer or by the 
Fund of the other side, he may nominate the Fund of his side as his proxy for this 
purpose. The Fund so nominated may address any relevant party from the other 
side directly or through the other sides' Fund. 
6. In the case of a road accident in which neither the registration number of the 
vehicle nor the identity of the driver are known, the Fund of the side which has 
jurisdiction over the place of the accident will compensate the victim, according to 
its own legislation. 
7. The Fund of each side will be responsible towards the victims of the other side for 
any liability of the insurers of its side regarding the compulsory insurance and will 
guarantee their liabilities. 
8. Each side will guarantee its Fund's liabilities according to this Article. 
9. The two sides will negotiate within three months from the date of the signing of the 
Agreement a cut-off agreement between the Existing Fund and the Palestinian Fund 
concerning accidents which occurred in the Areas prior to the date of the signing of 
the Agreement, whether claims have been reported or not. The cut-off agreement 
will not include compensation for Israeli victims involved in accidents which 
occurred in the Areas prior to the date of the signing of the Agreement. 
10. 
a. The two sides will establish immediately upon the signing of the 
Agreement, a sub-committee of experts (hereinafter- the Sub-Committee) 
which will deal with issues regarding the implementation of this Article, 
including: 
I. Procedures concerning the handling of claims of victims of the one 
side from insurers or from the Fund of the other side; 
2. Procedures concerning the transfer of the amounts between the 
Funds of both sides as mentioned in para 4(b) above; 
3. The details ofthe cut-off agreement between the Existing Fund and 
the Palestinian Fund, as set out in para 9 above; 
4. Any other relevant issue raised by either side. 
b. The Sub-Committee will act as a continuous committee for issues 
regarding this Article. 
c. The two sides will exchange, through the Sub-Committee, the relevant 
information regarding the implementation of this Article, including police 
reports, medical information, relevant statistics, premiums, etc. The two 
sides will provide each other with any other assistance required in this 
regard. 
11. Each side may require the re-examination of the arrangements set out in this Article 
a year after the date of the signing of the Agreement. 
12. Insurers from both sides may apply for a license to the relevant authorities of the 
other side, according to the rules and regulations regarding foreign insurers in the 
latter side. The two sides agree not to discriminate against such applicants. 
Done in Paris, this twenty ninth day of April, 1994 
For the Government of Israel 
Finance Minister Avraham Shohat 
For the PLO 
Abu Ala (Ahmad Qurei) 
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Israeli - Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip 
September 28, 1995 
The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter "the 
PLO"), the representative of the Palestinian people; 
PREAMBLE 
WITHIN the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated at Madrid in October 1991; 
REAFFIRMING their determination to put an end to decades of confrontation and to live in 
peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security, while recognizing their mutual legitimate and 
political rights; 
REAFFIRMING their desire to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and 
historic reconciliation through the agreed political process; 
RECOGNIZING that the peace process and the new era that it has created, as well as the new 
relationship established between the two Parties as described above, are irreversible, and the 
determination of the two Parties to maintain, sustain and continue the peace process; 
RECOGNIZING that the aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East 
peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, 
i.e. the elected Council (hereinafter "the Council" or "the Palestinian Council"), and the elected 
Ra'ees of the Executive Authority, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
for a transitional period not exceeding five years from the date of signing the Agreement on the 
Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (hereinafter "the Gaza-Jericho Agreement") on May 4, 1994, 
leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; 
REAFFIRMING their understanding that the interim self-government arrangements contained in 
this Agreement are an integral part of the whole peace process, that the negotiations on the 
permanent status, that will start as soon as possible but not later than May 4, 1996, will lead to the 
implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and that the Interim Agreement shall 
settle all the issues of the interim period and that no such issues will be deferred to the agenda of 
the permanent status negotiations; 
REAFFIRMING their adherence to the mutual recognition and commitments expressed in the 
letters dated September 9, 1993, signed by and exchanged between the Prime Minister of Israel and 
the Chairman of the PLO; 
DESIROUS of putting into effect the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements signed at Washington, D.C. on September 13, 1993, and the Agreed Minutes thereto 
(hereinafter "the DOP") and in particular Article III and Annex I concerning the holding of direct, 
free and general political elections for the Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority in 
order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip may 
democratically elect accountable representatives; 
RECOGNIZING that these elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward 
the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements and will 
provide a democratic basis for the establishment of Palestinian institutions; 
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REAFFIRMING their mutual commitment to act, in accordance with this Agreement, immediately, 
efficiently and effectively against acts or threats of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether 
committed by Palestinians or Israelis; 
FOLLOWING the Gaza-Jericho Agreement; the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and 
Responsibilities signed at Erez on August 29, 1994 (hereinafter "the Preparatory Transfer 
Agreement"); and the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities signed at Cairo 
on August 27, 1995 (hereinafter "the Further Transfer Protocol"); which three agreements will be 
superseded by this Agreement; 
HEREBY AGREE as follows: 
CHAPTER I - THE COUNCIL 
ARTICLE I 
Transfer of Authority 
I. Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli 
military government and its Civil Administration to the Council in accordance with this 
Agreement. Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so transferred. 
2. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the powers and responsibilities transferred to the 
Council shall be exercised by the Palestinian Authority established in accordance with the Gaza-
Jericho Agreement, which shall also have all the rights, liabilities and obligations to be assumed by 
the Council in this regard. Accordingly, the term "Council" throughout this Agreement shall, 
pending the inauguration of the Council, be construed as meaning the Palestinian Authority. 
3. The transfer of powers and responsibilities to the police force established by the Palestinian 
Council in accordance with Article XIV below (hereinafter "the Palestinian Police") shall be 
accomplished in a phased manner, as detailed in this Agreement and in the Protocol concerning 
Redeployment and Security Arrangements attached as Annex I to this Agreement (hereinafter 
"Annex!"). 
4. As regards the transfer and assumption of authority in civil spheres, powers and responsibilities 
shall be transferred and assumed as set out in the Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs attached as 
Annex Ill to this Agreement (hereinafter "Annex Ill"). 
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration in the West Bank will be 
dissolved, and the Israeli military government shall be withdrawn. The withdrawal of the military 
government shall not prevent it from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to 
the Council. 
6. A Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee (hereinafter "the CAC"), Joint 
Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees, one for the Gaza Strip and the other for the West Bank, and 
District Civil Liaison Offices in the West Bank shall be established in order to provide for 
coordination and cooperation in civil affairs between the Council and Israel, as detailed in Annex 
Ill. 
7. The offices of the Council, and the offices of its Ra'ees and its Executive Authority and other 
committees, shall be located in areas under Palestinian territorial jurisdiction in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip. 
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ARTICLE II 
Elections 
I. In order that the Palestinian people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip may govern themselves 
according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the 
Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council in accordance with the provisions 
set out in the Protocol concerning Elections attached as Annex II to this Agreement (hereinafter 
"Annex II"). 
2. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towards the realization of 
the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements and will provide a 
democratic basis for the establishment of Palestinian institutions. 
3. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there may participate in the election process in accordance 
with the provisions contained in this Article and in Article VI of Annex II (Election Arrangements 
concerning Jerusalem). 
4. The elections shall be called by the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority immediately 
following the signing of this Agreement to take place at the earliest practicable date following the 
redeployment of Israeli forces in accordance with Annex I, and consistent with the requirements of 
the election timetable as provided in Annex II, the Election Law and the Election Regulations, as 
defined in Article I of Annex II. 
ARTICLE III 
Structure of the Palestinian Council 
I. The Palestinian Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council constitute the 
Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, which will be elected by the Palestinian people of 
the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip for the transitional period agreed in Article I of the 
DOP. 
2. The Council shall possess both legislative power and executive power, in accordance with 
Articles VII and IX ofthe DOP. The Council shall carry out and be responsible for all the 
legislative and executive powers and responsibilities transferred to it under this Agreement. The 
exercise of legislative powers shall be in accordance with Article XVIII of this Agreement 
(Legislative Powers of the Council). 
3. The Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be directly and 
simultaneously elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, 
in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the Election Law and Regulations, which 
shall not be contrary to the provisions of this Agreement. 
4. The Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be elected for a 
transitional period not exceeding five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on 
May 4, 1994. 
5. Immediately upon its inauguration, the Council will elect from among its members a Speaker. 
The Speaker will preside over the meetings of the Council, administer the Council and its 
committees, decide on the agenda of each meeting, and lay before the Council proposals for voting 
and declare their results. 
6. The jurisdiction of the Council shall be as determined in Article XVII of this Agreement 
(Jurisdiction). 
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7. The organization, structure and functioning of the Council shall be in accordance with this 
Agreement and the Basic Law for the Palestinian Interim Self-government Authority, which Law 
shall be adopted by the Council. The Basic Law and any regulations made under it shall not be 
contrary to the provisions of this Agreement. 
8. The Council shall be responsible under its executive powers for the offices, services and 
departments transferred to it and may establish, within its jurisdiction, ministries and subordinate 
bodies, as necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities. 
9. The Speaker will present for the Council's approval proposed internal procedures that will 
regulate, among other things, the decision-making processes of the Council. 
ARTICLE IV 
Size of the Council 
The Palestinian Council shall be composed of82 representatives and the Ra'ees ofthe Executive 
Authority, who will be directly and simultaneously elected by the Palestinian people of the West 
Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. 
ARTICLE V 
The Executive Authority of the Council 
I. The Council will have a committee that will exercise the executive authority of the Council, 
formed in accordance with paragraph 4 below (hereinafter "the Executive Authority"). 
2. The Executive Authority shall be bestowed with the executive authority of the Council and will 
exercise it on behalf ofthe Council. It shall determine its own internal procedures and decision 
making processes. 
3. The Council will publish the names of the members of the Executive Authority immediately 
upon their initial appointment and subsequent to any changes. 
4. a. The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority shall be an ex officio member of the Executive 
Authority. 
b. All of the other members of the Executive Authority, except as provided in subparagraph c. 
below, shall be members of the Council, chosen and proposed to the Council by the Ra'ees ofthe 
Executive Authority and approved by the Council. 
c. The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority shall have the right to appoint some persons, in number 
not exceeding twenty percent of the total membership of the Executive Authority, who are not 
members of the Council, to exercise executive authority and participate in government tasks. Such 
appointed members may not vote in meetings of the Council. 
d. Non-elected members of the Executive Authority must have a valid address in an area under the 
jurisdiction of the Council. 
ARTICLE VI 
Other Committees of the Council 
I. The Council may form small committees to simplify the proceedings of the Council and to assist 
in controlling the activity of its Executive Authority. 
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2. Each committee shall establish its own decision-making processes within the general framework 
of the organization and structure of the Council. 
ARTICLE VII 
Open Government 
I. All meetings of the Council and of its committees, other than the Executive Authority, shall be 
open to the public, except upon a resolution of the Council or the relevant committee on the 
grounds of security, or commercial or personal confidentiality. 
2. Participation in the deliberations of the Council, its committees and the Executive Authority 
shall be limited to their respective members only. Experts may be invited to such meetings to 
address specific issues on an ad hoc basis. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Judicial Review 
Any person or organization affected by any act or decision ofthe Ra'ees of the Executive Authority 
of the Council or of any member of the Executive Authority, who believes that such act or decision 
exceeds the authority of the Ra'ees or of such member, or is otherwise incorrect in law or 
procedure, may apply to the relevant Palestinian Court of Justice for a review of such activity or 
decision. 
ARTICLE IX 
Powers and Responsibilities of the Council 
I. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Council will, within its jurisdiction, have 
legislative powers as set out in Article XVIII of this Agreement, as well as executive powers. 
2. The executive power of the Palestinian Council shall extend to all matters within its jurisdiction 
under this Agreement or any future agreement that may be reached between the two Parties during 
the interim period. It shall include the power to formulate and conduct Palestinian policies and to 
supervise their implementation, to issue any rule or regulation under powers given in approved 
legislation and administrative decisions necessary for the realization of Palestinian self-
government, the power to employ staff, sue and be sued and conclude contracts, and the power to 
keep and administer registers and records of the population, and issue certificates, licenses and 
documents. 
3. The Palestinian Council's executive decisions and acts shall be consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement. 
4. The Palestinian Council may adopt all necessary measures in order to enforce the law and any of 
its decisions, and bring proceedings before the Palestinian courts and tribunals. 
5. a. In accordance with the DOP, the Council will not have powers and responsibilities in the 
sphere offoreign relations, which sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies, 
consulates or other types of foreign missions and posts or permitting their establishment in the 
West Bank or the Gaza Strip, the appointment of or admission of diplomatic and consular staff, and 
the exercise of diplomatic functions. 
b. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, the PLO may conduct negotiations and 
sign agreements with states or international organizations for the benefit of the Council in 
the following cases only: 
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(I) economic agreements, as specifically provided in Annex V of this Agreement: 
(2) agreements with donor countries for the purpose of implementing arrangements 
for the provision of assistance to the Council, 
(3) agreements for the purpose of implementing the regional development plans 
detailed in Annex IV of the DOP or in agreements entered into in the framework of 
the multilateral negotiations, and 
(4) cultural, scientific and educational agreements. Dealings between the Council 
and representatives of foreign states and international organizations, as well as the 
establishment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of representative offices other 
than those described in subparagraph 5.a above, for the purpose of implementing 
the agreements referred to in subparagraph 5.b above, shall not be considered 
foreign relations. 
6. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Council shall, within its jurisdiction, have an 
independent judicial system composed of independent Palestinian courts and tribunals. 
CHAPTER 2 - REDEPLOYMENT AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS 
ARTICLE X 
Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces 
I. The first phase of the Israeli military forces redeployment will cover populated areas in the West 
Bank- cities, towns, villages, refugee camps and hamlets- as set out in Annex I, and will be 
completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, i.e., 22 days before the day of the elections. 
2. Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will commence 
after the inauguration of the Council and will be gradually implemented commensurate with the 
assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian Police, to be 
completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council as detailed in Articles 
XI (Land) and XIII (Security), below and in Annex I. 
3. The Palestinian Police shall be deployed and shall assume responsibility for public order and 
internal security for Palestinians in a phased manner in accordance with XIII (Security) below and 
Annex I. 
4. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for external security, as well as the responsibility 
for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public 
order. 
5. For the purpose of this Agreement, "Israeli military forces" includes Israel Police and other 
Israeli security forces. 
ARTICLE XI 
Land 
I. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and 
status of which will be preserved during the interim period. 
2. The two sides agree that West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be 
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian 
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Council in a phased manner, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of 
the Council, as specified below: 
a. Land in populated areas (Areas A and B), including government and AI Waqf land, will 
come under the jurisdiction of the Council during the first phase of redeployment. 
b. All civil powers and responsibilities, including planning and zoning, in Areas A and 8, 
set out in Annex III, will be transferred to and assumed by the Council during the first 
phase of redeployment. 
c. In Area C, during the first phase of redeployment Israel will transfer to the Council civil 
powers and responsibilities not relating to territory, as set out in Annex III. 
d. The further redeployments oflsraeli military forces to specified military locations will 
be gradually implemented in accordance with the DOP in three phases, each to take place 
after an interval of six months, after the inauguration of the Council, to be completed 
within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council. 
e. During the further redeployment phases to be completed within 18 months from the date 
of the inauguration of the Council, powers and responsibilities relating to territory will be 
transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip 
territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. 
f. The specified military locations referred to in Article X, paragraph 2 above will be 
determined in the further redeployment phases, within the specified time-frame ending not 
later than 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, and will be 
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. 
3. For the purpose of this Agreement and until the completion ofthe first phase of the further 
redeployments: 
a. "Area A" means the populated areas delineated by a red line and shaded in brown on 
attached map No. I; 
b. "Area 8" means the populated areas delineated by a red line and shaded in yellow on 
attached map No. I, and the built-up area of the ham lets I isted in Appendix 6 to Annex I, 
and 
c. "Area C" means areas of the West Bank outside Areas A and B, which, except for the 
issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually 
transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in accordance with this Agreement. 
ARTICLE XII 
Arrangements for Security and Public Order 
I. In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, the Council shall establish a strong police force as set out in Article XIV below. 
Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for defense against external threats, including the 
responsibility for protecting the Egyptian and Jordanian borders, and for defense against external 
threats from the sea and from the air, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis and 
Settlements, for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order, and will have 
all the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility. 
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2. Agreed security arrangements and coordination mechanisms are specified in Annex I. 
3. A Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security Purposes (hereinafter "the 
JSC"), as well as Joint Regional Security Committees (hereinafter "RSCs") and Joint District 
Coordination Offices (hereinafter "DCOs"), are hereby established as provided for in Annex I. 
4. The security arrangements provided for in this Agreement and in Annex I may be reviewed at 
the request of either Party and may be amended by mutual agreement of the Parties. Specific 
review arrangements are included in Annex I. 
5. For the purpose of this Agreement, "the Settlements" means, in the West Bank the settlements in 
Area C; and in the Gaza Strip - the Gush Kat if and Erez settlement areas, as well as the other 
settlements in the Gaza Strip, as shown on attached map No. 2. 
ARTICLE XIII 
Security 
I. The Council will, upon completion ofthe redeployment of Israeli military forces in each district, 
as set out in Appendix I to Annex I, assume the powers and responsibilities for internal security 
and public order in Area A in that district. 
2. 
a. There will be a complete redeployment of Israeli military forces from Area B. Israel will 
transfer to the Council and the Council will assume responsibility for public order for 
Palestinians. Israel shall have the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of 
protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism. 
b. In Area B the Palestinian Police shall assume the responsibility for public order for 
Palestinians and shall be deployed in order to accommodate the Palestinian needs and 
requirements in the following manner: 
(I) The Palestinian Police shall establish 25 police stations and posts in towns, 
villages, and other places listed in Appendix 2 to Annex land as delineated on map 
No.3. The West Bank RSC may agree on the establishment of additional police 
stations and posts, if required. 
(2) The Palestinian Police shall be responsible for handling public order incidents 
in which only Palestinians are involved. 
(3) The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in populated places where police 
stations and posts are located, as set out in paragraph b( I) above. 
(4) While the movement of uniformed Palestinian policemen in Area B outside 
places where there is a Palestinian police station or post will be carried out after 
coordination and confirmation through the relevant DCO, three months after the 
completion of redeployment from Area B, the DCOs may decide that movement of 
Palestinian policemen from the police stations in Area B to Palestinian towns and 
villages in Area B on roads that are used only by Palestinian traffic will take place 
after notizying the DCO. 
(5) The coordination of such planned movement prior to confirmation through the 
relevant DCO shall include a scheduled plan, including the number of policemen, 
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ARTICLE XIV 
as well as the type and number of weapons and vehicles intended to take part. It 
shall also include details of arrangements for ensuring continued coordination 
through appropriate communication links, the exact schedule of movement to the 
area of the planned operation, including the destination and routes thereto, its 
proposed duration and the schedule for returning to the police station or post. 
The Israeli side of the DCO will provide the Palestinian side with its response, 
following a request for movement of policemen in accordance with this paragraph, 
in normal or routine cases within one day and in emergency cases no later than 2 
hours. 
(6) The Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces will conduct joint security 
activities on the main roads as set out in Annex I. 
(7) The Palestinian Police will notify the West Bank RSC of the names ofthe 
policemen, number plates of police vehicles and serial numbers of weapons, with 
respect to each police station and post in Area B. 
(8) Further redeployments from Area C and transfer of internal security 
responsibility to the Palestinian Police in Areas B and C will be carried out in three 
phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 
months after the inauguration ofthe Council, except for the issues of permanent 
status negotiations and of Israel's overall responsibility for Israelis and borders. 
(9) The procedures detailed in this paragraph will be reviewed within six months 
of the completion of the first phase of redeployment. 
The Palestinian Police 
I. The Council shall establish a strong police force. The duties, functions, structure, deployment 
and composition of the Palestinian Police, together with provisions regarding its equipment and 
operation, as well as rules of conduct, are set out in Annex I. 
2. The Palestinian police force established under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement will be fully 
integrated into the Palestinian Police and will be subject to the provisions of this Agreement. 
3. Except for the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces, no other armed forces shall be 
established or operate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
4. Except for the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Palestinian Police described in Annex I, 
and those of the Israeli military forces, no organization, group or individual in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip shall manufacture, sell, acquire, possess, import or otherwise introduce into the West 
Bank or the Gaza Strip any firearms, ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder or any related 
equipment, unless otherwise provided for in Annex I. 
ARTICLE XV 
Prevention of Hostile Acts 
1. Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and 
hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other's authority and 
against their property and shall take legal measures against offenders. 
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2. Specific provisions for the implementation of this Article are set out in Annex I. 
ARTICLE XVI 
Confidence Building Measures 
With a view to fostering a positive and supportive public atmosphere to accompany the 
implementation of this Agreement, to establish a solid basis of mutual trust and good faith, and in 
order to facilitate the anticipated cooperation and new relations between the two peoples, both 
Parties agree to carry out confidence building measures as detailed herewith: 
I. Israel will release or tum over to the Palestinian side, Palestinian detainees and prisoners, 
residents ofthe West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The first stage of release ofthese prisoners and 
detainees will take place on the signing of this Agreement and the second stage will take place 
prior to the date of the elections. There will be a third stage of release of detainees and prisoners. 
Detainees and prisoners will be released from among categories detailed in Annex VII (Release of 
Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees). Those released will be free to return to their homes in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
2. Palestinians who have maintained contact with the Israeli authorities will not be subjected to acts 
of harassment, violence, retribution or prosecution. Appropriate ongoing measures will be taken, in 
coordination with Israel, in order to ensure their protection. 
3. Palestinians from abroad whose entry into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is approved 
pursuant to this Agreement, and to whom the provisions of this Article are applicable, will not be 
prosecuted for offenses committed prior to September 13, 1993. 
CHAPTER 3 - LEGAL AFFAIRS 
ARTICLE XVII 
Jurisdiction 
1. In accordance with the DOP, the jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza 
Strip territory as a single territorial unit, except for: 
a. issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, 
settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations 
and Israelis; and 
b. powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council. 
2. Accordingly, the authority ofthe Council encompasses all matters that fall within its territorial, 
functional and personal jurisdiction, as follows: 
a. The territorial jurisdiction of the Council shall encompass Gaza Strip territory, except for 
the Settlements and the Military Installation Area shown on map No.2, and West Bank 
territory, except for Area C which, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the 
permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in 
three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months 
after the inauguration of the Council. At this time, the jurisdiction of the Council will cover 
West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the 
permanent status negotiations. 
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Territorial jurisdiction includes land, subsoil and territorial waters, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
b. The functional jurisdiction of the Council extends to all powers and responsibilities 
transferred to the Council, as specified in this Agreement or in any future agreements that 
may be reached between the Parties during the interim period. 
c. The territorial and functional jurisdiction of the Council will apply to all persons, except 
for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement. 
d. Notwithstanding subparagraph a. above, the Council shall have functional jurisdiction in 
Area C, as detailed in Article IV of Annex Ill. 
3. The Council has, within its authority, legislative, executive and judicial powers and 
responsibilities, as provided for in this Agreement. 
4. a. Israel, through its military government, has the authority over areas that are not under the 
territorial jurisdiction of the Council, powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council and 
Israelis. 
b. To this end, the Israeli military government shall retain the necessary legislative, judicial 
and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with international law. This 
provision shall not derogate from Israel's applicable legislation over Israelis in personam. 
5. The exercise of authority with regard to the electromagnetic sphere and air space shall be in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. 
6. Without derogating from the provisions of this Article, legal arrangements detailed in the 
Protocol Concerning Legal Matters attached as Annex IV to this Agreement (hereinafter "Annex 
IV") shall be observed. Israel and the Council may negotiate further legal arrangements. 
7. Israel and the Council shall cooperate on matters of legal assistance in criminal and civil matters 
through a legal committee (hereinafter "the Legal Committee"), hereby established. 
8. The Council's jurisdiction will extend gradually to cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, 
except for the issues to be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, through a series of 
redeployments ofthe Israeli military forces. The first phase ofthe redeployment of Israeli military 
forces will cover populated areas in the West Bank- cities, towns, refugee camps and hamlets, as 
set out in Annex I- and will be completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, i.e. 22 days 
before the day of the elections. Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military 
locations will commence immediately upon the inauguration of the Council and will be effected in 
three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be concluded no later than 
eighteen months from the date of the inauguration of the Council. 
ARTICLE XVIII 
Legislative Powers of the Council 
1. For the purposes of this Article, legislation shall mean any primary and secondary legislation, 
including basic laws, laws, regulations and other legislative acts. 
2. The Council has the power, within its jurisdiction as defined in Article XVII of this Agreement, 
to adopt legislation. 
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3. While the primary legislative power shall lie in the hands of the Council as a whole, the Ra'ees 
of the Executive Authority of the Council shall have the following legislative powers 
a. the power to initiate legislation or to present proposed legislation to the Council; 
b. the power to promulgate legislation adopted by the Council; and 
c. the power to issue secondary legislation, including regulations, relating to any matters 
specified and within the scope laid down in any primary legislation adopted by the 
Council. 
4. a. Legislation, including legislation which amends or abrogates existing laws or military orders, 
which exceeds the jurisdiction of the Council or which is otherwise inconsistent with the provisions 
of the DOP, this Agreement, or of any other agreement that may be reached between the two sides 
during the interim period, shall have no effect and shall be void ab initio. 
b. The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall not promulgate legislation 
adopted by the Council if such legislation falls under the provisions of this paragraph. 
5. All legislation shall be communicated to the Israeli side of the Legal Committee. 
6. Without derogating from the provisions of paragraph 4 above, the Israeli side of the Legal 
Committee may refer for the attention of the Committee any legislation regarding which Israel 
considers the provisions of paragraph 4 apply, in order to discuss issues arising from such 
legislation. The Legal Committee will consider the legislation referred to it at the earliest 
opportunity. 
ARTICLE XIX 
Human Rights and the Rule of Law 
Israel and the Council shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this Agreement 
with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of 
law. 
ARTICLE XX 
Rights, Liabilities and Obligations 
I. 
a. The transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its 
civil administration to the Council, as detailed in Annex III, includes all related rights, 
liabilities and obligations arising with regard to acts or omissions which occurred prior to 
such transfer. Israel will cease to bear any financial responsibility regarding such acts or 
omissions and the Council will bear all financial responsibility for these and for its own 
functioning. 
b. Any financial claim made in this regard against Israel will be referred to the Council. 
c. Israel shall provide the Council with the information it has regarding pending and 
anticipated claims brought before any court or tribunal against Israel in this regard. 
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2. 
d. Where legal proceedings are brought in respect of such a claim, Israel will notify the 
Council and enable it to participate in defending the claim and raise any arguments on its 
behalf. 
e. In the event that an award is made against Israel by any court or tribunal in respect of 
such a claim, the Council shall immediately reimburse Israel the full amount of the award. 
f. Without prejudice to the above, where a court or tribunal hearing such a claim finds that 
liability rests solely with an employee or agent who acted beyond the scope of the powers 
assigned to him or her, unlawfully or with willful malfeasance, the Council shall not bear 
financial responsibility. 
a. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs l.d through l.fabove, each side may take 
the necessary measures, including promulgation of legislation, in order to ensure that such 
claims by Palestinians including pending claims in which the hearing of evidence has not 
yet begun, are brought only before Palestinian courts or tribunals in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, and are not brought before or heard by Israeli courts or tribunals. 
b. Where a new claim has been brought before a Palestinian court or tribunal subsequent to 
the dismissal of the claim pursuant to subparagraph a. above, the Council shall defend it 
and, in accordance with subparagraph l.a above, in the event that an award is made for the 
plaintiff, shall pay the amount of the award. 
c. The Legal Committee shall agree on arrangements for the transfer of all materials and 
information needed to enable the Palestinian courts or tribunals to hear such claims as 
referred to in subparagraph b. above, and, when necessary, for the provision of legal 
assistance by Israel to the Council in defending such claims. 
3. The transfer of authority in itself shall not affect rights, liabilities and obligations of any person 
or legal entity, in existence at the date of signing of this Agreement. 
4. The Council, upon its inauguration, will assume all the rights, liabilities and obligations of the 
Palestinian Authority. 
5. For the purpose of this Agreement, "Israelis" also includes Israeli statutory agencies and 
corporations registered in Israel. 
ARTICLE XXI 
Settlement of Differences and Disputes 
Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred to the appropriate 
coordination and cooperation mechanism established under this Agreement. The provisions of 
Article XV of the DOP shall apply to any such difference which is not settled through the 
appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism, namely: 
I. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Agreement or any related 
agreements pertaining to the interim period shall be settled through the Liaison Committee. 
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be settled by a mechanism of conciliation 
to be agreed between the Parties. 
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3. The Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which 
cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both Parties, the Parties 
will establish an Arbitration Committee. 
CHAPTER 4 - COOPERATION 
ARTICLE XXII 
Relations between Israel and the Council 
I. Israel and the Council shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall 
accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other and, without 
derogating from the principle of freedom of expression, shall take legal measures to prevent such 
incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction. 
2. Israel and the Council will ensure that their respective educational systems contribute to the 
peace between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples and to peace in the entire region, and will refrain 
from the introduction of any motifs that could adversely affect the process of reconciliation. 
3. Without derogating from the other provisions of this Agreement, Israel and the Council shall 
cooperate in combating criminal activity which may affect both sides, including offenses related to 
trafficking in illegal drugs and psychotropic substances, smuggling, and offenses against property, 
including offenses related to vehicles. 
ARTICLE XXIII 
Cooperation with Regard to Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities 
In order to ensure a smooth, peaceful and orderly transfer of powers and responsibilities, the two 
sides will cooperate with regard to the transfer of security powers and responsibilities in 
accordance with the provisions of Annex I, and the transfer of civil powers and responsibilities in 
accordance with the provisions of Annex Ill. 
ARTICLE XXIV 
Economic Relations 
The economic relations between the two sides are set out in the Protocol on Economic Relations 
signed in Paris on April 29, 1994, and the Appendices thereto, and the Supplement to the Protocol 
on Economic Relations all attached as Annex V, and will be governed by the relevant provisions of 
this Agreement and its Annexes. 
ARTICLE XXV 
Cooperation Programs 
1. The Parties agree to establish a mechanism to develop programs of cooperation between them. 
Details of such cooperation are set out in Annex VI. 
2. A Standing Cooperation Committee to deal with issues arising in the context of this cooperation 
is hereby established as provided for in Annex VI. 
ARTICLE XXVI 
The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee 
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I. The Liaison Committee established pursuant to Article X of the DOP shall ensure the smooth 
implementation of this Agreement. It shall deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of 
common interest and disputes. 
2. The Liaison Committee shall be composed of an equal number of members from each Party. It 
may add other technicians and experts as necessary. 
3. The Liaison Committee shall adopt its rules of procedures, including the frequency and place or 
places of its meetings. 
4. The Liaison Committee shall reach its decisions by agreement. 
5. The Liaison Committee shall establish a subcommittee that will monitor and steer the 
implementation of this Agreement (hereinafter "the Monitoring and Steering Committee"). It will 
function as follows: 
a. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will, on an ongoing basis, monitor the 
implementation of this Agreement, with a view to enhancing the cooperation and fostering 
the peaceful relations between the two sides. 
b. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will steer the activities of the various joint 
committees established in this Agreement (the JSC, the CAC, the Legal Committee, the 
Joint Economic Committee and the Standing Cooperation Committee) concerning the 
ongoing implementation of the Agreement, and will report to the Liaison Committee. 
c. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will be composed of the heads of the various 
committees mentioned above. 
d. The two heads of the Monitoring and Steering Committee will establish its rules of 
procedures, including the frequency and places of its meetings. 
ARTICLE XXVII 
Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt 
I. Pursuant to Article XII of the DOP, the two Parties have invited the Governments of Jordan and 
Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the 
Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives on the one hand, and the Governments of 
Jordan and Egypt on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. As part of these 
arrangements a Continuing Committee has been constituted and has commenced its deliberations. 
2. The Continuing Committee shall decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons 
displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to 
prevent disruption and disorder. 
3. The Continuing Committee shall also deal with other matters of common concern. 
ARTICLE XXVIII 
Missing Persons 
I. Israel and the Council shall cooperate by providing each other with all necessary assistance in 
the conduct of searches for missing persons and bodies of persons which have not been recovered, 
as well as by providing information about missing persons. 
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2. The PLO undertakes to cooperate with Israel and to assist it in its efforts to locate and to return 
to Israel Israeli soldiers who are missing in action and the bodies of soldiers which have not been 
recovered. 
CHAPTER 5 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE XXIX 
Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
Arrangements for safe passage of persons and transportation between the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip are set out in Annex I. 
ARTICLE XXX 
Passages 
Arrangements for coordination between Israel and the Council regarding passage to and from 
Egypt and Jordan, as well as any other agreed international crossings, are set out in Annex I. 
ARTICLE XXXI 
Final Clauses 
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signing. 
2. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement, except for Article XX (Confidence-Building Measures), the 
Preparatory Transfer Agreement and the Further Transfer Protocol will be superseded by this 
Agreement. 
3. The Council, upon its inauguration, shall replace the Palestinian Authority and shall assume all 
the undertakings and obligations of the Palestinian Authority under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, 
the Preparatory Transfer Agreement, and the Further Transfer Protocol. 
4. The two sides shall pass all necessary legislation to implement this Agreement. 
5. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than May 4, 
1996, between the Parties. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, 
including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and 
cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest. 
6. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or preempt the outcome of the negotiations on the 
permanent status to be conducted pursuant to the DOP. Neither Party shall be deemed, by virtue of 
having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, claims 
or positions. 
7. Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations. 
8. The two Parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity 
and status of which will be preserved during the interim period. 
9. The PLO undertakes that, within two months ofthe date ofthe inauguration ofthe Council, the 
Palestinian National Council will convene and formally approve the necessary changes in regard to 
the Palestinian Covenant, as undertaken in the letters signed by the Chairman of the PLO and 
addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994. 
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I 0. Pursuant to Annex J, Article IX of this Agreement, Israel confirm-s that the permanent 
checkpoints on the roads leading to and from the Jericho Area (except those related to the access 
road leading from Mousa Alami to the Allenby Bridge) will be removed upon the completion of the 
first phase of redeployment. 
II. Prisoners who, pursuant to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, were turned over to the Palestinian 
Authority on the condition that they remain in the Jericho Area for the remainder of their sentence, 
will be free to return to their homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip upon the completion of 
the first phase of redeployment. 
12. As regards relations between Israel and the PLO, and without derogating fi·om the 
commitments contained in the letters signed by and exchanged between the Prime Minister of 
Israel and the Chairman of the PLO, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994, the two sides will 
apply between them the provisions contained in Article XXII, paragraph I, with the necessary 
changes. 
13. 
a. The Preamble to this Agreement, and all Annexes, Appendices and maps attached 
hereto, shall constitute an integral part hereof. 
b. The Parties agree that the maps attached to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement as: 
a. map No. I (The Gaza Strip), an exact copy of which is attached to this 
Agreement as map No. (in this Agreement "map No. 2"); 
b. map No. 4 (Deployment of Palestinian Police in the Gaza Strip), an exact copy 
of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 5 (in this Agreement "map No. 
5"); and 
c. map No.6 (Maritime Activity Zones), an exact copy of which is attached to this 
Agreement as map No. 8 (in this Agreement "map No. 8"; are an integral part 
hereof and will remain in effect for the duration of this Agreement. 
14. While the Jeftlik area will come under the functional and personal jurisdiction of the Council in 
the first phase of redeployment, the area's transfer to the territorial jurisdiction of the Council will 
be considered by the Israeli side in the first phase of the further redeployment phases. 
Done at Washington DC, this 28th day of September, 1995. 
For the Government of the State of Israel 
For the PLO 
Witnessed by: 
The Unites States of America 
The Russian Federation 
The Arab Republic of Egypt 
The European Union 
The Kingdom of Norway 
The European Union 
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Figurt> 1: map of interim agreemt>nt 
323 
